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EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO, LiTT.D. 

FELLOW OF king's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
AND PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY AND 
NAPOLEONIC ERA. 



71670 



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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, 

AVE MARIA LANE. 

ffilasgoto: 263, ARGYLE STREET. 




Ucipjig: F. A. BROCKHAUS. 

i^efaj lorfe: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

aSamfaHu: E. SEYMOUR HALE. 



THE 

REVOLUTIONARY 



AND 



NAPOLEONIC ERA 



1789—1815 



BY 



J.*^ H. ROSE, M.A. 

LATE SCHOLAR OF CHRIST's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
UNIVERSITY EXTENSION LECTURER IN MODERN HISTORY. 



STEREOTYPED EDITION. 



CAMBRIDGE 

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1898 

[A// Rights resefved.^ 



FROM THE EDITOR'S PREFACE. 

The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern 
Europe^ with that of its chief colo7iies and conquests^ from about 
the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one 
or two cases the story will commence at an earlier date, but this 
will only be by way of introduction. The histories of the different 
countries will be described, as a general rule, in separate volumes, 
for it is believed that, except in epochs like that of the French 
Revolution and Napoleon, the connection of events will be better 
understood and the continuity of historical development more 
clearly displayed by this method, than by any other. 

The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to 
understand the nature of existing political conditions. " The roots 
of the present lie deep in the past," and the real significance of 
contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes 
which have led to them are known. The plan of the series will 
make it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in 
considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of 
modern research. It is hoped therefore that the forthcoming 
volumes will be useful not only to beginners but to students who 
have already acquired some general knowledge of European His- 
tory. For those who wish to carry their studies further, the 
bibliography appended to each volume will act as a guide to original 
sources of information and works more detailed and authoritative. 

Considerable attention will be paid to geography, and each 
volume will be furnished with such maps and plans as may be 
requisite for the illustration of the text. 



First Edition 1894 
Revised Edition 1895. Reprinted 1! 



PREFACE, 



The dramatic intensity of many phases of the French Revo- 
lution has, until recently, so absorbed the attention of students 
as to obscure its relation to the European Revolution. It is the 
chief aim of this little work to show this inter-dependence, and 
to explain the influence of French ideas and policy on Europe. 
Though this plan somewhat restricts the arena of personal 
achievement and romance, it will, I trust, ensure a corresponding 
gain in historical interest; for the European nations were then 
first brought into close contact, not merely by dynastic interests, 
but by their own conscious aspirations or antipathies. My 
object has been to exhibit the influences in France and 
Europe tending to overthrow the old systems of government 
and society, to trace, even amidst the apparent chaos of the 
French Revolution, the growth of forces which tended towards 
a strongly centralised government and autocracy, to describe 
Napoleon's work of destruction and reconstruction, and finally 
to analyse the character of the new national impulses which 
overthrew his domination. Passing over unimportant details, 
I have everywhere endeavoured to concentrate attention on 
those events and crises which exercised most influence on 
the formation of the European system, and to show the con- 
nection, too often ignored, between the earHer and later phases 
of the French Revolution. To study the intricate strifes of 
French parties in 1789 — 1795, apart from the reorganisation 
effected by Bonaparte, appears to me as unprofitable as to master 
the enunciation and construction of a geometrical problem 
without proceeding to its solution. 

The present time is singularly favourable to an attempt at 
reviewing the features of this momentous era. The researches 



vi Preface. 

of MM. Sorel, Aulard, Vandal and others have added largely 
to our knowledge of the epoch, especially that portion of it in 
which Napoleon is the principal figure. The general tendency 
of recent French enquiries has been to some extent to redress 
the balance in favour of the great conqueror. The historian 
must, however, duly discount the brilliant romancings of 
Marbot, the trustful confidences of Meneval, and the quaint 
attempts of M. Levy to depict his hero as a good-natured 
bourgeois in private life. Fortunately, the other side of 
the picture has been set forth in the sober and authentic 
narratives of Chaptal, Macdonald and Pasquier. Besides 
working through these and many other French Memoirs, I have 
endeavoured to enter into the general spirit of the age by 
studying the chief histories, memoirs and biographies relating 
to other European lands, especially Germany. The perusal of 
our Foreign Office records has also convinced me that much 
more may be urged in defence of British policy than has 
hitherto been conceded. 

My best thanks are due to the Rev. Dr Marchand, of Angers, 
and Signor Lumbroso, of Rome, for information respecting 
French and Italian affairs respectively; also to Mr A. J. 
Grant, and Mr J. W. Headlam, both of King's College, 
Cambridge, for several valuable suggestions; but, most of 
all, to the Editor of the series, Dr Prothero, for the care 
which he has bestowed alike on multifarious details and on 
questions involving a wide historical survey. 

J. H. R. 

August^ 1894. 

For the second edition the suggestions of critics have been 
carefully considered and in some cases adopted. 

J. H. R. 

June^ 1895. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



THE 



Chapter I. The Political and Social Weakness of 

Europe 

„ II. Louis XVI, the Parlements, and 
States General .... 

III. The Constituent Assembly 

IV. The Girondins and Europe 

V. The Jacobins and the First Coalition 

VI. The Directory and Buonaparte 

VII. The Consulate 

VIII. Napoleon and the old Governments 

IX. The Nationalist Reaction 

X. The Wars of Liberation . 
XL The Reconstruction of Europe 



.so 
43 

78 
92 
119 
148 
184 
238 
293 



APPENDIX. 



I, List of authorities 

II. List of the chief dignities and appointments conferred by 



373 



Napoleon 279 



MAPS AND PLANS. 

Plan of the Partitions of Poland ...... 76 

The Peace of Basle to face page 91 ' 

The Peace of Luneville and the Secularisations to face page 126 / 

The Treaty of Tilsit to face page 175 ^ 

Napoleon's Empire at its height (1812) . . to face page 217 

Plan of the Waterloo Campaign 349 



THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC 
ERA, OR, FRANCE AND EUROPE, 

1789—1815. 

CHAPTER I. 

The Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 

"The corruption of each form of government commences with that of 
its principles." — Montesquieu. 

T he F rench, JR.e volution was a conquest in the spheres of 
thoj.iglit,_societv, and fiolitics, -efifected by a people over the old 
systems of authority, class privilege, and absolute rule. In its 
course it came almost inevitably into collision with governments 
founded on the old ideas and customs; and the shock of arms 
favoured the rise of a miUtary dictatorship, which curbed the 
revolution in France while extending it over the Continent. 
The conflict with monarchical Europe is therefore the central 
fact^rthe revolution, determining not only the trend of events 
in"^ance, but also the extension of French influence over 
Europe, and the formation of the chief Continental States. 

What was the old Europe which the revolutionary ideas 
were to permeate and transform? How came it that the 
revolution organised itself in France so effectively as to over- 
throw States which had defied the power of Louis XIV? In 
F. R. I 



2 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

brief, what was the potential strength of the new ideas; whence 
came the weakness inherent in the Continental States? A 
survey of the chief tendencies in pre-revolutionary Europe will 
serve as an answer to these questions and an introduction to 
the momentous events of 1789. 

The Holy Roman Empire is the nebulous material from 
which most of the Continental States have been evolved. Cen- 
tral, Western, and Southern Europe with few exceptions ac- 
knowledged the sway of Karl the Great (Charlemagne) as "the 
Emperor," crowned by the Pope, and wielding the temporal 
power of Christendom, while the successor of Peter embodied 
the spiritual authority of the Church. Though many peoples 
never belonged to " The Empire," yet the underlying concep- 
tion had been that of a central predominant State, not belong- 
ing to any one ruling house, or people. It was Catholic in a 
political, as well as in a religious sense. The great religious 
and political strife of the Thirty Years' War (1618 — 1648) 
shook old Europe to its base. The cosmopolitan Empire was 
divided by a perpetuation of the religious schism. North- 
Germany became definitely Protestant; South-Germany re- 
mained Roman Catholic and under the influence of the House 
of Hapsburg. By the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the Empire 
not only lost the Dutch Netherlands and the Swiss Confedera- 
tion, but also relinquished the control of the foreign policy of 
the chief German States. The Thirty Years' War undermined 
the power of the Emperor, just as the Reformation had im- 
paired the authority of the Pope. The European system was 
left without any dominant principle of government, and Central 
Europe became an ever-shifting mosaic of States tending to 
group themselves around Vienna or Berlin, around the House 
of Hapsburg-Lorraine, or the House of Hohenzollern. Even if 
Germany had not been open to the intervention of other 
powers, as Sweden and France, her history would have been 
ever distracted by this dualism of interests. 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe . 3 

The House of Hapsburg had long made use of its tenure 
of the Imperial throne to aggrandise its hereditary States, 
Bohemia, Moravia, the Duchy of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, 
Tyrol, and scattered lands on the Upper Danube and Rhine ; 
for though the Imperial crown was in theory elective, yet the 
reigning Hapsburg was nearly always chosen by the princely 
Electors to be ' Emperor.' Now, when the Imperial power 
decayed, the Hapsburgs redoubled their attempts to make Ger- 
many an appanage of Austria ; but the diversity of peoples and 
constitutions of the Hapsburg States would have made this all 
but impossible, even if a vigorous purely German State had 
not opposed it. 

The rise of Brandenburg-Prussia was due to the skill and 
foresight by which the early Electors of Brandenburg used their 
central position in North Germany to champion national 
interests against the Poles and the Swedes, or the encroach- 
ments of Hapsburgs and Bourbons. Prussia has always 
increased most in power and territory, when her policy has 
been truly German. She has fallen back, when, as in 1795 — 
1806, or 1849 — 1 85 1, her government has been subservient to 
France or Austria. 

The pohcy of Frederick the Great .had the result of 
making Prulsia' the 'first of purely German States, and one 
of "the^Great^ Powers of Europe. Frederick determined to 
unite his scaftered dominions of Brandenburg- Prussia, and add 
to them whatever lands could be welded on to his realm. 

Thus, when the Hapsburg possessions were weakened by 
the contested succession of Maria Theresa, Frederick seized 
the opportunity to invade and conquer Silesia (1740). The 
revival of some old claims on this province formed an in- 
sufficient excuse for so glaring a violation of dynastic rights; 
but, if the end can justify the means, the seizure of Silesia 
may be paUiated. Community with the Protestant North in 
race, physical conditions and commercial interests, seemed to 



4 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

declare for a union of Silesia with Brandenburg, and its sepa- 
ration from the Slavonic and Roman Catholic states of the/ 
House of Austria; and Silesia has ever since remained Prussian. ) 
It was in Silesia and Prussia (proper) that the national rising 
of 1813 was most general and enthusiastic. The seizure of 
Silesia, however, was a signal instance of the spirit which since 
the Thirty Years' War had begun to undermine the European 
system. That respect for dynastic rights and treaty obligations 
which generally held sway when Christendom was more than a 
name, now gave place to a state policy which avowedly aimed 
at little else but gain of territory or markets. 

The same incisive assertion of natural and national claims 
at the expense of governmental rights, is observable in 
Frederick's policy with regard to Poland. There seems to be 
an inherent antipathy between the Poles and Germans. For 
ages the two races have striven for supremacy on the banks of 
the Wartha, the Vistula, and the Niemen. In the i6th and 
17th centuries, when the Polish nobles were public-spirited 
enough to prefer the public interest to personal gains, their 
martial spirit gained the victory ; but while the Electors of Bran- 
denburg were slowly consolidating the North-German power, 
the Polish and Lithuanian realms were disintegrated by faction. 
The Polish nobles succeeded in making the Crown elective, in 
curtailing the political rights of the towns, and in reducing the 
peasants to abject serfdom. While in Western Europe aristo- 
cracy was yielding ground to the Crown or to the people, the 
reverse had been the case in Poland. The absorption of the 
governing powers by the Polish nobles was as fatal to the 
effective action of the government as to the liberties of the 
lower orders ; for in the General Diet, consisting of the nobles, 
the laws must be passed unanimously; the veto of a single noble 
could reduce the State to a deadlock. Montesquieu censured 
its government as being the worst of aristocracies, "where the 
part of the people which obeys is in civil slavery to that which 



l] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 5 

holds sway." In Prussia the iron will of the great Frederick 
linked closely together the different provinces and distinct 
orders of his people; and, though the Prussian Government 
and society had little of the unity which the Revolution was to 
impart in 1807 — 181 2, yet Frederick's abiHty and energy 
ensured a strength far greater than that of the more extensive 
Polish State. 

In 1772 came the first of the three partitions of Poland, 
which by 1795 ended its existence as an independent Power. 
Frederick, in planning with the Czarina Catherine II and 
Maria Theresa the spoliation of Poland, could urge no legal 
claims. The restoration to Germans in West-Prussia and Erme- 
land of German rule, and their liberation from the rule of factious 
nobles who sought to impose the Roman Catholic creed, will 
now, however, be generally considered a valid excuse for Prussia's 
share in the first partition. By it Frederick gained West-Prussia 
(except Danzig and Thorn) and Ermeland, thus securing a 
continuous German territory from the Niemen to the Middle 
Elbe ; and North Germans were now freed from the danger re- 
sulting from the increase of Russian influence over the Polish 
Government. Frederick was no revolutionist, by theory or 
design. His aim was to consolidate his monarchy by all the 
means in his power, relying on his own vast faculties of or- 
ganisation to control his ministers and officials, on the devotion 
of his nobles to officer his army, and on the subservience of 
the peasant-serfs to furnish the sinews of war, and the rank and 
file of the army. His public works aimed at making Prussia 
rich in herself, and as far as possible self-sufficing. Frederick's 
foreign policy was, however, distinctly fatal to the old order of 
things in Central and Eastern Europe. The seizure of Silesia 
and the first partition of Poland showed how a State might grow 
in size and strength, which furthered natural and national claims 
against treaty obligations. It will be seen how largely the power 
of Prussia at the death of Frederick (1786) was due to his 



6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

forceful will and intelligence. Her territories were still 
straggling ; and parts, as Anspach, Baireuth, Cleves, and East- 
Friesland, were widely detached : her administration was 
cumbrous : her people were rigidly divided in the old orders : 
her power and prestige were due to an abnormally large army 
vigorously led. 

In sharp contrast with the prudent boldness of Frederick 
stands the well-meaning but reckless policy of the reigning 
Hapsburg, Joseph II (1780 — 1790). He had noticed the 
power of Prussia, vigorously wielded by the able and ambitious 
Frederick, and determined to concentrate the government of 
his diverse territories at Vienna. His task was far more 
difficult than that of Frederick, for his States had their own 
constitutions, governments, and laws, which the House of 
Hapsburg-Lorraine had sworn to observe; and these differ- 
ences were by no means artificial, but represented deep-rooted 
national distinctions: in fact, the golden link of the Crown 
had been hitherto almost the only bond of union. He now 
issued edicts canceUing the most cherished laws, customs, and 
privileges of his kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, though 
these were kingdoms when Austria was not yet a duchy. So 
far did he push his innovations as to remove to Vienna the 
sacred crown, sent by the Pope in the year 1000 a.d. as a gift 
to the first Hungarian king, St Stephen. This was rank 
sacrilege in the eyes of all true Hungarians, who thenceforth 
looked on Joseph as the " hatted king," not duly crowned. It 
is possible that he might have succeeded if he had introduced 
his revolutionary policy piecemeal in time of profound peace, 
and with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The 
national feelings were still well-nigh dormant. It was Joseph II 
w^ho first aroused them to active hostihty by seeking to 
centralise all power at Vienna, and to make German the 
official language for his Hungarian and Slavonic States. At 
the same time he irritated the Roman Catholic Church at 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 7 

home, and created troubles abroad by his meddlesome foreign 
policy. As long as the Hapsburgs supported the power 
and privileges of the Roman Catholic clergy, these had oiled 
the complex wheels of the Hapsburg Governments ; but, 
when Joseph abolished the exceptional privileges of nobles 
and clergy alike, closed and confiscated the funds of most 
of the monasteries, and interfered with religious worship, he 
met with opposition everywhere, especially in his Austrian 
Netherlands. 

As if it was not enough to provoke the privileged classes, 
as well as the religious and national sentiments, in his diverse 
States, Joseph II pursued an aggressive foreign policy which 
finally banded half Europe against him. Thus, he violated 
treaty engagements with the Dutch by declaring (1784) the 
navigation of the lower Scheldt completely open, even to his 
warships; and only the opposition of England and Holland, 
backed by the remonstrance of his ally France, led him to with- 
draw a claim which the French revolutionists were to revive in 
1792. Despising the unreal glamour of his Imperial dignity, he 
sought the aggrandisement of his hereditary States, which then in- 
cluded numerous scattered lands along the upper Danube and 
Rhine. He desired to connect these with Austria by acquiring 
the Electorate of Bavaria, either by conquest or in exchange for 
his distant and troublesome Netherlands. This plan, which 
would have made Austria definitely the mistress of Southern 
and Central Germany, aroused the opposition of the German 
princes thus threatened ; and one of the last acts of Frederick's 
poHcy was to form the Fiirstenbund, or League of German 
Princes, joined by the spiritual Electors of Mainz and Treves, 
against the encroachments of the Emperor himself. 

The next Prussian King, Frederick William II (1786 — 
1797) for the first few years of his reign maintained a strongly 
anti-Austrian and anti-Russian policy. The identity of English 
and Prussian interests in maintaining the authority of the 



8 TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap, 

House of Orange in the Stadtholdership of the Dutch Nether- 
lands and in checking the democratic party which was supported 
by France, led to a Prussian invasion of Holland, and the 
formation of the important Triple AlHance between England, 
Prussia and Holland (1788). This aimed at maintaining the 
balance of power in Europe against the attempts of France in 
the Netherlands and the encroachments of Russia and Austria 
on Poland and Turkey. Some of the most important results of 
this conservative aUiance must here be noticed. In the second 
article of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of defensive alliance (April, 
1788) the allies "guarantee each other mutually in the possession 
of all their Dominions, Territories, Towns, Places, Franchises, 
and Liberties." The two last designations of course included 
the rights of the Dutch Government over the lower part of the 
Scheldt, which, by the treaty of 1785 between the Emperor and 
the States General of Holland, were to belong to the latter and 
be "kept shut by them." The fact that the French Govern- 
ment gave a formal guarantee of the last-named treaty should 
also be noticed; for the abolition of the Dutch rights over the 
lower Scheldt by the French Convention in 1792, together with 
other menaces to our Dutch allies, was the chief cause of the out- 
break of war between England and France which had so lament- 
able an influence on the French revolution and determined 
the general trend of European affairs throughout the whole era. 
Though the influence of the Triple Alliance on the west of 
Europe was distinctly conservative, yet in Eastern affairs its 
interests were complicated by the need of checking or out- 
witting those two restless and aggressive potentates, Catherine 
II and Joseph II. Knowing that they were planning the parti- 
tion of Turkey, and were striving to obtain the aid of Poland, 
the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herzberg, had already 
endeavoured to stir up war between Sweden and Russia, to 
encourage the Polish patriots to resist the Russophil poHcy of 
their King Stanislaus, to paralyse the Hapsburg States by 



l] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 9 

fomenting the discontent everywhere prevalent, and to strengthen 
Turkey's power of resistance. He was for a time completely 
successful. Gustavus III of Sweden, after consolidating the 
royal power by a successful coup d'etat^ longed to recover parts 
of Finland from Russia, and marched his troops towards St. 
Petersburg (July 1788), which they would probably have taken 
but for the defection of some of their Finnish troops and an 
attack of the Danes on their western frontier. The troops of 
Catherine and Joseph encountered unexpectedly vigorous re- 
sistance from the Turks ; and the PoHsh patriots seemed about 
to seize the opportunity to cast off the Czarina's influence, 
expel her troops from their land, and rehabilitate their dis- 
tracted State. The PoUsh Diet, which met in Oct. 1788, 
proclaimed its intention of abolishing the libenwt veto and of 
declaring the right of the majority to carry any measure; while 
Catherine as clearly showed her determination to perpetuate 
the anarchy of that unhappy land, by proclaiming that she 
would regard the least change in the Polish Constitution of 
1775 as a violation of treaties. Prussia, feeHng sure of the 
ultimate support of England, promised to help the Poles to 
recover their former Lithuanian lands, secretly stipulating for 
the cession of Thorn and Danzig as the price of her aid ; and 
Frederick William in 1789 was only deterred from making war 
on the two Imperial Governments by the pacific advice of Pitt 
and the possibility of France and Spain joining them. But the 
projected Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Russia, France and 
Spain could not be formed owing to Louis XVI's dislike of 
Russian plans against Poland ; besides which the impending 
troubles in France forbade the adoption of an energetic foreign 
policy. Even so, however, the prowess of Russian and Austrian 
troops later in the campaign gained some important victories 
over the Turks. Sweden was soon compelled to desist from 
her invasion of Russia by the invasion of the Danes and a con- 
spiracy of the Swedish nobles against the Crown; and though 



10 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Gustavus III drove out the Danes, and in the Swedish States 
General succeeded in reducing his nobles to submission (Feb. 
— May 1789), yet Sweden was for the time reduced to the 
defensive. The influence of the Triple Alliance saved her from 
any severe pressure by Russia, and further prevented the two 
Imperial Powers from reaping the fruits of their victories over 
the Turks. The ferment in Poland still distracted the atten- 
tion of Russia, while the discontent in Hungary and Belgium, 
which threatened to subvert the Hapsburg throne, was openly 
fomented by Prussia. 

Joseph II's difficulties were vastly augmented, when the 
Belgian discontent against his sweeping reforms burst into 
open revolt (Dec. 1789). The student must, however, care- 
fully distinguish between this Belgian or Brabant insurrection, 
headed by nobles and clergy, and the essentially democratic 
and social revolution which was swiftly transforming France 
into a modern State. In Hungary and in the Austrian 
Netherlands it was the ruler who was the revolutionist; and 
the discontent arose solely from his abolition of local privileges 
and charters, and his infraction of the historic rights and 
privileges of the nobles and clergy. In the Belgic provinces 
especially the revolt was strongly conservative and religious. 
Its leader. Van der Noot, appealed in his manifesto to the 
"primitive and imprescriptible rights" of the Belgian people 
and declared Joseph II deposed from the sovereignty for his 
violation of the fundamental charter of the land. On the 
overthrow of the Imperial troops by the patriots, Van der Noot 
entered Brussels in triumph, and with the nobles and "their 
mightinesses the Estates of Brabant," marched to the cathedral, 
where a Te Deum was sung to celebrate the restoration of the 
old religious and civic customs so heedlessly abolished by the 
Imperial innovator. In Jan. 1790 the Estates of the pro- 
vinces assembled at Brussels and decreed the establishment of 
the United States of Belgium with a loose form of federal 



l] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 1 1 

union similar to that connecting the provinces of the Dutch 
Netherlands. In its essential features this Belgian revolution 
resembles the revolts of the Vende'ans in 1793 ^^^d the 
Tyrolese in 1809. The three risings were protests against the 
heedless application of a cast-iron Liberahsm. The Brabant 
revolution, therefore, faintly foreshadows the beginnings of 
that national reaction which was finally to roll back the east- 
ward rush of French democracy. Its immediate influence on 
the political situation in 1789 — 1790 was fatal to the sovereign 
who sought to reform and revolutionise by royal prerogative. 
Overwhelmed by this last of many bitter disappointments 
and failures, the well-meaning but unfortunate Hapsburg ruler 
came to an untimely end (Feb. 1790) ; and his policy was soon 
reversed by his cautious and diplomatic brother Leopold II. 

Joseph II was the last and by far the most reckless of 
those great eighteenth century rulers who sought to remodel 
their realms according to the precepts of philosophy but who 
in effect only strengthened the central power at the expense of 
local liberties. So obviously was this the case that it is 
questionable whether even the most enlightened of these 
crowned reformers, Frederick the Great, Joseph II, and the 
statesmen Turgot in France and Pombal in Portugal, would 
in the least degree have sympathised with Rousseau's doctrine 
of the sovereignty of the general will. As for the reforms of 
Catherine II in Russia and the expulsion of the Jesuits from 
all the Bourbon realms, France, Spain, Naples and Parma, as 
well as from Portugal, they were certainly inspired mainly by 
the desire of strengthening the central power. However 
diverse were their motives, the crowned innovators of the 
latter half of the eighteenth century began that process of 
simplification and centraHsation of governing powers which is 
so prominent a characteristic of the revolutionary and Napo- 
leonic era. The sequel of this narrative will reveal the strange 
paradox that the revolutionary doctrines, and the dictatorship 



12 The RevoliUionary and Napoleonic Ei^a. [Chap. 

which a warlike policy necessitated, were soon to end in a far 
more sternly centralised rule than that for which Joseph II 
had vainly striven. 

Instead of leaving the Hapsbiirg States strong and united 
from the upper Danube to its mouth, with Vienna as the political 
centre of the Continent, Joseph II left them no larger than at 
his accession, and eager to throw off his innovations. His 
policy, foreign and domestic, was essentially revolutionary, and 
bears some striking resemblances to that of Napoleon. Imbued 
with the new ideas, both sought to level privileges and distinc- 
tions of rank, religion, and nationality : both sought to cen- 
tralise their power by subordinating the Church to the State, 
and the State to the ruler; while their rash or premature 
attempt at a cosmopolitan sway, complicated by a grandiose 
and ill-proportioned policy, was overthrown by a strongly 
national reaction championed by the conservative Powers. 
There is however this sharp distinction between the careers 
of Joseph II and Napoleon, that whereas the latter, as " heir 
to the Revolution," only completed the work of social recon- 
struction marked out by the French Convention, Joseph II 
sought to force on his States a social revolution, for which there 
had been little or no intellectual preparation. Consequently, 
while the Hapsburg ruler had to lament the miscarriage of all 
his schemes, Napoleon's measures of social reconstruction form 
the basis of the France of to-day. 

Even in many of the smaller European States there was a 
division of interests and sympathy between the rulers and 
ruled. Thus in the Bishopric of Liege the Prince Bishop 
endeavoured to encroach on the constitutional rights of his 
subjects. In the neighbouring Republic of the Dutch Nether- 
lands, the House of Orange, which had long held the Stadt- 
holdership, had for some time attempted to change this 
precarious dignity into an hereditary monarchy ; and civil 
strifes ensued, in which France supported the democrats or 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 13 

" patriots." Finally England by diplomatic pressure on France, 
and Prussia by armed intervention in the Netherlands restored 
the Stadtholder to more than his old powers (1787). This 
victory of the two Northern Powers marked the recovery by 
England of her former place in Europe, and by revealing the 
financial and political weakness of France, dealt a fatal blow to 
the prestige of the Bourbons. In the Austrian Netherlands and 
Liege, however, Prussia helped the people to resist the inno- 
vations of Joseph II and the Bishop respectively. Indeed, 
there was nowhere any consistent support of poHtical principles. 
Thus, Louis XVI, yielding to his courtiers and his army, sup- 
ported the American colonists in their struggle against the 
Enghsh monarchy ; but none the less did he help to crush the 
Swiss democrats. 

The succession of Leopold to the Hapsburg dominions 
soon effected a change in the policy of those distracted States 
and in the general diplomatic situation. In order to hold 
Prussia in check and regain his power over the Austrian 
Netherlands, Leopold made friendly overtures to England 
with the hope of dissolving the Triple Alliance. They were 
well received; for Pitt now distrusted the ambitious designs 
of the Prussian Court which threatened to lead to a general 
conflagration. Moreover, it was a cardinal principle of EngHsh 
policy to keep the Belgic provinces in the hand of a strong 
friendly government as a barrier against French encroachments 
on the north. English influence was therefore used to aid in 
the restoration of Austria's power in her Netherlands, provided 
that she would guarantee to the patriots their ancient rights 
and customs. Thus began the breach between England and 
Prussia which was eventually to paralyse the First Coalition 
and lead to open hostility in 1800 — 1805. An Anglo-Austrian 
alliance now supplanted the enteiite cordiale between Paris and 
Vienna ; and Pitt w^as able to take a high tone in the Nootka 
Sound dispute with Spain, in which Louis XVI by virtue of 



14 TJie Reiwhitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the Bourbon Family Compact for a time seemed about to take 
vigorous action against us. In spite of the beginnings of an 
Anglo-Austrian alHance, the Prussian Court persisted in its 
warhke pohcy against that of Vienna, though the poHcy of the 
latter had lost its aggressive character. An alliance with the 
Polish Government (March 1790) promised to strengthen 
Frederick William's hands, and he massed a large army on the 
Bohemian frontier. At once the prudent Hapsburg ruler made 
an armistice with the Turks (gaining Orsova), and turned to 
face Prussia. This Power suddenly found herself isolated; 
for the Poles energetically refused to promise the cession of 
Thorn and Danzig to Prussia as the price of her aid. Frederick 
William II, a blase sentimentalist, was disgusted at suddenly 
finding himself involved by Herzberg's ambitious policy in 
a single-handed contest with Austria, at a time when the 
principles of the French Revolution were beginning to sap the 
foundations of the old governments. Now that the prospect 
of humbling Austria and of gaining two important fortresses 
from Poland had completely vanished, the Prussian king 
remembered that his duty as a German sovereign forbade an 
almost fratricidal war. He therefore favourably received over- 
tures of peace which Leopold made at Reichenbach with a 
view to an alliance based on monarchical principles and the 
maintenance of the status quo. The Austrian Government 
deftly insinuated that the French Revolution was the foe to be 
faced ; and the Prussian envoy at Paris also hinted to his 
master that one or two eastern districts of France midit 

o 

become the prize of an Austro- Prussian war against the revo- 
lution. The more pressing reason, however, for the peace 
finally agreed on at Reichenbach (July 27, 1790) was that 
both the Central Powers were in military or diplomatic diffi- 
culties. Leopold desired to pacify the discontent in Hungary 
and Brabant, and to secure his election as Emperor; while 
Prussia was not loth to extricate herself from the false position 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 15 

in which Herzberg's diplomacy had involved her. Indeed, 
while appearing to dictate the following terms of peace, she 
really accepted them. Austria was to negotiate peace with 
Turkey on the basis of the status quo. Prussia agreed not 
to intervene in Belgian affairs save with the accord of England 
and Holland, and would recognise the restoration of Austrian 
authority there if an amnesty were granted to the Belgian 
patriots. 

The consequences of this peace were most important. 
Austria speedily regained her authority in the Netherlands and 
her prestige in Europe; while Prussia, which had appeared 
about to dictate terms to her, withdrew baffled and discon- 
certed. The Poles, annoyed at the insidious policy of Berlin, 
turned to Austria as a more trustworthy ally; and Sweden, left 
without support, had to conclude a disadvantageous peace at 
Werela with Russia (Aug. 1790). Catherine II was thus able 
to push on the war against Turkey; and until a definite settle- 
ment had been arrived at on the Danube it was impossible for 
the Eastern Powers to act vigorously elsewhere. The tardiness 
with which a definite peace was finally arranged between 
Austria and Turkey at Sistova (Aug. 5, 1791), proved the hol- 
lowness of the pretended European concert against revolu- 
tionary France. Austria, in fact, could not spare a great army 
to march on Paris while Catherine was still successfully 
pursuing the war against Turkey; and it was not till the 
Czarina signed (Aug. 11, 1791) the preliminaries of peace at 
Galatz and the definitive Treaty of Jassy five months later, 
whereby she gained the Turkish lands east of the Dniester, 
that there was any possibility of united and vigorous action by 
the other Continental Powers against the French Revolution. 

After peace was restored on the Pruth and Danube, the 
Polish question threatened war on the Vistula. At the close 
of 1791 Catherine massed 130,000 men on the borders of 
Poland, intending to subject that land to her authority, and if 



1 6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Austria and Prussia opposed her by force, to buy off their hos- 
tility by offering them a share in the partition, or ''compensa- 
tion" elsewhere.. In the hope of diverting all their energies 
westwards, the ambitious and unscrupulous Czarina affected 
great indignation against the French revolutionists and osten- 
sibly prepared to take part in a monarchical crusade, the better 
to conceal her design of subjugating the whole of Poland. 

I have judged it advisable to preface this little work by a 
brief sketch of the very complicated struggles in eastern and 
central Europe, in order to correct a prevalent misconception 
that the French Revolution was the only question then occu- 
pying the attention of statesmen. On the contrary, the aggres- 
sive designs of Joseph II and the Czarina Catherine on Turkey 
and Poland riveted their gaze almost exclusively on the East; 
and the troubles in France were, down to the Midsummer of 
1 791, regarded as important, only because they reduced her to 
a passive role in the European embroglio, leaving the Eastern 
Powers free for their designs on the Danube and the Vistula 
and throwing on England the chief burden of maintaining the 
position of the States there threatened. The democrats of 
Paris were therefore left free for fully two years to make or 
mar the destinies of France; while the Central and Eastern 
Powers, released from all fears of French intervention, pro- 
ceeded with their designs, and reluctantly paused in their plans 
for the overthrow of the weaker States, only when it appeared 
necessary to save the cause of monarchy at Paris. The tardi- 
ness with which in 1791 — 1792 they turned to uphola monar- 
chical principles in the West, and yet ever cast backward glances 
on the plunder obtainable in the East, revealed the inner weak- 
ness of the European system, if that can be called a system 
which rested on no principle of action and set no limits 
to aggression on the weak except those dictated by the fears 
or jealousies of neighbours and rivals. 

The whole spirit of European politics was such as to further 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe, 17 

the destructive aims of the French revolutionists. To strengthen 
and unite probable friends : to weaken and divide actual and 
possible foes, especially in neighbouring States — these were the 
marks of a successful ruler or statesman. Hence came the 
kaleidoscopic changes in continental diplomacy, — all finally 
ending in the general crash of the Revolution. 

The Decay of the old Society. 

In its best and truest form the old feudal relation between 
lord and vassal was a rough and ready means of organising 
local defence and government, of gaining some security from 
universal rapine. The lord gave protection. In return, the 
vassal owned his complete dependence on the lord for life 
and land, rendered him stated service in labour or in kind, 
paid dues for the use of his bridge, ferry, mill, wine-press, or 
oven, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the seigneurial 
law-court. As the feudal barons defended and governed their 
domains at their own charges, and brought their vassals to 
swell the royal army, they were free from king's taxes; for 
they gave what was in those troublous times more needed — 
military aid. 

The security for property which the mail-clad baron won 
by prowess, the priest and the monk gained by their sanctity. 
Reverence felt by ambitious kings and lawless barons for 
mother Church, or the intrigues of clerics in the royal Council, 
dowered the clergy with rich and broad domains, which in 
Er^'Hce *T3efore the Revolution probably comprised nearly one- 
fifth of all the land; and the clergy formed a privileged Order, 
exempt from nearly all taxes. 

The lack of any effective central power in Germany had 
allowed the bishops and feudal nobles to build up States which 
were almost independent of the Emperor. In France the 
ability and energy of the kings brought all the bishops and 
great nobles under the authority of the Crown, and by the time 
F. R. 2 



1 8 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

of Louis XIV, France was politically united; yet in both 
countries, and almost everywhere on the Continent, the nobles 
and clergy formed two powerful privileged Orders, distinct 
from the mass of the people. In Germany they retained their 
old governing functions j but in France the nobles now served 
merely as officers in the royal standing army. The old feudal 
forces, the ba7i and the arriere ban, were not called out after 
1674: and Richelieu transferred to the intendants, or con- 
trollers of administrative districts, the remains of the old 
governing powers of the French nobles. Yet these remained 
almost exempt from taxes, as if they were still governing their 
fiefs, and helping in the defence of the realm, at their own 
expense. They formed no longer an aristocracy but a noblesse. 

Even a supporter of the old social system, like Chateau- 
briand, could see whither this was tending: — "Aristocracy has 
three ages, first the age of force, from which it degenerates into 
the age of privilege, and is finally extinguished in the age of 
vanity." The age of privilege was then merging in the age of 
vanity, as was seen in the haughty disdain with which the 
old nobles regarded the relatively small, though increasing 
middle-class. Lawyers and jurists who distinguished them- 
selves in the French provincial 'Parlements' often gained 
titles of nobility, whence they were called noblesse de robe: 
though they were looked down upon as parvenus, yet they 
gained exemption from taxation. So that by one means or 
another most of the wealthy classes escaped the burdens of 
the State taxes. 

Consequently the King had to press hard on the lower 
orders for money to support the vast expenses of the new 
centralised State engaged in frequent and prolonged wars. 
Nearly all the costs of the wars, the magnificent palaces, and 
the gorgeous ceremonial of Louis XIV were borne by the 
middle and lower classes of France. These last were often re- 
duced to piteous misery by the threefold burden of the feudal 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 19 

dues paid to the nobles, the tithes paid to the clergy, and 
the taxes paid to the State. The differences between the 
privileges of different provinces in the matter of taxation make 
a general computation difficult ; but Taine has reckoned that 
a peasant, out of every 100 francs of income, would have to 
pay 53 in taxes to the State, 14 to his lord, 14 for tithes, 
and out of the remaining 19 to satisfy the exciseman and 
support life ! 

The French peasant was, however, far freer socially than 
the serfs of Germany, Italy, and Spaing and in Prussia, where 
the burdens of a vigorous and aggressive monarchy were added 
to those of feudalism, the peasants had to bear heavier loads 
even than those of central France. In Brandenburg it appears 
that for 30 acres of land yielding pf- crowns, the peasant often 
had to pay to the State 8 crovvns, without counting what he 
owed to the lord and to the clergy. Prussia under Frederick 
the Great was, however, in a far healthier state than was France 
under Louis XV; the Prussian administration was as vigorous 
as that of France was corrupt. Frederick made his nobles 
work for the State not only as officers but as administrators 
of the law, and as governors of towns. He desired them 
to reside on their estates, and look after the interests of 
their peasants ; and if the latter made any complaint against 
their lords, Frederick carefully investigated it. Thus the feudal 
system retained its vitality in Prussia longer than in France, 
where the old feudal privileges outhved the duties which had 
gone hand in hand with them. In the small states of Central 
and Southern Europe feudalism had not lost all its governing 
powers, and in the Hapsburg dominions the nobles had 
successfully resisted the hasty attempts of Joseph II to merge 
their governing functions in the central power. In all these 
countries feudalism was still a stern reality. The feudal 
government by the German, Italian, or Spanish nobles presse'd 
harder on their dependents or serfs than was the case in 

2 — 2 



20 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

France, where serfdom still existed only in the provinces 
recently acquired from the Empire, — Alsace, Franche Comte, 
and Lorraine. The German or Italian peasant was still tied to 
the soil, and might be brought back by force if he escaped. 
Still, in Prussia feudalism involved a beneficial protection of 
the weak by the strong. There is much to be said, especially 
in a rigorous climate, for complete feudal dependence, or 
serfdom, if it be humanely exercised. But in France there 
was no such dependence on a present protector; only a number 
of complex dues survived, payable to a lord rarely seen on 
his estates. Absenteeism converted the tenure into the most 
irritating form of copyhold. From the time of Louis XIV 
onwards the feudal relation between lord and vassal was an 
anachronism, cramping the peasant at every turn. The feudal 
dues were irritating from their number and uncertainty, rather 
than burdensome from their weight. Corn, fowls, wine, etc. 
had to be paid when the farm changed hands, at stated seasons, 
or when the lord died, when his eldest son or daughter came 
of age, or was married. The peasant in many parts must bake 
his bread only in the lord's oven, press his grapes in the lord's 
wine-press and use only the seigneurial mill; and, worst of 
all, he must for a certain number of days give his labour gra- 
tuitously to mend the roads of the lord, or of the commune, 
and gather in the lord's harvest. Endless friction arose about 
other exclusive rights {bajiaiites), the minute quit-rents {cens)^ 
and the damage caused by the lord's game. The game-laws 
were very oppressive. In most parts of Europe the farmer 
must not hoe or weed his crops, nor mow his hay and plough 
in his stubble before a certain time, lest the partridges should be 
disturbed ; and the only legal way of protecting his crops from 
the deer or boars, was to sit up all night, and scare them away 
by shouting. These grievances, terrible everywhere, were at 
their worst in the capitaineries, or districts reserved for hunting 
to the princes of France. 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 2 1 

In brief, while feudalism was socially or politically more 
oppressive elsewhere on the Continent, it was financially most 
burdensome in France, owing to absenteeism. Few French 
nobles resided among their dependents, save in the West and 
North- West of France; and it was in these very parts that the 
peasants rose in defence of their priests and nobles, when the 
patriarchal life was threatened by the innovations of the revo- 
lutionists. Even around Nantes, however, there were the same 
glaring contrasts between the splendour of the city and the 
misery of the country, which were so painfully evident in 
entering Versailles, Paris, Lyons, Bordeaux, and a few other 
chief provincial centres. "What a miracle (wrote Arthur Young 
at Nantes) that all this splendour and wealth of the cities of 
France should be so unconnected with the country. There 
are no gentle transitions from ease to comfort, from comfort 

to wealth: you pass at once from beggary to profusion." 

"The country deserted, or if a gentleman in it, you find him 
in some wretched hole, to save that money which is lavished 
with profusion in the luxuries of a capital." 

In no other part of Europe was there so perilous a con- 
centration of wealth in a few centres. Elsewhere on the 
Continent, the feudal nobles as a rule still lived among their 
dependents ; and wealth was not drawn away from the 
districts where it was produced. In France it was drained 
away from the country to a few of the chief centres of fashion ; 
and to these pleasure resorts the toilers followed the spenders 
in any time of exceptional distress, as in the winter of 1789. 
The extremes of misery and luxury form an explosive com- 
bination. It was these contrasts which fired with indignation 
Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. 

The Intellectual Revolution. 

The elan of French thought, its lucidity of expression, its 
concentration around a brilliant Court, an august Academy, or 



22 TJie Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

in salons where conversation became a fine art, conspired to 
make Paris at once the Athens as well as the Rome of the 
modern world. The first of the French thinkers on politics 
and society whose works made any lasting impression was 
Montesquieu, whose Esprit des Lois (i 748) aimed at discovering 
the laws which govern the action of men in political societies. 
There is nothing revolutionary in his spirit or conclusions. 
With philosophic impartiahty he examines each form of govern- 
ment, pointing out its excellences and defects, the causes of its 
rise, duration, and decay. As Aristotle considered virtue the 
mean between opposing extremes, so Montesquieu abhors all 
political extremes, especially an arbitrary despotism, and shows 
a bias in favour of the English constitution, as combining the 
excellences of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. " It is 
sometimes necessary to change certain laws (he says) ; but the 
case is rare ; and when it comes, they ought to be touched 
only with a trembling hand." His true greatness is that he 
first illustrated on a grand scale the relations of cause and 
effect in human affairs; and his influence is traceable in the 
general and repeated efforts "to make war on absolutism." 

Next there arose a school of thinkers, the Physiocrats, who 
sought to find the Natural Order which permeated the whole 
of society, and the economic conditions which formed the basis 
of its prosperity. The most important writers and speculators 
of this school were Quesnay, author of La P/iysiocratie, on Con- 
stitution jiaturelle des Goiivernenients (1768), and Turgot, who 
was soon to apply his theories in the Limousin, and for two 
years to all France. Looking around them at the actual state 
of France, where trade was shackled on all sides by privileges 
of classes, towns, districts, and trade gilds, while commerce 
was strangled by provincial customs' barriers, they proclaimed 
the famous maxim laissez /aire et laissez passer as the cure for 
these economic evils. They assumed that wages and profits were 
fixed by natural laws, and that the natural value of things was 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 23 

the result. Though their reasoning was generally founded on 
theories rather than on observed facts, yet any inquiry was fatal 
to the old social and political order of things, which rested on 
nothing but custom. Adam Smith, visiting Paris in 1763, was 
much stimulated by intercourse with these fathers of Political 
Economy; and his great work The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
paved the way in England, as did the Economists in France, 
for the commercial treaty between the two countries (1786 — 7) 
which was the first and premature approximation to Free Trade. 

In the sphere of philosophy and speculation the revolt 
against authority and tradition had the most important in- 
fluence on the trend of events. It originated in England with 
the materialistic philosophy of Locke, who maintained that the 
human mind was in itself a blank, with no innate ideas : these 
were solely the result, either of external sensation falling on the 
cajuera obscura of the mind, or of internal reflection. The 
materialist side of this theory was developed by Hume in 
Scotland, and by Condillac and others in France, viz. that 
ideas were solely due to external sensation and all knowledge 
was derived from experience : men were therefore perfect 
animals, and animals were imperfect men. This materialism 
was pushed still further by Helvetius, who, in his treatise de 
r Esprit (1758) asserted that self-love and self-interest are the 
source of all human action : morality must therefore be 
avowedly based on animal feeling, on pleasure and pain. 

Following the leads thus given, a whole cohort of 'philo- 
sophers ' began to assail existing beliefs and customs ; and in 
that long reign of Louis XV, when the monarchy was at the 
lowest ebb of disaster and disgrace, when the king's mistress 
influenced foreign politics and jobbed appointments at Court 
and in the Church, there could be no sincere and successful 
defence of the threatened institutions and beliefs. Never was 
a more brilliant attack made on a life so hollow and artificial ; 
and if the peasantry had not been completely isolated by 



24 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

ignorance and unceasing toil, the revolution would probably 
have burst forth before the death of Louis XV (1774). 

Prominent among the assailants was Voltaire, famous for 
his work as an historian, play-wright, versifier, man of science, 
and philosopher. Devoid of any decided originality, he yet 
possessed a marvellous faculty for adapting the results of 
research, and setting them forth in a limpid style sparkling 
with wit and sarcasm. For these reasons, and because he 
was the completest mirror of the French thought of his 
age, with its eager inquiries and lack of any fixed con- 
victions, but winsome grace of style, his reputation far trans- 
cended the bounds of France. Frederick the Great's one 
weakness was Voltaire ; he delighted to bandy verses with 
him, quarrel with him, scorn German men-of-letters — even 
the great Lessing — and declare that the German language 
must be reformed before it could be a fit vehicle for poetry ! 
In his scientific, ethical, and historical work, Voltaire followed 
the general trend of thought, viz. to find the universal laws 
which underhe and govern all things. "All beings without 
exception are subject to invariable laws" ; it is the aim of the 
thinker to discover them, of the statesman and practical man 
to apply them ; and only by obedience to these universal laws 
will the human race progress. He waged ceaseless war on 
ecclesiastical authority and tradition, and placed his hopes 
only on the discoveries of the human intellect. So far from 
being hostile to monarchy, Voltaire favoured reform by royal 
decrees as the simplest and most expeditious method. Thus, 
when Louis XV, on the advice of his minister Maupeou, sup- 
pressed the powers of the French Parlements (1771), Voltaire 
defended the act as a blow at provincialism and class privilege : 
"Have not these Parlements been often barbarous and perse- 
cuting?... Since one must obey, I had rather obey a lion of good 
family, whom nature has made much my superior, than 200 rats 
of my own species." Indeed, most of the 'philosophers' of 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Enrope. 25 

France would have consistently supported the monarchy if it 
had firmly suppressed all the social and economic abuses of the 
realm. It was against these that they declaimed, and only 
against the monarchy when allied with them. But though 
Voltaire did not attack the political forms of the a?tcien regime, 
he yet began to undermine its base, by bringing discredit on 
the ideas of authority, tradition, and custom, on which it rested. 

If prudence kept Voltaire from scattering broadcast the 
new theories, because, as he once said, he did not wish to be 
murdered by his own valet, no such scruples or fears held back 
the two most outspoken champions of the intellectual revolu- 
tion, Diderot and d'Alembert. Morality is only relative to 
the senses of the individual : " Pain and pleasure are the only 
springs of the moral universe." "Would you see man free and 
happy, do not meddle with his affairs." " Man is wicked, not 
because he is wicked, but because he has been made so." 

Such are some of their assertions, implying that the 
individual is the supreme judge of his own conduct — a 
teaching which naturally led to moral, social, and political 
anarchy. All the old institutions and beliefs were vehemently 
assailed; and Diderot's destructive aims find their most 
ferocious expression in the wish that the last king might be 
strangled with the entrails of the last priest. These two men, 
aided by many other 'philosophers,' compiled the famous 
Encydopedie (1766), a complete circle of education framed 
on the basis of the new scientific and philosophic research. 
It was designed to combat or tacitly exclude the older system 
of thought resting on authority or tradition. The Encyclo- 
paedists, as they were called, systematized the intellectual 
revolution, — the effort to emancipate and perfect mankind 
by means of human reason and knowledge. 

This aim was not one which could speedily arouse the 
masses, sunk in ignorance or despair. Enthusiasm was aroused, 
not by the new philosophy, but by one who appealed to the 



26 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

heart rather than the head, who pointed to a bHssful social 
past, and not to a future intellectual perfectibility. Jean 
Jacques Rousseau was the first to fire mankind with hopes 
of a social millennium easily to be attained. In his pages the 
return to a golden age of social equality, from which men had 
foolishly strayed, seemed so simple as to be within the reach of 
all. It was hope which made the Revolution, beckoning on 
those disciples of the new gospel, St Just and Robespierre, 
far into the Reign of Terror. It was despair which finally laid 
France at the feet of Bonaparte. 

In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Rousseau 
fantastically traces social evil to its source, the growth of civili- 
sation : — " From the time when one man needed the help of 
another, and it was seen to be useful for one man to have 
provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was intro- 
duced, toil became necessary, and the vast forests changed into 
smiling fields watered by the sweat of man, wherein slavery and 
misery soon took root and grew ripe with the crops." Agricul- 
ture and the working of metals helped on the fall of man, since 
completed by reason and reflection : — " It is philosophy which 
isolates man, and inspires the thought, at the sight of a sufferer, 
'Die, if you will; I am safe.'" How, then, is mankind to be 
regenerated? By going back — answers Rousseau in his Social 
Contract (1762) — as near as may be to the primitive compact 
which first brought men together free and equal. The problem 
is, "to find a form of association which defends and protects 
with all the common force the person and the goods of each 
member ; and by which each, uniting with all, yet only obeys 
himself, and remains as free as before." The solution of this 
difficult problem is reached with surprising ease : — " Each of 
us places in common his person and all his power under the 
supreme direction of the general will ; and we further receive 
each member as an indivisible part of the whole." As men enter 
the new social contract freely and on equal terms, there hence 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Eiwope. 27 

ensue the ideas of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity — the 
watchwords of the French Revolution. Rousseau, however, 
proceeds to exalt equality at the expense of liberty, by asserting 
that the general will must be right, and must tend to the public 
advantage ; that the State, being the collective will of its mem- 
bers, "must have a universal and compulsory power to move 
and dispose each part in the' way most suitable for the whole." 
Rousseau's return to nature therefore favoured the growth of a 
State despotism necessarily hostile to all institutions seeming 
to conflict with it; and the fallacious ease and rigidity of his 
reasoning — due to its being based on theory, carried out by 
verbal proofs, and rarely checked by observance of facts, — im- 
pelled the French revolutionists to many of the outrageous acts 
which brought them into collision with the rest of Europe. 

If Voltaire charmed by his wit and the lucidity of his reason- 
ing, Rousseau was as Avidely read throughout Europe for his 
many tender appeals to the emotions. A wave of sentimentalism 
was then spreading over Europe, of which Richardson's novels 
in England, those of Rousseau in France, and Goethe's 
Sorrows of Werther in Germany, were the chief expression. 
Courtiers, affecting weariness of the artificial splendours of 
Versailles, discovered new charms in rustic life, even in the 
occupations of the field and dairy; and literary people, tired of 
pure reason, turned to the emotions as an undeveloped side of 
human nature. 

In France the emotional school had no such lasting effect 
on literature as it had on politics ; but in Germany the revolt 
against the past was at the outset rather literary than political, 
as in the dramas of Lessing and Goethe. The separation of the 
national life in a mosaic of petty States limited the social and 
political horizon of Germans, and at first diverted their atten- 
tion to individual achievement in literature or science; but the 
younger poet Schiller, coming under the spell of Rousseau's 
influence, revolted not only against the severely classical style. 



28 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

with its unities of time and place, but also against the narrow 
tyranny of nearly all the petty princes of Germany. In Schil- 
ler's youthful play The Robbers we have (to use his own 
words) " an example of the offspring which Genius in its unna- 
tural union with Thraldom may give to the world." It is indeed 
the poetry of revolt, fiercer than any of Byron's. " Put me at 
the head of a troop of fellows like myself (exclaims his hero), 
and Germany shall become a republic, by the side of which 
Sparta and Rome shall seem like nunneries"; and he recom- 
mended the now famous prescription of "blood and iron" as 
the only cure for a corrupt world. For less daring utterances 
the Duke of Wiirtemberg had imprisoned the patriotic poet 
Schubart, and Schiller had to flee from Stuttgart. The influ- 
ence of Rousseau's social teachings inspired many more of the 
younger German poets, e.g. the Gottingen Brotherhood, headed 
by Klopstock, which desired to enthrone naturalism in litera- 
ture as in politics. These ideas were undermining the Ger- 
manic system of States — "a chaos upheld by Providence." 

The German savants meanwhile were compiling an Ency- 
clopaedia with the same destructive aims as that of Diderot; 
and a secret club or order, the ' Illuminati,' founded in 1776 in 
Swabia, rapidly spread the revolutionary doctrines of the age all 
over Southern and Western Germany. Though suppressed in 
Bavaria and some other States, it had a powerful hold on educated 
people, especially in the important fortress and cathedral city 
of Mainz, where the Prince-bishop, though Chancellor of the 
Empire, patronised it. Priding himself on his enlightenment, 
he favoured the spread of an education inspired by Rousseau's 
Emile. His coadjutor and successor, Dalberg, was a mem- 
ber of the society; and the forms of religion and morality were 
barely respected in the Archbishop's Court. In the other lay 
and spiritual States of W. Germany there was no loyalty or 
respect for the effete goverments ; and the learned Forster of 
Mainz wrote (1782) — "Europe seems to me on the brink of a 



I.] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 29 

terrible revolution : the mass is so corrupt that a bleeding 
seems necessary." 

The same revolutionary ferment was beginning to spread in 
the Dutch and Austrian Netherlands, in oligarchical Switzerland 
and in oppressed and divided Italy. Everywhere thought con 
flicted with fact, the ideal with the real, the head with the 
body; and the events of 1789 — 18 15 were to show that it is 
ideas which mould the destinies of nations. 



CHAPTER 11. 
Louis XVI, the Parlements, and the States General. 

"The States General were like a bridge made for passing from the old to 
the new order of things." — (Thierry.) 

For generations thinking men had seen that France could 
not long endure the double strain of an ambitious monarchical 
policy and the cramping results of the old feudal social 
system. One or other must go. Few, however, expected 
that the conflict would lead up to a Revolution in which both 
would vanish. 

The death of the vicious and despicable Louis XV (1774) 
brought to the French throne his amiable grandson, Louis 
XVI, who had lately espoused Marie Antoinette, the daughter 
of the great Empress Queen, Maria Theresa. Never has a 
heavier burden rested on shoulders so young and inexperi- 
enced. Louis XV had lost to England nearly all the French 
possessions in North America and India ; and though he had 
added most of Lorraine to the French Crown, yet his reign 
was disgraced by failures abroad, distress at home, and his 
own cynical immorality. His successor had all the good 
qualities fitted to adorn a private station, but none of the fore- 
sight, determination, resource, and brilHance needed to re- 
trieve the fortunes of the Bourbon House. His queen had 



Chap, ii.] Loitis X VI, the Parlements and States General. 3 1 

more than all the attractive qualities, but none of the tact, 
prudence, and quiet tenacity of her mother. The jealousy of 
French statesmen and courtiers would not allow " the Austrian " 
to interfere with affairs of state. Hence she could not, save 
by fits and starts, bring her powers of exciting entliusiasm to 
supplement the kindly but phlegmatic temperament of her 
consort. 

But in 1774 all seemed bright. Morality was no longer 
outraged at Court. Reforms were undertaken ; and the revolt 
of the American colonists soon gave France the opportunity of 
humbling her rival in the race for empire. The philosophers 
and economists now hoped that the golden age had come 
when society would be reformed by royal decrees; for 
Turgot, famed not only by his writings, but by his splendid 
achievements as ' intendant,' or royal administrator, of the 
Limousin, was appointed to the most important office in the 
Council of Ministers, the Control of the Finances. In the 
Limousin he had mitigated the hardships of compulsory 
enrolment in the militia, had freed trade from some of its 
many shackles, and had commuted the corvee^ or forced 
labour of the peasants on the public roads, for a small tax, 
which, however, he could not exact from the privileged classes; 
and his enlightened policy had finally been as much resisted 
by the ignorant peasants as by the privileged orders. The 
same stupidity and selfishness was to foil his efforts to restore 
the prosperity of France by royal decrees. He said to the 
king, "Sire, you ought to govern by general laws, as God." 
Unfortunately the king and his diplomatic minister, Maurepas, 
had restored the powers of the old ' Parlements,' without any 
due restrictions to prevent their abuse. These 'Parlements' 
were the supreme judicial bodies at Paris and the twelve chief 
provincial capitals — Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, 
Rouen, Aix, Rennes, Pau, Metz, Douai, Besangon, and Nancy. 
Their members were strictly mere jurists, who constituted an 



32 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

hereditary magistracy. The tenure of their offices had up to 
1 77 1 been, and now again was, saleable. Their functions were 
properly judicial; but they had long interfered in purely political 
matters, had even issued decrees in their several provinces, and 
severely punished any contravention of them. Their action 
as law courts was dilatory and venal; and, being composed 
mainly of the privileged orders, they now resisted reforms 
which assailed their privileges. The king could, however, 
overbear their opposition by bringing his personal authority 
into play, and, by holding what was called a /// de justice, 
compel them to register his edicts. 

Turgot now freed the internal trade in corn and flour from 
all the old provincial customs dues, and abolished not only 
the exclusive right of many a seigneur to own a corn-mill on 
his domain, but also the privileges of bakers in towns. Riots 
caused by greed, or by fear that the corn would all leave the 
district, were promptly suppressed. The economies which he 
urged at Court and in the army aroused bitter hatred; and 
when in March 1776 he sent six edicts, suppressing various 
privileges, especially the old trade-gilds and corvees on the 
roads, for registration by the Paris Parlement, this body re- 
fused, until compelled to do so by a "bed of justice," which 
Voltaire hailed as a " bed of beneficence." It was now open 
war between the privileged ordere and the reforming monarch 
and statesman. The Parlements objected above all to the 
substitution of a tax on all landed property for the corvee 
hitherto rendered by the peasants. In appearance the king 
and Turgot won their point ; but cabals at Court and in the 
Ministry increased ; and though the great minister liberated 
traders, especially vine-growers, from many shackles, freed the 
serfs on the royal domains, and curtailed the immunities of the 
nobles, yet he was unable to carry out his other beneficent 
plans. He tried in vain to consolidate the public debt, reform 
the collection of the gabelle, or salt-duties, and other taxes and 



II.] Louis XVI, the Parlements and States General. 33 

tolls [octrois), form a fund to aid peasants in the redemption of 
the feudal services, and give local self-government not only to 
the co7?vnune or parish, but also to the arrondissement (a larger 
area), to the province, and to the whole realm. These re- 
forms, which would have peacefully revolutionised France, 
were never carried out. Turgot's somewhat rigid and arbitrary 
methods of reform caused unnecessary friction; and the queen, 
annoyed by an act which injured one of her favourites, per- 
suaded Louis to dismiss him (1776). This victory of the 
privileged orders over the monarchy made a democratic 
revolution almost inevitable; but so unpractical were French- 
men then, that they even rejoiced at this and subsequent 
successes of the Parlements over the royal power, as if "to 
make war on absolutism" were more important than to abolish 
antiquated privileges. Turgot's reforms were soon nearly all 
reversed. 

His successor, Necker, a skilful banker rather than a far- 
seeing statesman, did his best to promote economy, establish 
the credit of the State, and postpone burning social questions. 
He warned Louis that bankruptcy would follow an open 
alliance with the American colonists against England. Yet 
such was his financial skill and personal credit with bankers 
that he was able to raise loans and tide over the financial 
strain of that war ; but success in borrowing enhances financial 
difficulties in the future. Moreover, Lafayette and the French 
soldiers returned from the United States inflamed with a love 
of liberty and self-government. "The American revolution 
(wrote Young) has laid the foundation of another in France, if 
Government does not take care of itself." Yet at the time 
when the proposed American Constitution was the general 
topic of conversation in the salons of Paris, Louis was weak 
enough to decree that only those whose families had been 
noble for four generations could attain high offices in the 
French army. Necker was brought by the financial needs of 
F. R. 3 



34 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the State to demand that the privileged classes should be 
taxed. Feeling his fall to be near, he published (Jan. 1781) 
his "Account of the finances/' laying bare for the first time the 
expenses of the Court, which were nearly one-third of the cost 
of maintaining the whole army. 

Bankruptcy was soon brought nearer by the spendthrift 
policy of the frivolous Calonne — " Whoever wishes for credit 
must cultivate luxury " ; and when in his much ridiculed 
Assembly of Notables he ventured to suggest the equalisation 
of taxation as the inevitable cure, he was dismissed (1787). 
His successor, Lomenie de Brienne. the Archbishop of Toulouse, 
sought to carry out the aims of the Encyclopaedists by the 
methods of Richelieu, to establish liberty and equality by royal 
decree. He extended to all the provinces the plan, conceived 
by Turgot, and commenced by Necker in Berri and Guienne, 
of provincial and parochial assemblies. He also permitted the 
redemption of the corvee by a money payment, abolished the 
provincial customs dues, and sought to impose a general land 
tax and a stamp tax. These last were resisted by the Paris 
Parlement, which declared itself incapable of registering a per- 
petual tax ; but the king overbore their opposition by a /// de 
justice and for a time exiled them from Paris. Finally, Brienne 
in May 1788 suppressed nearly all the powers of the Parle- 
ments, and tried to substitute a Plenary Court, composed of 
dignitaries nominated for hfe by the king, as the sole authority 
for registering laws for all France. This coup d'etat enraged all 
classes and interests — the privileged orders, who saw them- 
selves thenceforth taxable at the will of the sovereign; the 
provincial patriots, menaced with a complete subjection to 
the capital; and the democrats, who longed for a complete 
representation of the nation. All rallied round the Parlements 
as the chief barriers against a central despotism : Mirabeau 
expressed the ideas of all friends of freedom v/hen he wrote, 
" I will never make war on the Parlements save in presence of 



II.] Loins XVI, tJie Parlements and States General. 35 

the nation." The people of Rennes and Grenoble rose in de- 
fence of their Parlements. Louis bowed before the storm, 
dismissed the Minister who had raised it, recalled Necker, and 
finally convoked for 1789 the States General of France, repre- 
senting the three orders — Nobles, Clergy, and Commons. 

Lafayette, who had gained immense popularity in the 
American War, had already expressed the wishes of democrats 
that the States General should be called ; and the Paris Parle- 
ment had also taken up this suggestion from a clerical coun- 
cillor, because it would benefit the commonwealth, embarrass 
the king, or add to its own popularity. After Brienne's 
utter failure there seemed to be no other course open, unless 
Louis took the prudently daring advice of his former minister, 
Malesherbes, and frankly substituted a National Assembly 
in place of the cumbrous States General which had not met 
since 16 14. But Louis could not take occasion by the forelock. 
He desired to meet the deficit and remove some of the most 
glaring abuses ; while most Frenchmen now wished to govern 
themselves and have social equality. A dignitary of the Paris 
Parlement, the Counsellor Pasquier, had truly said, " Sirs, this 
is not child's play : the first time that France sees the States 
General, she will see also a terrible revolution." 

The States General formed three Chambers, consisting of 
deputies of the Nobles, Clergy, and Tiers Etat (Commons) of 
P^rance, the last being chosen by 'secondary election'; that 
is, all the commoners of each town, bailiwick or senechaiissee, 
could vote for 'electors,' who in their turn chose representatives 
of their Order in the States General. The cahiers, or instructions 
drawn up for each representative, evince no desire for a political 
revolution. They show the general wish that the sovereign 
should control the executive, but share the legislative powers 
with an Assembly meeting at stated times and representing 
the nation, to which the king's ministers should be re- 
sponsible. The cahiers of the Commons all demand that they 



36 The RevoltUioiiary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

should have as many representatives as those of the nobles and 
clergy, and that the Orders should meet as one Chamber, not 
as three distinct Estates : those of the clergy and nobles vary 
on this point. The recollection of the Enghsh parliamentary 
struggles against Charles I inspired the recommendation in some 
cahie7's that no taxes should be voted until this constitutional 
question were settled. All the cahiers of the Commons demand 
equal taxation, which some of those of the privileged Orders 
also admit, with the proviso, however, in several of the clerical 
cahiers^ that in return the State should take over their special 
debt or liabilities. There is a like approach to unanimity as to 
the redemption of the feudal dues, with infinite variety as to the 
means of effecting this complicated change. Local privileges 
of towns, corporations, districts, and provinces are to be sacri- 
ficed, whether from conviction, generosity, or despair of keeping 
them. Liberty of the press, personal Hberty, inviolabihty of 
the deputies, abolition of lettres de cachet (sealed letters by 
which a minister could secretly order imprisonment), control 
of the finances by the States General, reduction of pensions 
and sinecures, — on all these points there is complete accord ; 
as well as on the question of improving the lot of the hard- 
worked cui'es by redistributing the revenues and rewards of the 
Church. These cahiers refute the prevalent error that the 
privileged Orders would renounce nothing, and that the Tiers 
6tat alone was desirous of reform. The king, quite half the 
clergy, and an influential minority of the deputies of the nobles, 
desired nearly all the reforms which would have placed France 
on a level with England as a constitutional State. 

How came it then that the deputies who met at Versailles 
in May 1789 did not peacefully regenerate France, but set in 
motion the revolution? There was at the outset a great 
constitutional question, which also served as a test for a deep 
underlying principle, — Should the three Orders sit separately, 
or as one Chamber ; i.e. should they vote par ordre^ or par 



II.] Louis XVI, tJie Pai'lements and States General. 37 

tctel If the former, then France was still divided in three 
distinct Orders, and the Commons would be outvoted on any 
question on which nobles and clergy were opposed to them ; if 
the latter, then equality was not a mere name, and the re- 
formers would certainly carry the day in the Assembly. Great 
blame must attach to Louis and still more to Necker, for first 
raising the expectations of the Tiers Etat, and then leaving 
this initial question to be fought out in wordy war by the 
Orders. In the new provincial Assemblies the Orders sat 
together. The principle of the 'double representation' of 
the Third Estate in the Provincial AssembHes had been in- 
sisted on by the Notables two years before; and Necker had 
lately conceded the same principle for the States General. 
Why grant this, if they were to be kept distinct from the other 
Orders? France was in a ferment of excitement. The com- 
mercial treaty with England (1786 — 7), allowing the import of 
English goods at moderate duties, subjected French manu- 
factures to sharp competition from our more advanced in- 
dustrial system, and was causing much distress in the north of 
France. A protracted drought in the summer of 1788, closing 
with a terrible hail-storm, had rained the crops in northern and 
central France; and the winter of 1788 — 9 was one of the 
severest ever known. Crowds of starving wretches flocked to 
the relief works foolishly opened in Paris and the large towns. 
The distress embittered the whole course of the elections in 
the early spring of 1789; and while philosophers and senti- 
mentalists were dreaming of human perfectibility, universal 
brotherhood and the abolition of armies, the fortunes of 
France were more and more at the mercy of the Paris mob, 
now swelled by thousands of ignorant and desperate peasants. 
The revolution prepared by the savants was to be carried out 
by the men of the slums. The social and poHtical danger was 
seen in the Reveillon riot at Paris ; while the de' ermination of 
the nobles and titled clergy of Brittany to adhere to the 



38 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Ei'a. [Chap. 

ancient constitution of their provincial estates and sit sepa- 
rately from the lower clergy and commoners, provoked blood- 
shed at Rennes. Everything showed that it was on this social 
and constitutional question that discord would break out. 

Nevertheless on the meeting of the States General the 
600 deputies of the Commons were kept rigidly distinct 
from the 300 deputies of the clergy, and the 300 of the 
nobles ; and at the opening ceremony (May 5) their en- 
thusiasm was quenched by a long dissertation from Necker 
on the deficit. The Tiers Etat when left alone, following 
the instructions of many of its cahiers, refused to do any- 
thing to recognise the separate existence of the other two 
Orders. This policy lasted six weeks, during which time 
Necker's suggestion, that the nobles and titled clergy should 
form an Upper Chamber, was shelved. On the repeated 
refusals of the two other Orders to join them, the Tiers Etat 
finally declared itself (June 17) to be the National Assembly of 
France — a bold declaration of sovereign power by the very 
body which Louis had looked forward to as an ally in his 
contest with the privileged Orders. The Assembly at once 
asserted its new claim by declaring the present taxes legal 
only during its existence, by taking under its protection the 
creditors of the State, and by naming a committee on food- 
supply. 

The king, puzzled at these events, was now persuaded by 
his queen and his youngest brother the Comte d'Artois to 
reject these bold innovations, as inroads on his prerogatives. 
Three courses were open to Louis, (i) to surrender to the 
Tiers Etat : (2) to expel them by force, which would bring on 
a civil war : (3) to forestall their actions by royal reforms. 
Louis resolved to try the last, and have troops at hand to 
overawe the people. Necker had drawn up a list of royal 
reforms : these were to be read out at a " royal session " 
before the three Orders; but owing to the influence of his 



II.] Louis XVI, the Parlements and States General. 39 

queen and youngest brother, the reforms were so reduced that 
Necker would have no more to do with this policy. The hall 
at Versailles where the Tiers Etat met was closed to prepare 
for the royal session ; but the deputies at once flocked to the 
Tennis Court, and, electing Bailly the astronomer as their 
first President, they swore the famous oath — that they would 
in no case separate, but would meet in all places, under all 
circumstances, till they had made the Constitution (June 20). 
Fortified by the adhesion of 149 deputies of the clergy and 
2 nobles, they were ready for the royal session (June 23). 
Louis annulled their decrees, and imposed reforms in 35 
articles : if the three Orders (voting as such) cannot agree on 
these reforms, " I alone will effect the welfare of my people." 

To impose political reforms, while reviving the old system 
of three distinct Orders, showed a complete disregard of those 
passionate longings for social equality and self-government 
which were fusing provinces and Orders into a united nation. 
Louis' unfortunate attempt to solve the difficulty aroused more 
opposition than ever. At the end of the session the Orders 
were bidden to retire. The Tiers Etat and their new adherents 
did not stir. When the master of ceremonies repeated the 
king's command, the national consciousness flashed forth in a 
withering retort from Mirabeau, " VVe are assembled by the 
national will : force alone shall disperse us." 

The royal session has been as much misunderstood as 
Mirabeau's actual words have been improved upon. It was 
not a mere exhibition of arbitrary power, but a spasmodic 
attempt to recur, when too late, to the policy of imposing 
reforms by royal decrees, always till then followed by conti- 
nental rulers and statesmen. It was the policy of Frederick 
the Great, of Pombal in Portugal, of Maria Theresa, of Joseph 
II, and of Turgot. The Tennis Court oath, the retort of Mira- 
beau, and the collapse of Joseph II's reforms, mark the end of 
that era, and the commencement of a new age, inaugurated 



40 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

by Rousseau and the American patriots, when the people insist 
that reforms shall be effected not only for them, but by them. 

If the king's unskilful poHcy had for the time confused 
the cause of royal reform with that of the privileged orders, 
yet on the other hand the attitude of the Tiers Etat in re- 
sisting all compromise must be held partly responsible for the 
first rupture. Jefferson, the American patriot, had strongly 
urged them to accept the reforms which Louis would at once 
have granted, viz. a representative legislature meeting every 
year with the right of originating laws and the control of taxation, 
responsibihty of the king's ministers to the Legislature, trial by 
jury, freedom of conscience and of the press: "with these 
powers they could obtain in the future whatever else was 
necessary to perfect their Constitution. They thought other- 
wise, and events have proved their lamentable error; for 
after 30 years of foreign and domestic war, and the loss 
of millions of lives, they have in the end obtained no more, 
nor even that securely." The defiant attitude of the National 
Assembly and the adhesion of forty-seven reforming nobles 
with the Duke of Orleans at their head, disconcerted 
the Court; and the king, after the "timid violence," — as 
Malouet phrased it — of the royal session, now desired the rest 
of the noble and clerical deputies to join the Assembly 
(June 27), and requested Necker not to resign. 

The Court retired only to take a better spring. Dis- 
orders in Paris in the privileged regiment of the Gardes 
Frangaises served as a pretext for massing between Versailles 
and the capital a large force of troops, among whom were 
several mercenary German and Swiss regiments. Everything 
was thought to be ready for the coup d'etat. Necker was dis- 
missed, and quietly withdrew to Brussels. On July 12 this 
news was brought to the excitable crowd always thronging 
the gardens of the Palais Royal, by the ardent young journalist 
Camille Desmoulins ; and all Paris rushed to arms and demon- 



II.] Loins XVI, the Parlements and States General, 41 

strations. After a brush with the ' Royal Germans ' in the 
Champs Elysees, the crowd, ahvays helped by the Gardes 
Frangaises, plundered the 'Invalides' of 28,000 muskets, and 
then rushed to the famous Bastille (July 14). This fortress, 
built three centuries before to command the St Antoine gate 
and suburb, had been often used as a prison for poHtical 
offenders; but under the mildei rule of Louis XVI it now 
held only seven prisoners, and these not for political offences. 
Yet its eight lofty towers still seemed to threaten Paris; and 
an excited crowd, on Delaunay's firm refusal to surrender, 
rushed at the outer drawbridge, which soon fell under the 
blows of two old soldiers. The arrival of the Gardes Fran- 
daises with their cannon finally dispirited the little garrison of 
114 men, and they compelled Delaunay to surrender. The 
mob massacred four of the soldiers and five officers, including 
Delaunay; and de Flesselles, Provost of the Merchants of 
Paris, soon after fell a victim to their suspicions of his treachery 
at the Hotel de Ville. Sensation-mongers have added almost 
a cycle of legends to the so-called ' Storming of the Bastille.' 
The prosaic truth is thus declared by an eye-witness, the 
CounseUor Pasquier : — ''What has been called the fight was 
not serious : resistance there was none. In the Bastille there 
were neither provisions, nor munitions of war : there was no 

need to invest it It did not for a moment terrify the 

many spectators who flocked to see the result. Among these 
were several elegant ladies, who, to approach nearer, had left 
their carriages at some distance." 

Paris could now defy the royal troops. As disaffection was 
rife among them (for reasons stated in the last chapter), they 
were withdrawn to Versailles; and the Comte d'Artois, with 
many reactionary nobles, quitted France, in what was called 
the 'joyous emigration.' The surrender of the Bastille marks 
the commencement of outbreaks of violence, which culminated 
in 1793. The news aroused wide-spread Jacqueries, or risings 



42 The Revohttionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. ii. 

of the peasants, especially in the east of France, from Dauphine 
to Alsace. The sky was red with the flare of burning castles ; 
but in many parts the peasants only burned the hated feudal 
deeds enumerating their services and dues. There were riots 
in the autumn of 1789 at Strassburg, Troyes, Rouen, Caen, 
and other towns, generally arising from the dearness of bread 
or the poverty of the ouvriers. In nearly every case order 
was ultimately restored by the National Guard, mainly com- 
posed of bourgeois. Power was everywhere passing from the 
royal intendants to the new citizen force; and it was soon seen 
that the revolution advanced as quickly in the provinces as 
at the capital. In the manufacturing districts of the north, 
where the recent commercial treaty with England had ruined 
many manufacturers, the outbreaks were directed against the 
machinery which would have helped them in the competition 
with English goods. The industrial revolution, then peacefully 
proceeding in England, was soon to be checked in France, by 
the internal disorders and by a desire to completely exclude 
English goods. In Paris the trades which depended on the 
luxury of the few were at once paralysed by the flight of the 
wealthy. "I saw (says Bailly in his memoirs) mercers, jewel- 
lers, and other tradesmen implore the favour of being employed 
at 20 sous the day" — on public relief works. 

But even amid these disorders, social and political re- 
construction was vigorously begun. The king, in a memorable 
visit to Paris (July 17), donned the new tricolour cockade; 
and on the balcony of the Hotel de Ville recognised two new 
creations of the popular will, the Paris Municipality with 
Bailly as first Mayor, and the National Guard commanded by 
Lafayette. These institutions spread through France. Popular 
municipalities everywhere replaced the old corporations of 
royal nominees, as the National Guard replaced the militia. 
Every citizen was expected to serve as a National Guard — the 
commencement of the great citizen armies of our day. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Constituent Assembly. 

•'A people so badly prepared to act by itself, could not set about reforming 
everything at once, without destroying everything." — De Tocqueville. 

Meanwhile at Versailles the National Assembly (which on 
July 9 had taken the special title of ' Constituent,' as having to 
frame the Constitution) was beginning to organise itself and 
France. Not till after its removal to Paris did its members sit 
in a semi-circle, facing the fortnightly President ; but the names 
Right, Left, &c. were beginning to be used to denote its 
political -groups. Those close by the President's right were 
the ultra royalists, reactionary nobles, titled clergy led by the 
clever Abbe Maury, or factious defenders of the privileged 
Orders in the Parlements — as d'Espremenil. In the Right 
Centre were the reforming nobles and other partisans of a Con- 
stitution Hke that of England, as Mounier and Tally ToUendal, 
who soon found themselves left high and dry by the rush of 
events. The Left Centre included more pronounced reformers, 
such as Mirabeau, destroyer of a worn-out social order, but 
champion of monarchy in its hour of need ; Rabaut de St Etienne, 
leader of the Protestants ; the Jansenist Camus ; Gre'goire, the 
leader of the country priests in their onset on clerical abuses ; 



44 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the versatile Talleyrand, soon to become the chief diplomatist 
of the age ; and the Abbe' Sieyes, with his clear-cut face and 
incisive phrases, whose constitution-mongering was finally to 
help Bonaparte to power and himself to inglorious ease. Farther 
round the Chamber to the President's left sat the professed 
revolutionists, organised by Duport, Barnave, and Lameth, who 
desired at the outset a reconstruction of the State on demo- 
cratic principles; while on the extreme left was a party, called 
the ' trente voix,' desirous of a complete social revolution, as 
sketched by Rousseau. This small group, led by Petion, 
Buzot, and Robespierre, was to swallow the fat kine of the 
Assembly and of France. 

For the present these groups were only beginning to crystal- 
lize into parties, and generally voted on the sentiment of the 
moment. There was no more sequence in the speeches read from 
the tribime than there was order in the procedure. When 
Mirabeau laid on the table a translation of Romilly's little work 
on English parliamentary procedure, it was rejected; for "we 
are not EngUsh, and we want nothing English." The lack of 
political experience, the interference of the public in the 
galleries, and the weakness of the fortnightly Presidents, often 
reduced the Assembly to a mere Bedlam ; yet, when emotion 
stilled its strifes, it could act with spasmodic energy. Thus, 
when the report on the Jacqueries thrilled the deputies, there 
arose a generous rivalry in self-sacrifice (Aug. 4). The mem- 
bers of the privileged Orders kept thronging to the table to give 
up their immunities. Nobles, clergy, towns, districts, and 
corporations, alike gave up all their immunities from taxation : 
serfs were liberated, and all degrading forms of servitude were 
swept away without compensation : slaves in the colonies were 
declared to be free, though the slave-owners disputed the 
validity of this decree : nobles consented to modify the harsher 
provisions of the game laws, as well as to give up their right 
of administering justice in their own seigneurial law-courts : 



III.] TJie Const itiie7it Assembly. 45 

the clergy saw their tithes aboHshed without definite compen- 
sation, on a motion of the sceptical Bishop Talleyrand : the 
suppression of plurality of benefices, the abolition of the old 
exclusive trade-gilds, the sacrifice of the droit de colombier^ or 
sole right of keeping a dove-cote, and the admissibility of all 
classes to all civil and military appointments, completed the 
fusion of the Orders in one nation ; and the Assembly broke 
up at dawn with fervent cries of "Vive le roi." 

In a single sitting it had carried what the royal authority 
had been unable to gain from the Parlements in fifteen years ; 
but, in spite of this feverish haste, the concessions now came 
too late to calm the people. They seemed like a jettison of 
cargo to lighten the ship in the storm now raging around. The 
peasants and hberated serfs, reahsing their power, acted as 
though the Assembly had swept away all the game laws and all 
the feudal dues. In all parts, but especially in the east, they 
killed the game, and, instead of redeeming the ordinary feudal 
dues, refused to pay them one and all. It was in vain for the 
Assembly to proclaim the law on these points. The royal 
intendants had no power to enforce order, or even payment of 
taxes. Necker was ever bewailing the increase of the deficit ; 
and when the Assembly jealously refused to strengthen the 
executive for the collection of taxes, he proposed (Sept.) that a 
"patriotic contribution" should be made by every citizen of 
one fourth of his income to rescue the State from bankruptcy. 
The Assembly was wavering, when Mirabeau's eloquent support 
carried the measure: "Bankruptcy, hideous bankruptcy is 
there : it threatens to consume you, your honour, your fortunes 
— and you dehberate!" Even after this appeal, the patriotic 
contribution was a dismal failure; and the first year of the 
revolution was to close with a deficit of over ;£;, 000,000. 
Both the Assembly and the populace were less concerned about 
the payment of taxes than the correct phrasing of the Rights of 
Man. After long deliberation these were accepted; but a 



46 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, [Chap. 

proposal that the duties of the citizen should also be defined 
was lost by a small majority. To insist on rights, and shirk 
disagreeable duties, was the radical defect of the new civic life, 
fatal to the solvency, order, and stability of the State. 

Still longer and more animated were the debates on the 
bases of the new Constitution ; and it was soon apparent that 
the theories of Rousseau, as to the complete sovereignty and 
indivisibiHty of the nation, would triumph over results of experi- 
ence gained in English and American parhamentary life. 
Sie'yes showed most logically that logic forbade the existence 
of a Senate, or of the royal veto ; and the Assembly decided 
that the legislative power should remain with one Assembly, 
having the sole right of initiating laws, and controlling all the 
legislative functions of the State. Though the three National 
Assemblies successively proclaimed the need of a "distinction 
of powers," i.e. between the legislative and executive functions 
of government, they were brought by a curious irony of events 
to encroach more and more on the latter. Distrust of the 
king's ministers and officials, rumours of plots against the 
Assembly and the nation, finally the strain and stress of civil 
strifes and war against the combined States of Europe, gradually 
led to an almost complete absorption of the executive by the 
legislative. The beginnings of this process were at once 
observable. Distracted by its many difficulties, the Assembly 
even at the close of July 1789 empowered a Committee of its 
members, renewable every month, to procure information lead- 
ing to the conviction of persons suspected of plotting the 
overthrow of the Assembly. This Committee of Inquiry was 
finally to become the terrible Committee of General Security 
of 1793. 

Passion rose high in the debates on the royal veto, i.e. the 
right of the king to stop the passing of a law; and when 
Mirabeau defended the veto, people in Paris begged him to 
desist : " If the king has the veto, there will be no 9ccasion for 



III.] TJie Constituent Assembly. 47 

a National Assembly. We shall all be slaves again." Threats 
were uttered against the Assembly if it should admit the veto ; 
but it was strong enough then to despise them, while the Paris 
municipality for a time suppressed seditious gatherings in the 
Palais Royal. In the Assembly the democrats all followed 
Sieyes' argument that the ^'division of powers" required the 
king's authority to be solely executive : — "The Assembly is the 
head, the king is the arm ; and the head never admits the arm 
to deliberate with it." Mirabeau defended the veto by showing 
the need of some check on the acts of a single Assembly, and 
proved that the division of powers, if rigorously followed out, 
would place the legislative and executive as rivals with no links 
of connection. Necker's ministry ended these disputes by de- 
claring in favour of a compromise called the suspensive veto, 
by which the king's refusal to pass any measure was to hold 
good only throughout two sessions, but must lapse if the 
measure was passed in a third session. The new Constitution 
was, however, not to be subject to any exercise of the veto. 

The balance of political power was finally upset by the 
events of Oct. 5. The loss of trade caused by the disorders, and 
the dearth caused by a poor harvest, increased popular excite- 
ment. No tale in the new journals or pamphlets was too wild 
for belief. " The aristocrats destroyed corn before it was ripe, 
paid the bakers not to work, suspended trade, and threw flour 
into the rivers." The arrival of a new regiment at Versailles, 
and the effervescence of its loyalty to the king and queen in a 
banquet held there on Oct. i, appeared a real cause for alarm ; 
and the report that the national tricolour had been insulted 
seemed to foreshadow a new Court conspiracy. Seeing that 
the men had lately been strictly controlled by the Paris 
authorities, the women assembled, pillaged the Hotel de Ville, 
and began their weird march to the Assembly and Palace at 
Versailles. After invading the Assembly "to hear our little 
mother Mirabeau speak," and to get the Rights of Man finally 



48 The ReiwliLtionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

accepted, and the price of bread fixed, they and the riff-raff 
following them encamped opposite the great Chateau, which 
Lafayette undertook to protect with the Paris National Guard. 
At dawn of Oct. 6 a few of the mob burst in by an unguarded 
side-door, and the royal family barely escaped massacre by the 
devotion of a garde du corps and the arrival of Lafayette's men; 
but, to make sure that bread would be cheap, the mob 
clamoured in the courtyard for the king to go to Paris. Thither 
the royal family of France had to go, amidst a crowd of 
National Guards, repentant body-guards, and fish-wives dancing 
around cart-loads of corn, — the funeral march of the old 
monarchy. 

The Assembly soon followed, though 56 members were 
afraid to trust themselves in Paris. It had prevailed over the 
privileged Orders and clipped the wings of monarchy; but 
Oct. 6 was the victory of the Paris mob, which henceforth 
exercised a predominant and fatal influence on the National 
Assembly and its successors. Camille DesmouHns thought the 
revolution was now finished; but the events of Oct. 5 — 6 really 
inaugurated an era of mob rule, culminating in the supremacy 
of the Clubs and the Paris Commune. 

It is thought that the factious Duke of Orleans had insti- 
gated the march on Versailles. Mirabeau, who then had 
some secret connection with him, said of that event, " Instead 
of a glass of brandy, a bottle was given"; and he seems to have 
desired that a sharp lesson should be given to the Court, to 
make reaction impossible. Lafayette, who was now for a time 
almost dictator, insisted that the Duke should leave France; 
and, if a close understanding had been formed between Necker, 
representing the Ministry, Mirabeau, whose eloquence nearly 
always carried the Assembly with him, and Lafayette at the 
head of the Paris National Guards, a party of order might still 
have rallied around this triumvirate, strong enough to prevent 
the political clubs from becoming supreme ; but the vanity or 



III.] The Constituent Assembly. 49 

folly of Lafayette and Necker hindered any co-operation with a 
man of so doubtful a character as Mirabeau. The cause of 
order was weakened by the withdrawal from the Assembly of 
Mounier and some other supporters of a monarchy like that of 
England. Parties began to separate more clearly, the gain 
being decidedly to the democratic Left; and the Assembly 
soon showed its jealousy of the executive, which Mirabeau now 
desired to strengthen, by decreeing (Nov. 7) that none of its 
members could join the king's Ministry, nor for six months 
after resignation. By this rigid division of powers the Assembly 
weakened the executive, which alone could legally put into 
force its decrees. So the cause of order was weakened, while 
what was most dreaded by Mirabeau came to pass — " Anarchy 
organised itself" in the poUtical clubs. 

The most famous of these was the Jacobins, so called from 
the disused monastery where it met. At first it comprised 
men of all parties ; but revolutionary ardour disowned first the 
moderates, then Mirabeau, and, after the flight to Varennes, 
Duport, Barnave, and the Lameths, until Robespierre, the 
inflexible exponent of Rousseau's ideas, was there omnipotent. 
The power of the club lay in its network of branches spreading 
over all France, so that a motion carried by the Jacobins 
was soon better executed than any decrees of the National 
Assembly. An early offshoot from the Jacobins was the Cor- 
deliers' Club, representing the extremists of Paris, such as the 
witty Desmoulins, the obscene He'bert, the brazen-lunged 
Danton, half demagogue, half statesman ; and that queer com- 
pound, part man of science, part social martyr, part homicidal 
lunatic, Marat. These men by their newspapers or mob-oratory 
had great hold on Paris; and in the dynamics of the revolution 
they may be named the prime motors, influencing the Jacobins, 
who then pulled the strings all over France. 

The intense interest in the debates of the Assembly and 
the Clubs may be measured by the mushroom growth of 
F. R. 4 



50 The RevohUionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

pamphlets and newspapers, the names of some of which still 
survive — as the Journal des Debats and Aloniteicr ; and French 
journalism still retains the strongly individual tone which 
marked its beginnings; for in 1789 every prominent politician, 
or group of deputies, strove to carry on a journal; Desmoulins, 
Marat, and, in 1793, Hebert, gained more power by the pen 
than by their speeches. Posters {affiches) and cheap pamphlets 
spread the revolutionary notions far and wide, carrying along 
France in the wake of Paris. 

Mounier and some other seceders were trying to stir up 
against the Assembly the old provincial spirit, so fatal to 
Louis XVI's reforming efforts; but the change of political 
power was seen in the ease with which the Assembly overthrew 
the Parlements and the provincial system. Lameth's proposal 
(Nov. 3), that the Parlements should be left in vacation, was 
carried, and scarcely an arm was raised in their defence. 
The provinces with their immunities and, in some cases, their 
separate constitutions, were swept away; as well as the ad- 
ministrative areas of the intendants, or royal controllers. By 
the early spring of 1790 all France was poUtically unified, as it 
had been socially unified by the decrees of Aug. 4. Sieyes 
desired to see France divided into eighty squares designated 
by numbers ! But as her boundaries conflicted with a chess- 
board pattern, the remodelling took the form of 83 Depart- 
ments named after natural features. The provincial system 
had represented the differences derived from the great fiefs of 
old France: the new system symbolized the natural unity 
of the French people, first united by the monarchy and now 
indivisibly welded together by the Revolution. Each Depart- 
ment was divided into districts or arrondissements, each of 
these into cantons; while the smallest unit was the rural 
municipality or commune, which through its mayor and council 
had at the outset very wide powers of self-government. The 
canton was the electoral district, where the * electors' were 



III.] The Constituent Assembly. 51 

chosen by the ' active ' citizens, i.e. by those who paid in direct 
taxes a sum equal to three days' earnings : the ' electoral 
colleges' were then to choose the representatives for each 
Department in the National Assembly. The new Depart- 
mental System thus sought the expression of the nation's will 
from each commune or parish, by secondary election, through 
the medium of the canton and Department. It not only 
secured self-government to the communes and Departments, 
but also local defence ; for each * active citizen ' was to serve 
as a National Guard. Moreover, as the jury system and 
election of magistrates and judges subjected the law courts 
to the control of the Department and of the nation, the 
Departmental System quietly took the place of the feudal and 
monarchical governing powers in the spheres of local govern- 
ment, defence, and justice. This system, admirable in the 
symmetry of its outlines, yet had the great defect of subjecting 
all the functions of government to oft-recurring elections by 
men who had no experience of public duties ; and power fell 
more and more into the hands of the local Jacobin clubs. 

In its policy towards the Church of France the Assembly 
had the double aim of asserting the sovereignty of the nation 
over every institution, and of re-establishing the finances. 
Despite the protest of Sieyes — "They would be free, and 
know not how to be just" — it had already abolished all 
tithes, thereby transferring about ^£'3, 000,000 a year from the 
clergy to the landowners. Talleyrand in Oct. 1789 had pro- 
posed that the nation should take over all the Church property, 
assuring to the clergy two-thirds of its rentals ; but Mirabeau 
brought forward a much more extreme motion, that the nation 
should hold this property, bear the costs of public worship, 
and should pay to every cure not less than ^i\?> a year, 
exclusive of lodging. The desire to redress the scandalous 
inequalities of income, and to reduce the clergy to salaried 
officers of the State, secured the success of this motion (Nov. 

4—2 



52 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

1789). The Church lands were forthwith used as security for 
an issue of paper notes, or assigjiafs, for small amounts. The 
design of Claviere and Mirabeau, who proposed this scheme, 
was that only 400,000,000 francs' worth should at first be 
issued; though in Sept. 1790 they were compelled to a second 
issue of double this amount, with the proviso — also soon dis- 
regarded — that there should never be more than 1,200,000,000 
francs' worth in circulation. Assignats alone were to be 
received in payment for the purchase of the new national 
domains sold by the municipalities ; but the fatal facility with 
which the credit of the State seemed to be thus restored, soon 
lured the financiers who succeeded Necker deeper and deeper 
into debt. The Church lands were wastefully sold, and little 
financial benefit resulted from the confiscation, though it some- 
what increased the number of peasant proprietors. 

The Assembly, after decreeing complete liberty for all 
religious beliefs, and suppressing and confiscating the property 
of religious orders, completed the subjection of the Church to 
the State by its 'Civil Constitution of the Clergy' (June 1790), 
by which the Jansenists, Camus, Gregoire, and Lanjuinais, 
hoped to restore the simplicity of the early Christian Church. 
By this important measure bishop and priests were to be chosen 
by the electors of the Department and the district respec- 
tively, and were not to apply to the Pope for confirmation of 
their election nor for canonical investiture, but must take an oath 
of obedience to the civil authorities and to the new constitution. 
The fairer apportionment of stipends which accompanied this 
decree does not redeem it from the charge of persecution. Or- 
thodox Roman Catholics could not recognise the supremacy 
of the State in place of that of the Pope ; and though Bishop 
Talleyrand and others began to institute the new 'constitu- 
tional' priests, yet about two-thirds of the clergy of France 
(called orthodox or 'non-jurors') refused to obey the decree. 
This was the beginning of a schism in the Church of France, 



III.] The ConstitiLent Assembly. 53 

which embittered the whole course of events and was only- 
healed by Bonaparte's 'Concordat' in 1801. Ultimately it was 
seen that the State, in subjecting the clergy, only bound them 
the more closely to the Papal See. 

All through the spring of 1790 the general rejoicings at 
the new civic life inaugurated by the Departmental System 
took the form of ' federations ' of towns and districts that they 
would keep the law and see it respected by aristocrats, fore- 
stallers of corn, and all other traitors. After a great federation 
at Lyons of the centre and south of France, a federation of 
the entire nation was held in the Champ de Mars at Paris 
(July 14, 1790), when King, Queen, National Assembly, 
representatives of every Department, and a vast concourse of 
people, took an oath to obey the laws and the Constitution. 
In the words of an eye-witness, M. Ferrieres — "The soul felt 
oppressed beneath the weight of a delicious intoxication, at 
sight of a people actuated by the gentle emotions of a 
primitive fraternity." 

This imposing demonstration of national unity could not 
heal the disorders. There had been many a riot to seize corn 
or prevent it leaving the district : the anti-clerical policy of the 
Assembly fanned the slumbering embers of the old religious 
feuds into fierce flame at Montauban and Nimes : troops at 
Nancy, enraged at arrears of pay, mutinied, and were crushed 
only after a fearful fight (Aug. 31, 1790): tolls and taxes 
were generally left unpaid, and Necker in despair fled to 
Geneva. 

There was only one man who seemed able to breast the 
revolutionary torrent — Mirabeau; and he was losing his control 
over the people. This had been seen in the debates on the 
right of the king to declare war (May, 1790). The question 
might have been all-important, if England and Spain had gone 
to war over a dispute about Nootka Sound in California ; for 
by the Bourbon Family compact of 1761 France and Spain 



54 The RevohLtionmy and Napoleonic Era, [Chap. 

would have made common cause; and as Austria was annoyed 
at our preventing the partition of Turkey between her and 
Russia, it seemed for a time that a war of France, Austria, 
and Spain against England and Holland might alter the whole 
aspect of Europe. Lafayette with the French moderates strove 
for this, that he might become dictator, and stay the course of 
the revolution. But this was just what the Jacobins feared ; 
and it needed all Mirabeau's passionate eloquence to convince 
the Assembly that the king, as head of the executive, should 
have, conjointly with the Legislature, the right of declaring war. 
The first article of the law ran thus — "The right of peace and 
war belongs to the nation. War can be decided only by a 
decree of the National Assembly, which shall be passed on the 
formal and necessary proposal of the king, and which shall be 
sanctioned by him " — a Pyrrhic victory for the monarchy, and 
for Mirabeau. The foreign complications were somewhat 
lessened by the treaty of Reichenbach which, as previously 
explained on page 14, brought Prussia and Austria to accord, 
and tended to the maintenance of the status quo (July, 1790); 
but the danger of a war against England over the Spanish 
difficulty did not vanish until the mutiny at Nancy and the 
general insubordination in army and navy convinced even the 
French royalists that war was impossible. 

Not only was Mirabeau by conviction a monarchist, as 
seeing no stability in one almost irresponsible x\ssembly, but 
he had been brought into close communications with the king 
and queen by means of Lamarck and the Austrian ambassador. 
He urged the passive king to play a vigorous part, to denounce 
the emigrant nobles, and control the revolution by putting 
himself at its head. He accepted a large sum from the king 
to pay his debts, and ;£24o a month besides. His childish 
love of display revealed the secret ; and during the war debates 
he was denounced by the Jacobins as "the traitor." On the 
other side the Court utterly distrusted the man who had done 



III.] The Constituent Assembly. 55 

so much in 1789 to overthrow the king's old powers; and 
it regarded him merely as the arch-demagogue, now at last 
bought over. Both charges were equally beside the mark; 
for Mirabeau's conduct and policy was from first to last an 
attempt to found a democratic monarchy, strong enough in 
the support of the people to act as a check on the Assembly ; 
but his policy of statesmanlike compromise was impossible, 
with an inert king, a jealous Assembly torn by conflicting 
extremes, and a populace leavened by Rousseau's doctrines. 
Not till political experiments had been tried and had failed, 
was a compromise between authority and democracy likely 
to succeed. Mirabeau's efforts may be regarded as Titanic 
struggles for the impossible. In 1791 even Buonaparte must 
have failed. No one could have made Louis XVI a leader, 
or endowed Assembly and people with the spirit of reasonable 
compromise. ^'It is clear that we are perishing, royalty, authority, 
the whole nation. The Assembly is killing itself and us with 
it." Such are his words in one of his last notes to the king; 
but even so, his fertility of resource kept weaving plans of 
propping up the monarchy by discrediting the Assembly, buying 
over deputies or demagogues, luring it into unpopular acts 
(especially against the clergy, in which he himself took the 
lead), and setting the Departments against Paris. Mirabeau's 
Machiavellian policy cut both ways. The king could not 
understand him : the Court feared and hated the Tribune of 
the people : the democrats distrusted or despised him as the 
bribed ally of the monarchy. Not even Mirabeau's energy 
and eloquence could overcome the mutual distrust of Court 
and people; and, worn out by ceaseless toil and frequent de- 
baucheries, he ended his many-sided career with the prophecy 
— " I carry in my heart the death dirge of the monarchy : the 
dead remains of it will now be the spoil of the factions" (April 2, 
1791). 

Mirabeau had often advised the king to retire to Rouen or 



56 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Compiegne. The events of the spring of 1791 — especially his 
forcible detention at the Tuileries at and after Easter — decided 
Louis to fly to Metz or Montmedy, where Bouille still held 
together some faithful regulars to guard the frontiers. The 
flight was on the point of success, when at Sainte Menehould 
the village postmaster Drouet recognised Louis beneath^ his 
disguise, and, galloping on, secured the bridge at Varennes ; 
while Bouille's troopers, wearied at the delay of the royal 
coach (caused by a breakdown), were not at hand in time for 
a rescue (June 21, 1791)^ 

Gloomy silence greeted the king on his return to Paris. 
It is surprising that the Assembly did not dethrone him at 
once ; for he had left behind a declaration revoking his assent 
to every decree passed by the Assembly since the royal session 
of June 23, 1789; but the prospect of a civil war appalled the 
Assembly, which was also desirous of ending its constitutional 
labours. It even sanctioned the rigorous dispersion by Mayor 
Bailly of the ' clubbists ' who were petitioning on the Champ 
de Mars for the dethronement (July 17); and a show of 
energy on the part of the Feuillants, or Constitutionalists (now 
joined by Barnave and the Lameths), temporarily checked the 
anarchic forces at work in Paris and the Departments. 

The acceptance by Louis of the new Constitution for a 
time seemed to still foreign and domestic complications (Sept. 
1 791). Reared on the bases described above (see pages 46 
■ — 51), it transferred the chief power from the sovereign to a 
National Assembly elected every two years, which alone was 
to initiate laws, and could not be dissolved by the king. 

Under the ancient regime there had been a perfect chaos 
of intersecting governing powers, seigneurial, provincial, and 
royal, the latter having gradually absorbed most of the two 
former in the King's Council and in the administration by 
royal ' intendants.' The revolution, ever tending towards 
Rousseau's sovereignty and indivisibility of the national will, 



in.] The Constituent Assembly. 57 

at once simplified and unified the functions of government; 
and many a loyal courtier reflected with secret joy that when 
the king recovered his authority, he would not be hampered 
by factious Parlements. The work of the Constituent Assembly 
cleared the way for Buonaparte, and the modern centralised 
State. The radical defect of the Constitution was the jealous 
isolation in which it placed the king's Ministry, nominally en- 
trusted with the execution of the laws, but practically powerless. 
So, only those laws were observed which were approved by the 
people, especially by the political clubs; and France when 
face to face with invaders, and groping for a vigorous executive, 
was to find it in secret and finally irresponsible committees. 
The first encroachment of the legislative on the executive 
functions in July, 1789, has been already noticed. The king's 
flight to Varennes enabled the Assembly to seize still more of 
the executive power. Its decrees, though unsigned by Louis, 
had for a time the force of laws, and it sent commissioners to 
secure the public safety and maintain order in the frontier 
Departments. These steps were provisional and temporary ; 
but, in general, the effective work and influence of the Assembly 
was mostly due to the vigorous action of its twenty committees, 
which supervised or sought to control, not only the preparation 
of laws and of the Constitution, but even purely executive 
business, such as diplomacy, war, the navy, food supply, and 
plots against its own authority. In these committees, most 
of which were permanent, lay the germ of that tyranny under 
which France was to groan in 1793 — 4; and the sequel will 
show that this same dominant aim of controlling the executive 
by a permanent commission selected from the Legislature, led 
to the installation of the Directory in 1795, and inspired Sie'yes 
with his scheme of that perfect Constitution of 1799, which 
helped Buonaparte to power. 

In sharp contrast to the imprudence of the Constituent 
Assembly in constitutional efforts, is its swift, unerring, and 



58 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. hi. 

irreversible action in social questions. The fusion of the three 
Orders, the abolition of Feudalism, and the recognition of 
individual liberty and civic equality, laid the foundations broad 
and deep, not only of the French State, but of every country 
directly influenced by the revolution. 



CHAPTER IV. 

The Girondins and Europe. 

" Divided into a number of different governments, Europe has no bases 
for a general resistance ; and the first great continental nation which changes 
the face of society, has only disunited members to fear. " 

Mallet du Pan, 1792. 

The flight to Varennes, and the ludicrous spectacle of a 
king held on his throne lest he should run away, seemed to call 
for the intervention of absolute monarchs. They had hitherto 
politely ignored the clamorous requests of French emigrant 
nobles, once headed by the Comte d'Artois, and now by 
the Comte de Provence; but after Varennes the Emperor 
Leopold II, alarmed for the safety of his sister Marie 
Antoinette, drew closer to Prussia, in order to assert the cause 
of monarchy against the Paris Jacobins. 

Another influence was secretly urging the two central 
Powers to a rupture with France. The ambitious Czarina, 
Catherine II, was anxious to keep them busy in the west, so 
that she might have a free hand to intervene in the PoHsh crisis. 
The Polish patriots, fired by the success of the French Assembly 
in sweeping away old abuses, desired to regenerate their un- 
happy realm. Having gained the support of their king, 
Stanislaus, they carried through their Diet decrees which trans- 
formed their aristocratic government into a constitutional 
monarchy (Jvlay, 1791). The liberum veto was suppressed, the 



6o The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Diet was divided into two Chambers, in which the balance of 
power lay with the Chamber of Nuncios or Deputies, and the 
monarchy, instead of being elective, was to be hereditary in the 
line of the Electors of Saxony. This admirable Constitution, 
which followed the aims of Voltaire and Turgot rather than 
those of Rousseau's " Gouvernement de Pologne," would have 
founded a strong executive on a democratic basis. Art. V 
declared : " All power in civil society should be derived from 
the will of the people, its end and object being the preservation 
and integrity of the State, the civil liberty, and the good order 
of society, on an equal scale, and on a lasting foundation." 
As this Constitution closed the door to Russian intrigues, which 
had used the election of the Polish king and the liheruni veto 
to foment disorders, Catherine II plotted its overthrow. Re- 
lieved from the pressure of wars with Sweden and Turkey, she 
strove to gain a free hand in Poland, by encouraging Austria 
and Prussia to intervene in French affairs, and we shall see that 
the outbreak of war with France in 1792, and still more its 
expansion in 1793, were to be fatal to the nascent liberties of 
Poland. 

These hidden reasons smoothed the way for the Austrian 
and Prussian sovereigns, and enabled them to come to a close 
understanding; while Gustavus III, the chivalrous ruler of 
Sweden, tried to form a league of kings against the French 
Revolution. Austria and Prussia, improving on the policy of 
Reichenbach, now guaranteed to each other the possession of 
their States. But though they affected great concern at the 
position of Louis XVI, they had only temporarily laid aside their 
mutual jealousy, their designs on Poland, and their dread of 
Russia's aggression in that quarter; and they were above all 
disgusted at the presumption of the Comte d'Artois in asking 
that they should invade France to re-establish the ancient regime 
and place the Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII) on the throne. 
The conferences at Pillnitz, near Dresden (Aug. 1791), led to 



IV.] The Giroiidins and Europe. 6i 

their declaration that they considered the re-establishment of 
order and monarchy in France an object of interest to all the 
sovereigns of Europe; "they will not refuse to employ con- 
jointly with them the most efficacious means" to strengthen the 
French monarchy. "Then and in that case" they "are re- 
solved to act promptly." As all well-informed persons knew 
that England would remain neutral, the words which required 
the action of all the sovereigns showed that the Declaration of 
Pillnitz was only meant to intimidate the French revolutionists. 
It had the opposite effect. 

A conflict between the disciples of Rousseau and the 
upholders in old Europe of the complicated feudal and dynastic 
claims was perhaps inevitable. The eager enthusiasm of the 
French reformers had brought them into collision with the 
German princes, when on Aug. 4, 1789, the abolition of all 
feudal dues and services swept away some of their claims on 
parts of Alsace. The princes had decHned the money compen- 
sation offered as inadequate ; so this question opened a dispute 
with the Empire, which was intensified when the Constituent 
Assembly decreed the annexation of the Papal County of 
Avignon, though by the new constitution France was to renounce 
all conquest or aggrandisement. French patriots, on their side, 
were enraged at the gatherings of bands of the French emigrant 
nobles near the frontier; and now the Declaration of Pillnitz 
aroused a martial feeling among the inexperienced members of 
the Second National Assembly — known as the 'Legislative' — 
which met in Paris on Oct. i, 1791. 

Members of the Constituent Assembly were by its own act 
excluded from the Legislative, which was much more hasty and 
revolutionary than its predecessor. More than half of its 
members were under thirty years of age. The ardent monarch- 
ists numbered scarcely 100; the supporters of the Constitution 
— generally known as Feuillants from the name of the Consti- 
tutionalist club — could muster 164 votes, while the professed 



62 The Revohtiionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

foes of the Constitution were about 236 — including Girondins 
and Jacobins. The balance of power at first rested with a 
'Centre' of some 245 members, as yet pledged to no definite 
programme, but soon destined to join the extreme party. Yet 
the partisans of the Constitution might have held their ground 
if they had been as determined and as well organised as the 
Jacobins; but their right hand, Lafayette, resigned his command 
of the Paris National Guard, which was thenceforth commanded 
for a month by each colonel in turn : so power fell more and 
more into the hands of the sansculottes. The troubles of the 
time also fomented discontent; thus serving to discredit the 
Constitution of 1791 at the outset. A terrible massacre at 
Avignon, a revolt of the slaves in the French West Indies in 
assertion of their equality, and continued Jacqueries through 
France — all these events in the autumn of 1791 and winter of 
179T — 2 increased the financial embarrassment; and yet assig- 
nats were being issued with reckless rapidity to meet the ever- 
increasing deficit. The consequent distress and stoppage of 
trade appeared to the excited imagination of Frenchmen as the 
work of aristocrats, and the completion of the revolution as the 
only hope for France. The whole state of affairs, therefore, 
vastly increased the difficulties of the quickly changing Feuillant 
Ministries in their attempts to govern by a Constitution which 
was designed to hamper the executive power. Augustus Miles, 
writing from Paris in the last days of 1791, gives the following 
description, and ventures on a remarkable conjecture about the 
future. — "The assignats have fallen to above 40 per cent, 
discount, and the explosion — temporary bankruptcy, and all 
the evils attendant on the guilt and folly of these sorry legis- 
lators in Paris — cannot long be deferred. Yet, mark my words, 
France will recover from her present delirium : the fulness of 
her crimes will be the measure of her debility and weakness, 
and, acquiring a wise and free Government, she will overawe 
the imperial eagle and threaten the liberties of Europe." 



IV.] The Gh'ondins and Etirope. 63 

Foremost in the Legislative Assembly was a group of ardent 
young orators, known as the Girondins, because three of their 
prominent members — Vergniaud, Gensonne, and Guadet — 
came from the Department of the Gironde. Other members of 
this interesting group were Petion, now Mayor of Paris in place 
of the more moderate Bailly ; the philosophic Condorcet, timid 
in action, yet gifted with so lofty a spirit as to complete his 
work on " The Human Mind " while he was being hounded to 
death; the ambitious journalist and wire-puller Brissot, eager 
for war with feudal Europe ; the handsome young advocate 
Barbaroux, once leader of the Marseilles rabble ; the novelist 
Louvet, bold in attack ; the impetuous Isnard, of hot southern 
blood ; the stoical, methodical Roland ; and the conscientious 
and talented Buzot, secretly loving and beloved by Madame 
Roland, whose beauty and enthusiasm marked her out as the 
inspiring genius of the party. Her keen instinct detected the 
weak points of each and all : she admired the orations of 
Vergniaud, ''strong in logic, burning with passion, sparkling 
with beauties, sustained by a noble elocution" : — "and yet I do 
not like Vergniaud : what a pity that genius such as his is not 
animated by love of the commonwealth, and by tenacity of 
purpose." This last defect she saw to be the defect of the 
party, and with masculine force of will she strove to push them 
on from words to sustained action. 

At the outset the political views of the Girondins were as 
advanced as those of the ' Mountain' (so called because they 
filled the highest benches of the Assembly) ; but, as the 
Girondins were men of culture, antique Romans in the loftiness 
of their views, the distinction soon came to be one of methods 
and morality. As Sainte Beuve finely says — " The Girondins 
drew back with a cry of horror from the river of blood." This 
did not stop the men of the Paris clubs, and of the 'Moun- 
tain.' 

Girondins and Jacobins alike desired to absorb the few 



64 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, [Chap. 

functions left to the king and his ministry, and finally to over- 
turn the monarchy. A committee of deputies sat to control 
even the Minister for Foreign Affairs ; he and other ministers 
were often threatened with impeachment, and the Assembly 
soon reduced them to the position of chief clerks. It deter- 
mined to override even the suspensive veto granted to the king, 
when he vetoed their decrees declaring non-juring priests to be 
suspects, and confiscating the lands of emigrant nobles who did 
not return. 

After the efforts of the Feuillants (or Constitutionalists) to 
bolster up their ever-shifting ministries had failed, Louis had to 
accept a Girondin ministry (March, 1792). It desired war, so 
as to complete the revolution — as Brissot afterwards said, "to 
set traps for the king, to expose his bad faith, and his relations 
with the emigrant nobles"; while many of the ConstitutionaHsts, 
especially Lafayette, thought that war would strengthen the 
Constitution by diverting men's minds from home troubles ! 
Crusading zeal for liberty carried all before it, even though the 
clear-sighted Robespierre foretold the danger of a war managed 
by "aristocrats who could not be trusted"; but Robespierre, 
Danton, and some others of the extreme Left were unable, even 
at the Jacobins' Club, to restrain the war party, headed by 
Brissot. The war craze was kept at fever heat by armed bands 
of the emigrant nobles at Coblentz and Treves, threatening to 
reimpose the hated ancient regime on France ; and one of the 
few imprudences of the Emperor Leopold II was to send a 
despatch (Feb. 17), urging the French people to dehver them- 
selves from the war party. His sudden death (March i) 
placed over the Hapsburg dominions, and on the Imperial 
throne, the young Francis II, who was not averse from war; 
and when the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dumouriez, 
demanded that the Austrian alliance with Prussia should be 
suspended, he replied that this should be done when France 
compensated the German princes for the loss of their rights in 



TV.] The Girondins and Europe. 65 

Alsace, and the Pope for the loss of Avignon. On April 20, 
1792, the Girondin ministers brought Louis to propose a 
declaration of war against the King of Bohemia and Hungary, 
which the Assembly passed almost unanimously; as also, a 
month later, against the kingdom of Sardinia. Thus inconsider- 
ately was begun the most tremendous series of wars known to 
civilised nations — wars which, though propagating the revo- 
lution throughout Central and Southern Europe, were to bring 
back France to a military despotism wielded first by a secret 
Committee, then by the Directory, and finally by the great 
soldier of the revolution, Buonaparte. 

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dumouriez, sprung 
like Mirabeau from the new noblesse of Provence, resembled 
him also in his wide range of talents, his quick perception, and 
his secret desire to found a strong monarchy on a democratic 
basis. Foreseeing that this war would be one against old 
Europe, his plan was a defensive campaign where France had 
definite or defensible frontiers — as the Pyrenees, and upper 
Rhine, — but a vigorous offensive where — as in the Austrian 
Netherlands and Savoy — no natural obstacles opposed her 
advance. Thus grew up the idea of the ' natural frontiers,'— 
ocean, Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine — which has played so great 
a part in French politics. 

Though the Belgians welcomed the French invaders, yet 
these were so undisciplined that two columns fled at the first 
skirmish, scarcely firing a shot. At Paris also difficulties 
thickened. The State had to meet its expenses by partly 
repudiating its debts, and by issuing more asstgnafs ; but the 
Girondin Ministry (except Dumouriez) plotted to turn these 
disorders against the monarchy. It deprived the king of his 
royal guard, and proposed that a camp of 'federates' from 
the Departments should be formed outside Paris; but Louis 
firmly forbade this. He also vetoed a bill for banishing non- 
juring priests, and dismissed the Girondin Ministry (June 13). 
F. R. 5 



66 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

The revolutionists of the Paris faubourgs, seeing their chance, 
organised a demonstration against the king. A vast crowd 
burst into the Tuiieries, and vainly demanded the withdrawal 
of his veto. Louis remained calm and inflexible, when 
conscience was at stake; and Petion finally persuaded the 
mob to withdraw (June 20). Lafayette, realising too late the 
fatal trend of events, came from his army to crush anarchy at 
its source, the Jacobins' and Cordeliers' clubs; but the Court 
disowned his effort, orderly citizens kept timidly in their 
homes, the National Guard was now full of sansculottes', and 
the last chance of maintaining order was lost. 

A month later came the Prussian declaration of war, 
followed by a foolish manifesto issued on July 27, against his 
better judgment, by the commander of the Prussian forces, 
the Duke of Brunswick, that Paris should suffer condign 
vengeance if it injured its king and queen. These unhappy 
sovereigns were now distracted between hope of Prussian 
succour, and despair at the menaces of the Paris revolutionists; 
but while Brunswick set about a methodical plan of campaign, 
the revolutionists rushed on their prey. They were reinforced 
by 500 men of Marseilles, who, at the call of Barbaroux, 
marched through France chanting the ' Marseillaise,' to strike 
down the "tyrant"; and in Paris a new revolutionary power — 
the Paris Commune — was formed by members from the 48 
' sections,' which began to usurp the powers of the legal 
municipality. 

At dawn on Aug. 10, vast crowds, headed by the Marseillais, 
the men of Brest, and other 'federates^' closed around the 
Tuiieries palace, defended by about 1000 Swiss Guards, and 
a larger number of National Guards. Many of these were 
disaffected, and when their commander Mandat, a Consti- 
tutionalist, was ensnared and slain by the new Commune, 
resistance seemed hopeless. Urgently pressed to seek refuge 
with the National Assembly, Louis at last consented, hoping, 



IV.] The Girondins and Europe. 6"/ 

as ever, to avoid bloodshed by surrender ; but his hope that 
violence would be avoided was vain. He had left no orders 
for his gallant Swiss. They patiently held their ground under 
many provocations. Two shots fired by the mob at last drew 
from them a volley and a successful charge : but in the midst 
of a splendid resistance they received an order from the luck- 
less king to retire to their barracks. Breaking up under the 
hot fusillade, they were relentlessly pursued, and all who stood 
their ground at the Tuileries were cut down by the infuriated 
mob, which then sacked the palace, killing every man found 
there. Meanwhile the Assembly (or rather the 284 members 
who dared to show themselves) provisionally dethroned the 
king, and restored three Girondins to office, with Danton as 
Minister of Justice. Another National Assembly — the " Con- 
vention" — was to be elected by all men of over 25 years of 
age, to decide on the form of government for the future. The 
royal family was soon lodged in the 'Temple' and guarded by 
the all-powerful Paris Commune. 

That the loth of August was the victory, not of the 
Girondin idealists, but of the desperadoes of the Commune, 
was soon shown by the terrible September massacres. The 
new revolutionary Commune seized the control over the police 
of Paris, over its prisons, and its barriers : it dictated its will 
to the moribund Assembly, and sent commissioners to the 
armies. These were in dire disorder; for Lafayette, after 
failing in an attempt to turn his army and the north-eastern 
districts against Paris, now fled over the frontier, with Lameth 
and many other officers. The Prussians, accompanied by a 
force of French emigrant nobles, took Longwy, and on Sept. 2 
the fortress of Verdun surrendered to them ; while in the west 
the peasants of La Vendee began to rise in arms for their 
king and their faith. It seemed that France, without any 
real government or well organised armies, must fall beneath 
the invasion, and that too though crowds of volunteers enlisted 

5—2 



6S The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

to die for the country. This distracting news was the excuse 
for, though not the cause of, the September massacres in Paris. 

The records of the Commune show a careful preparation 
for this event. Its executive committee estabHshed a tribunal 
to decree summary justice, ordered suspects to be kept in its 
prisons as " hostages," hired a band of desperadoes, ordered 
the barriers of Paris to be closed, made a house to house 
search for suspects ; while everywhere the rumour ran that, 
after the patriots had departed to fight the invaders, the 
aristocrats with their bands of brigands would hold another 
St Bartholomew. All was now ready. On Sept. 2 — 6 the 
paid agents of the Commune methodically "purged the 
prisons" of all who were thought to be aristocrats, though 
a few suspects were released by order of the tribunal. The 
National Guard and the police "had no orders" to stop these 
orgies; the National Assembly and one or two of the Ministers 
{7iot Danton, Minister of Justice) feebly protested. France 
shuddered, but turned to face her invaders. 

" Oil and vinegar, fire and water, Prussians and Austrians, 
are united to carry war among 26 millions of men" : so wrote 
Young in 1792. The Duke of Brunswick was equally appre- 
hensive: he thought it unsafe to attempt in 1792 anything 
more than the reduction of the fortresses on the Meuse ; but 
the Prussian king, Frederick William II, ardent in the cause 
of monarchy, desired to press on to Paris, though he knew 
that his troops might soon be needed for more profitable work 
in Poland. This division of opinion at Prussian headquarters 
gave time for a genius to infuse a new spirit into the ill- 
organised French troops. Dumouriez, rallying the fragments 
of the armies on the Belgian frontier, marched, as ordered by 
the War Minister, Servan, to seize the position of the Argonne, 
a low range of clay hills then clad with forests. The invaders 
seized one of the five forest defiles, and Brunswick, by dis- 
regarding the raw levies in his rear, and pressing on for Paris, 



IV.] The Giroiidins and Europe. 69 

might have drawn them into the open. He shrank from such 
a departure from rules, faced round, and attacked the greater 
part of the French forces on the hill of Valmy. These, 
animated by their leader, Kellermann, firmly kept their ground, 
and Brunswick, afraid of losing too many men, called off his 
troops. It was a cannonade rather than a battle : the troops 
never came to close quarters, but the moral effect was immense. 
Goethe, who was with the Prussian army, truly said ''From this 
day and this hour dates a new epoch in the history of the world." 

The results of Valmy would not have been so decisive, 
if the action of Russia in Polish affairs had not called for 
Prussian intervention there : so Brunswick soon led his troops, 
enfeebled by dysentery, back towards the Rhine, after coming 
to a secret understanding with Dumouriez to suspend hostiUties. 
The French general was also anxious to keep his army intact, 
so as to carry out his pet scheme of invading the Austrian 
Netherlands. The Austrians, always weakened by the dis- 
affection of their subjects there, had been foiled by the 
obstinate resistance of Lille and Thionville; and now, on 
Dumouriez' advance with superior forces, they fell back on 
the villages of Jemmappes and Cuesmes, in front of Mons. 
After desperate charges on both sides, the French troops, 
advancing to the strains of the Marseillaise, drove the Austrians 
out (Nov. 6). This great victory laid the Austrian Netherlands 
and Liege at their feet, — the inhabitants everywhere welcoming 
them, until fraternity was found to be a mask for spoliation by 
the French commissioners. 

Nice and Savoy were in that autumn overrun by the 
French almost without striking a blow. The Savoyards were 
almost entirely French : their land is cut off from the rest 
of the kingdom of Sardinia by the huge barrier of the Alps. 
The kings of the House of Savoy rarely visited the cradle 
of their race. The writings of Rousseau, the sight of Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternity in France, the hatred of the old feudal 



/O The RevoliLtionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

dues, the gabelles, the corvees, in a word, of Piedmontese 
supremacy — these had made Savoy French, before Montes- 
quiou's troops occupied it (Nov., 1792). At that same time 
the Italians in the county of Nice made no resistance. Itahan 
nationality still slumbered. 

German patriotism seemed equally dead, when the dashing 
French general Custine, pressing on to the Rhine, seized the 
strong fortress of Mainz (Oct. 21), and for a time occupied the 
free city of Frankfurt. The Illuminati everywhere welcomed 
them; and it seemed that the policy "peace to peoples: war 
to governments" would easily overthrow the old Empire. 
Dumouriez' statesmanlike plan of seizing the "natural frontiers," 
and surrounding France by friendly democratic republics, 
might possibly have prevented the extension of the war ; but 
unfortunately power at Paris was passing into the hands of 
the extreme party, to whom all compromise was treachery. 

The National Convention which met at Paris (Sept. 21, 
1792) at once proclaimed the Republic, and from that autumnal 
equinox a new revolutionary calendar was soon to be dated, in 
which the decade replaced the week, while terms conceived in 
a naturalistic spirit dethroned the old Roman names of the 
months. Everywhere we see the influence of Rousseau in the 
abolition of the chaotic social arrangements based on custom, 
and the foundation of simple uniform methods on a natural 
basis : thus, in place of the old weights and measures, varying 
in many districts, came the metric system based on the metre, 
with ten as the sole multiple. Amidst all the strifes of its 
parties, committees of the Convention quietly laid the basis of 
the new social order by a splendid scheme of National Educa- 
tion (drawn up by Condorcet on Rousseau's ideas) in primary 
schools, central schools, and a normal school for the instruction 
of teachers. Another committee worked at the Civil Code 
(afterwards methodized, under Napoleon's orders), which aimed 
at founding the whole social life on the principle of equality: 



IV,] The Girondins and Europe. 71 

thus, it decreed compulsory equality of inheritance by all the 
children of a family, a law which — though since slightly modi- 
fied — has diffused wealth but restricted population in France. 

The general aims of the Convention may indeed be summed 
up in Camille Desmoulins' fine phrase — *'to make the people"; 
but in their application of Rousseau's theories by methods fully 
as rigid, and almost as faulty, as his reasoning, the revolu- 
tionists aroused strife at home and abroad which wrecked their 
hopes, and led France back, not to a social millennium, but to a 
military despotism. The Girondins, who at first generally had 
a majority in the Convention, soon showed their powerlessness 
in face of the more determined Mountain and the Clubs. They 
failed to drag the September murderers to justice, and to carry 
out the enrolment of a Departmental Guard for the Convention. 
Useless attacks on Robespierre and Danton only brought back 
the charge that they were plotting to divide the republic " one 
and indivisible," a charge which was to be their ruin. Even 
their culture and talents made them suspected by safisadoites, 
to whom Marat's sordid rags and Hebert's obscenity seemed 
the signs of a true patriot. Every incident was skilfully used 
against their ministers : thus, when Roland neglected to verify 
in presence of witnesses the papers found in Louis' "iron 
chest," he was charged with tampering with them. 

These documents fatally compromised Louis XVI, and 
the Mountain saw that his trial would further embarrass the 
Girondins, who had some regard for justice and mercy. An 
enthusiastic follower of Robespierre, the young St Just, thus 
expressed the views of the extreme Left : " The death of the 
tyrant is necessary to reassure those who fear that one day they 
will be punished for their daring, and also to terrify those who 
have not yet renounced the monarchy. A people cannot found 
liberty when it respects the memory of its chains." Robes- 
pierre, as usual, spoke in the spirit of Rousseau — "When a 
nation has been forced into insurrection, it returns to a state of 



72 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

nature with regard to the tyrant. There is no longer any law 
but the safety of the people." The Convention nevertheless 
decided that Louis should be tried before it. The Jacobins 
packed the galleries, to intimidate those deputies who leaned 
towards mercy. In vain Thomas Paine asked that Louis should 
be banished to America. In vain did several Girondins pro- 
pose to refer sentence to the primary assemblies of voters. 
Their party was too disunited to maintain this motion. Though 
it was once carried, it was soon rescinded, as likely to spread 
discord in France. The Jacobins, small in numbers, but clear 
in their views and unscrupulous in their methods, pressed 
for the king's death with the double aim of discrediting the 
undecided Girondin party and hurrying on the revolution to 
further extremes. They succeeded. The last of the Girondin 
attempts to save the life of Louis, viz. to postpone the execu- 
tion, fell through, owing to the divisions of their party ; and 
Danton's whispered comment — "Your party is ruined" — re- 
flected the opinion of all France. Finally the Convention 
voted openly, member by member; and most of the Girondins, 
from fear of the galleries, voted for death. Even so it was 
carried only by a majority of one. The silence of horror which 
speedily followed the execution (Jan. 21, 1793) showed that it 
outraged the feelings even of Paris. Men knew that the 
mutterings of La Vendee presaged a civil war. *'We have 
burnt our ships behind us" exultantly cried Marat after the 
deed ; and Danton defied the Powers of Europe to fight — 
" Let us fling down to the kings the head of a king as gage of 
battle." 

It is a mistake as serious as it is wide-spread to suppose 
that the war proclaimed by France against England (Feb. i) 
was solely a war of principles between a republic and a 
monarchy. To a large extent it was a question affecting 
material interests — whether French influence should or should 
not be paramount in the whole of the Netherlands, Dutch as 



IV ] TJie Girondins and Europe. 73 

well as Austrian. It is true that general provocations had a 
considerable effect in embittering the controversy- Thus, in 
the exultation caused by the conquest of Savoy, Nice, and the 
Austrian Netherlands, the Convention abandoned the procla- 
mation of the Constituent Assembly, which forbade wars of 
aggrandisement. It further passed a decree (Nov. 1792) 
offering assistance to peoples who rose against their govern- 
ments ; and a month later declared that : " Wherever French 
armies shall come, all taxes, tithes, and privileges of rank are to 
be abolished, all existing authorities annulled, and provisional 
administrators elected by universal suffrage. The property of 
the fallen government, of the privileged classes and their 
adherents, is to be placed under French protection...." But a 
special challenge was also given to England by a decree 
(Nov. 16) throwing open the navigation of the Scheldt to 
all nations. By the Triple Alliance of 1788 we had guaranteed 
to the House of Orange the Dutch Netherlands with all 
their rights j among these was the control of the lower Scheldt 
in Dutch territory. This was not a mere abstract question of 
natural versus treaty rights; but the French, then besieging 
Antwerp citadel, wished to make that port a station for their 
navy ; and French warships sailed up the Scheldt to bombard 
the citadel. 

Hitherto, every principle of sound policy, domestic and 
foreign, had prescribed to England a pacific policy; and Pitt 
had maintained a strict neutrality, unmoved by all the diatribes 
of Burke against the revolution. In the spring of 1792 he 
had reduced our army and navy ; and his great desire was to 
reduce our national debt, foster trade with France, and uphold 
Turkey and Poland by diplomatic means against the attempts 
of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Armed with a secret under- 
standing with Prussia, Catherine II, in the autumn of 1792, was 
arranging a second partition of Poland. As for the Emperor 
P'rancis II, he might, as a set-off to his neighbours' gains, 



74 '^Ji^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

acquire Bavaria instead of his Netherlands — if he could now 
recover these, so as to offer them in exchange to the Elector of 
Bavaria. Now, both the partition and the exchange were 
strongly objected to by Great Britain, it being a cardinal 
principle of English foreign policy to support a weak State like 
Poland against powerful and aggressive neighbours, and also to 
keep the Netherlands in the hands of a generally friendly Power 
such as Austria, as a firm barrier against French encroachments. 
Pitt therefore desired peace, so as to leave England free 
to resist these revolutionary schemes of the monarchs. At the 
end of November, he was still desirous of recognising the 
young French Republic if it would desist from opening the 
Scheldt; but ChauveHn, the French agent in London, in order 
to enhance his reputation as an ardent republican, irritated our 
government by intriguing with the clubs of English malcontents, 
by striving to stir up revolt in Ireland, and by the assertion 
that we could not trust our militia. It was in answer to this 
that our government speedily enrolled the militia and increased 
the regular forces to 27,000 sailors and 17,000 soldiers. Efforts 
were made by some persons on both sides, however, to arrive 
at a pacific settlement. Miles, who had consistently striven to 
form an Anglo-French alliance, warned an assistant agent who 
had just been sent from Paris, Maret, that " if the Executive 
Power in Paris thinks of meddling with our internal affairs or 
seeks to sow dissension in England, this alliance, so much 
desired by all sensible people, will never be realised"; but 
Maret sorrowfully informed him that though orders were sent 
to Dumouriez not to invade Holland, yet war with England 
was inevitable not for any reason of external politics, but "in 
order to get rid of 300,000 armed brigands, who ought not to 
be allowed to re-enter France." Other evidence points in the 
same direction, viz. that Pitt desired to bring about a general 
peace, and, if possible, an Anglo-French alliance, while the 
French Convention and people, flushed with the brilliant 



IV.] The Girondins and Ettrope. 75 

victories of Dumouriez and Custine, saw less danger in war 
than in the return of their armies. A member of the French 
Convention wrote to Miles Dec. 9, 1792 in this sense. — "I tell 
you again that war is inevitable, and that if we had no cause of 
complaint against the Cabinet of St James, it would be necessary 
from policy and for our internal security to break with it, 
rather than consent to a general peace, which, I conceive, is the 
principal object of your minister. I am not insensible to the 
difficulties and dangers of a general war, and that whenever 
England declares against us, we shall have to contend with all 
Europe ; but you seem to have a very imperfect idea of our 
resources, and of the wonderful enthusiasm which prevails 
throughout France. ...It is Mdme Roland's opinion, as well as 
mine, that we cannot make peace with the Emperor without 
danger to the Republic, and that it would be hazardous to 
recall an army, flushed with victory and impatient to gather 
fresh laurels, into the heart of a country whose commerce and 
manufactures have lost their activity, and which would leave 
the disbanded multitude without resources or employment." 

We notice here the extension of that policy which was to 
turn Europe into a gigantic battle-field and blast the efforts 
of the friends of liberty. Seeing that past dangers had only 
goaded on the revolutionists to fiercer energy at Paris and on 
the frontiers, and believing that the British Government was as 
ripe for overthrow as that of the Hapsburgs, both Girondins and 
Jacobins drifted into a policy which promised further conquests 
abroad and temporary respite from internal strife. Thus, long 
before the advent of Buonaparte, the revolution took that bias 
towards miHtarism which was to propagate its principles abroad 
even while they were being curbed or abrogated in France 
itself. 

On the last day of 1792, the French Minister for the Navy 
sent a letter to the French sea-ports, urging a descent on Eng- 
land to help their brother republicans : " We will hurl thither 



76 



TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 



50,000 caps of liberty, we will plant there the sacred tree of 
Hberty." The menacing attitude of the French Convention 
led to a dignified protest from the British Government. " If 
France really desires peace and friendship (wrote Grenville to 
Chauvelin, Dec. 31) she must show herself disposed to renounce 
her views of aggression and aggrandizement, and confine herself 
within her own territory, without insulting other governments, 
without disturbing their tranquillity, and violating their rights." 
The Executive Council of the Convention held to its point, and 
by the middle of Jan. 1793 was bent on war. The execution 



THE PARTITIONS 
OF 

POLAND. 




Portion acquired by Russia 
,, ,, Prussia 

I' I, ,, Austria ^^< 



Dates of Partitions, thus:- 1795 



Sia7tford's Geog^. Enabi London.. 

Plan of "Partitions of Poland.''' 



IV.] TJie Gtrondins and Europe. yy 

of Louis made it certain. Chauvelin was ordered to leave 
England; and the irrevocable step was taken when the Con- 
vention unanimously declared war on England and Holland 
(Feb. I, 1793). 

These events were to react fatally on Poland. England, 
instead of resisting the further partition of that unhappy State, 
had thenceforth to support the central Powers against France : 
to defend the Dutch Netherlands was now her first thought. 
In May, 1792, a Russian army under Suv6roff had entered 
Poland. Overpowered by superior force, the Diet abrogated 
the Constitution of 1791, and soon afterwards the second 
Partition was carried out. Austria took no part, but Prussian 
troops co-operated with the Russians, and these two Powers 
divided the spoils, Prussia receiving Posen, Thorn, and the 
districts along the Wartha, while Catharine II seized nearly all 
the land between the upper Dwina and Moldavia. The over- 
throw of the Polish Constitution of 1791 dealt as fatal a blow 
to ordered Hberty, as the downfall of the sister Constitution of 
France. Regenerated Poland might have been a solid barrier 
between Prussia, Russia and Austria. The European system, 
strengthened by the events of 1791, now fast crumbled away 
beneath the unscrupulous intrigues of autocrats in the East, 
and revolutionary violence in the West. 



CHAPTER V. 

The Jacobins and the First Coalition. 

"Solon's weak confidence threw Athens into fresh slavery, while the 
severity of Lycurgus founded the republic of Sparta on an immovable 
basis." — {Decree of the Cotnmitiee of Public Safety). 

"Without war the republic would not have existed": such 
were Louvet's words in his attack on Robespierre. The 
republic was now to be strengthened by a war against kings. 
When Spain and iihe Empire joined the Coalition in March, 
1793, France was at war with more than half Europe. 

The connection between panic on the frontiers and excesses 
at Paris had been shown in the preceding summer : it is even 
more closely traceable in 1793. The Austrians, now making a 
great effort to regain their Netherlands, decisively defeated 
Dumouriez at Neerwinden (March 18), and drove out the 
French as quickly as these had overrun the land. There was, 
in truth, little similarity between the Belgian revolution of 
1789 — 90 and that of France. The former was a strongly 
national and conservative reaction against the philosophic in- 
novations of Joseph II ; and the Belgians soon evinced as little 
desire for the fraternal embraces of Danton and other French 
Commissioners as for confiscation of Church lands, and imposi- 
tion of worthless assignats as payment. The change from the 
rule of Francis II to that of their ' liberators ' was speedily found 



Chap, v.] The Jacobins and the First Coalition. 79 

to yield no immediate benefits. The statesmanlike Dmiiouriez 
had not only protested against the mad decrees of the Con- 
vention and the spoliation of the Belgians, but he had vainly 
attempted to save Louis. The War Minister, Pache, now sent 
him bitter recriminations and no supplies. Determined to 
overthrow the regicides, and if possible to place the young 
Louis Philippe on the throne, he entered into secret negotia- 
tions with the enemy, imprisoned the Commissioners sent from 
Paris to arrest him, and failing to gain over his troops, fled 
to the Austrians with Louis Philippe and some 800 men 
(April 3). 

Had space permitted, the connection between an increase 
of national danger and the need of a stronger control over the 
executive powers might have been fully detailed. Suffice it to 
say that the Legislative Assembly had composed from its 20 
committees a Commission to supervise the Feuillant Ministries, 
and aid in overthrowing the monarchy. The Convention also, 
at the close of 1792, had formed a central Committee of 
General Defence of 25 members ; but after Neerwinden a small 
secret body was needed for vigorous action. *' Secrecy is the 
soul of government," said Barere. "We must estabUsh the 
despotism of liberty " cried Marat " to crush the despotism of 
kings." Appalled by the news from Belgium, the Convention 
now established (April 6) a secret Committee, at first of nine 
members, to control the acts of the Girondin Ministry. This 
Committee, known as the Committee of Public Safety, was 
also to keep a tight hold on each army by sending one 
or more Commissioners to stimulate the devotion of the 
soldiers to the republic, to examine and report on the conduct 
of the commander, and thereby to secure the dependence of 
the military on the civil power. St Just once expressed to the 
Committee his fear that some ambitious general would be fatal 
to the republic ; whereupon Barere replied that this would be 
impossible while the Committee existed. The apparatus of 



So The Revohttionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

despotism was now nearly perfected, and on the collapse of the 
Committee it would pass into the hands of any future govern- 
ment. 

For the present these powers, and the disposal of a secret 
fund, enabled the Committee of Public Safety to absorb the 
functions of the twenty special committees. A weekly report to 
the Convention placed it under nominal control ; but the later 
Committees, consisting of ten or twelve members, were able 
to carry out their policy when acting in concert ; and the 
Convention soon became the slave of the Committee. As 
for the Ministry, it was left with a mere shadow of authority. 

There was also a secret Committee of General Security, 
dating from Aug. 1789, which now enjoyed greatly increased 
powers. It controlled the police, received the reports of 
informers, ordered the arrest of conspirators or 'suspects,' 
and drew up the lists of those who were to be tried by the 
Revolutionary Tribunal. As its powers threatened to conflict 
with those of the sister Committee, Danton proposed and 
carried a decree (Sept. 13, 1793) that its members, as well as 
those of all the committees, should be named by the Com 
mittee of Public Safety, which thus ultimately controlled all 
the executive functions of the State. For all serious cases the 
two Committees met together; and they soon found plenty 
of work for the new Revolutionary Tribunal and its engine. 
According to a mot of the day — The French became republican 
"a coups de giiilloiine.^'' 

The breach between the Girondins and the Mountain 
yawned wider every day. The former had lost ground during 
the trial of the king. Dumouriez' treason was their death- 
blow ; for he had been one of them. In vain did they charge 
Danton with Orleanism and complicity with the traitor. It 
added one more powerful voice to their enemies; for Danton and 
his friends formed the majority in the first Committee of Public 
Safety. Again, when the extraordinary 'maximum' law aimed 



v.] The Jacobins and the First Coalition. 8i 

at rigorously limiting the price of provisions, the opposition of 
the Girondists (who knew some political economy) roused the 
fury of the hungry mob. After a last vain attempt to quell the 
disorders, the Convention was surrounded by the Paris National 
Guards, and was compelled to give up the 22 Girondin leaders. 
Madame Roland was also arrested. Some of them escaped to 
arouse the Departments against the mob-rule in Paris ; but the 
national instinct, except in the royalist west and north, forbade 
a rising against the new vigorous central power. Unity alone 
could save France from the invaders. A Girondin and royalist 
rising at Caen was a sorry failure ; and the only result of this 
last flicker of Girondin idealism was that it inspired a beautiful 
Norman girl, Charlotte Corday, to go to Paris and stab Marat 
to the heart. This deed, again, reacted fatally on the Girondins 
and Moderates. Guadet, Barbaroux, Petion, and Buzot were 
hunted down as traitors in the Gironde Department. The 
Girondin party fell because it strove after revolutionary aims 
while rejecting any resort to mob violence. It could not cope 
with the storm which its war policy and overthrow of the 
monarchy had raised the year before. 

In revolutions things tend to extremes. This same month 
of July 1793, so fatal to the cause of the ideal republic, saw the 
Dantonists or ' indulgents ' lose their hold on the Committee of 
Public Safety, the majority of which now became Robespierrist; 
but, while at Paris power was being seized by the extreme 
faction, the royaHst reaction was gaining strength in the south 
and west. At Marseilles and Lyons the citizens, indignant at 
the violence of the Jacobins who had just seized power, rose in 
arms, and after sharp fights restored order. Lyons became the 
centre of resistance to the Paris committees; but a decree, 
offering it as plunder to its captors, drew a great revolutionary 
force, which reduced it (Oct.), decimated its inhabitants, and 
renamed it " Commune affranchie." By the autumn the Jaco- 
bin triumph, checked in the spring, was complete, except in the 
F. R. 6 



82 TJie Revohitioiiary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

west of France. There the simple peasants of La Vendee, 
attached to the monarchy, the Church, and to the nobles who 
lived among them, rose in arms (March, 1793) against the 
regicide republic, which was banishing the orthodox priests, and 
striving to enrol their own sons in its armies. If they had to 
fight, they would fight against it, not for it. Luring column after 
column of the blue National Guards into the depths of the 
Bocage forest south of Nantes, they defeated them with im- 
mense loss. They took Saumur, attacked Nantes and Angers, 
and tried unsuccessfully to spread the revolt into Brittany and 
Maine. Even so, it was not till the autumn that they were 
checked by Kleber with his brave troops, who had had to 
surrender Mainz to the allies. The want of a thorough and 
intelligent organisation ever paralysed the royalist efforts. It 
was not till after decisive defeats of the Vende'an royalists that 
Brittany and Maine began to rise against the republic in 
isolated revolts, which soon degenerated into mere brigandage 
or choiiannerie. 

Checks in the spring and summer, followed by triumphs in 
the autumn and winter, also marked the course of the war on 
the frontiers. If the troops of the fifteen States then at war 
with France had been vigorously led, they might have achieved 
as much as the half-armed Vendean peasants ; but Poland still 
interested the Eastern Powers more than France; and after 
Neerwinden the only important successes of the allies were the 
capture of Conde, Valenciennes and Mainz. Corsica, under 
the patriot Paoli, had thrown off the French yoke, Piedmontese 
and Spaniards were passing the Alps and Pyrenees, and the 
royalists of Toulon admitted Admiral Hood and an English 
fleet to hold that great arsenal for Louis XVII (Aug.). These 
reverses only incited the Jacobins to fiercer energy. Arms, 
organisation, commanders, ammunition — everything was want- 
ing, except zeal. "Better that 25,000,000 beings should perish, 
than the republic one and indivisible": such were the words of 



v.] The Jacobins and the First Coalition, 83 

one of the commissioners of the Convention, whose "powers 
had no hmit save that of the pubHc activity." Arms were 
forged. Saltpetre works were organised by the chemist, 
Chaptal. Military camps were formed by the great Carnot, 
who had signalised his entry into the Committee of PubHc 
Safety (Aug.) by calling for a levee en masse; and soon 13 
armies, of 750,000 men in all, began to press back the disunited 
allies. The French, having the advantage of a central position, 
first forced the English and Hanoverians to raise the siege of 
Dunkirk : in October the Austrians were defeated at Wattignies 
by General Jourdan ; and, at the close of the year 1793, the 
young St Just, breathing his own fanaticism into the half-clad 
levies of the republic, headed the charges which drove the 
Austrians from Weissenburg in the north of Alsace. In the 
south fortune also favoured the revolutionists, who recaptured 
Toulon from the English and royalist forces (Dec. 17). There 
the young Napoleon Buonaparte was virtually in command of 
the besiegers' artillery, and gave proof of that skill and deter- 
mination which changed the face of the world; and yet in the 
official report his name appears only side by side with officers 
of small note. The close of 1793 saw France freed from 
foreign foes — an astonishing change which foreshadowed the 
triumphs of French revolutionary fanaticism, wielded by a 
vigorous dictatorship, over the disunited governments of 
Europe. 

Meanwhile at Paris the Terror had been ever increasing. 
Along with the collapse of public credit the assignats fell in 
actual value, and prices of goods rose in proportion. It was in 
vain for the Convention to order a more stringent tariff of 
maximum prices. Specie was hidden, or steadily flowed out of 
the country; for forced loans on the wealthy and progressive 
taxation scared it away. Speculators and forestallers were 
denounced, and often guillotined, for causing a scarcity of ready 
money and dearness of food; but owing to the collapse of 

6—2 



84 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

public credit and the persistent fall in the exchange, money 
continued to leave the country; and the economic situation 
was not improved when the Convention made the French 
tariff more and more stringent, and finally adopted the heroic 
remedy of prohibiting all foreign commerce (Oct. — Dec. 1793). 
The appalling dangers from domestic treason and the 
triumphs of the invaders in August had but served to re- 
kindle Jacobin fanaticism and reinforce its despotic power. 
When, in the early days of September, the Committee of Public 
Safety was blamed for its want of vigour, the accusers, Billaud- 
Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, were promptly added to its 
number. The entry of these sombre blood-thirsty fanatics 
conciliated the Paris Commune and redoubled the Terror. 
Chaumette, another man of this faction now predominant in 
the Commune, proposed and carried through the Convention 
the infamous Law of Suspects (Sept. 17), subjecting to arrest 
all courtiers and members of the old privileged classes or the 
Parlements, all speculators in corn or in assig7tats, and (later 
on) those who spoke of the misfortunes of the republic and 
the shortcomings of its authorities. Finally, on the motion of 
St Just (Oct. 10), the government of France was declared to be 
"revolutionary" until the general peace. The Revolutionary 
Tribunal was divided into two sections, to double its speed ; 
and as the property of victims was confiscated to the State, the 
deficit was partly met — for a time. As Barere, the versatile 
reporter to the Committee, remarked — '*We coin money by the 
guillotine." Its first notable victim was the widowed Marie 
Antoinette, her hair blanched ever since the agonies of the 
flight to Varennes. She nobly repelled the insults of Hebert at 
the trial, and died calmly, leaving the charge to her son never 
to revenge the wrongs of his parents. The boy was slowly 
done to death by the brutalities of his keepers at the Temple. 
The remaining Girondin chiefs were next put on their trial, and 
when Vergniaud's noble oratory made the issue doubtful, the 



v.] The jfacobins and the First Coalition. 85 

trial was closed, and they were condemned, Oct. 29. Philippe 
Egalite, Madame Roland, Bailly, Lavoisier, Barnave, the 
generals Custine and Houchard, Manuel, Jourdan coiipe-tete^ the 
du Barry, mistress of Louis XV, and Madame Elisabeth, sister 
of Louis XVI, these names of victims will suffice to show the 
impartiality of Jacobin vengeance on royalists, Feuillants and 
republicans alike, on vice and virtue, on men of thought and 
men of blood. To have done something worthy of death if 
the royalists ever regained power, — this was the only sure pass- 
port to safety before the Tribunal. On the news of the capture 
of Toulon, all citizens were held to be suspects who did not 
show decided joy. And yet a royalist who passed through 
many dangers noted that as they increased, so did the faculty 
of disregarding them. Certain it is, that throughout the Reign 
of Terror the theatres of Paris were full. 

Amidst these horrors, the Committee of Public Safety had 
profited by its victories to definitely constitute the new govern- 
ment, which its emissaries, the omnipotent ' representatives on 
mission,' had already enforced in all parts of France. In Nov. 
1793, the Convention, on its recommendation, had sternly re- 
pressed the almost unlimited powers of local self-government 
which the Constituent Assembly had given to the Communes and 
Departments. That excessive devolution of power having led 
to widespread anarchy, there was now a sharp rebound towards 
centralisation. Henceforth the communes or municipalities 
were on every tenth day to report to a larger area, the district, 
how they had executed the revolutionary laws or measures 
enacted at Paris by the Convention or the two secret Com- 
mittees ; and in place of the elected procureurs-syndics of each 
district, executive authority was to be wielded by a national 
agent, appointed by the central power at Paris. Except the 
apportioning of taxes, no important duty was left to the larger 
areas, the Departments. In a word, local self-government was 
succeeded by an almost complete centraHsation of power at 



86 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Paris ; and the publication of a decree in the new official 
^Bulletin des Lois' sufficed to render its execution valid. 
France was, in fact, ruled by the two secret Committees sitting 
at the Tuileries. 

But while the government was fast becoming an almost 
irresponsible despotism, France seemed on the verge of moral 
dissolution. 

The revolution passed to its lowest circle of horrors when 
Hebert and Chaumette — all-powerful in the Paris Commune — 
installed atheism by dances and the hymn of Reason in Notre 
Dame. Their followers outraged the tombs of the kings at 
St Denis, and steeples were ordered to be demolished as an 
insult to equality ! Robespierre, seeking to save the revo- 
lution from disgrace, with Danton's aid finally sent these men 
to the guillotine (March 24). 

Danton himself fell next. He was not in the secret Com- 
mittees, and had for a time retired in disgust. The astute 
Robespierre now carried with him the Committees and the 
Jacobins, and, on an insidious charge of complicity with the 
Orleanists and Dumouriez, crushed his burly rival who had 
breasted his way to the front by sheer strength, and was now 
desirous of retiring to rest on his laurels. With Danton fell 
the witty DesmouHns, and several other ^ indulgent s' guilty of 
pity or remorse (April 5). 

The unwearied labours of M. Robinet and M. Aulard have 
recently proved that the charges of peculation showered on 
Danton by Mdme Roland and others are devoid of foundation 
and that his property did not increase during the revolution. 
M. Aulard has also discovered the copies of his accounts sub- 
mitted to the Executive Council, which seem clear and satis- 
factory. The secret funds which he administered to stimulate 
the national resistance seem to have been so effectively used as 
to leave little room for malversation. The efforts to clear 
Danton of complicity with the September massacres are less 



v.] The Jacobins and the First Coalition. 87 

successful ; but it may be freely granted that he Avas a straight- 
forward zealot who knew that the ardent revolutionists were in 
a minority, and believed it necessary to strike terror into the 
royalists. With his fall France lost a statesman who could 
possibly have dominated the course of events. To the very 
end he protested against needless severity in France and the 
reckless policy which banded Europe against her. It was he 
who inspired the decree of April 13, 1793, by which the Con- 
vention declared that it would not interfere with the affairs of 
other peoples. 

Robespierre and his Committee were now supreme. The 
Council of Ministers was replaced by twelve Commissions 
dependent on the all-powerful Committee of Public Safety, 
in which Robespierre, Couthon, and St Just formed the domi- 
nant 'triumvirate.' Never had there been seen so complete 
a concentration of power in modern Europe. An order from 
the Committee sufficed to stop the brutal orgies at Nantes 
and Lyons ; but it was only so as to methodize the Terror 
at Paris. Rousseau had declared that atheists ought to be 
banished, as devoid of virtue and the social instincts ; so now, 
his high priest caused the Convention to decree that the idea 
of a Supreme Being and of the immortality of the soul was a 
continual appeal to justice. This return to deism was cele- 
brated in a festival, at which Robespierre appeared in ecstasy 
as the saviour of humanity. The social millennium was surely 
now at hand ! 

Murmurs arose at his dictatorial pretensions. To allay 
them, he redoubled the Terror by the Law of Prairial (June, 
1794), framed by him and Couthon alone to render justice 
more expeditious by suppressing witnesses, and giving to the 
Committee of Public Safety the right of sending suspects before 
the Tribunal. The Mountain and most of the members of the 
Committees felt themselves threatened. Many of the Terrorists, 
led by Tallien, finally combined to oppose Robespierre, roused 



88 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the ' sections/ and, victorious in a street fight, sent him and 
his followers, St Just, Couthon, and many others, to the 
guillotine (July 28, or loth Thermidor, 1794). From the law 
of Prairial up to this Thermidorian reaction, i.e. from June 10 
to July 28, as many as 2085 victims fell at Paris. 

Robespierre's career exhibits a singular mixture of philo- 
sophic fervour with mean intrigue. Puny in person, and 
uninspiring in speech, he yet had the power which an honest 
and intense conviction gives to a small nature, even over abler 
men like Danton, who had less definite principles. Efforts 
have been made, and with some success, to show that he was 
at last helplessly pushed along by violent men, who wrenched 
from his hands the law of Prairial, the weapon which he aimed 
at them ; but a comparison of his rise to power with the 
number of victims seems to show that his inflexible fanaticism 
was the mainspring of the Terror. Though his general aim 
to found a republic of the virtues resembled that of the Gi- 
rondins, yet his methods were diametrically opposed. If their 
fall was due to reliance on moral suasion and inability to cope 
with facts, Robespierre's overthrow resulted as naturally from 
the very nature of his attempt, to secure liberty by terrorism. 
"In peace" (he wrote) "the strength of popular government 
is Virtue. Amidst revolution it is both Virtue and Terror — 
virtue, without which terror is fatal, terror, without which 
virtue is powerless." Hence his policy was to methodize the 
Terror by crushing the factions whose clemency might ruin, 
or whose excesses might degrade, the republic. It is, more- 
over, certain that the last excesses of the Terror at Paris were 
regarded by all as the work of Robespierre. Though his 
disposition and his methods showed more of feline than of 
human nature, yet his sincerity of conviction and incorrupti- 
bility in the midst of bribers and bribed, must ever raise him 
above the mere wolves of the clubs and the hyenas of the 
Commune. The young St Just, even more than Robespierre 



v.] The yacobins and the First Coalition. 89 

and Couthon, is a striking instance of fanaticism steeling an 
estimable nature. Firmly believing that the immorality of the 
old regime could only be stamped out in blood, he shared 
with them the hope that the youth of France would be regene- 
rated by a severely Spartan training in the schools of the 
nation, and by the extirpation of all luxury. Unfortunately 
for these men, their social experiment broke down towards 
the end of the guillotine stage, and at the time when they 
were trying to muzzle the bloodhounds whom they had urged 
on. Hence their supremacy remains a frightful example of 
the tyranny of tyrannicides, and the despotism of fanatics in 
the cause of liberty and equality. 

There is one other character in the Committee of Public 
Safety who merits attention — the great Carnot. Though 
M. Aulard's researches have recently established Carnot's 
direct responsibility for its sanguinary deeds, yet it is true 
that his special task was to organise victory, by drilling and 
equipping the vast masses of men who rushed to arms. 
The successes of 1793 were repeated. In June, 1794? 
the French forced the Austrians to retire from the field of 
Fleurus ; and as the English and Prussians gave little help to 
their allies, they had even before the defeat determined to 
evacuate their Netherlands ; for Thugut, the Austrian Chan- 
cellor, looked to Poland as a near and easy prize. Jourdan's 
troops soon entered Coblentz, and occupied the whole left 
bank of the Rhine, where two years before the emigrant nobles 
had gaily prepared to reduce France. " Eight pitched batdes 
gained, 116 towns and 230 forts taken, 90,000 prisoners and 
3,800 cannons captured " — such were the results of the cam- 
paigns of 1794, as stated in the Convention (Oct. 21). At the 
close of the year the French, under Pichegru and Macdonald, 
easily overran the whole of Holland, a severe frost now 
rendering untenable fortresses which had defied the might 
of Louis XIV. In Jan. 1795, Pichegru occupied Amsterdam. 



90 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

The Dutch patriots everywhere welcomed the French ; and 
the new government of the Batavian Repubhc at once sur- 
rendered its ships to the French, without the intervention of 
the legendary squadron of French cavalry on the ice. The 
flight of the Stadtholder to England, and the pursuit of the 
Prussians by Macdonald as far as the Ems (April), dissolved 
Pitt's Triple Alliance between England, Prussia, and Holland, 
and secured French supremacy in Holland — a brilliant contrast 
to the collapse of Louis XVI's Dutch policy in 1787 before 
Prussian arms and English menaces. Almost equally decisive 
were the French successes in the south, where the revolutionists 
now drove Spaniards and Piedmontese back across the Pyrenees 
and Alps. 

The sequel will show how fatal was the contrast between 
the patriotism and devotion of the French armies, and the 
cruelties of the civiHans who disgraced the revolution at 
Paris, Lyons, and Nantes. France was to be found in her 
armies rather than in the factions struggling for power at 
Paris. The great commanders — Hoche, Jourdan, Marceau, 
Kleber, Macdonald, Murat, Davoust, Bernadotte, Massena, 
Moreau, and Buonaparte, — began to rise from the ranks. 
" Victory or the guillotine " : such was the alternative which 
brought the best men to the front, though it sent to the block 
some good generals, as Houchard and Custine. In the first 
three years of the war as many as 373 French generals 
resigned, or were cashiered. In striking contrast to this revo- 
lutionary rigour, was the favouritism which placed the fortunes 
of the allies in the hands of the incompetent Duke of 
V'ork, or of pedants like Brunswick and Clerfait. Energy, 
enthusiasm, the weight of numbers, absolute unity of plan, 
promptness to take the offensive, the advantage of a central 
position, — these were the main causes of the French triumphs 
over foes disunited alike in methods and in general policy. 

Poland was now, as ever, the ulcer which ate into the 



PE TO ILLUSTRATE THE PEACE OF BASEL (1795), 
AND OF CAMPO FORMIO (1797 ) . 




^ Say t'S^a 



200 STATUTE MILES 



Stanford's Oeoo-Egtab.. London. 



CENTRAL EUROPE TO ILLUSTRATE THE PEACE OF BASEL (1795), 
AND OF CAMPO FORMIO (1707 ) . 




Sta/i/ord's Geoo- EatabiLondon. 



v.] The Jacobins and the First Coalition. 91 

vitals of the First Coalition. In May, 1794, the Poles, inspired 
by the patriot Kosciusko, rose against the Russian garrison, 
and soon drove the Prussian forces ahuost out of the lands 
which remained to Poland; but the terrible Suvdroff was 
now at hand with Russian troops whom he had always led 
to conquest. Kosciusko was badly wounded : the Russians 
stormed Praga, a suburb opposite Warsaw, with fearful 
slaughter; and the surrender of the capital was the end of 
Poland (Nov. 1794). Early in the next year the last partition 
of this unhappy land was arranged. Catherine II seized all 
the land between the lower Dwina and Galicia^ Austria 
gained a large tract to the east and south of Warsaw, while 
Prussia had to be content with Warsaw and the land between 
the Bug and Niemen. This favour shown to Francis II, who 
had not fought, was due to his complaisance towards Russian 
schemes on Turkey, which Prussia had resisted. 

The latter Power showed her resentment by deserting the 
First Coalition and coming to terms with France in the Treaty 
of Basel (April 5, 1795). The repubHc evacuated some 
Prussian land which it had conquered on the right bank 
(i.e. east) of the Rhine, but retained Cleves and Obergeldern, 
on its left bank : it accorded peace to those States of the 
Empire for which Prussia interceded, viz. Saxony, Mainz, the 
Bavarian Palatinate and the two Hesses. In secret articles of 
the treaty, France promised, if she gained the Rhine frontier, 
to help Prussia to compensation on its right bank ; while 
French troops were not to operate north of a demarcation 
line separating the neutral States of Germany from those 
which, following the lead of Austria, remained at war with 
France. 

This peace was a terrible blow to the First Coalition. 
The monarchical crusade broke down owing to the scramble 

^ See Flan of the Partitions of Poland, page 76. 



92 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. v. 

for the remains of Poland, and the ceaseless rivalry of Austria 
and Prussia in German affairs. Prussia now enticed away 
most of the north and central German States to follow her 
jackal policy of subservience to France, which fmally met 
with due chastisement in 1806. Catherine II, now near the 
end of her intrigues and aggrandisements, had not moved 
a soldier in the crusade which she had ostensibly favoured. 
Gustavus III had been assassinated by an agent of his 
turbulent nobles. Spain made peace with France, yielding 
up her part of Hayti (July, 1795). England, Austria, and 
Sardinia alone actively persevered with the war. These diplo- 
matic triumphs were the last work of the Committee of Public 
Safety in its first phase. After crushing foreign and domestic 
foes, it had virtually gained for France the boundaries desired 
by Richelieu and Louis XIV — the Rhine, the Alps, the 
Pyrenees and the Ocean. Its organising energy, aided by 
Jacobin patriotism, had revealed to the astonished world 
the weakness inherent in the imposing fabric of the First 
CoaUtion. 



CHAPTER VI. 

The Directory and Buonaparte. 

"Despotism is there, watching for the moment of our exhaustion to 
offer us peace and bread, along with chains !" — Buzot. 

Events in France had shown how short could be the steps 
from anarchy to despotism. Indeed, if Robespierre had been 
a less sincere republican and a man of greater powers, he could 
probably have seized the dictatorship which St Just proposed 
for him. By his fall the tendencies towards despotism were 
temporarily checked : but France had learnt that only a strongly 
centralised power could save the republic in time of danger, 
and the attempts at a royalist reaction were now to favour the 
rise of a far abler man than the pedant of Arras. 

We have seen that the Thermidorian reaction was begun by 
a few terrorists from personal fear. Its main strength, how- 
ever, was in the support of the many, who were weary of 
bloodshed. The long terrorised Convention now regained its 
powers from the two secret committees, which for a time sank 
to the level of the other 14 committees of the Convention 
supervising the special executive departments. It further 
abolished the payment of citizens who attended the meetings 
of the ' sections ' of Paris, — a premium on sedition : it closed 
the Jacobins' Club for a time, and the Paris Commune entirely, 
and recalled to its midst the wrecks of the Girondin party; 



94 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

while nearly all the most prominent terrorists — except Carnot, 
Tallien, and Fouche — were guillotined or banished. The sup- 
pression of forced loans, of the ridiculous ' maximum ' law, of 
the persecuting decrees against priests and emigrant nobles, as 
well as the abolition of revolutionary names, marked a still 
further return to ordinary government. In vain were two 
attempts made by the mob to overawe the Convention. The 
National Guards freed the deputies, though not till one had 
lost his life (May 20). The disarming of the revolutionary 
suburb, St Antoine, and the presence of regular troops, at last 
ensured some rest to Paris. 

The Convention was equally determined to prevent a recoil 
towards monarchy, and three events in 1795 dashed the royalist 
hopes. The little Louis XVII, as he was called, at last 
succumbed in June to the brutal attempts of his keepers to 
wear out his frail life; so now the succession passed to the 
Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII), hated by Frenchmen as 
being at the head of the emigrant nobles. An equal misfortune 
was the disastrous failure of these emigres to make a descent 
at Quiberon in Brittany and rekindle the embers of revolt. 
Though supported by an English fleet, they were shut in by the 
able young General Hoche ; and by the orders of Tallien, who 
wished to clear himself of charges of royaHsm, some 700 nobles 
were shot in cold blood. Hoche succeeded in pacifying the 
north-west of France, where the genuine royalism of the peasants 
had proved to be as serious a danger to the republic as all the 
armies of the coalition. Still the royalist reaction gathered 
strength in other parts of France ; and the Convention, afraid 
of trusting to the voice of the nation at the forthcoming elec- 
tions, decreed, as an appendix to its new Constitution (Aug. 
1795)? that two-thirds of the next Legislature must be chosen 
from the members of the Convention itself. This unheard of 
violation of electoral freedom exasperated all malcontents, 
whether royalists or constitutionalists; and 40,000 National 



VI.] TJie Dh'ectory and Buonaparte. 95 

Guards of Paris, mainly royalist after the purging of pikemen 
and sa?is-culoties from their ranks, openly menaced the Conven- 
tion. Barras, entrusted with its defence, bethought him of the 
young artillery officer Buonaparte, then in Paris. He, who had 
helped to regain Toulon, was now to defend the republic at 
its very heart. Murat seized cannons from the Sablons camp. 
These Buonaparte planted so as to sweep the approaches to 
the Tuileries, where the Convention sat. For the first time in 
the revolution was seen the effect of cannon in a street fight. 
The royalists were swept from the riverside quays ; and Buona- 
parte brought his guns to bear on the church of St Roch, and 
then along the Rue Honore (Oct. 5). The republic was saved 
— by the man who was to overthrow it, and by the means 
which have always been fatal to constitutional liberty. 

The importance of Buonaparte's service at Paris can hardly 
be over-estimated. It enabled the Convention to impose on 
France a republican Legislature, and its new Constitution. 
That of 1793 having been set aside at Thermidor, France was 
subjected to a new experiment, which, avoiding the defects of 
that of 1 79 1 and the despotism of the Committees, was yet 
strongly republican. Every citizen who had lived a year in 
one place and paid a tax could vote for 'electors,' who in 
their turn voted for the 750 deputies. These were to form two 
Chambers : the 500 younger members (none under 30 years 
were eligible) were, in three 'readings,' to propose decrees, 
which then came before the 250 older members in the Council 
of Ancients, — a democratic form of Senate. The executive 
powers were to be controlled by a Directory of five, who super- 
vised the execution of decrees by Ministers named by them 
and individually responsible to them. The Directory therefore 
inherited the chief functions of the Committee of Public Safety: 
both derived their powers from the Legislature, deliberated 
secretly, controlled the action of the Ministers, and, in fact, 
aimed at securing unity of action in the legislative and execu- 



g6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

tive powers. The two fatal defects in the present ingenious 
arrangement were that the Directors had no legal means of 
opposing a law passed by the two Councils ; and that, as one 
Director in five was to retire each year, while one third of the 
Councils was submitted to annual re-election, the latter would 
change their political complexion more quickly than the former. 
Hence, in any time of reaction or disaffection, conflicts were 
sure to break out between Directory and Councils, which 
would wreck the Constitution and leave the ground clear for 
any skilful intriguer. 

The Convention, quietly finishing the most stormy career 
known to any representative Assembly, now handed on its 
powers to the Councils and the Directors named by them : 
these were Barras, Carnot, La Re'veillere, Letourneur, and 
Rewbell (Oct. 1795). For the first two years all worked well. 
A firm national government began to quell the brigandage rife 
in many parts of the west. To quote Mdme de Stael : " The 
old landlords Hved quietly side by side with buyers of land 
confiscated by the nation : the roads in the country became 
safe : the armies were only too victorious : liberty of the press 
was restored ; and one could have called France a free country, 
if the two classes of nobles and priests had enjoyed the same 
guarantees as other citizens." In brief, the government was 
Girondin in spirit, but Jacobin in energy ; and in May 1796 it 
promptly suppressed a communistic plot, headed by Babeuf 
and some members of the old Hebertist faction, who desired 
to overthrow the Directory and abolish property, " the greatest 
scourge of society, a veritable public crime." Events, how- 
ever, were tending not towards Communism, but were even now 
favouring the rise of the greatest autocrat of modern times. 

The young Napoleon Buonaparte, born at Ajaccio in 1769, 
united the Florentine skill and suppleness of his father's family 
with the Corsican pride and stubbornness of his mother's race ; 
and his early life, spent amidst family feuds and civil strifes, 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. 97 

inured him to habits of intrigue and violence. Sent by his 
father to the miHtary schools at Brienne and Paris, he there 
evinced a versatility of genius and a masterful temper, which 
startled his comrades. The first year of the Revolution found 
him with poor health and prospects, working hard in his spare 
time at a History of Corsica^ and sympathising with the abolition 
of privileges; but the mob violence in June 1792 aroused his 
disgust. "One must confess (he wrote) when one sees all this 
close at hand, that the people are little worth the trouble that 
one takes to deserve their favour." A little later, on returning 
to Corsica, he even for a time thought of offering his services to 
the British East India Company, for they " made more account 
of a good artillery officer than the French did." And yet, 
though admiring Paoli's Corsican patriotism as much as he 
probably detested the Jacobinical terrorists then devastating 
France, he would not hear of the separation of Corsica from 
France ; and when the islanders, led by Paoli, definitely threw 
off the foreign yoke (April, 1793), the Buonapartes took the 
side of the French, and were forced to flee to Marseilles. 

There they espoused the cause of the dominant Jacobin 
faction; and Napoleon talked and wrote the revolutionary 
jargon with such success as to be called the "little Robes- 
pierre." His services at Toulon availed to save his head after 
the fall of the Robespierrists, and procured his hberty. After 
varying fortunes, he entered the topographical bureau of the 
Committee of Public Safety, taking Carnot's place for a time 
(Aug. 1795). The strange whirl of events drew from him these 
strange reflections in a letter — "Everything makes me brave 
death and destiny. My reason is sometimes startled at this ; 
but it is the effect which the moral spectacle of France, and the 
custom of running risks, have produced in me." He even 
applied for leave to go to Constantinople to organise the 
Sultan's artillery; but, fortunately for himself, was refused leave, 
owing to the critical state of France ; and at the same time, 
F. R. 7 



98 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

after resigning his post in the topographical committee, he was 
cashiered by an order of the Committee of Pubhc Safety for 
not having proceeded to a post assigned him in the army 
campaigning in La Vende'e. In September all careers seemed 
closed to the thin yellow-cheeked ex-officer. In October he 
was hailed as the saviour of the Republic for dispersing the 
Paris malcontents ; and the grateful Barras now smoothed the 
way for his marriage with a charming widow, Josephine de 
Beauharnais. The story that Barras also gave him the com- 
mand of the army of Italy as a dowry for Josephine is disproved 
by the evidence of two other Directors, Carnot and La 
Re'veillere. It was Carnot's discernment of Buonaparte's great 
abilities which most availed to gain him this command ; for the 
"organizer of victory" desired to replace the incompetent 
General Scherer by one who had shown his powers of energetic 
action, and had also sent in a remarkable plan of campaign for 
the war in Italy. Buonaparte owed little or nothing to favour : 
he forced his way to the front by sheer power and ability. " I 
am terrified" (wrote Josephine) "at the empire which he seems 
to exercise on all who come near him. His keen gaze has 
something uncanny and inexphcable in it which imposes even 
on the Directors. ...' My brothers in arms will all be only too 
happy some day to have my protection (he said to me) : my 
sword is at my side, and with it I will go far.'" Such were the 
influences which moulded a character naturally proud, ambitious, 
profoundly able and far-seeing. The Italian blood of his father 
is seen in his appreciation of the arts and his far-reaching powers 
of intrigue and civil organisation. As a Corsican chieftain 
(' caporal ') he ever at heart despised the Jacobin rabble, and 
sought the aggrandizement of his family; and his masterful 
personahty was to completely dominate a generation enervated 
by the sentimentaHsm of Rousseau and well-nigh paralysed by 
the fever of revolution. Events brought him to the front when 
France was saddled with a third impracticable Constitution, 



VI,] The Directory and Buonaparte, 99 

when the energy of her armies had all but broken the First 
Coalition; and fortune sent him against that part of Europe 
which offered the most splendid field for conquest. 

The revolutionists, after beating back all the attempts of 
the Austrians and Piedmontese to regain Nice and Savoy, had 
already conquered the Italian Riviera as far as Savona. North 
of this seaport there is a depression which marks off the 
Maritime Alps from the Apennines. There the Piedmontese 
and Austrian forces were posted — in all about 52,000 men. 
Bonaparte (so he spelt his name from this time) inspired his 
49,000 men, badly equipped, but inured to war, by his 
trenchant words — " Soldiers, I am to lead you into the most 
fertile plains in the world. There you will find honour, glory, 
and riches." He at once put in force his four maxims — 
" Divide for finding provisions : concentrate to fight : unity of 
command is necessary for success : time is everything.*' 

His first aim was to strike at the joint connecting the 
allied armies ; and by five successful battles in and beyond the 
pass (April 12 — 25, 1796) he forced them back on divergent 
lines of retreat, the aims of the Austrians being to protect 
Milan, that of the Piedmontese to cover their capital Turin. 
Seeing his exhausted little State open to the incursions of a 
powerful foe, the King of Sardinia at Cherasco concluded an 
armistice, definitely ceding to France Savoy and Nice, and 
allowing Bonaparte to occupy the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, 
and Alessandria (April 28). In 16 days he had detached 
Sardinia from the Coalition. 

It now remained to drive the Austrians out of their 
Milanese province, of which the only great stronghold was 
Mantua. The Austrian general Beaulieu had lined the banks of 
the swiftly flowing Ticino ; but Bonaparte outflanked this strong 
position by a secret and speedy march along the south bank of 
the Po, and by the seizure of Piacenza. Crossing the Po at this 
city, he was now almost in the rear of the Austrians : these 

7—2 
l.ofC. 



100 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

hastily fell back on the Adda, another northern affluent of the 
Po, trusting to 1 0,000 men and 20 cannons to render the long 
narrow bridge of Lodi impregnable. Bonaparte at the head 
of a column of 6000 picked men charged over the bridge : 
a storm of shot tore through its ranks. Again the young 
general with Lannes, Berthier, and Massena cheered on his 
men ; while French cavalry, fording the river higher up, turned 
the scale in favour of the French. Bonaparte's daring won 
him the title of "le petit caporal" from his soldiers. "It 
was a strange sight (says Bourrienne) to see him on the bridge 
of Lodi : mixed up with his tall grenadiers he looked a mere 
boy." Lodi cleared Lombardy of the Austrians : and the 
French, amidst popular rejoicings, entered Milan fifteen days 
after the second part of the campaign began. 

Twenty-nine days sufficed to hurl back the remains of the 
Austrian forces beyond the Mincio into Mantua, or up the 
valley of the Adige ; also to make a rapid incursion into the 
northern part of the Papal States (the Legations) and to 
confiscate EngHsh merchandize at Leghorn (June). 

The next events bear even more strongly the impress of a 

master mind. The French were besieging Mantua, when they 

learnt that a new Austrian army of some 47,000 men, under 

General Wiirmser, was marching to its relief in two parts, one 

west, the other east, of L. Garda. There was only one hope 

of safety for Bonaparte's 42,000 men — to raise the siege of 

Mantua, and fall on the two parts before they re-united. He 

crushed the western army at Lonato (Aug. 3), and by skilful 

manoeuvres at Castiglione cut in half Wiirmser's main force, 

pressed it back into Tyrol, again defeating it at Bassano. 

The gallant old Austrian finally reached Mantua; but in a 

fortnight he had lost 27,000 men to a force less than his own. 

The effect of concentrated vigorous action against superior, 

but disunited forces, has never been more strikingly shown', 

^ The figures given above are from official sources and therefore dififer 
from the estimates given by Thiers. See my articles on Col. Graham's 
Reports on the Italian Campaign in the Eng. Hist. Rev, of 1899. 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. loi 

Another Austrian army under Allvintzi descended the 
Adige, and checked the French at Caldiero ; but Bonaparte's 
skill and persistence at Areola compelled the foe to retire 
outflanked after three days of desperate fight (Nov.). The 
crowning victories of RivoU and La Favorita (Jan. 1797) 
reduced the Austrians to despair, and Mantua to surrender 
(Feb. 2). 

A fortnight's campaign against the Papal States next 
showed the utter weakness of the Pope's temporal power. 
The Papal troops hardly awaited the onset of the French; 
and by the Treaty of Tolentino (Feb. 1797) the Pope gave 
up all claims to Avignon, paid a war indemnity and yielded up 
many precious manuscripts, pictures and statues, beside ceding 
the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and the Romagna. 
These districts -soon formed, with Austrian Lombardy and 
Modena (whose Duke had been deposed by Bonaparte), a 
compact State called the Cisalpine Republic, — the nucleus 
of the future Kingdom of Italy. From the outset the new 
State was completely under French control. As Bonaparte 
frankly said to Melzi — "Italy contains still fewer elements 
of republicanism than France : but we must temporize with 
the fever of the moment, and we are going to have one or two 
republics here of our own particular kind." The kind was to 
be that which would admit of changes responsive to changes 
in France. For the present, however, the summoning of a 
representative Assembly, the aboHtion of feudal dues, and a 
decree of civic equality, seemed the dawn of a new political 
and social life for Italy. 

In the spring of 1797, Bonaparte resumed hostilities 
against the Austrians, drove them across the Carnic and Noric 
Alps, and dictated preliminaries of peace at Leoben, within 
two days' march of Vienna. He thus snatched the laurels 
of victory from the French forces on the Rhine. These under 
the command of Jourdan and Moreau had been about to effect 



102 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

a junction near the upper Danube, when the Austrian Arch- 
duke Charles completely defeated the former near Wiirzburg. 
Jourdan's retreat behind the Rhine was fatal to Moreau's plans; 
and the latter only by great skill and determination withdrew 
his troops into Alsace (Oct. 1796). The Directory had, there- 
fore, to support these beaten troops ; while Bonaparte's forces 
were living on Italy and were even sending to Paris contri- 
butions levied on the liberated people, to fill up the yawning 
gulf of the French exchequer. In the spring of 1797, Hoche, 
replacing Jourdan, crossed the Rhine and gained a success; 
yet Moreau could not cross that river for want of pontoons, 
before the news came of the armistice with Austria. The army 
of the Rhine seemed doomed to misfortune. In September 
following, the death of its able commander, the sincere 
republican Hoche, removed a possible rival from Bonaparte's 
path. 

Another motive, beside that of winning the sole glory of 
the campaign, urged Bonaparte to arrange matters with 
Austria. The Venetians had been enraged at the exactions of 
the French and at the protracted violation of their neutral 
territory. At Eastertide, 1797, the people of Verona rose and 
massacred several of the French wounded left in hospital; 
and elsewhere risings against the ' liberators ' provoked severe 
reprisals. Other excuses for disputes with the Venetian 
Republic led to menaces from Bonaparte which frightened 
the timid oligarchs into resignation; and under pretence of 
coming to terms with their democratic successors, he gained 
control of Venice, its fleet, and even its Ionian Isles. While 
on May 26, 1797, he assured the new municipality of Venice 
that "its people alone were worthy of liberty," on the very 
next day he wrote to the Directory: — "^ Venice, which has 
been decaying ever since the discovery of the Cape of Good 
Hope, and the rise of Trieste and Ancona, can hardly survive 
the blows we have just struck. With a cowardly and helpless 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. 103 

population, in no way fit for liberty, without territory and 
without rivers, it seems natural that she should be left to 
those to whom we give the mainland territory." As for her 
Ionian Isles, he wrote later on, France must take them ; for 
" the time is not far distant when we shall feel that, to destroy 
England, we must make Egypt ours." 

This explains the favourable terms of peace finally granted 
by him to Austria in the Treaty of Campo Formio (Oct. 1 7, 
1797). Francis II, though ready to give up all claim to his 
Netherlands, firmly demanded all Venetia as far as the R. 
Oglio; and Bonaparte, desirous of isolating England, finally 
acceded (sorely against the wishes of the Directory) to his 
acquisition of Venetia east of the Adige, and all the possessions 
of Venice along the Adriatic, viz. Istria and Dalmatia. France 
was to keep the Austrian Netherlands, the Ionian Isles and 
the Venetian fleet. Austria recognized the Cisalpine Republic, 
which was to include Lombardy, the western part of Venetia, 
the Legations, Romagna, and Modena ; and she was to give 
the Breisgau to the deposed Duke of Modena. In secret 
articles she promised to recognize the extension of the French 
frontier as far east as the Rhine. As a set-off to her losses she 
received most of the Venetian lands, and she soon gained Salz- 
burg for one of her Arch-Dukes. (See Map opposite page 126.) 

It remains to sum up the results of this brilliant campaign 
on the combatants, on Italy, and on the relations of Bonaparte 
to the Directory. 

The Treaty of Campo Formio shattered the remains of the 
once great First Coalition. England alone was left to struggle 
against the ever increasing power of France ; for the Directors 
had curtly repulsed attempts made by Pitt to come to an under- 
standing. France now definitively gained what Louis XIV 
had vainly striven for, the Rhine frontier down to the border 
of the Batavian Republic, which was virtually subject to her. 
She had gained her " natural frontiers " on the south-east by 



104 ^/^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the definitive acquisition of Savoy and Nice ; and now by the 
formation of her dependent Cisalpine Republic, she held the 
balance of power in Italy; while her Ionian Isles were so 
many stepping stones towards Egypt. On the other hand, 
Austria, after terrible disasters in Italy, still held a commanding 
position there, and by the acquisition of Venice and Dalmatia 
became a sea-power. If she had lost her outlying possessions 
such as the Netherlands, Breisgau, and Milan, she had con- 
solidated her territory \ and had the prospect of doing so still 
more in the disputes for German lands soon to begin at 
Rastadt. 

Italy had just received a shock comparable to that dealt 
by the French King Charles VIII in 1494, so fatal to the 
older order of things in Italy as in Europe. The once vigorous 
kingdom of Sardinia had lost its transalpine provinces ; and in 
1798 the king fled to Sardinia when his capital was menaced 
by French troops. The Republic of Venice, on the most 
frivolous pretext, was made a victim to Bonaparte's policy, 
and partitioned with Austria, even against the protests of the 
Directory. Its sister Republic of Genoa was encouraged to 
overthrow its oligarchs, and under the new name of the 
Ligurian Republic, became nominally democratic, but really 
French. The most important State of the peninsula, the 
Cisalpine Republic, accepted a French form of government, 
was occupied by French troops, and sent frequent subsidies to 
Paris. Lucca, Tuscany, and Naples were left alone for a 
time. The Pope's temporal power, already crumbling away, 
was early in the next year replaced by a Roman Republic 
proclaimed by a French general. 

The Directors had hoped to be free from Bonaparte's 
dictation during the Italian campaign; but when they pro- 
posed to send him Kellermann as his equal in command, 
his retort "one bad commander is better than two good 
commanders " showed not only his sounder judgment but his 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. 105 

complete independence. Throughout the campaign he ac- 
customed his officers and soldiers alike to look to him alone 
for advancement and wealth ; and while conducting the 
negotiations with Austria, in defiance of the Directors' orders, 
he had an opportunity of rendering them also subservient to 
him. The royalist reaction in France brought to a crisis the 
inevitable conflict between the Directory and the Councils. 
As has been pointed out, the Councils were renewed by one- 
third every year ; while only one of the five Directors was subject 
to annual re-election by the Councils. Thus, by the middle 
of 1797, while four of the five Directors were Jacobins, there 
was a royalist majority in the Councils and the country. At 
Marseilles, Lyons and elsewhere the old Jacobin party had 
met with its deserts from royalist vengeance in the "white 
terror " ; and the royalist club at CHchy on the outskirts of the 
capital aimed at overthrowing the Directory. Two reasons 
impelled Bonaparte to crush this reaction. Not only would 
the return of Louis XVIII be fatal to his hopes, but also 
the French armies still retained much of their revolutionary 
fervour. They were fighting against feudal Europe and 
knew little of Jacobin cruelty and the meanness of the new 
despotism at Paris. "The soldiers are asking (wrote Bona- 
parte) whether they are to be rewarded by assassination on 
their return home:... I see that the Clichy Club means to 
pass over my corpse to the destruction of the Republic." 
He therefore sent his General Augereau, a blustering Jacobin, 
with a strong body of troops to Paris. These in the early 
morning of i8th Fructidor (Sept. 4, 1797) surrounded the 
Tuileries, where the Councils were sitting, and arrested 53 
deputies; while three Directors caused their royahst colleague 
Barthele'my to be arrested; even the great Carnot, who now 
desired peace and moderation, only saved himself by flight. 
As a sequel to this Pride's Purge, Hberty of the press was 
suspended, the elections in more than half the Departments 



io6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

were annulled, many deputies, including the now royalist 
General Pichegru, were banished to Cayenne, and the old 
persecuting laws against non-juring priests and nobles were 
re-enacted. In fact, there was a recrudescence of the Terror, 
"into which (as the Due de Broglie wrote) France plunged 
without consolation and without hope." 

This coup d^etat of Fructidor 1797 was followed by a 
national bankruptcy. The Directory had in vain replaced the 
worthless assignats by mandats territoriaux, directly exchange- 
able for the national lands. The expedient only enriched stock- 
jobbers and swelled the vulgar ostentation of the noiwcaux 
riches at Paris, which showed itself in fetes resplendent with 
Greek costumes, and in a life depraved by worse than Greek 
immorality. In fact, now that the old bonds of society were 
broken, there remained no other ideal of conduct than the 
Rights of Man, and a fantastic Deism, into which La Reveillere 
tried hard to breathe some life. It was in vain. The feverish 
gaiety was only a proof of the despair and utter unrest of the 
times. Men shut their eyes to the future ; for the past five 
years had seen the revolution reverse most of the aims of 
1789. Instead of liberty and equality there was an equality in 
servitude to a vulgar despotism propped up by bayonets ; and 
the crusade to liberate Humanity had ended in wars of conquest 
and plunder. A careful study of the inner significance of events 
shows that the fundamental cause of this degradation was the 
absence of any inspiring principle of social and political duty. 
What wonder then, that in the cruel disenchantment which 
followed on the roseate hopes of 1789, France, weary of being 
tossed from one extreme to another, turned her gaze more and 
more away from the moral and political chaos at Paris, to the 
discipline, devotion, brilliance and glory of the army of Italy 
and its young leader ? 

The victor of eighteen pitched battles, who in a year had 
changed the face of Italy and Europe, was received with 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. 107 

boundless enthusiasm at Paris ; and Barras, clasping the 
conqueror to his breast, exclaimed — "Go, capture the giant 
corsair that infests the seas : go, punish in London outrages 
that have been too long unpunished." Under the guise of 
admiration for his genius, the Directors nourished a secret 
fear of his domination, and desired above all his absence from 
Paris ; and for other reasons of State, the time seemed favour- 
able for the reduction of England's power. Our economic 
troubles were scarcely less than those of France; for in the 
spring of 1797 the Bank of England stopped cash payments, 
and for 22 years we subsisted on what was virtually a paper 
currency. In 1795 — 6 the price of wheat was for some time 
over ;^5 the quarter ; and there had been bread riots in 
London. If the naval victories of St Vincent and Camperdown 
(1797) restored to us the supremacy of the high seas, yet the 
mutinies at the Nore and Spithead in that very year had 
threatened our ruin. The alliance between France, Holland, 
and Spain gave the Directory a fleet numerically stronger than 
ours. The Mediterranean was fast becoming a French lake; for 
we had lost our hold on Corsica, and then held only Gibraltar, 
while France was now mistress of Northern Italy and the 
Ionian Isles, and secretly bought over the Commander of the 
Knights of St John at Malta. In India, Tippoo Sahib, helped 
by the French, was contesting our supremacy. The Cape 
route to India was in the hands of the Dutch, now allied to 
France. If France seized Egypt, could she not cut off our 
Eastern commerce, and so compel us to surrender? "Let us 
concentrate all our activity on our fleet (wrote Bonaparte to 
Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs) and destroy England. 
That done, Europe is at our feet." The Directors were equally 
anxious to send away their imperious deliverer on a distant 
enterprise ; and Bonaparte, though it realised a dream of his 
youth, fostered the impression that he was being banished by 
the jealous Government. 



loS The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Two other events in the early part of 1798 increased the 
responsibiUties of the Directory, when they were losing their 
best support. The murder of a French general at Rome 
gave the excuse for French troops to march in and proclaim 
the Roman RepubHc (Feb. 1798). The Pope was removed in 
honourable captivity, which he survived for only a year; and 
the Eternal City furnished rich plunder in jewels and still more 
precious objects of art. The latter were sent to adorn the 
Paris museums : the former went towards the expenses of the 
Toulon armada. 

The invasion of Switzerland had a similar result. There 
had been risings in Valais and in the subject district of Vaud, 
against the oligarchic rule of the old governing cantons or 
towns. The unionists, who desired a closer union of the 13 
cantons on the basis of complete political equality, received 
the help of the French. The forces of oligarchic Berne and 
of the democratic ' forest cantons * were overpowered by 
the invaders; and though the mountain districts bravely held 
out, yet by 1799 they were reduced. Cantonal and municipal 
privileges and exceptional governing powers were at once 
abolished. Vaud was freed from the rule of Berne, and the 
vale of the upper Ticino from the control of Uri. What had 
previously been a league of cantons with sovereign powers, 
now became, at the order of the Paris Directory (April, 1798), 
" the one, indivisible, democratic and representative Helvetic 
Republic," the cantons being subdivided so as to form mere 
administrative Departments. Fortunately this new centralised 
Government, imposed from Paris, did not permanently replace 
the primaeval democracy of the forest cantons, where the 
citizens had hitherto always met in a Cluwip de Afai for the 
adoption of laws and the election of their magistrates. The 
old federal system was partly restored by Bonaparte in his Act 
of Mediation of 1803; and Switzerland ultimately gained by the 
abohtion of municipal bureaucracy and cantonal inequalities. 



vj.] The Directory and Buonaparte, 109 

The immediate results of the French invasion were the 
annexation of Geneva, Biel and Miihlhausen by France, and 
the plunder of the treasuries at Berne, Zurich, Lucerne, 
Fribourg, &c., for the benefit of Bonaparte's expedition. The 
ex-Director Carnot thus vigorously characterised the whole 
affair: "The Directory has sought where it could find most 
free men to immolate, and so has flung itself on Switzer- 
land." 

In May, 1798, the French armada was ready to sail. 
Bonaparte was ordered to seize Malta and Egypt, with which 
France was at peace, to cut through the isthmus of Suez, and 
to drive the English from India. The first detail was easily 
accomplished. The Grand Master of the Knights of St John 
had been bought over by the French ; only a pretence of 
resistance was made ; and Valetta passed into the hands of the 
French. After remaining there a week to organize his new 
conquest, and showing his splendid powers of administration, 
Bonaparte sailed for Alexandria. Fortunately for him, Nelson, 
in his eager search for the French, had left that port the day 
before. The French hurriedly disembarked and captured the 
city by a rush. Then ensued a weary march across the desert 
to the Nile and Cairo. Loud were the complaints of his men — 
this then was the land where they were to gain enough money 
to buy six arpents of land apiece on their return ! A brilliant 
victory near the Pyramids, over the splendid Mameluke cavalry, 
and the plunder of this governing caste, reconciled the French 
to Egypt. Bonaparte occupied Cairo, and was organizing his 
new colony, when news of a disaster came. 

Nelson, after twice narrowly missing Bonaparte's armada, 
had at last found the French men-of-war drawn up near the 
shoals of Aboukir Bay. " Where there is room for ships to 
swing, there is room for my ships to run alongside between 
them and the shoal," was Nelson's reasoning ; and, near sunset 
though it was, he placed the French line, as it lay at anchor, 



no The Revolutmtary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

between two fires. After three hours' desperate conflict, the 
French flagship, 1' Orient, caught fire and blew up; and by 
morning, out of the French squadron of i6 ships only four had 
escaped (Aug. i — 2). 

"We are condemned to do something great" was the 
resolve of the indomitable Bonaparte, on hearing of this 
disaster. He laboured to assure his position by developing the 
resources of Egypt, and by a public profession of Moham- 
medanism. "Do you not think that the Empire of the East was 
worth a turban and a pair of loose trousers ?" was his subsequent 
comment on this burlesque. After crushing a revolt at Cairo, 
and inspecting the traces of the old canal cut across the 
isthmus, he resolved to strike at Turkey by an invasion of 
Syria. After defeating the Turks at Jaffa and massacring some 
2,500 prisoners who encumbered his march, he attacked Acre; 
but his siege artillery had been captured by Sir Sidney Smith, 
while on its way from Alexandria, and was now used against 
the French. Assault after assault was beaten back with heavy 
loss ; and though the French routed near Mt Tabor a Turkish 
relieving force, yet all Bonaparte's eff"orts (March — May, 1799) 
failed against Acre — " that miserable hole which came between 
me and my destiny." With some 8,000 men, many afflicted by 
the plague, he retreated to Egypt, to show his and their prowess 
by driving a Turkish force into the sea at Aboukir. During the 
exchange of prisoners which followed, Sidney Smith sent him 
a packet of French newspapers. In them Bonaparte eagerly 
read news of France threatened by the Second Coalition, of 
Italy lost to her, of the Directory once again threatened by the 
royalist reaction. If ever he was to seize power, it must be 
now. Casting aside his dreams of an Eastern Empire stretching 
from the Ganges to the Danube, he bequeathed his " exhausted 
enterprise " to Kleber ; and taking with him Berthier, Lannes, 
Marmont, Murat, and a few other generals, he secretly sailed 
for France, which by marvellous good fortune he reached in 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. 1 1 1 

time to be rapturously received as the conqueror of the East 
(Oct. 1799). 

His expectations with regard to the failures of the Directory 
had been more than realised. Its foreign and domestic policy 
was at once exasperating and weak. Only a firm conciliatory 
government could have made its new conquests a source of 
strength. Instead of that, the Germans of its Rhineland were 
irritated by the appointment of Frenchmen to every paid post ; 
and even the Illuminati lost their enthusiasm for France when 
the four new Rhenish Departments were seen to be mere 
pashalics for the favourites of the Directory. It is true that 
many changes, such as social equality, trial by jury, and the 
abolition of tithes and feudal dues, were generally welcomed ; 
but the laws which abolished the old German education, from 
the school to the University, in favour of the new French 
system, and other decrees which compelled the observance of 
the decadi in place of Sunday, and handed over all monastic 
and Church property to the administration of French officials, 
soon provoked a return of German feeling. 

This reaction of sentiment encouraged Austria and the dis- 
possessed German princes ; and French demands met with 
increasing resistance at the Congress of Rastadt, which from 
Sept. 1797 to April 1799 was settling the affairs of Germany. 
The weakness of the Germanic system was glaringly shown at 
this Congress, State quarrelling with State, while the German 
princes, dispossessed of their domains west of the Rhine, 
clamoured for " compensation " at the expense of the ecclesi- 
astical lands. A great ruler might even then have banded 
most of Germany together against France; but when the 
dissolute and hapless Frederick William II of Prussia died in 
1797, his successor, of the same name, continued the spiritless 
policy of alliance with France, which long cleft Germany in 
twain. Austria, however, felt herself threatened by the French 
occupation of Switzerland and by the dictatorial treatment of 



112 The Revohitionaiy and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the Cisalpine Republic by the Directory and its generals. The 
excitable Czar Paul, who had succeeded Catherine in 1796, 
imagined himself insulted by the seizure of Malta, of which he 
desired to be the protector ; and the Bourbons of Naples, 
alarmed at the creation of the new Roman Republic and the 
spread of French principles, were openly meditating war. 
Nelson on his return from Egypt was rapturously welcomed by 
the Neapolitan Court, and developed a plan for the restoration 
of Italy to its old rulers. 

The Directory, after passing the first law of universal con- 
scription (Sept. 1798), sent armies to occupy Naples and Turin, 
whence the kings fled to their insular possessions, Sicily and 
Sardinia respectively, and the south of Italy was now re- 
organized by the French as the Parthenopaean Republic; while 
the occupation of Lucca and Tuscany completed their domina- 
tion in Italy. 

A slight acquaintance with facts suffices to dispel the error 
that the Coalitions were "built up by Pitt's gold." To the 
French this has seemed a sufficient cause for events which 
really resulted quite naturally from their own aggressions. 
This Second Coalition was an attempt made by Russia, which 
took the initiative, England, Austria, Naples, Portugal and 
Turkey, to set some limits to French domination, which had 
now spread from the mouth of the Adige to that of the Rhine. 
At first the allies gained some signal successes. The young 
French conscripts were not ready to take the field ; and only 
about 100,000 trained troops were ready to defend this 
immense line. Bonaparte and many of the best generals and 
troops were in the sands of Syria. Jourdan was badly beaten 
at Stockach, near Lake Constance (March, 1799); and even 
the brilliant and tenacious Massena could make no headway 
against the superior numbers of the Austrians, who began to 
invade the central bastion of the French line — Switzerland. 
The struggle entered on a bitterer phase when the French 



VI.] TJie Directory and Buonaparte. 113 

envoys to the Congress of Rastadt were after its close (April) 
assassinated by Austrian hussars, who carried off their papers. 

In Italy the arrival of a great Russo-Austrian force under 
Suv6roff and Me'las drove back the French from the Adige 
and even from Milan, which the Russians entered in triumph. 
Moreau withdrew his shattered forces behind the strongholds of 
Alessandria and Genoa, there to await the arrival of Macdonald 
from the south. This able general had long held southern Italy 
against vastly greater forces of insurgents. Brushing these 
aside, he now tried by a skilful march across the Apennines 
and along the River Po to join hands with Moreau. After 
some successes he was overwhelmed by the Russians at the 
Trebbia (June) ; and the two French armies in Italy, passing 
the Apennines, had much difficulty in uniting near Genoa 
(June). Except the Genoese coast line, Italy was lost to the 
French ; and, as they retired, the artificial character of their 
rule was shown by wide-spread insurrections. A defeat at 
Novi (Aug.) completed their disasters in the very land which 
Bonaparte had associated with victory. 

In September the folly of the allies and the genius of 
Masse'na somewhat turned the scale. Owing to the complaints 
of Austrian generals at Suv6rofif's arrogance, he was finally 
required to cross the Alps, join the Russian forces under 
Korsakoff, and drive the French out of Switzerland. The 
power of jealousy to wreck a whole campaign has rarely been 
more signally shown. After toiling for five days over the St. 
Gothard pass, against a skilful resistance, he arrived at the 
southern end of the Lake of Lucerne (Sept. 26) to find no help 
from Russians or Austrians; for Massena on that very day 
seized the opportunity oftered by the withdrawal of the Arch- 
duke Charles northwards, to crush Korsakoff's Russians at 
Ziirich, capturing all their cannons, stores, treasure, and nearly 
one-fourth of their men. Korsakoff led the wreck of his forces 
towards the Rhine, while Suvoroff's weary men had to traverse 
F. R. 8 



1 14 TJie Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

frightful mountains and defiles, harassed by the foe, until with 
the loss of half their men, and all their horses and stores, they 
reached the Upper Rhine valley. In Holland the Anglo- 
Russian forces were scarcely more fortunate ; and the Duke of 
York, by the capitulation of Alkmaar (Oct. 18), withdrew his 
troops, sore stricken with marsh-fever. 

Thus, before Bonaparte's arrival in France, Massena in 
Switzerland and Brune in Holland had restored victory to the 
French arms, and cleared these' dependent republics of the 
allied forces. There was now Httle danger of an invasion, 
except from the Austrians, who threatened Nice and Alsace. 
The Czar Paul, indignant at the treatment of his brave troops 
by the allies, soon came to terms with France. 

And yet the Directory was in great danger. If victory had 
finally returned to the tricolour flag everywhere except in Italy, 
the policy of violent repression had brought France to the 
verge of revolt and royalism. Far from putting an end to the 
civil strifes, the coup d'etat of Fructidor was repeated on a 
small scale in June 1798, when the Directory annulled the 
elections of sixty members, on the plea of excluding from the 
Councils those who had declared against the Constitution. 
General Jourdan and other Jacobins protested against the new 
tyranny as reducing the Councils«to a mere registration court ; 
and the defeats of the spring and summer raised a storm of 
execrations at these civilian Directors ("lawyers" they were 
dubbed) whose temerity was jeopardising France. In the 
elections of the spring of 1799 the Jacobins gained ground 
against the directorial party. Sieybs was chosen Director in 
place of the unpopular Rewbell, and a change of constitution 
was therefore imminent. The Councils repealed the excep- 
tional laws pfissed at Fructidor, compelled three Directors to 
resign, and declared the national representation to be inviolable 
(June 1799). This coup d'etat of the Councils was a reversal 
of that of the Directors and the troops in Fructidor 1797 ; but 



VI.] The Directory and BiLonaparte. 115 

forced loans, progressive taxation, and the exaction of hostages 
from Breton villages where royalism lurked under the guise of 
brigandage, showed that the new Councils and Directory were 
as little royalist as the men of Fructidor. Sieyes determined 
to prevent any revival of the Terror, by closing the Jacobin 
Club, which had for a time re-assembled, and by making over 
500 arrests at Paris ; but even his reputation and skill could 
hardly bear up against Jacobins in Paris and royalists in the 
country. 

Such, then, was the political situation on Bonaparte's 
arrival from Egypt — the executive and legislative powers at 
open variance, the Directory hated for its tyranny and despised 
for its failures, a general desire for any government which would 
secure the safety and order of the State. Sieyes had said that 
France only needed a head and a sword. He himself of course 
was the head ; but would the trenchant sword now returned 
from Egypt be an obedient tool in his hands? Bonaparte 
cautiously looked around. He was too young to be chosen as 
a Director ; and he hated the Jacobins as much as the royal- 
ists j but he skilfully made use of all parties who were dis- 
satisfied with the Directory or with the Constitution of 1795 ; 
and among the latter class were three Directors, Sie'yes, Ducos, 
and Barras. After combining these diverse elements of oppo- 
sition for the work of overthrow, they could be left to fall 
asunder afterwards. At the outset Bonaparte declared that he 
would save France from the red as well as from the white terror. 
An understanding with Sieyes assured him the support 01 the 
moderates who desired a firm rule undisturbed by yearly revo- 
lutions ; and Sieyes, after making a ladder for Bonaparte to 
seize power, was a man who could easily be shelved. A com- 
mittee was secretly formed by Sieyes, Bonaparte and his brother 
Lucien, Talleyrand, and a few others, to arrange the coup d'etat. 
The threats of the Jacobins furnished an excuse for removing 
the Councils to St. Cloud. Bonaparte commanded the armed 

8—2 



Ii6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

forces, and had the support of the generals, except Jourdan 
and Bernadotte. The Directors, Sieyes, Ducos, and Barras, 
connived at the coup d^etat, and the two others, Gohier and 
Moulins, who refused to recognise the dissolution of the 
Directory, were guarded by troops at the Luxemburg Palace. 
It remained to coerce the Councils. Of these the Council of 
Ancients desired a change in the constitution of 1795 while 
the Council of Five Hundred began its memorable sitting at 
St. Cloud (19th Brumaire, or Nov. 11) with an oath of obedi- 
ence to that Constitution, in which even Lucien and other 
conspirators joined. So strong was the Jacobin enthusiasm 
which swayed the Five Hundred, that when Bonaparte entered 
their Chamber he could gain no hearing and was hurried out 
half fainting by his friends. Their cause seemed lost; but 
Lucien, then President of this chamber, refused to put the 
vote of outlawry against his brother, and leaving the hall 
harangued the soldiers against the deputies in the pay of 
England, armed with daggers which they had lifted against the 
general. The lies took effect. The charge was sounded ; and 
the representatives of France fled before the levelled bayonets. 
Representative government, which had survived the Reign of 
Terror, succumbed to the attacks of a victorious general; and 
the power of the Jacobins, who desired to perpetuate the 
policy of the Convention, was now decisively overthrown by 
the very means to which they had appealed in 1795 ^^d 1797 
— military force. 

The Council of Ancients, with a {q\v young deputies, at 
once decreed the creation of a provisional executive committee 
of three; and Lucien, re-assembling a handful of his adherents 
of the Council of Five Hundred, proposed that these three 
should be Sie'yes, Ducos, and Bonaparte, with the title of 
Consuls; and a Commission representing the Five Hundred 
was to help the Consuls in modifying the Constitution of 1795, 
and in preparing a new Civil Code. 



VI.] The Directory and Buonaparte. 1 1 7 

Thus ended that Constitution: — "turn by turn invoked by 
all the factions, incessantly violated by all, it had ceased to be 
a means of safety for the Republic. It was necessary to pre- 
vent the principles on which it rested perishing with it." So 
ran the official justification of the events of Brumaire. Its 
defects had led to constant friction between the executive and 
legislative powers, and in 1797 — 1799 to a revival of the Terror. 
France longed for peace and quietness wherein the civil and 
social conquests of the Revolution might be consolidated. The 
strifes between the Directors and the Councils had rendered 
imminent a relapse into the Jacobin tyranny of 1793 or the 
royalism of the old regime. It was the aim of the 'men of 
Brumaire' to combine order with Uberty by a new constitution 
which Sieyes was known to have long been perfecting. Even 
in 1789 he had said— "The science of politics is one in 
which I think I am perfect." The fortunes of France in 1799 
rested apparently on Sieyes and Bonaparte— its brain and its 
sword ! 

The interest of this epoch of the Directory centres in 
Bonaparte's achievements and those of the French armies. In 
France the work of pacification and consolidation, begun in 
i7C)5 — 1797, had been largely undone in the two troublous 
years which followed; and the only great constructive eftort 
of this period was the famous law of conscription (Sept. 5, 
1798) which rendered permanent the great levees en masse of 
the earlier years of the Revolution. The battalions of volun- 
teers had in 1794 been amalgamated with the regular forces ; 
and the work which Carnot had begun was now completed by 
another great organising genius, the former terrorist Dubois- 
Crance, to whom is due the formation of armies in divisions, 
brigades and half-brigades. The whole war organisation was 
carried out under the three Yi^z.^s— personnel, materiel, and 
secretariat. Thus the vast masses of men raised by the 
conscription soon became parts of a powerful and smoothly 



Ii8 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. vi. 

working machine destined to overthrow the disjointed forces 
of the Coalition. 

Conscious of its potential military strength, the Directory had 
adopted a pohcy of provocation and aggrandisement against 
all neighbouring States. Its conduct towards Switzerland and 
the Pope has already been described, as also the recklessly 
revolutionary and Gallicising policy of its commissioner Rudler 
towards its new subjects in the Rhineland. In Holland the 
Directory had aided the democratic party, or "patriots," in over- 
throwing the Stadtholder's or federal party and had in March 
1798 imposed a constitution closely resembling that of France. 
After the Duke of York had in Oct. 1799 evacuated Holland, 
that unhappy land fell a prey to the exactions of the victorious 
French general Brune. The Cisalpine Republic in northern Italy 
had in the previous year felt the weight of Brune's hand, and a 
constitution like that of the French Directory had been im 
posed. Dumouriez' design of surrounding France with a ring 
of friendly republics had ended in a policy of imperious dicta- 
tion and pillage by the French in the Batavian, Helvetian and 
Cisalpine RepubHcs ; and the same militarism which repressed 
these vassal States, was even now building up a despodsm at 
Paris. 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Consulate. 

"France did not hesitate to sacrifice political liberty, of which she as 
yet knew only the abuse, in order to preserve the civil conquests of the 
Revolution." {Lcbofi.) 

The three provisional consuls thus described their aims — 
*'to organise order in all parts of the administration, re-establish 
tranquillity at home, and procure an honourable and solid 
peace." They thus gained the support of all who had been 
oppressed and harassed by the Directory. Political prisoners 
— especially the non-juring priests — were released. Forced 
loans and progressive taxation were discontinued; and 37 
terrorists and prominent Jacobins were exiled (Nov. 1799). 
The appointment of Talleyrand to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (he held it from Nov. 1799 to Aug. 1807) ensured the 
conduct of negotiations with more skill and suavity than had 
been shown during the last years of the Directory. 

Sieyes soon had to yield to a more commanding will. He 
had gained his chief reputation in 1789 and again in 1798 — 9 
— years when there was no one of commanding powers, 
prestige and experience. The theorist was now at once out- 
distanced in the race for power, by a nature profoundly able, 
far-seeing, and determined, endowed with a subtlety in intrigue 
more than Italian, and with the elemental strength of a race 



I20 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

unexhausted by sentimentalism and anarchy. Full of scorn 
for the ' idealogues ' who by their theories had brought France 
to her present desperate straits, he, the descendant of Corsican 
chieftains, resolved to bring her back to order and prosperity 
by what he regarded as the sole effective means of rule, 
personal authority. France, he declared, had had but one 
real government since 1789, the Committee of Public Safety. 
He was now to improve on its methods, even while discarding 
the passionate beliefs which alone had made its tyranny 
excusable. Against theories he pitted facts. Instead of the 
perfectibility of the human race by means of watchwords and 
constitutions, he recognised only the weakness and credulity 
of the average man. A Jacobm when Robespierre was 
supreme, and the saviour of the Directory in 1795, he had 
now overthrown the latter, and exiled the chief Jacobins. 
His opportunism is as conspicuous in his actions as in his 
poUtical professions. In reality he consistently opposed only 
those who hindered his advancement or menaced his security. 
His wide-sweeping ambition only served to stimulate that 
scrupulous care about details which ensures a brilliant triumph. 
— "If (he wrote to Talleyrand in 1797) we take as the basis 
for all operations true policy, which is nothing else than the 
calculation of combinations and chances, we shall long remain 
la grande ?iation, the arbiter of Europe. I say more. If 
destiny decrees it, I do not see why we should not attain 
in a few years, those splendid results, of which the heated 
and enthusiastic imagination catches a glimpse, but which 
the extremely cool, persevering, and positive man alone can 
grasp.'' 

The first question in which Sieyes, the man of words and 
phrases, was worsted by the man of keen insight and practical 
sense, was that of the new constitution, devised by the former 
on two chief principles — " confidence coming from below : 
power coming from above." Its basis was universal suffrage, 



VII.] TJie Consulate. 121 

carefully filtered by three decimal divisions. The five millions 
of French voters were to choose one-tenth of their number; 
and from these 500,000 — called notabilities of the com- 
munes — the central executive at Paris was to select the 
authorities for the communes or parishes. The 500,000 in 
their turn chose one-tenth of their number, from whom the 
authorities for the Department were to- be selected by the 
central executive power. The 50,000 also were to choose 
one-tenth of their number; and from these 5,000 the Consuls 
or Senate were to select members of the Council of State, 
Tribunate, Corps Legislatif, Judges of the Supreme Court, 
and Ministers of State. Of these bodies the right of initiating 
legislation lay with the Council of State; that of criticism 
of the proposed measures lay with the Tribunate named by 
the Senate ; while the Co?'J)s Legislatif, chosen by the Senate, 
after listening to the arguments for and against the measure, 
silently accepted or rejected it. Not content with safeguarding 
his constitution by these elaborate checks and balances, Sieyes 
placed above them an august Senate of 80 members, chosen 
partly by the Consuls, partly by co-optation, to veto any 
unconstitutional proposal or action. At the apex of his 
pyramid were to be two Consuls, subordinate to a Grand 
Elector ; and the Senate was to safeguard liberty against any 
coup d'etat by having power to absorb into its ranks any 
functionary — even the Grand Elector himself. It was against 
this last part of the scheme that Bonaparte furiously and 
successfully protested in the sub-commission which at the 
close of 1799 was secretly disposing of the destinies of France. 
The Grand Elector, he said, would be a "fatted hog, or the 
chained-up ghost of a roi faineant.^'' Sieyes had to yield. 
The Senate lost its powers of deposition ^nd * absorption'; 
and, for the name ' Grand Elector,' was to be substituted that 
of P'irst Consul, who wielded considerably greater powers than 
Sieyes had intended. As finally amended at Bonaparte's 



122 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

instance, the new Constitution gave to the First Consul the 
rights of nominating the members of the Council of State 
(and hence of initiating legislation), all the chief miHtary, 
naval, diplomatic, and judicial officials and functionaries, 
of deciding the questions of war or peace, foreign policy and 
the conduct of military and naval affairs. He named his own 
Ministers, who were individually responsible to him for their 
own departments of affairs, but not collectively responsible. 
The two subordinate Consuls were mere ciphers who might 
be consulted or not, as the First Consul chose. In fact, he 
wielded more than all the powers enjoyed by the Directors ; 
and through them he became the lineal descendant of the 
Committee of Public Safety, nearly all of whose functions were 
now concentrated in him alone. 

This new Constitution, promulgated Dec. 15, 1799, was 
offered to the French people for acceptance or rejection with 
the famous phrase — " Citizens, the revolution is fixed to the 
principles which commenced it. It is finished." The fear 
of renewed disorder, and the magic of Bonaparte's name as 
a pledge of glory and order, led to more than three milHon 
affirmative votes being given in Xho. plebiscite, against a minority 
of 1567' negatives. Thus France passed rapidly and almost 
unwittingly from a distinctively republican constitution to one 
which was more autocratic than she had ever known. The 
power of Louis XIV had been limited by the provincial laws 
and customs. The Revolution had swept these away ; and 
Garat truly said of the new rule — " The limits of the executive 
power would henceforth be not in a charter, but in the heart 
and in the very passions of a great man." The provisional 
Consuls now made way for three Consuls — Bonaparte, Cam- 
bace'res, and Lebrun. Sieyes was thus shelved. The empty 
honour of presiding over the Senate marked his retirement 
from active public Hfe and his "absorption" by his own 
creation ; while his acceptance from the First Consul of a fine 



VII.] The Consulate. 123 

estate at Crosne served as a token of the services which his 
constitution had rendered to Bonaparte, and as a pledge for 
his own nulUty in the future. In the words of a contemporary 
epigram : 

"Sieyes a Bonaparte a fait present du trone 
Sous un pompeux debris croyant I'ensevelir. 
Bonaparte a Sieyes a fait present de Crosne 
Pour le payer et I'avilir ! " 

The Consuls, or rather the First Consul, used their extensive 
powers of selection to name men of moderate opinions to the 
Legislature and capable men as Ministers to carry out the 
laws. He proclaimed an amnesty for most political offenders, 
especially for the victims of the Jacobin triumph of Fructidor, 
1797 : he allowed all but the most obnoxious emigrant nobles 
to return to France, if they would ; and, reversing the policy 
of Fructidor, he permitted religious worship to be publicly 
celebrated by all priests who took a formula of obedience to 
the government. These acts tended to reassure the royalists, 
who with their Chouan followers had kept Normandy, Brittany 
and la Vendee in a ferment of revolt ; and the withdrawal of 
the cruel law of hostages, latterly imposed by the Directory, 
together with the promise of hberty of public worship, pacified 
(Jan. 1800) these districts, which had enjoyed barely a year 
of peace since 1792. Bonaparte began to build up his power 
by healing the internal discords and conciliating the important 
interests, which the zeal or folly of the revolutionists had 
provoked in 1792 — 1795, and again in 1797 — 1799- His rule 
was at once a pledge for order, and a guarantee against a 
return of the social and financial abuses of the old regime^ 
though he at once aimed at restoring all, and more than all, 
its absolutism in government. 

The local self-government which the Constitution of 1791 
had so fully extended to the Departments, districts, cantons, 
and communes, had at once fallen into disrepute owing to the 



124 1^^^^ Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

total inexperience of those who worked it. CentraHsation was 
therefore the tendency under the rule of the secret Committees, 
and the Directory (see page 85). Bonaparte emphasized this 
reaction towards the old governmental system of ' intendants,' 
by a law (1800) which imposed a Prefect and Sub-Prefects on 
every Department. These officials, appointed by the central 
executive power at Paris, were to control all the local affairs of 
their several Departments, and act as "little First Consuls"; 
while the mayors of the communes, also appointed from Paris, 
were to regulate the affairs of the parishes. The elective rural 
municipalities, and Directories of Departments, Avhich had 
played so important a part in 1790 — 1793, now became mere 
consultative bodies. The principle of election by the people 
was now completely subordinated to that of selection by the 
Paris Executive, i.e. by Bonaparte. 

It is very doubtful whether Bonaparte was sincere in the 
informal requests for peace which he sent to George III and 
the Emperor Francis II. The forces of Austria and Southern 
Germany had held their own on the Rhine, and had driven the 
French from all Italy except Genoa and its coast-hne; while 
British squadrons had taken Minorca, were on the point of re- 
ducing Malta by blockade, and kept a French army imprisoned 
in the sands of Egypt. Peace under such conditions could 
only have been damaging to the prestige of Bonaparte's new 
rule ; but the sending of these overtures for peace — and 
again to Francis II after Marengo, — enabled him to pose as 
the would-be pacifier of a world weary of strife, while their 
rejection speedily rallied around him the warlike enthusiasm 
of France. 

The Austrians opened the campaign of i8oo by cutting in 
twain the French forces which sought to hold the Italian Riviera. 
Massena with 18,000 French was shut up in the fortress of 
Genoa, which he held with splendid tenacity (April — June). 
The victorious Austrian general Me'las began to press back the 



VII.] The Considate. 125 

other French forces on Nice and the line of the R. Var. These 
losses were partly balanced by the victories of Moreau and 
Lecourbe over the Austrian and South German forces on the 
Rhine and Upper Danube. The military situation in Italy there- 
fore called for all Bonaparte's energies. Echeloning his troops 
between Dijon and Geneva so as to leave it doubtful whether 
he intended to march to the Upper Danube, or against Melas, 
he secretly made his plans for leading his forces over the Great 
St Bernard Pass, so as to cut the communications both of the 
troops of Me'las and of the Austrian s besieging Genoa. With 
the help of Carnot, now again Minister of War, Bonaparte 
organised his army for this dramatic enterprise, which bears the 
impress of a spirit at once daring in conception and patient in 
the execution of myriads of details. He overcame the gigantic 
difficulties of transporting 35,000 men with artillery and 
baggage across the Alps, and at the end of May 1800 the 
French army, reinforced by 15,000 men who crossed the St. 
Gothard, were in the rear of the Austrians. These reduced 
Massena to surrender Genoa (June 4) ; but their main body now 
had to fight to keep open their communications with Mantua 
and Tyrol. Concentrating his available forces at and around 
Alessandria, Melas began the Battle of Marengo (June 14) by 
pushing aside the scattered French divisions which barred his 
way. The battle seemed lost to Bonaparte, when Desaix, 
coming up with 6,000 men, renewed the fight, and a brilliant 
cavalry charge by Kellermann cut in pieces an Austrian column, 
which then laid down its arms. A panic seized the other 
Austrian forces, and they rushed wildly for the bridges in their 
rear. Melas, with perhaps needless despair, on the next 
day ceded to Bonaparte all Italy west of the Mincio, on condi- 
tion that the Austrian troops should go free to Mantua. 
Marengo thus reversed all the successes gained in Italy by 
Austria in the war of the Second Coalition, and reduced her to 
the hmits imposed by the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. 



126 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Bonaparte re-established the Cisalpine Republic, and garrisoned 
Piedmont with French troops. 

The French arms were equally successful north of the Alps. 
Five days after Marengo, Moreau turned the strong defensive 
positions held by the Austrians in and around Ulm, and by the 
far more important victory of Hohenlinden (Dec. 3) he finally 
compelled the Emperor to sue for peace. The Treaty of 
Luneville (Feb. 1801), which dissolved the Second Coalition, 
was in its main outlines a repetition of that of Campio Formio ; 
but the independence of the Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian 
Republics was guaranteed; and, by secret arrangements with 
the Courts of Spain and Vienna, the Hapsburg Grand Duke of 
Tuscany was to receive the Archbishopric of Salzburg, while 
Tuscany, re-named the Kingdom of Etruria, was to be trans- 
ferred to the young Duke of Parma. As this young duke was 
a scion of the Spanish Bourbon House, Bonaparte received a 
secret promise from Madrid that on the completion of this 
exchange France should regain from Spain the vast district of 
Louisiana, comprising most of the basin of the Mississippi. 
By these politic schemes Bonaparte hoped to regain part of the 
colonial empire lost by Louis XV. The loss in these exchanges 
fell ultimately on Austria and Germany. Central Europe was 
again distracted by the question of indemnities for the German 
princes, who now lost all hope of their old domains west of the 
Rhine. The Duke of Modena was to receive the Breisgau 
from the House of Hapsburg. The King of Naples and 
Pope Pius VH were left by Bonaparte in the possession of their 
States, on condition that they closed them against English 
goods. 

If Bonaparte had failed in the Marengo campaign, his power 
in France would probably have been overthrown by malcontent 
Jacobins or royalists. Even as it was, a desperate attempt was 
made to take his life by an infernal machine, as he was driving 
to the Opera in Paris (Dec. 24 or 3rd Nivose, 1800). Profiting 



ILLUSTRATE THE PEACE OFLUNEVILLE tl801) 
[HE SECULARISATIOiYS (1803) 



11. 




Stanford's Geog} Extai' LaivSan. 



CENTRAL EUROPE TO m^USTRATi: THE PEAC3i OF LUNEVH.LE fi801) 
^^D THE SECULARISATIONS (1803) 



JV o n r ji s jc A 

Cu.vh,. 




coloured m, flat tmtx 
The smcJUf Staies art 
left white. 



VII.] The Consulate. 127 

by the general indignation against the Jacobins, who were 
hastily supposed to be the authors of this outrage, Bonaparte 
demanded a law which should "purge France and also reassure 
her." When the police inquiry was beginning to make it clear 
that the Jacobins had no hand in the outrage, the servile 
Senate, in its capacity of guardian of the constitution, passed a 
'''' saiatus-considtum^' conferring on Bonaparte summary powers, 
by which he at once exiled 130 of the Jacobin leaders to 
Cayenne or to the Isle of Oleron ; nor were they released 
when it was absolutely proved that the attempt on the First 
Consul's hfe was the work of some Breton Choiums, six of 
whom were caught and executed. 

Not only did Bonaparte disregard the protests of some 
members of the Senate, Corps Legislatif and Tribunate against 
this gross illegality, but in the early months of 1801 he began 
to restrict the already limited powers of the two latter bodies. 
Thus, on the pretext of reasons of State, he withheld from them 
the details of the national expenditure ; and from this time on 
to 1 8 14 Bonaparte and his Ministers alone regulated the public 
expenditure. The peace with Austria, however, gave him an 
opportunity of re-establishing the credit of France, which had 
fallen very low since the State bankruptcy of 1797. The duty 
of levying the national taxes was now taken from local bodies, 
which had little interest in careful collection, and was given to 
840 controllers of taxation appointed by the Executive at Paris. 
After Luneville new stocks could be issued on favourable terms 
on the security of confiscated lands which were as yet unsold ; 
and these stocks were used to indemnify the State creditors for 
what they had lost in the " bankruptcy of the two-thirds " of 
1797. The money gain was to the many an ample compensa- 
tion for the loss of political liberty ; and while the bourgeoisie 
regarded Bonaparte's rule as a pledge of order and prosperity, 
the peasants hailed it as the only security against the return of 
feudalism, and the restoration of confiscated lands to their 



128 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

former owners. In no sphere of action was Bonaparte so 
emphatically the " heir of the revolution " as in that of material 
interests ; and his keen sense of the share which hunger had 
had in the Revolution is shown by his efforts in time of dearth 
to keep the price of bread in Paris artificially cheap, at the 
expense of the bakers. 

It is an unquestionable though humiliating fact that the 
ideal aims of the early revolutionists had never permeated 
more than a small minority of the people; and though the 
fiery zeal of Mdme. Roland, Condorcet, and Robespierre had 
for a time dominated the inert mass, yet, when the enthusiasts 
fell a prey to their own dissensions, the less pronounced zealots 
were gradually re-absorbed by the apathetic multitude; and 
the revolution, which to the many had always been merely a 
struggle for individual rights and a higher standard of comfort, 
entered on its second chief phase — the endeavour to retain 
and consolidate the newly-won privileges and possessions 
against the real or fancied hostility of monarchical Europe. 

While Bonaparte was consolidating his power in France, 
Great Britain had to face a new and formidable maritime 
league, at the time when she was losing the support of her chief 
ally, and the guidance of her one great statesman, William 
Pitt. The same month of Feb. 1801 which saw Austria sign 
the Treaty of LuneVille with France, was marked by the resig- 
nation of Pitt, owing to George Ill's vehement opposition to 
Catholic Emancipation, and by our preparations for war against 
the Armed Neutrality League. This League was formed by 
Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and was reluctantly joined by Prussia, 
to maintain the rights of neutrals as asserted in the previous 
Armed Neutrality League of 1780. Great Britain now again 
contended that (i) an enemy's goods might be seized on neutral 
merchantmen, (2) that these might be seized when sailing for a 
port the blockade of which was merely nominal, (3) that iron, 
hemp, timber, pitch, and corn were contraband of war, and 



VII.] The Consulate. 129 

might be seized on a neutral ship under any circumstances, 
(4) that a neutral ship might be searched even when convoyed 
by a man-of-war. The neutral powers denied these claims, one 
and all. 

Personal disputes with the Czar Paul tended to embitter 
these questions ; for while we had relaxed the stringency of our 
claims in 1794 and 1798, so far as to allow neutral ships to 
trade direct between their country and French colonies, yet we 
had given great offence to the Czar Paul by our capture of Malta 
(Sept. 1800) which Bonaparte, shortly before its expected 
surrender, had presented to him. The Czar had at once seized 
some British ships in Russian ports, and almost compelled 
Prussia to join the Armed Neutrality League (Dec. 1800). 
Our Government, treating its declarations as equivalent to war, 
determined to overpower the Danes before their allies could 
come up, and so close the entrance to the Baltic. Admirals 
Parker and Nelson set sail from Yarmouth Roads, and, aided 
by the severe frost which held the northern fleets ice-bound in 
their harbours and prevented the construction of batteries on 
the Swedish side of the Sound, arrived before Copenhagen 
without opposition. Nelson, with twelve sail of the line and a 
few frigates, determined, on April 2, 1801, to repeat the tactics 
which had been so effective at Aboukir Bay, viz. to crush in 
detail the line of 20 heavily-armed anchored hulks which pro- 
tected the Danish capital. The swift current carried three of 
his large ships aground ; but, undaunted by this and by " the 
most terrible fire of all the battles in which he had been 
present," Nelson's ships silenced most of the hulks, though the 
forts defied all their efforts. Persisting in his attack, in spite 
of Parker's signal to desist. Nelson, by a generous appeal to the 
Danes for an armistice, finally put an end to the carnage. The 
Danish regent had received private news of the assassination of 
the Czar Paul, and gladly accepted an armistice for fourteen 
weeks. 

F. R. 9 



130 The Revolutionary and Napoleo7iic Era. [Chap. 

The caprice, fury, and almost proved insanity of this Czar 
had led to the formation of a palace plot for his deposition 
in favour of his son Alexander. The conspirators on the night 
of March 23, 1801, strove in vain to extort his abdication; 
and, fearing the arrival of his guards, they strangled him. 
Alexander 1, though full of remorse at an end to the plot never 
contemplated by him, did not hesitate to reverse the anti- 
English policy of his father ; and when our Government yielded 
its claims (2), (3), (4) given above, the famous League of the 
Neutrals was dissolved (June, 1801). Alexander also surren- 
dered his father's claim to Malta, accepting, however, the 
title of Protector of the Knights of St John. 

Our maritime supremacy also gained us a signal success in 
the Mediterranean. A British force, landing at Aboukir, drove 
the French from their entrenchments, though with the loss of 
the gallant Abercrombie's life. Aided by Turkish forces, and 
by the landing of some sepoys at Suez, our forces compelled 
the French to surrender at Alexandria (Aug. 1801), on con- 
dition that they should be taken back to France on British 
ships. The collections of Egyptian antiquities, made by the 
French savants for their government, went to enrich the British 
Museum. Another practical result of Bonaparte's Egyptian 
Expedition was that our efforts to thwart it had secured our 
supremacy in India by the storming of Seringapatam (1799) 
and in the Mediterranean by the capture of Malta (1800). 
The failure of Nelson's attack on the (first) flotilla at Boulogne 
(Aug. 1 801), and the pressure successfully put by France and 
Spain on our ally Portugal to close her ports to us, showed 
that the land power of France was as invulnerable as was our 
maritime supremacy. To prolong such a struggle was futile. 
Negotiations for peace were opened at London with the peace- 
loving Addington Cabinet; the preliminaries were signed Oct. i, 
180T, but five months passed before the Treaty of Amiens was 
signed. 

Shortly before, or during, this interval several events showed 



VII.] The Consulate. 13 1 

that Bonaparte intended to respect the terms of the Treaty of 
Luneville no further than it suited him. Though that Treaty 
stipulated for the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, 
Ligurian, and Cisalpine RepubHcs, yet Bonaparte imposed a 
new Constitution on the Dutch or Batavian Republic (Sept. 
1801) and kept 10,000 French troops in its chief fortresses at 
the expense of the Dutch. 

Shortly after the assassination of the Czar Paul, who had 
championed the interests of the King of Sardinia, Bonaparte 
virtually annexed Piedmont. He also prepared for the Cisal- 
pine Republic a Constitution, which, like that of France, should 
unite the form of democracy with an almost unbridled auto- 
cracy; and 452 notables of that Republic, invited by Bonaparte 
to meet him at Lyons, not only accepted the Constitution, but, 
adopting the suggestion given by Talleyrand, offered to Bona- 
parte the Presidency of their State, now renamed the Italian 
Republic (Jan. 25, 1802). Similar changes were soon brought 
about in the Ligurian Republic, of which Bonaparte became 
the doge; so that he was now master of North Italy. 

The Addington Ministry, in its supreme desire for the 
conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, did not offer any 
firm protest against these interventions of Bonaparte; and 
the Treaty of Amiens was signed March 27, 1802, by which 
(i) Great Britain retained Ceylon, taken from the Dutch, and 
Trinidad, taken from Spain, but restored her other conquests, 
the Cape, &c. : (2) France evacuated Naples, and the Roman 
territory, and restored Egypt to Turkey: (3) the independence 
of the Ionian Isles was acknowledged : (4) Portugal surrendered 
a strip of Guiana to France: (5) Great Britain was to restore 
Malta and Gozo to the Knights of St John, subject to thirteen 
conditions, the chief of which were that the Order should 
be reconstituted so as to be independent and for ever neutral 
under the guarantee of all the Great Powers, that the British 
forces should leave the island within three months, and that it 

9—2 



132 TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

should be garrisoned for one year at least by 2000 troops of 
Southern Italy. 

These terms were evidently favourable to France; for, in 
spite of her losses at sea and in Egypt, she retained all her old 
colonies, with a slight addition, while her dependent allies, 
Spain and Holland, were made to suffer for her maritime 
reverses. The Treaty contained no reference to the state of 
the Continent, except that the House of Nassau should receive 
adequate compensation for its losses in Holland. This added 
one more dispossessed prince as a competitor for German 
lands, with the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena and the host of 
German nobles driven by the French over the Rhine. 

These complicated interests were to be re-adjusted in a 
special deputation from the States of the Empire, which from 
Aug. 1802 to Feb. 1803 largely altered the map of Central 
Europe. The Germanic system, resting on a perfect network 
of traditional rights, was revolutionised by the law of the 
survival of the fittest and strongest. The example set by the 
Eastern Powers with regard to Poland, and improved upon 
by Bonaparte at Campo Formio, was now followed in Central 
Europe, where the small weak States began to be transformed 
or absorbed. The ecclesiastical States, the less important Free 
Cities, and even some of the small domains of the Imperial 
Free Knights now furnished the 'indemnities' for the losses 
sustained by the larger States in the wars against France. 
As the extensive territories of the Church in Germany were 
now transferred to secular princes, these spoliations were known 
by the euphemistic term 'secularisations.' Thus, (i) Austria 
consolidated Tyrol by gaining the bishoprics of Trient and 
Brixen, while the scions of the Hapsburg House, ousted from 
Tuscany and Modena, received respectively the Electorate of 
Salzburg with other smaller territories, and the Breisgau. 
(2) Prussia, by the acquisition of the sees of Paderborn and 
Hildesheim, parts of Miinster and Mainz, &c., in place of 



VII.] TJie Consttlate. 133 

Geldern, part of Cleves, and other smaller districts, gained 
nearly 400,000 inhabitants in lands nearly contiguous. 
(3) Bavaria was more than compensated for her heavy losses 
of the Rhenish Palatinate, Jiilich and other Rhine lands, by 
gaining the bishoprics of Wiirzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, and 
several Free Cities. (4) Wiirtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Cassel 
extended and consoHdated their domains at the expense of their 
neighbours, and became Electorates of the Empire. (5) The 
Princes of Nassau received various ecclesiastical lands opposite 
Coblenz and Mainz instead of their once important domains — 
the head of the Nassau-Orange branch receiving Fulda and 
other church lands in place of his rights in the Netherlands. 
The lesser potentates received scant satisfaction, the general 
tendency being to strengthen the strong at the expense of the 
weak. The Illuminati further gained a striking victory in the 
decision of this ■ Reichs-deputation ' that the property of all 
sees, abbeys, and convents was at the full and free disposal of 
the secular power for defraying the expenses of public worship, 
education, useful institutions, as well as for the reHef of the 
finances ! Nowhere was this policy carried out so fully and 
ruthlessly as in that abode of clericahsm, Jacobinism, and 
bankruptcy, the Electorate of Bavaria, where the 'Illuminat* 
Minister Montgelas in 1802 — 1810 effected almost as complete 
a revolution as that of the French National Assemblies. The 
new Germanic system of States thus began to rise on the ruins 
of free municipal rule and of the temporal power of the Church 
in Central and South Germany; and the Emperor shared in 
spoliations which tended to strengthen the States of moderate 
size, and to emphasize their independence of the Empire and 
of Austria. The result was to be seen in the campaign of 
Austerlitz and in Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine. 

While in Germany the dissolution of the old Imperial 
power was accelerated by these revolutionary methods of the 
rulers, Bonaparte consolidated his power in France by reducing 



134 1^^^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

anarchy to order in nearly every department of the national 
life. In gratitude to him for having given peace to the world, 
the Senate was desirous of prolonging his Consulate for a 
second term of ten years after the first term of ten years should 
have transpired; but when Bonaparte showed his displeasure 
at this paltry gift, Cambaceres suggested to the subservient 
Council of State that it should propose to the people by 
plebiscite^ whether Bonaparte should be Consul for life. Some 
three and a half million votes in the affirmative, against about 
8000 negatives, showed that France was indifferent to the form 
of her government, provided that she gained order at home 
and glory abroad (May, 1802); and the Senate — the guardian 
of the Republican Constitution — proclaimed him Consul for 
life and shortly after gave him power to name his successor. 
He thenceforth used his Christian name Napoleon, and began 
to restrict those governmental powers which Sie'yes had 
intended to be safeguards for liberty. Thus, in place of the 
decimal system of the 'lists of notabihties' (see page 121) 
there were now to be 'electoral colleges' consisting of electors 
appointed for life. The Senate was now (June — Aug. 1802) to 
have power to dissolve the Corps Le'gislatif and the Tribunate ; 
and the new Senators were to be chosen by Napoleon and 
not by co-optation. The Tribunate, which had occasionally 
ventured to criticise the government, was now reduced to fifty 
members, deliberating secretly and in five separate sections; 
while Napoleon withheld from these so-called representative 
bodies the yearly budgets and treaties with foreign powers. 

A comparison of the Constitutions of 1791, 1793, 1795, 
1799, and 1802 will show how rapidly France passed from 
rule by one all-powerful Assembly to a monarchy absolute in 
all but name — from a complete control of the Executive by 
the Legislature to as absolute a supremacy of the former. 
The thoughtful student will observe the fundamental and irre- 
sistible force in this extraordinary reaction to be the supreme 



VII.] The Consttlate. 135 

need for a strong Executive in any great military State. In 
fact, the means, which in 1799 and 1802 ensured the supremacy 
of the Executive over the Legislature, may be summed up in 
the phrase ^divide et impera.'' 

It will be convenient to consider here the civil institutions 
of the years 1801 — 1804, which form the most solid and 
lasting tribute to Napoleon's genius. The means by which 
he curbed local government and restored the national finances 
have been noted above. It was equally important to heal the 
rehgious schism which had been caused by the iconoclastic 
zeal of the revolutionists, and by their desire to completely 
subject the Church to the State, Bonaparte had annulled 
the persecuting policy revived in Fructidor (1797); but public 
worship was as yet only tolerated, not recognised; the 'con- 
stitutional' clergy were looked upon by the orthodox or 'non- 
juring ' clergy as renegades from the Roman Catholic Church ; 
and the schism rent French society in twain. Bonaparte felt 
the need of religious peace, and foresaw the prestige which 
he would gain as 'restorer of the altars' and nominator of 
the bishops. After long discussions with the Papal See and 
its envoy, the famous compromise called the Concordat was 
finally signed (July, 1801). By it the Papacy resigned all 
claims to the Church lands confiscated during the revolution, 
even to those few which were still unsold. In return the 
Government of the Republic recognised that "the Catholic 
Apostohc and Roman faith is the religion of the great majority 
of French citizens " — as well as of the Consuls : all the French 
bishops were to resign, or to be deposed if they refused ; and 
Bonaparte, as Chief of the State, was to nominate the bishops 
fairly from both parties; the 'constitutionals' were to be 
received back into the Church by canonic rites, those who 
had married having first put away their wives: the new bishops 
were then to similarly re-instate the cures or parish priests. 
Church discipline was to be regulated by the State, which 



136 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Ej^a. [Chap. 

promised to pay bishops and cures nearly the same stipends 
as those proposed by Mirabeau in 1789. These promises 
were not strictly kept by Bonaparte; but, by healing the 
schism, he soon made the clergy his interested and docile 
supporters; and many of the clerics prominent during the 
revolution had to give their countenance to the new Im- 
perial catechism which taught children that "to honour our 
Emperor and to serve him is therefore to honour and serve 
God Himself." At Easter, 1802, Bonaparte and the chief 
officials attended mass at Notre Dame, and a Te Deum was 
sung to celebrate the return of religious peace and order — 
"the most biilliaiit victory which could possibly be gained 
over the revolutionary spirit." 

An equally politic and more generous measure was that 
which cancelled (April, 1802) all decrees and laws which kept 
very many suspects out of France as emigres. Most of these 
were of noble or wealthy families; and with some few ex- 
ceptions they were now, in spite of some qualms of conscience 
in the Senate, to be allowed to return to France, though their 
estates were not restored. As Mdme de Stael said, the 
"priests and nobles were to be the caryatides of Napoleon's 
future throne." These two measures cut the ground from under 
the Bourbon princes, who now began to despair of ever reigning 
in France. Bonaparte's success equally enraged the older 
revolutionary generals, twelve of whom (so he said to Chaptal) 
made a secret treaty "to divide France into twelve provinces, 
generously leaving me Paris and its vicinity. Massena was 
named to bring it to me. He refused, saying that he would 
in that case come out from the Tuileries, only to be shot by 
my guard. He knew me well !" Whether this be true or false, 
it is certain that Bonaparte ever distrusted his chief generals 
except Berthier, Duroc, and Junot. 

The keen mind of the First Consul discerned in education 
a potent means for attaching the youth of France to his rule. 



VII.] The Considate. 137 

The splendid scheme of national education, drawn up by the 
Convention during the Reign of Terror, had never taken deep 
hold on France. The primary or elementary schools were now 
very few in number: there were only 102 ecoles centrales, where 
more advanced instruction was given; and ihQeeoles superieures, 
for higher education, were doing little work. Grand as had been 
the aims of Condorcet and his co-workers, they had really 
effected Httle more than the destruction of the old clerical 
education. Bonaparte had, therefore, a vast field for his 
energies in re-organising (1802) the education of France. The 
expense of elementary instruction was now made the reason 
for delegating it to the local authorities, who had also to super- 
vise and control all the private schools in their districts. Prac- 
tically, very little was done for elementary education; but 
secondary education received a very characteristic development. 
The 30 most successful ecoles centrales were now re-organised 
as lyc'ees, where the pupils were to be drilled and trained in 
semi-military fashion, the lessons beginning and ending with 
the roll of drums; and, to bind these new schools as closely as 
possible to the State, 6000 pupils, called "pupils of the nation," 
were to receive their education free, most of these being sons 
of deserving soldiers and officials selected by Bonaparte him- 
self. Technical and special schools were also soon founded; 
and we may notice here that later on Bonaparte completed 
his autocratic system of education by founding (1806) the 
University of France, organised in 17 Academies — one at Paris, 
the others at large provincial centres — to control all the public 
education of France in accord with his own will. Education, 
which had been up to 1790 in the hands of the clergy, became 
a powerful tool of the new State. 

Another creation of the year 1802 revealed Bonaparte's 
ulterior aims. By the Legion of Honour he began to construct 
a new aristocracy as a reward for services rendered to the State, 
classed in various grades of merit, and comprising in all some 



138 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

6800 members named for life. The sharp opposition to this 
departure from social equahty, offered by the Tribunate, led to 
the curtailment of its functions, as above described. 

The most lasting work of this period was the Civil Code 
(1800 — 1804), which reduced to order and harmony the best 
of the laws and social customs established by the revolution. 
In place of the complex tangle of Frankish or Roman, royal, 
provincial, and seigneurial laws and customs, a committee of 
the Convention had begun to construct one legal system for 
all France, based on principles of personal liberty and social 
equality, as far as these could be harmonised. A perfect mania 
for legislation had characterised the tirst three National Assem- 
bhes. Bonaparte, after stilling the clamorous and often useless 
debates, now, with his usual stern common sense, summed up 
their chief results by means of a small committee of experts. 
In 1800 he commissioned four jurists to complete the gigantic 
work, and often brought his own powers of incisive thought and 
trenchant expression to emphasize or simplify their phraseology. 
With a few subsequent additions in 1807, it was then renamed 
the Code Napoleon^ and forms the basis of present French law. 
In 2281 articles it regulated French life in its legal aspect — civil 
rights and duties, marriage, divorce (wherein it restricted the 
facilities granted by revolutionary customs), the mutual duties 
and rights of parents and children, guardians and wards, &c. : 
it also continued the law of compulsory equal division of 
property among the children of a family, which has tended to 
equalise wealth but check the growth of population in France. 
Other codes of civil procedure, commerce, criminal instruction, 
and penal laws, soon followed ; and very many of these laws 
extended to the whole of Italy, southern and central Germany, 
and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It is in the domain of law 
that the principles of the revolution — as modified by these 
codes — have gained their most lasting conquests over the 
chaotic systems of nearly half of the Continent ; for Switzerland, 



VII.] The Consulate. 139 

Prussia, and Spain followed the lead of France. (See Chap. 

IX.) 

Napoleon's name will always be associated with many great 
public works in France. The construction of canals joining 
her chief river systems, and of good roads on the left bank of 
the Rhine, along the Riviera, and over the Simplon and other 
Alpine passes, served to promote commerce and to protect the 
new boundaries of France; while the commencement of the 
great breakwater at Cherbourg, planned by Vauban, served as 
a menace to England. The previous abolition of the monas- 
teries and convents had made it possible almost to rebuild 
many parts of Paris and other large towns. The Rue de Rivoli, 
the conversion of the old palace of the Louvre into a great 
museum and art-gallery, and (later on) the construction of 
several bridges over the Seine, and of the Arc de Triomphe, 
gave a new splendour to the French capital. After the sordid 
misery of 1793 — 1795 and 1797 — 1799, the new policy of 
panejn et circenses was completely successful. 

Bonaparte determined to revive the French colonial Empire 
not only by the acquisition of Louisiana from Spain, but also by 
the re-conquest of Hayti or San Domingo, which a French 
expedition effected in May 1802. The gifted negro ruler, 
Toussaint I'Ouverture, was sent to perish in a cold dungeon 
in France; but in Dec. 1803 the negroes regained their inde- 
pendence. The First Consul also sent out men-of-war to 
survey the south coast of Australia for a settlement ; and an 
old French map gives to that land and its chief inlet the names 
' Terre Napoleon^ and '' Golf e Josephine.^ 

Such was Napoleon's success in healing the wounds left 
by the revolution, and in stilling the strifes of the factions, 
that the year 1793 seemed (wrote Chaptal) to have faded into 
the past as completely as the events of Greece and Rome. 
In all this many-sided activity, only one parallel to which can 
be found in all history, the First Consul figured not only as 



140 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the ''heir to the revokition," but the restorer of autocracy. 
Though the social basis of France remained revokitionary, yet 
the new centraHsation of rule, the restriction of political liberty, 
the vigorous impulse given to useful and splendid public 
works, and the restoration of the colonial empire lost by 
Louis XV, all marked a return to the methods of Louis XIV 
and Colbert. Nay more ! France, after having thrown off 
the feudalism imposed by the Franks, was now ripe for a far 
vaster experiment — a return to the Romano-Gallic ideal of 
equal citizenship in one great State controlled and safeguarded 
by an enlightened Caesarism. To the duties of Rousseau's 
ideal dictator Napoleon was now adding the functions of a 
Caesar restrained by no scruples from assuming the crown. 

As there is a wide-spread belief that Napoleon was entirely 
occupied by these pacific undertakings, and was only forced 
into war by 'perfidious Albion,' it will be well to examine 
carefully the causes of the renewal of war in 1803. It has 
been noted above (pages 130 — 131) that the Peace of Amiens 
was due chiefly to the facts that both combatants were wearied 
by the long fight, that neither could now materially injure the 
other, and that the pacific Addington Cabinet was disposed to 
overlook the interventions of the First Consul in the affairs of 
Holland and northern Italy. But when, after the signature 
of the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon kept his troops in Holland 
and in the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, in violation of 
the Treaty of Luneville, the British Government in Nov. 
1802 charged its ambassador at Paris, Lord Whitworth, to 
proiest against these acts, as also against the definitive in- 
corporation of Piedmont in France (Sept. 1802) and the 
renunciation of the Duchy of Parma in favour of France, 
which last had been kept secret at the time of signing the 
Peace of Amiens. Moreover, Napoleon's refusal to make any 
treaty of commerce with England kept English goods out of 
every land subject to his will, such as Holland and North 



VII.] The Considate. 141 

and Central Italy; and British manufactures and commerce 
suffered as much as during the war from a policy which fore- 
shadowed the Continental System \ 

Civil strifes in Switzerland, perhaps fomented by French 
influence, gave Bonaparte an excuse for sending an army there 
and imposing his will as 'Mediator.' In a speech which 
startled the Swiss deputies by its vigour of thought and intimate 
knowledge of their affairs, Bonaparte proved that the associa- 
tions of the past and the physical conditions traced by nature 
herself, declared against the rigorous centralisation decreed by 
the French Directory in 1798 and called for a return to the old 
government by the cantons. The Act of Mediation (March, 
1803) restored to the cantons, now 19 in number, most of their 
old powers; but Napoleon as 'Mediator' was careful to gain 
the upper hand in the central government ; and the seigniories 
and suzerainties of the old governing families were not revived. 
Here again, then, we find the principle of divide et impcra 
successfully applied; and the cantons had to furnish levies 
of troops to their ' Mediator ' for his wars. A short time 
previously, canton Valais had been detached from the federa- 
tion, ostensibly to form an 'independent republic,' but really 
to secure a completer control to France of the Simplon road 
into Northern Italy. Austria and Germany were too much 
engaged in the scramble for the 'ecclesiastical lands' to join 
England in her protest against this perpetuation of French 
influence in Switzerland ; and Napoleon proudly said, " It is 
recognised in Europe that Italy, Holland, and Switzerland, are 
at the disposal of France." 

When angry newspaper articles were appearing on both 
sides of the Channel on these and other questions, the 
French AloJiiteiir published (Jan. 30, 1803) the official report 

1 I have discussed the importance of commercial affairs at that time and 
Bonaparte's plan for the invasion of England in an article entitled "Napo- 
leon and British Commerce " in the English Historical Review for Oct. 1893. 



142 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

of Colonel Sebastiani's 'commercial mission' to the East. 
It stated that the Ionian Isles would willingly receive the 
French again, and that 6000 French troops could easily re- 
conquer Egypt. By the beginning of March, British troops 
had evacuated the Cape and also Egypt ; but, as war seemed 
imminent, they were retained at Malta. The technical excuse 
for this was that the guarantee for the neutrality of Malta had 
not as yet been given by Prussia and Russia; but the real 
reason for our clinging to Malta was that, after evacuating 
the Cape and Egypt, we should have no hold on either route 
to India, if the threatening war-cloud burst; and the British 
Government declared that it could not entertain the idea of 
abandoning Malta unless it received a satisfactory explanation 
about the threats contained in Sebastiani's report. That 
Sebastiani's mission and report were regarded in well-informed 
circles in Paris as the chief cause of war, is clear from a 
vehement expression of Joseph Bonaparte to Miot de Melito : 
— " Let him (Napoleon) once more drench Europe with blood 
in a war which he could have avoided, and which, but for the 
outrageous mission on which he sent his Sebastiani, would 
never have occurred." After our army and navy had been 
strengthened by votes in Parliament (March 8 — 9), Napoleon 
had a ' scene ' with Lord Whitworth, the importance of which 
has been much exaggerated. Insults to ambassadors are very 
rarely the sole cause of war. The casus belli arose out of the 
need of safeguarding one of our routes to the East. The 
Addington Cabinet, on April 26, demanded as a set-off to 
French interventions and annexations {a) the occupation of 
Malta by our troops for ten years : {b) the evacuation of 
Holland and Switzerland by the French troops : (t) an in- 
demnity to the king of Sardinia for the loss of Piedmont: 
{d) our acquisition of the Isle of Lampedusa; whereupon {e) 
England would recognise the Kingdom of Etruria and the 
new Italian Republic, &c. Though these claims may appear 



VII.] The Consulate. 143 

excessive, yet they were really small compared with the gains 
effected by Napoleon since the peace, and he had recently 
admitted the right of our government to some ' compensation.' 
Besides this, the Addington Ministry had seen its previous 
mistake in being too pliable, and was now determined not to 
yield all the stepping-stones to the East. The Cape and 
nearly all Italy were virtually in the hands of the French; 
and there was no doubt that the policy of 1798 would be 
renewed if England gave up Malta, the key of the Mediter- 
ranean. A review of all the evidence shows that, while after 
April 1803 we were technically guilty of violating the Treaty 
of Amiens by holding Malta, yet the policy of Napoleon 
compelled us to do so, if we were not to see both routes to 
India fall into his hands. Both sides were inexorable on the 
chief points at issue; and Lord Whitworth left Calais May 17, 
1803, at the same time that the French ambassador left 
England. Napoleon showed his rancour by ordering some 
8000 or 10,000 English travellers in France to be kept 
prisoners; and most of them were detained until 1814. 

Thus began the mighty struggle which was to extend to 
all the Continent, revolutionise its social systems, and, after 
arraying the land power against the sea power, finally end in 
the victory of Great Britain and the rising nationalities of 
Europe. On the renewal of war, England was in a far worse 
position relatively to Napoleon than in 1801. We had restored 
all our maritime conquests except Ceylon, Trinidad and Malta; 
while Napoleon now had control over the French and Dutch 
colonies restored by us at the peace, as also over Holland, 
Switzerland, Elba, and most of Italy. The sale of Louisiana 
to the United States for ;£3, 200,000, the annual revenue from 
North Italy, and subsidies which Spain and even Portugal were 
secretly compelled to pay, relieved Napoleon from entire 
dependence on French taxation ; and two French armies were 
at once sent to seize and occupy the chief positions in Naples 



144 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

and Hanover, at the expense of those territories. Prussia was 
too much occupied in profitable exchanges of German land 
to forcibly resent this violation of North German neutrality, 
which closed the Elbe and the Weser to British trade; and 
Napoleon ere long made skilful use of his seizure of Hanover 
to separate Prussia from England. Russia and Austria were 
deeply incensed at the French violation of the neutrality of 
northern Germany and southern Italy ; but for the present 
they awaited an opportunity for effective intervention. The 
payment of a subsidy by Spain to France having become 
known to our Government, it ordered Spanish treasure ships 
to be seized on their way to Spain; and this high-handed 
action on our part led to the active hostility of Spain from 
Dec. 1804 on to the middle of 1808. Thus skilfully did 
Napoleon use his supremacy on land, not only to save his own 
revenue, but to separate us from our old allies in the previous 
wars against France. By these beginnings of the Continental 
System, our goods were soon shut out from nearly all central 
and southern Europe ; and the doom of the ' nation of shop- 
keepers ' seemed assured. 

This commercial war could not by itself satisfy the ardent 
nature of the First Consul. He nmst, if possible, strike at 
England's heart. In a progress, made with regal pomp, in 
Belgium and the north of France he ordered the construction 
of a great port and arsenal at Antwerp, the assembly of a host 
of some 120,000 men near the north coast of France, and the 
building of more than 1200 large flat-bottomed boats, to trans- 
port his men from Boulogne and neighbouring ports to the 
coast of Kent. But though the resources of Holland, Belgium 
and North France were pressed into his service, yet the progress 
was slow ; for the type of boat and the size of the cannon had 
to be altered to secure stability in a sea way. Indeed, in spite 
of constant practice, it was found that the embarkation of the 
troops could not be managed in one tide ; and the currents 



VII.] The Consulate. 145 

of the Strait drove the heavy boats far out of their direct 
course. The American inventor, Fuhon, whose steamboat 
was three years later to be a practical success, came to 
Boulogne to offer his as yet untried invention for the flotilla, 
but was *' peremptorily repulsed." How different might have 
been the course of history if the invention had come a few 
years earlier and had been used by Napoleon ! 

Even as it was, the menace of invasion served to put 
England to ruinous expense in preparing a national defence; 
but our people, not trusting alone to the increase of the regular 
forces, thronged to join the volunteer regiments, everywhere 
being raised as in the years 1794 — 1798. 

"No parleying now! In Britain is one breath: 
We all are with you now from shore to shore. 
Ye men of Kent, 'tis victory or death." 

These lines of Wordsworth written in Oct. 1803 expressed the 
growth of a larger British feeling, in which Whigs and Tories, 
Scots and English, all joined. It was felt that the Addington 
Ministry was unequal to the strain of responsibility. Pitt 
returned to power (May, 1804), and only George Ill's prejudice 
against Fox prevented his inclusion in what would then have 
been a broadly national and non-partisan Ministry, Even so, 
the British Ministries up to 1807 were coaUtion rather than 
party Ministries. 

On the other side of the Channel this same month of May, 
1804, showed the influence of a great war in stilling party 
strifes and in raising to supreme power the one necessary man. 
Napoleon had already gained immense /;'^j-/i'^(? as the champion 
of injured French honour and virtue against 'perfidious Albion'; 
and a further incident enabled him now to don the imperial 
purple. That evil genius of the Bourbon House, the Comte 
d'Artois, had, with other reactionary French nobles in London, 
concocted a plot by which Georges Cadoudal, the Breton leader, 
and the royalist General Pichegru were to proceed secretly to 
F. R. 10 



146 The RevolutioJiary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Paris and take the life of the First Consul. But too many 
were in the secret. One of the Chouan suspects, when arrested 
and threatened with execution, revealed the details of the plot. 
Pichegru, Cadoudal, and others were seized; and on the 
information of some of these that Moreau had had several 
interviews with Pichegru and one at least with Cadoudal, he 
too was arrested. At the beginning of the trial Pichegru was 
found strangled in prison, probably by his own hand. The 
complete frustration of the plot was far from satisfying 
Napoleon. Unable to catch the Comte d'Artois, he now 
resolved to strike terror into all his foes by an exhibition of 
the Corsican vendetta against some Bourbon prince. French 
horsemen, crossing the Rhine by night, kidnapped the young 
Due d'Enghien, then residing in Baden, and hurried him to 
Vincennes, there to be tried by a commission of French 
colonels. On their request that the duke's prayer for an inter- 
view with the First Consul should be granted, Savary, who 
was in Napoleon's confidence and had received special orders 
through Murat, forced on the execution; and the last scion 
of the great Conde was shot four hours before any sentence 
was officially passed by the commission (March 21). The 
indignation which this brutal murder aroused throughout 
Europe, found Httle open expression in France. Indeed, the 
old revolutionists welcomed the deed as for ever cutting off 
Napoleon from the royalist party, and the holders of confiscated 
lands felt his rule to be more than ever a guarantee against 
retrocession to their former owners. It must be distinctly 
noticed that the hereditary principle was most strongly supported 
by the old revolutionists as well as by all who dreaded the 
return of Louis XVIII as hkely to endanger their lives or their 
property. The recent danger to the First Consul's life was 
used by prefects and servile officials as a pretext for sending 
up addresses and petitions that he would establish a dynasty, 
and so '-guarantee France for the future." The Senate — the 



VII.] The Consulate. 147 

guardian of the Republican Constitution — accordingly passed 
a Senatus-consultum decreeing to Napoleon the title of Emperor 
of the French (May 18, 1804). 

The two other Consuls now became arch-chancellor and 
arch-treasurer; all Napoleon's relatives became grand dignitaries 
of the Empire, the succession devolving upon Joseph in default 
of a direct heir ; the term hitherto used in address, ' citizen,' 
was discontinued, as harmonising ill with the new imperial 
pomp, and the revolutionary calendar was quietly dropped on 
Jan. I, 1806. The most serviceable or pliable generals were 
rewarded with the title of marshals, though brusque or ardently 
republican soldiers, as Macdonald and St Cyr, did not as yet 
share this honour. There was another contrast still more 
glaring. In spite of the want of any definite proof, Moreau 
was soon found guilty of conniving at the royalist plot; but 
by Napoleon's imperial clemency he was allowed to retire 
to America. The careers of Moreau and Napoleon illustrate 
the superiority in revolutionary crises of keen foresight and 
Macchiavellian intrigue over military genius alone. 

In accordance with the policy of the 'Concordat,' the Pope, 
Pius VII, was invited to assist at Napoleon's coronation at 
Notre Dame, Dec. 2, 1804; but when he was about to crown 
the Emperor, the latter, gently repelling him, placed the crown 
on his own head, and then on that of Josephine. Incidents 
like this and the murder of the Due d'Enghien enabled many 
of his subjects to believe that they were still 'revolutionary,' 
but only one prominent Frenchman, Carnot, accepted voluntary 
exile rather than recognise the Empire. 



10- 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Napoleon and the old Governments. 

"It was chiefly in the dilatoriness and blunders of the other Governments 
that Napoleon found his greatest strength." — Fouche. 

The history of Napoleon now becomes, for twelve momen- 
tous years, the history of mankind. His arms, directly or indi- 
rectly, revolutionise the political and social systems of central 
and southern Europe. By consummate military genius and 
organising power, he seeks to weld the Continent into one vast 
State and humble the mistress of the seas ; but he is finally 
baffled by British persistence and industrial skill, by Spanish 
pride, and by Russian immobility. In the struggle the States and 
social systems of modern Europe are evolved. Across the seas 
the English race is left free to extend westward across the 
Mississippi, to occupy the best parts of Australia, and to con- 
solidate its supremacy in India; while the immunity of Great 
Britain from internal war and revolution enables her to carry 
on the new mechanical inventions of Watt, Arkwright, Cart- 
wright, and others, to become the workshop of the world, and 
the only cheap source of supply for the devastated Continent. 

Napoleon's violation of the neutrality of Baden in order to 
wreak his vengeance on the due d'Enghien had an effect on 
the European situation similar to that which the execution of 
Louis XVI had exercised in 1793. Both events hastened the 
formation of coalitions which would otherwise have been 



Chap. VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 149 

formed more tardily to resist the encroachments of France. 
Both coalitions suffered in their inception and finally fell to 
pieces mainly owing to the aggrandising schemes of some of 
their chief members. In 1804 the fear of Napoleon so paralysed 
the rulers of Central and Southern Europe, that there was 
some disposition to condone his late outrage and to overlook 
his military occupation of Switzerland, Northern Italy, Holland 
and Hanover. Events soon showed that only distant Powers, 
Russia and Sweden, dared to stand forth as the champions of 
the law of nations. Russian and Swedish notes to the old 
Imperial Diet at Ratisbon, protesting against the violation of 
German territory, met with the most timid response from 
that effete body. Prussia soon recognised Napoleon's Imperial 
title; and diplomatic pressure from Paris drew from Francis II 
a similar recognition, subject to the condition that an Impe- 
rial title should be for ever held by the House of Hapsburg in 
its hereditary States. The House of Hapsburg, still the pos- 
sessor of the elective Imperial dignity, which it felt to be little 
more than honorary, now showed its desire to consoHdate its 
motley States in one hereditary Empire, the name of which 
should indicate the connection of the House of Hapsburg with 
the old Holy Roman Empire, and with the Archduchy of Austria. 
Francis therefore took (Aug. 1804) the tide of Francis I, 
Hereditary Emperor of Austria, an innovation fatal to the tradi- 
tions of the old Empire, which had been undermined in the 
previous year by the revolutionary policy of the Hapsburgs 
and Hohenzollerns. The Courts of Vienna and Berlin were, 
indeed, far more desirous of consolidating their newly-won 
States, than of risking them in conflicts with the prodigious 
power of Napoleon. The cause of European independence 
therefore passed to a worthier champion, the young Czar. 

Alexander I, suddenly raised at the age of twenty-four to 
the throne by the plot which ended with the murder of his 
father Paul I (March, 1801), was desirous of carrying out the 



1^0 The Reiwhttionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

reforming ideas imparted by his Swiss tutor, Laharpe. Ardent, 
impressionable, and full of enthusiasm for the principles of the 
French Revolution, he had hailed with joy the advent of 
Bonaparte to power, as consolidating the new French State; 
and, while making peace with England in 1801, he had sought 
the alliance of France and the personal friendship of the First 
Consul. The events of 1802 — 3, however, soon showed him 
that Bonaparte was no sincere friend of liberty. The persistent 
maintenance of French influence in Holland and Switzerland, 
the annexation of Parma and Piedmont, and the assumption 
by Bonaparte of the Consulate for life, severed their friend- 
ship; and a slight to the Russian ambassador at Paris nearly 
led to an open rupture in the autumn of 1803. The seizure 
and murder of the due d'Enghien drew from the Russian 
Embassy a spirited protest against this "gratuitous and mani- 
fest violation of the rights of nations," and the Court of St 
Petersburg went into mourning to mark the Czar's indignation 
at the outrage. 

Laharpe, and another loved and trusty friend, the Polish 
Prince Czartoryski, now the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (1803 — 1806), concurred in urging on Alexander the 
duty and the wisdom of championing the principles of 1789 
against Napoleon. Alexander's chief aims were set forth in the 
instructions (Sept. 11, 1804) to the Russian envoy sent to 
London for a preliminary understanding with our Government. 
The coalescing States, " in order to restrain the French power 
within just limits," must snatch from France her most effective 
weapon — "the idea that her cause is that of liberty and the 
prosperity of the peoples." The first object of the league 
should be " to deliver from Napoleon's yoke the peoples whom 
he oppressed"; the next "to free France from the despotism 
under which she groaned, to leave her the free choice of the 
government which she would choose." All European Govern- 
ments should aim at nothing but "the greatest welfare of their 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Govc^niments. 151 

subjects"; and after the war, a Congress should arrange the basis 
for a new European Federation. In these ideas of the young 
Czar, the Swiss ideaUst, and the Polish nationalist we see the 
chief aims of Alexander's policy in the Third and Fourth Coali- 
tions and in his unfortunate Holy Alliance formed in 181 5. It 
is needless to remark that the practical statesmen at Vienna 
and London never shared the Czar's generous enthusiasm for 
constitutional principles, while they secretly distrusted him for 
the fickleness and love oi finesse which marred an otherwise 
noble character. Furthermore, Czartoryski's secret intention 
of crowning Alexander king of a constitutional Polish State 
became known to Prussia, which then held all the Polish lands 
between Silesia and the R. Niemen. Indeed, the Russian 
State papers reveal his design of extending the Russo-Polish 
frontier to the Vistula, with compensations for Austria and 
Prussia in West and North-west Germany respectively, even 
Holland being named for the latter Power ! Moreover, Rus- 
sian forces were holding the Ionian Isles and some positions 
on the Albanian coast; and in the distracted state of the 
Turkish Empire it would be easy to gain the support of the 
Greek Christians and commence a partition of Turkey with 
Austrian aid, which was soon offered by the Court of Vienna. 
It was thus a strange mixture of generous and ambitious motives 
which impelled Alexander to take the initiative in forming a 
new Coalition. 

As there is a prevalent misconception that the Third Coalition 
was "built up by Pitt's gold," attention must be called to the 
fact that definite overtures for an Anglo-Russian alliance were 
handed in at London on June 26, 1804, when the English 
Ministry was framing its proposals for a league with Russia 
and Sweden. Indeed, the Swedish King, Gustavus IV, in a 
prolonged tour through Germany, so openly endeavoured to 
form a league of the old Governments, that a plot, which nearly 
succeeded, was laid by the French police to carry him off from 



152 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Munich. The negotiations between the three northern Powers 
progressed very slowly. Russia desired us to waive our claims 
respecting neutral commerce, and to give up Malta, both of 
which we refused. The Swedish king wished the restoration 
of the Bourbons to be the avowed aim of the Coalition, to 
which Russia and England equally demurred. The rumour of 
an Austro- Russian scheme for partitioning Turkey aroused 
English suspicions; and before satisfying the exorbitant claims 
of our future allies for British subsidies, we desired to know full 
details of Russo-Austrian policy. A preliminary agreement 
between those Powers (Nov. 1804) merely offered the Czar's 
help if Austria should be attacked by Napoleon, but did not 
commit that timid Government to any definite alliance. The 
Anglo-Swedish and the Russo-Swedish Conventions remained a 
dead-letter until the autumn of 1805, owing to Gustavus' desire 
for a crusade on behalf of the Bourbons, and his extravagant 
claim for an English subsidy. The Anglo-Russian negotiations 
were interrupted by the Czar's indignation at our treatment of 
Spain (see p. 144), while Pitt objected to some of the Russian 
plans for the future of Europe. Finally, without the knowledge 
of Austria, an Anglo- Russian Convention was signed at St 
Petersburg (April 11, 1805), aiming at the formation of a general 
league of the European States to compel Napoleon to withdraw 
his troops from Italy, North Germany, Holland and Switzerland, 
restore full liberty of action to the two last-named republics, 
and reinstate the king of Sardinia in his continental possessions. 
'Barrier States' were to be formed between France and her 
weaker neighbours; but France was not to be compelled to 
change her form of government. Any towns or districts occu- 
pied by the allies were to be held in the name of the country 
to which they rightfully belonged; and at the end of the war a 
Congress of the Powers was to endeavour to form a European 
Federal System based on the rights of nations. As to means, 
it was hoped that Russia and Austria would raise at least 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 153 

400,000 men; and England engaged to support the continental 
struggle by yearly subsidies of ;£i, 250,000 for every 100,000 
troops actively engaged. Differences of opinion between 
England and Russia as to the reconstruction of Europe, and 
still more the Czar's demand that we should restore Malta to 
the Knights of St John and mitigate our maritime code, delayed 
for three months the ratification of this agreement as a definite 
treaty, Alexander finally waiving these claims, with a formal 
protest. 

The chief obstacle, however, to the formation of the CoaH- 
tion was the ambiguous policy of the Berlin Court. Distracted 
between annoyance at the French occupation of Hanover, and 
the alluring offers from Paris of its cession to Prussia, Frederick 
William III finally decided on a policy of neutrality in the 
impending strife. He and his Gallophil Ministers foresaw a 
balance of profit to Prussia from that policy of friendly 
neutrality towards France which had brought so many gains 
since 1 7 95 . Moreover, English treatment of neutral ships caused 
constant friction between London and Berlin ; and the Prussian 
Court rightly distrusted the Polish schemes of the Russian 
Minister, Czartoryski. From Paris came the friendliest over- 
tures ; for Napoleon then desired a Franco-Prussian alliance as 
a set-off to the impending Coalition. The French party would 
probably have prevailed in the councils of Berlin had not 
Prussian supremacy in Northern Germany been insulted by the 
seizure of the British envoy, Sir G. Rumbold, in Hamburg by 
French gensdarmes (Oct. 1804). Frederick William at once 
wrote to Napoleon asking for his release as a proof of the 
French Emperor's "friendship and high consideration... a seal 
on the past, and a pledge for the future." Though Napoleon 
grudgingly released Sir G. Rumbold and renewed the offer of 
Hanover, yet Frederick William now remained neutral. — " He 
will declare for the side which ofl'ers the most chances of safety 
with the least exertion" — was the comment of Metternich, then 



154 1^^^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Austrian ambassador at Berlin ; and all the efforts and menaces 
of the Czar failed to draw Prussia from a neutrality fatal first 
to the allies, and a year later to herself. 

It remained to draw Austria into the Anglo-Russian 
alliance. Though her ablest general, the Archduke Charles, 
declared it madness to undertake a war before the spring of 
1806, yet pressure from Russia, and the offer of four months' 
preliminary subsidy from England, caused her to hurry on her 
military reorganisation under the incompetent and self-satisfied 
General Mack. Finally the provocations which she received 
from Napoleon in Italy decided Austria to join the Anglo- 
Russian alliance. 

It is indisputable that the French Emperor took no step to 
avert the war of the Third Coalition, and many st^ps to pro- 
voke it. In March, 1805, he made the constitution of the 
Batavian RepubHc more autocratic; and while Alexander's 
envoy was journeying to Paris with the final demands of the 
aUies for the independence of Holland and Italy, Napoleon 
crowned himself King of Italy in Milan Cathedral with the 
iron crown of the old Lombard kings (May 26, 1805), and 
annexed the Genoese Republic to his Empire. French 
memoirs agree with the records of diplomacy in attributing to 
Napoleon's aggressions the tremendous wars which followed. 
At a meeting of the Council of State (Jan. 1805), at which the 
memoir-writer Miot de Melito was present. Napoleon justified 
the expense of the Boulogne forces as giving him "fully twenty 
days' start over all enemies." — "A pretext had to be found 
for raising them and bringing them together without alarming 
the Continental Powers ; and that pretext was afforded me 
by the intended descent on England." Fouche, Minister of 
Police, also states that on the Council protesting against 
his projected title of King of Italy, Napoleon replied — 
"I must have battles and triumphs... I shall be able to strike 
the blow before the old coalition machines are ready." Indeed, 



VIII.] Napoleon and tJie old Governments. 155 

the French Emperor desired a diversion from the struggle 
against England 'nullos habitura triumphos.' Sure of the 
support of Baden, Wiirtemberg and Bavaria, and of the neu- 
trality of Prussia, he could also rely on troops accustomed to 
victory, and fully equal in number to the allied forces. France 
was throbbing with the vigour of life renewed, while Central 
Europe had but just passed through a political revolution. No 
time was better for a conflict which he professed to regard as 
inevitable; for "old dynasties put up with new ones only as 
long as they fear them." 

This brief recital will suffice to show that the tremendous 
war begun in 1805 cannot be called a war of political prin- 
ciples. Indeed, the cant about a crusade for liberty, which had 
figured largely even in the later revohitionary wars, was now 
dropped at Paris. On the other hand, the aims of Alexander and 
Czartoryski were far from being disinterested ; yet the success of 
the allies might perhaps have led to a reconstruction of Europe 
more favourable to popular desires than that of 18 15, when 
compensation for the fearful losses of warfare overrode more 
generous considerations. A study of the formation of the 
Third Coalition also reveals the hollowness of the agreement: 
eight years of disunion and disaster were needed to bring the 
allies to any practicable compromise of their interests. The 
possible alternatives before Europe in 1805 were a federation 
of the old Governments, with some approach to constitutional 
principles, or the overthrow of those Governments by Napoleon 
applying abroad the revolutionary methods which he had sup- 
pressed in France. The victory of the Coalition could have 
led to little more than a political readjustment of Europe 
carried out in the spirit of Frederick the Great; whereas Napo- 
leon's triumphs at Austerlitz and Jena were destined, not 
merely to change the map of Central Europe, but also to 
revolutionise the structure of its society. 

The plan of campaign drawn up at St Petersburg aimed at 



156 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

attacking Napoleon with "at least 400,000 men," mainly 
through Bavaria. A Russo-Swedish force acting from Stral- 
sund with "at least 10,000 British troops," was to drive the 
French from northern Germany; while an Anglo-Russian force 
wa-s to free southern and central Italy. These schemes were 
marred by the obstinate neutrality of Prussia, by the inability 
of the English War Office to send troops until the need for 
them was past, and most of all by the nervous precipitation 
with which Austria rushed alone into the fray. The war began 
with the invasion of Bavaria by 80,000 Austrians under General 
Mack (Sept. 8, 1805). The Court of Vienna, ever desirous of 
uniting its scattered Swabian lands by that annexation of 
Bavaria which the combined Powers secretly contemplated, now 
hoped to overpower the Elector's army — since Aug. 24 allied 
to the French — before the latter could come to its succour. 
Mack therefore hastily led his troops up the Danube valley, 
but failed to surround the Bavarians, who retreated north to join 
the French columns marching southward from Hanover. Foiled 
in his first attempt, Mack encamped most of his troops around 
Ulm, from which fortress as his base of operations he proposed 
to set about the invasion of France, as soon as Napoleon 
should have crossed the Straits of Dover. The French 
Emperor, however, was not concerned only with his schemes 
against England. Without relying too much on his later asser- 
tion to Metternich — " the army at Boulogne was always an 
army against Austria" — it is obvious that persistence in a 
scheme for the invasion of England, when half Europe was 
arming in his rear, would have been to court a disaster far 
worse than that which threatened France when his army was 
imprisoned in the sands of Egypt. It is quite probable that 
Napoleon never seriously intended to "jump the ditch," unless 
(as he said) "a revolution broke out in England"; and that he 
aimed rather at ruining our commerce by the extension of his 
'coast system.' Many of the best informed men in London 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 157 

and Paris believed that the Boulogne flotilla was an empty- 
threat; and it is certain that French funds fell sharply on every 
report of an intended embarkation at Boulogne. Napoleon's plan 
of a grand naval combination, by which French squadrons 
from Toulon and Rochefort, and Spanish ships from Cadiz, 
should assemble at a rendezvous in the West Indies, probably 
aimed at the destruction of our commerce there quite as much 
as the assembly of a considerable naval force. If the latter 
only had been desired, the Azores would have served equally 
well as a rendezvous. 

After cruising off Toulon for 21 months to blockade the 
French squadron there, Nelson had been driven away by storms ; 
but now, learning that the French and Spanish fleets were 
making for the West Indies, he gave chase to them across the 
Atlantic. He was in time not only to save our commerce 
from serious damage, but also to divine their second aim 
— a speedy return to liberate the French squadrons blockaded 
at Rochefort and Brest, so as to sweep the English Channel 
and convoy the Boulogne flotilla across to Kent. As Villeneuve, 
the French admiral, had some days' start in the return race for 
the Channel, Nelson sent two of his swiftest ships to warn our 
Admiralty. Fortunately, Sir Robert Calder's squadrons off the 
Bay of Biscay were strengthened in time to oppose a stout 
resistance off Cape Finisterre to Villeneuve's return (July 22); 
and the French admiral, worsted in the fight and discouraged 
by the bad working of his ships, put back to Ferrol, and later on 
retired to Cadiz. It is thought by naval writers that Villeneuve 
ought to have pushed on from Ferrol to Brest, even against a 
fleet superior in efficiency, so as to liberate the French ships 
blockaded there. Certainly, his prudence did not save his 
fleet from destruction; for Nelson, after a brief rest, soon took 
command of the English fleet blockading Cadiz; and when 
Villeneuve put out to sea, his 33 ships of the line were met off 
Cape Trafalgar by 27 British ships. Nelson's two attacking 



158 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

columns, in spite of a terrible raking fire on his leading ships, 
broke and completely disordered the enemy's crescent-like 
formation; but the capture of 18 French and Spanish ships 
was poor consolation to the British people for the loss of their 
great naval hero, who survived a mortal wound just long 
enough to know that England would thenceforth be undisputed 
mistress of the seas (Oct. 21). 

On the day before Nelson's last and greatest achievement, 
Napoleon had still more signally asserted his supremacy on 
land. Furious at Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz, he had at once 
determined on carrying out his alternative plan, namely to 
turn his splendid Boulogne army against the Austrians on the 
Upper Danube; and the precision of his orders shows that 
he had been carefully preparing to deal his foes a blow as ter- 
rible and as well prepared as Marengo. The position was some- 
what similar to that of 1800. As Melas had then advanced 
far from his base of supplies in his invasion of the French 
riviera, so now Mack had ventured into the heart of Bavaria, 
with the plan of invading France while Napoleon was attempt- 
ing the invasion of England. The Austrian success in the 
occupation of the Upper Danube valley blinded them to the 
danger of being far away from their Russian allies, who, unable 
to advance in force while Prussia maintained a suspicious 
neutrality, were vainly endeavouring to compel her to join the 
Coalition by an armed demonstration on her frontiers. The 
temerity of General Mack's advance gave Napoleon the long- 
wished-for opportunity. Marching his troops at the average 
rate of 15 miles a day from Boulogne and the Low Countries 
towards the valleys of the Main and Neckar, he thus turned 
the Black Forest, on which Mack relied as his screen of defence 
from a front attack. Bernadotte was ordered to march south- 
ward from Hanover with the French troops quartered there, 
though he violated Prussia's neutrality by passing across her 
Principality of Anspach. The French columns began to con- 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governmeiits. 159 

verge on Mack's rear, while that presumptuous commander 
persisted in regarding their march merely as a menace to the 
Bohemian frontier. Awaking when too late to their real danger, 
two divisions of the Austrians strove in vain to break through 
to Bohemia and Tyrol. Only a few hundred men finally 
succeeded ; while the main body, weakened by these spasmodic 
efforts, had to surrender to the French at Ulm (Oct. 18 — 20). 

As Marengo had strengthened Bonaparte's position in 
France as First Consul, so his even more important victory at 
Ulm consolidated his prestige as Emperor. The wearisome 
and inglorious sea war against England had aroused much dis- 
content in France, which was aggravated by a financial crisis; 
but now, discontent gave way to admiration for a genius who 
could decide a campaign by rapid marching. " Our Emperor 
(said the soldiers) has found a new way of making war : he 
makes it not with our arms, but with our legs." 

The loss of a great army with all its cannons and stores 
paralysed Austria for the rest of the campaign; and the vic- 
torious French pressed on to Vienna, which they occupied. 
The Austrian Archduke Charles, though successful in Venetia, 
had hastily retreated north to protect the capital. Arriving too 
late for this, he retired into Hungary. Napoleon's pursuit of 
the Russians, who fell back into Moravia, was facilitated by a 
perfidious ruse whereby Marshals Murat and Lannes gained 
possession of the bridge over the Danube north of Vienna 
without the loss of a single man. Four years later this passage 
of the Danube was to cost the French more than 30,000 men. 

Even now, if Prussian policy had been as clear and decisive 
as it was confused and vacillating, the French forces might 
have been placed in great danger by an onset of the splendid 
Prussian army on their communications. Frederick William 
III had ample cause for such action ; for while he was success- 
fully maintaining against the Czar the neutrality of Prussian 
territory in the east, Napoleon's troops were marching through 



i6o The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

his Principality of Anspach on the Upper Main. This insult 
for a time decided the Prussian monarch to offer his armed 
mediation on behalf of the alhes against Napoleon; and a con- 
ditional treaty of alliance between Austria, Russia and Prussia, 
was signed at Potsdam (Nov. 3). In case France did not 
accede to the demands of the three Powers, — almost similar to 
those of the Anglo-Russian treaty, — Prussia was to declare war, 
four weeks after the departure of the envoy charged with these 
terms to Napoleon. England was to be invited to join this 
compact, paying the Prussian and North-German forces at the 
yearly rate of ;£i2. lox. per man; but Alexander, on the in- 
sistence of the Berlin Court, promised, in a secret article, to 
use his good offices with the British Government for the cession 
of Hanover to Prussia at the end of the war. Pitt indignantly 
refused even to mention these insulting terms to his aged 
sovereign, lest they should occasion a return of his mental 
disease; and the English refusal enabled Haugwitz and the 
French party at BerHn to nullify the effect of the Potsdam 
Convention, and seal the doom of old Europe. He himself 
was to be the envoy to Napoleon, with the message that 
Prussia would unite her forces with those of the two Imperial 
Courts, if the French did not stay their victorious career. 
Purposely delaying his journey as long as possible, Haugwitz 
found that Napoleon had set out from Vienna, and followed 
him to Brunn in Moravia — only to be referred back by the 
French Emperor to his astute Minister Talleyrand at Vienna. 
During these delays the 240,000 Prussian and North- German 
forces, which were marching to threaten the French flank and 
communications, did nothing while the fate of Europe was 
trembling in the balance. 

Knowing that the Czar was desirous of changing the in- 
glorious but successful poHcy of retreat for a bold offensive. 
Napoleon fell back on an admirable position between Austerlitz 
and Brunn. By concealing his own forces and by affecting 



viil] Napoleon and the old Governments. i6i 

discouragement at the dangers gathering around, he encouraged 
the impatient Alexander to attempt to cut off the French com- 
munications with Vienna. Such an attack had to be dehvered 
in front of frozen marshes and a small lake ; and when the 
Russian left was lured into this position by a feigned withdrawal 
of Napoleon's right wing, it was by a vigorous offensive move 
of the dense masses of French hurled back on the lake, the 
ice of which gave way under a plunging fire from French 
cannons. "We saw" — says General de Marbot in his memoirs 
— "thousands of Russians, with their horses, guns, and waggons, 
slowly settle down into the depths. It was a horribly majestic 
spectacle which I shall never forget." The loss to the allies 
of 15,000 killed and wounded, 18,000 prisoners, and 150 
cannons, ended not only the campaign, but the war. With 
ordinary prudence and skill, the forces of Russia and Austria, 
if aided by those of Prussia, should have overpowered the 
French army. If the old Governments could have acted in 
concert, the Battle of Leipzig would have been ante-dated by 
six years: but concerted action was impossible in 1805. Just 
as Prussia's armed neutrality had ruined the early part of the 
campaign by detaining the Russians on her frontiers, so too 
her delays after joining the Coalition wrecked its chances in 
December. Dismayed by the disaster of Austerlitz, and dis- 
gusted at the self-seeking policy of his allies, the Czar withdrew 
his shattered forces under cover of a truce. 

It remained to dispose of Austria and Prussia. The latter 
had (as we have seen) made an offensive and defensive alli- 
ance with the Powers; but Alexander's signature of the truce 
with Napoleon furnished Haugwitz with an excuse for evading 
obligations, from which he had, even before Austerlitz, striven 
to escape ; but how should he now face the conqueror ? To 
his surprise and joy, Napoleon again offered Hanover as the 
price of Prussia's alliance, though she was to cede Anspach to 
Bavaria, and Cleves and Neufchatel to France. The magnitude 
F.R. II 



1 62 The Revohitionary and Napoleojiic Era. [Chap. 

of the gain decided Haugwitz to sign at once the conditional 
Treaty of Schonbrunn (Dec. 15); and the Prussian monarch, 
preferring a profitable though ignominious peace to a struggle 
with the victors of Austerlitz, gave his general assent to its 
terms, in spite of the entreaties of his spirited queen and 
the indignation of his soldiers. By skilfully working on the 
fear and cupidity of the allies, Napoleon was thus able to deal 
singly with Austria, and, ten months later, with Prussia. 

Austria was forthwith constrained by the Treaty of Presburg 
(Dec. 26, 1805) to surrender Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia — 
her spoils of the old Republic of Venice — to the kingdom of 
Italy : to cede Tyrol to Bavaria, as well as to recognise the new 
kingdoms of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg, and the Grand-Duchy 
of Baden. As a slight set-off to these losses she acquired 
Salzburg, for the loss of which the Archduke Ferdinand 
received Wiirzburg as compensation. 

The campaign of 1805 will ever be memorable not only for 
the inconsiderate rashness of the allied leaders, the imbecility 
of Prussian policy, and the skill with which Napoleon shattered 
their armies and dissolved their alliances, but also for its 
abiding results on the social and political systems of Central 
Europe. Before Napoleon began to march his legions towards 
the Upper Danube, it seemed possible that the helpless rule 
of the elective ' Emperor ' of the Holy Roman Empire might 
give way to the supremacy in Southern Germany of the hereditary 
Emperor of Austria, and that Central and Southern Europe 
might be reconstructed according to the chivalrous aims of the 
young Czar. After Ulm and Austerlitz the impulse, which 
was to temporarily transform Central Europe, could come only 
from Paris, not from St Petersburg or Vienna. It was to be 
no mere merging of Bavaria in the Austrian Empire, no mere 
readjustment of frontiers according to 'natural equilibrium/ 
but a social and political revolution welding Germans into a 
great federation under the supremacy of Napoleon. Though 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 163 

warmly attached to liberty, Alexander could never have im- 
posed his will on Central Europe with the power which the 
French Emperor wielded by right of conquest. 

The throne of France had never been the ultimate aim of 
the young Corsican's ambition. To found an Empire in the 
East and then " take Europe in the rear," was his mental post- 
script to the instructions of the Directory before the Egyptian 
expedition; but Ulm and Austerlitz had shown that Europe 
might be easily overthrown by a front attack ; and, just as the 
Italian campaign was but a prelude to his rise to power in 
France, so now his triumphs over Austria and Russia heralded 
the far vaster aim — to found the United States of Europe 
under his supremacy. The time was ripe for some such 
attempt. When the old order of things was being sapped by 
the intellectual revolution, the rulers of Central and Eastern 
Europe weakened its political structure by their rapacious 
designs on Bavaria and Poland ; and these two weak places in 
the European system were now to be effectively used by 
Napoleon against the old Governments. Furthermore, the 
ease with which in 1803 scores of petty German States had 
been absorbed by their more vigorous neighbours, showed the 
possibility of some yet wider union. Nowhere had feudalism 
brought itself to so complete a reductio ad absurduin ; nowhere 
was there more yearning for a fraternity based on liberty and 
equality. But the Germans, separated for centuries from each 
other and from public life, needed a man of action to destroy 
the old barriers and complete the work of fusion. " Our jour- 
nalists" (wrote the German patriot Perthes in Aug. 1805) 
" take up the cause of the tyrant and the grande nation^ either 
from meanness, stupidity, fear, or for gold.... but has not every 
people, until consolidated by unity, been ready to receive a 
leader, a deliverer ? There is here a universal panting, long- 
ing, grasping after ^oxi\& point d appuV 

What firm nucleus could be found on which these chaotic 

II — 2 



164 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

States could build up a new Federation adapted to the needs 
of the times ? Napoleon seemed marked out by destiny for 
this vast work ; for an old prophecy foretold that when every- 
thing was falling to ruin, a second Frankish ruler should arise 
to heal and renovate. Amidst all their divisions and discords, 
Germans looked back to the dim past when the Frank, Karl 
the Great (Charlemagne), had ruled over Teutons and Italians, 
levying his tribute from the Ebro to the Elbe. 

Rarely, indeed, have fact and fiction so favoured the designs 
of a conqueror. Germany presented to Napoleon as vast a 
sphere for beneficent re-organisation as France in 1799. Both 
lands were passing through a political and social revolution, 
which seemed likely to end in mere chaos, unless some able 
man, by retaining the essential and rejecting the chimerical, 
could found law and order on the half-formed desires of the 
many. Napoleon's skill in satisfying the need of France for 
social equality and political stability, seemed to mark him out 
as the new Charlemagne, the re-organiser, not of Germany 
alone, but also of Southern Europe. Napoleon did all in his 
power to complete the parallel with the mediaeval Frankish 
hero. The insignia of Charlemagne had been brought from 
Aix-la-Chapelle to Paris for Napoleon's coronation; and a little 
later the Emperor remarked to Bourrienne — "I have succeeded, 
not to the throne of Louis XIV but to that of Charlemagne." 
Even in April, 1805, before his triumphs, he said — "I have 
formed some projects about Germany. It is there I will give 
a mortal blow to England. I will deprive her of the Con- 
tinent: besides I have some ideas, not yet matured, which 
extend much further. European society must be regene- 
rated — a superior Power must control the other Powers, and 
compel them to live at peace with each other; and France is 
well situated for that purpose." 

We here approach the second mighty effort of Napoleon's 
career. His first great sphere of activity, the reconstruction of 



VIII.] Napoleon and tJie old Governments. 165 

France, had been in many respects an extraordinary, and in 
in the main a beneficent, success. We must now recount the 
sahent features of the second and vaster enterprise, with its 
startHng though temporary success, and its momentous failure. 

The exclusion of Austria from Germany and Italy by the 
Peace of Presburg gave Napoleon a free hand in the affairs of 
those countries ; and the day after the signature of the peace, 
the victor declared, in a proclamation to his soldiers at Vienna, 
that the King of Naples had ceased to reign. His crime was 
that after promising in Sept. 1805 strict neutrality, he had two 
months later joined the Coalition and admitted Russian and 
English forces. For this 'perfidy* he was to yield up his 
throne to Napoleon's brother Joseph. French troops under 
Massena and St Cyr overthrew the Bourbon dynasty at Naples, 
the Russian and English forces retiring to Corfu and Sicily 
respectively. 

The utter failure of the Coalition at all points, added to 
troubles in his Ministry, sapped Pitt's vital force. " The pilot 
who weathered the storm " sank under the blow of Austerlitz, 
and bequeathed to his rival Fox the helm of State ; but the 
generous Whig statesman, on making overtures for peace to 
Napoleon, found himself duped, and he also was soon to 
succumb to the cruel disappointment of his long cherished 
hopes. No twelve months in our annals have been more 
fatal than those which took from us Nelson, Pitt, and Fox. 

Master of all the mainland of Italy except the Papal 
States, Napoleon now disregarded the protests of Pius VII 
against the occupation of Ancona by French troops. "Tell 
him (he wrote to his uncle, Cardinal Fesch) that I am Charle- 
magne, the Emperor, and must be treated as such"; and the 
Papal States continued to be occupied by French troops. 

The Emperor of the French also imposed his will on 
Trance and Europe by reviving titles of nobility, generally at 
the expense of the lands lately ceded or appropriated. Thus 



1 66 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Talleyrand became Prince of Benevento and Bernadotte Prince 
of Ponte Corvo, Papal fiefs in South-Italy; Marshal Berthier 
became Prince de Neufchatel ; Murat, Grand Duke of Cleves 
and Berg, &c.^; and to mark his supremacy in the Netherlands, 
Napoleon made his brother Louis King of Holland (June, 
1806). In place of that early aim of the French revolutionists 
— a ring of friendly republics around the borders of France — 
Napoleon had begun to encircle her with vassal States, held by 
his relatives or paladins, which were to buttress the Empire 
as Vauban's fortresses had girdled the realm of Louis XIV. 
Such were the aims of the conqueror of Austerhtz. In place 
of Rousseau's vision of a federation of small republics, Europe 
was fast being merged in a vast miHtary Empire. 

Equally high-handed was Napoleon's policy in Germany, 
especially towards Prussia. The statesmen at Berhn, en- 
deavouring to get more favourable terms than those of the 
conditional treaty with France, had the inconceivable folly to 
demobilise their forces before the definite settlement of the 
treaty. At once the French demands rose: Prussia was to 
close all her coast line, including that of Hanover, to English 
commerce, make common cause with France in every war, and 
hand over three small domains to Murat, Grand Duke of Berg 
(Feb. 1806). Helpless under French threats of immediate 
war, Prussia agreed to these much severer terms, the first of 
which, together with the occupation of Hanover by Prussia, 
led to a commercial and maritime war with England. "All 
that is contemptible in slavery" — said Fox of Prussia's action 
— "is now united with all that is hateful in robbery"; and more 
than 3c o Prussian ships were forthwith seized and confis- 
cated in English harbours (April, 1806). Not satisfied with 
his successful use of the bait of Hanover, first to separate 
Prussia from her allies, and next to embroil her with England, 
Napoleon now used it to hasten the rupture with that unfor- 
1 For a list of these dignities, see Appendix II., at the end. 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 167 

tunate Power. In the course of negotiations for peace, which 
the Fox-Grenville Ministry opened in the spring of 1806, 
Napoleon let it be known that the restoration of Hanover by 
Prussia to George III would make no difficulty : — " Hanover 
for the honour of the British crown, Malta for that of the 
navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for that of British com- 
merce" (June 19). The fact that the first of these terms was 
allowed to become generally known, and that the whole 
negotiations soon broke down owing to a change of front of 
the French Government as to Sicily and our recent colonial 
conquests, seems to indicate Napoleon's desire for a rupture 
with Prussia before she could form a firm alliance with Russia. 
The treaty of peace, which the Russian charge d'affaires had 
been induced to sign at Paris (July 20), was soon disavowed 
by the Czar, who even now did not despair of arraying Europe 
against Napoleon; and with this chief aim Alexander signed 
with Prussia a secret treaty (July i) binding the two Powers in 
a defensive league against the French Emperor. Their com- 
pact was soon to be tested; for Napoleon, beUeving himself 
sure of a definite peace with Russia, and of the dependence of 
Prussia, perhaps even hoping for a cessation of hostiHties on 
the part of the Fox-Grenville Ministry, ventured on the final 
overthrow of the old Germanic system. 

In this month of July, 1806, so fruitful in negotiations and 
treaties, the French Government signed a compact with sixteen 
princes of Southern and Western Germany, who, renouncing 
their allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire, formed under 
Napoleon's Protectorate the Confederation of the Rhine. 
This new Germanic federation, consisting of Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
berg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and several smaller 
States, bound itself to entire union with Napoleon in foreign 
policy, thus placing 63,000 German troops under his orders. 
In return for this surrender or foreign policy the federated 
princes were to enjoy full sovereign rights in their own 



1 68 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

States, their disputes being adjusted before a Federal Diet, 
which was to sit at Frankfurt. All the smaller princes, barons, 
and Imperial Knights, within the limits of the Confedera- 
tion, were mediatised, i.e. they were deprived of their govern- 
ing rights by the State within which their domains la}'-. 
Similarly, the old Free City of Nuremberg was acquired by 
Bavaria, while Frankfurt went to the Archchancellor Dalberg. 
The same policy was to be extended to all States which might 
in future join the Confederation, We notice here the same 
tendency towards consolidation of powers as had recently 
occurred in France, Italy, and elsewhere; for the mediatised 
princes were deprived of governmental rights by their more 
powerful neighbours, who in their turn acknowledged the 
supremacy of the new Charlemagne in mihtary affairs and 
foreign policy ; while the fact that the proposed Frankfurt Diet 
never assembled, shows that the capital of the new Confedera- 
tion was really Paris. The resources of all lands from the North 
Sea to the Adjiatic, from the Pyrenees to the Bohmer Wald, 
were now at the disposal of Napoleon. A brief message from 
the envoys of the newly federated princes to the Diet of the 
Holy Roman Empire at Ratisbon, announced that its authority 
was now at an end ; and Francis II, recognising accomplished 
facts, resigned his title as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and thenceforth used only the title Francis I, Emperor of Austria. 
As to Prussia, equally threatened by the creation of this 
powerful Confederation, she was ostensibly encouraged to 
form a North German Confederation with Hesse- Cassel, 
Saxony, &c. ; while her indignation at the proposed restoration 
of Hanover to George III (a proposal which Talleyrand 
dangled before the British Ministry up to the end of Sept. 
1806) was met by the insidious suggestion that Prussia should 
receive or take some neighbouring territory with 400,000 in- 
habitants as * compensation.' The Berlin Government also 
found French intrigues at work in Saxony and Hesse-Cassel, to 



viii.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 169 

prevent those States joining any North-German Confederation. 
These repeated insults cut Frederick William to the quick. 
Even Haugwitz advised him to place his army on a war 
footing ; and the rejection by Alexander of the treaty which 
his Minister had signed at Paris, showed to Europe the Third 
Coalition of the Powers in its second phase, viz. Russia, 
Prussia, England and Sweden. 

The execution by Napoleon's orders of the Nuremberg 
bookseller Palm for selling patriotic German pamphlets, gave 
to the opening war something of the appearance of a national 
crusade. The philosopher Fichte, hitherto the devotee of a 
cosmopolitan creed which contemplated the rise and fall of 
States with indifference, now felt that Prussia was the champion 
of all that was dear. In his " Speeches to the German war- 
riors" he wrote: — ''This war is to decide whether all that 
Humanity has from the first by a thousand sacrifices gained 
for order and skill, morality, art, science, and pious entreaties 
to Heaven, shall continue and grow according to the laws of 
human development — or whether all that poets have sung, 
wise men have thought, and heroes have accomplished, is to 
sink in the bottomless abyss of one arbitrary will." Un- 
fortunately this academic address could have no effect on the 
uneducated serfs who formed the great mass of the Prussian 
army. There was less community of interest between the 
soldiers and their officers, nearly all nobles, than in the old 
royal army of France ; for the social chasm was widened by 
the harsh Prussian discipline which enacted corporal punish- 
ment for the slightest fault. According to the common 
saying, "they reckoned one cane to every seven men." In 
many cases the company, or troop, was the property of its 
captain ; and, as promotion generally went by seniority, most 
of the officers were old and worn out. The Prussian General 
Gneisenau later on thus reviewed the causes of Prussia's 
disasters : " The inability of the Duke of Brunswick to form a 



I/O The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

sound plan of campaign, his bad fortune in 1792, the army's 
distrust of him, and its want of practice in war; ... the bad 
quahty of our weapons, the incapacity of most of our generals, 
and, to sum up, our conceit, which did not allow us to advance 
with the times." 

Relying on the prestige of Frederick the Great's time, 
Prussia now rushed into war, as if desirous of effacing the 
memory of her late halting diplomacy. The inconsiderate 
strategy of Brunswick was now to complete the ruin begun by 
the delays of the pacific king. The Prussian and North-German 
forces, by advancing to occupy the valley which the R. Saale has 
worn through the Thuringian mountains, committed a strategic 
blunder similar to that of General Mack eleven months before. 
Their troops were far away from their Russian allies, and ex- 
posed to a sudden attack from a more powerful foe. Napoleon, 
with 170,000 French and Rhenish Confederation troops, was 
about to cut the communications of the 128,000 Prussians and 
Saxons, when Brunswick evaded Mack's fate by a retreat down 
the Saale valley. The campaign was decided by two great 
battles fought simultaneously at Jena and Auerstadt (Oct. 14). 
At Jena 50,000 Prussians under Prince Hohenlohe faced 
double their number of French, who, guided by a Saxon 
clergyman, had secretly made their way up a height dominating 
the Prussian position. Hopelessly outnumbered and out- 
manoeuvred, Hohenlohe's troops were broken after a brave 
resistance. This was a disaster. Near Auerstadt there was 
disaster and disgrace; for there Brunswick's greatly superior 
force failed to cut their way through Davoust's 30,000 French 
who were seeking to circumvent the whole Prussian and Saxon 
forces. Brunswick was mortally wounded. The Prussian 
charges were made piecemeal against strong positions obsti- 
nately held; 18,000 men of their reserves never joined in the 
fight; and finally outflanked, the main Prussian army retreated, 
to join the wreck of Hohenlohe's forces. Relentlessly chased 



VIII.] Napoleoft and the old Governments. 171 

by Murat's squadrons, Hohenlohe surrendered near Stettin, 
and the gallant Bliicher was overpowered at Liibeck. Fortress 
after fortress tamely capitulated to the French. Never in 
modern times was there so complete a collapse of a great 
military Power. A fortnight after Jena, Napoleon made his 
triumphal entry into Berhn, most of the Prussian ' Guard of 
Nobles ' marching as prisoners past the French Embassy, on 
the steps of which they had ostentatiously sharpened their 
swords two months before ! 

We have already seen that Napoleon had determined to 
strike a mortal blow at England in Germany. " England is 
everywhere " (he remarked to Bourrienne) " and the struggle 
is between her and me. The whole of Europe will be our 
instruments, sometimes serving one, sometimes the other." 
However exaggerated his estimate of England's power to 
' build up ' Coalitions, he now had the means of excluding her 
from nearly all the Continent; and on Nov. 21, 1806, appeared 
his Berlin Decrees. These declared the British Isles in a state 
of blockade, enjoined the seizure of all English subjects, goods 
and letters in any land held by French or aUied troops, and 
excluded from the ports of France and her allies all ships 
coming from Great Britain or her colonies. Half of the con- 
fiscated British goods were to serve as indemnity to French 
or allied merchants for their losses in the maritime war. 

The British Government took up the gauntlet. Two 
months later appeared the first of our Orders in Council, which, 
"in order to retort upon our foes the evils of their own in- 
justice," forbade neutral ships, under pain of seizure, to 
trade between ports from which British vessels and merchan- 
dise were excluded. To Napoleon's empty threat of block- 
ading the British Isles, the Enghsh Ministry replied by measures 
which soon excluded colonial produce from the Napoleonic 
States. 

Napoleon's decrees, as applied to French and allied lands. 



172 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

formed the Continental System, which aimed at compelling 
England to surrender, by cutting off her commerce. Our war 
with France thus became more and more a gigantic mercantile 
struggle which soon embraced the whole world. To Napo- 
leon's Continental System we retorted by a blockade of the 
Continent; and our policy became more and more commercial, 
leading to expeditions against French, Dutch, and Spanish 
colonies, and the occupation of vantage posts such as Sicily, 
Heligoland, &c., whence our goods could be smuggled into 
the Napoleonic States. Except for trifling subsidies to our 
few allies, and our participation in the Peninsular War, the 
struggle between France and England was, up to 1814, one of 
Land- Power against Sea-Power. 

Every extension of Napoleon's dominion on land widened 
the application of his commercial policy, until by 1808 it em- 
braced all the Continental States except Turkey and Sweden. 
We must now consider first the events which enabled Napoleon 
to impose this system on Russia, and, later on, how it involved 
him in his Spanish policy, in the Russian expedition, and the 
Wars of Liberation of 18 13. 

The Czar's troops had no more share in the disasters of 
Jena-Auerstadt than in Mack's catastrophe at Ulm in the pre- 
vious autumn. In both cases they were many days' march 
behind their too venturesome allies. Amidst the break-up of 
the Prussian military system and the surrender of the Oder 
fortresses to the French, Frederick William and his gallant 
queen still hoped to retain all their Prussian and Polish lands 
east of the Vistula, which then formed quite one-fourth of their 
possessions. At first Napoleon's troops gained some decisive 
successes over the Russian troops in Poland ; and the news of 
a rising in Warsaw led to the defection of the Polish troops 
from the Prussian colours, leaving only 13,000 for field-service. 
But the campaign entered on a new phase with the desperate 
and successful resistance of the Russians and Prussians at 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Cover mnents. 173 

Eylau (Feb. 8, 1807). " What a massacre, and without result ! " 
was Ney's description of the square league of carnage. Re- 
duced for a time almost to inactivity, Napoleon vainly tried to 
detach Frederick William from the Russian alliance. The 
Prusso-Russian compact was strengthened by a treaty of offen- 
sive and defensive alliance at Bartenstein (April), which 
England and Sweden soon joined, and to which Austria was 
urged to adhere; but that unfortunate Power, courted also by 
France, could not be induced to move; and the English 
Ministry— on Prussia's renunciation of Hanover to George III 
—sent money and arms, only when it was too late. The 
neglect of the English Government to send sufficient money, 
or to despatch at once an army to Stralsund for the help 
of the hard-pressed Swedish forces, was Alexander's chief 
excuse for the change of front which soon astonished the 
world. 

The campaign was ended by a fatal blunder of the Russian 
General Bennigsen. In order to save Konigsberg from the 
French, who were marching northwards nearly parallel with his 
army, he crossed the R. Alle at Friedland, believing that only 
Lannes' division of io,oco men would resist his advance; but 
Napoleon, probably expecting this step, had a large force near 
at hand. A daring charge of Marshal Ney drove the Russians 
back on the bridges of Friedland, which were broken by the 
fire of the French cannons ; and, swinging round his left wing, 
Napoleon captured or drove into the river nearly all the 
Russian centre and right (June 14)- The loss of nearly 
25,000 men killed, wounded, or prisoners, and 80 cannons 
decided Alexander to ask for a truce. Both in its military and 
political aspects, Friedland corresponds to Austerlitz. Before 
both battles Napoleon could have been overpowered by 
prompt and united action of all the States threatened by his 
domination; but their mutual jealousies, the tardy action of 
their Governments, and the culpable rashness of the Russian 



174 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

commanders, gave the victory to the one Power, whose diplo- 
matic and miUtary tactics were unerring. 

Disgusted at the continued neutraUty of Austria and at the 
dilatoriness of England, which sent arms only to be captured by 
the French at Konigsberg, the Czar now met his great foe at 
Tilsit with the words: — "I hate the Enghsh as much as you 
do." "In that case" — replied Napoleon — "peace is made." 
Yielding to the charm of the French Emperor's conversation, 
and captivated by the prospect of sharing as an equal in his 
Continental domination, Alexander gladly accepted a peace 
which promised gains of territory at the expense of Turkey. It 
is true that Napoleon had recently encouraged the Sultan to 
declare war on Russia and had helped him to withstand the 
menaces of an English fleet at the Dardanelles ; but the depo- 
sition of this Sultan by a palace revolution (May, 1807) helped 
Napoleon to the excuse that his friendship had been merely 
personal, and did not extend to his successor. Never did tidings 
come more opportunely ; and never have they been more 
astutely used. " It is a decree of Providence " — exclaimed 
Napoleon to the Czar — "which tells me that the Turkish 
Empire can no longer exist." Dazzled by the prospect of the 
lion's share in an approaching partition of Turkey, Alexander 
abandoned as quixotic his earlier schemes for the liberation of 
Europe, and fell back on Russia's traditional policy, the south- 
ward march towards Constantinople. Such was the policy 
underlying the Treaties of Tilsit. On his side of the bargain. 
Napoleon was to extend his influence at the expense of 
Prussia, by cutting her off from western Germany, and by forming 
her Polish provinces into a State dependent on France, called 
the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. Sure of the alliance of Saxony 
— thenceforth to be a kingdom — Napoleon would thus control 
a line of States from the Rhine to the Niemen, save for the 
narrow neck of Lower Silesia. On her seabord Prussia was to 
be crippled by Danzig becoming a *free town,' under a 



m. 



CENTRAL EUROPE 1807 1809. 




Stanford's Geogl Estab!.Londo 




tanford's Geoff} £stiibl London. 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 175 

French commander. In fact, the fourth clause of the Treaty- 
affirmed that only out of consideration for the Czar, did 
Napoleon restore to the King of Prussia any of his States. It 
was in vain that the lovely Queen Louisa came twice to beg 
that at least Napoleon would give her Magdeburg. After 
some empty compliments, he bade Talleyrand get the treaties 
signed as soon as possible. 

The Treaties of Tilsit (July 7, 1807) may be thus sum- 
marised : — Prussia lost nearly all the lands gained in the three 
partitions of Poland. These territories, except the district of 
Bialystok, were to form the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the 
protection of the King of Saxony. A military road across 
Lower Silesia was to keep open the communications between 
Saxony and the Duchy, while complete freedom of navigation 
on the Vistula served to connect Warsaw with the new ' free 
town ' of Danzig. Prussia also surrendered all her lands west 
of the Elbe, parts going to swell Murat's Duchy of Berg, other 
territories, with Hesse-Cassel, forming the new kingdom of 
Westphalia for Napoleon's brother Jerome; while his brother 
Louis received from Prussia East Frisia as an addition to 
Holland. France gained three fortresses and one district on 
the right bank of the Rhine, and the fortress of Erfurt as a 
stronghold in the midst of the Confederation of the Rhine. 
Hanover, Baireuth, and a few other German States were also 
to be occupied 'provisionally' by the French. The Czar 
reluctantly received (on Napoleon's insistence) the frontier 
district of Bialystok from the hapless Prussian monarch whose 
lands he had two months before solemnly promised to defend. 
The Russian troops were to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, 
but these provinces were not to be re-occupied by Turkish 
troops until the conclusion of peace between Russia and 
Turkey under the mediation of France. Similarly, Napoleon 
accepted the mediation of the Czar to bring about peace 
between France and England, if the latter accepted it within a 



176 The Reiwhitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

month. Russia also recognised the Napoleonic States in 
Germany and Italy. 

In a separate and secret Treaty of Alliance of the same date 
(the full details of which have only quite recently become 
known), the Czar agreed to join Napoleon against England, if 
she did not before Nov. i, 1807, abate her maritime claims, 
and consent to restore the conquests made since 1805 to 
France and her alHes. If England did not by Dec. i assent to 
these terms, the two Emperors would "summon the three 
Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their 
ports to the EngHsh, and declare war on England. That one 
of the three Courts which refuses shall be treated as an 
enemy ; and in the case of Sweden refusing, Denmark shall be 
compelled to declare war on her." Similar compulsion was to 
be used to compel Austria to join the Continental System. If, 
however, England agreed to the French terms, she was to 
receive Hanover as compensation for the French, Spanish, and 
Dutch colonies restored by her. Similarly, if Turkey refused 
the French mediation or the Russian terms, then the Emperors 
would make war on her "to withdraw from the burdensome 
yoke of the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
in Biirope, the city of Constantinople and the province of 
Roumelia only excepted." Other secret articles provided for 
the cession to the French of the Cattaro district of Dalmatia 
as also of the Ionian Isles, both of which had been occupied 
by Russian troops; also that if, at the future peace with 
England, Hanover should be added to Jerome's Kingdom of 
Westphalia, Prussia should then recover some of her lands 
west of the Elbe with about 400,000 inhabitants. 

The Treaty with Prussia to a similar effect was signed two 
days later. Napoleon declaring that his words to Queen 
Louisa were merely "amiable words which bound him to 
nothing," and that but for the intercession of the Czar, the 
whole of Prussia would have been given to Jerome Bonaparte. 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governmefits. 177 

Talleyrand inwardly revolted at "the barbarity with which 
Napoleon treated Prussia at Tilsit " ; but worse was to follow. 
The Convention of Konigsberg provided that the lands left 
to Prussia should be evacuated by French troops only in pro- 
portion as the war indemnity (as yet not specified), or securities 
to its amount, should be forthcoming ; and Prussian taxes were 
to be set apart for the satisfaction of French claims. Much 
of Napoleon's popularity in France was due to his policy that 
" war must support war," whereby France gained the glory of 
victory without any exceptional financial burdens. Prussia 
was now to support the Grand Army; and the financial 
exactions were so prolonged that Berlin was not completely 
freed from the French till the War of Liberation in 1 813. As if 
the loss of half her subjects and all her foreign commerce, the 
incubus of a huge debt and a rapacious army of occupation, 
had not sufficiently humbled Prussia, she was ordered a year 
later to limit her army to 42,000 men. 

Never has the European system sustained such a shock as 
at Tilsit. The Czar, who at Bartenstein had solemnly pledged 
his word to preserve the "natural equilibrium" of Europe, now 
at Tilsit made a profitable alliance with its destroyer, and 
Russian policy reverted to the aims of Peter the Great and 
Catherine, — conquests over Sweden and Turkey. Finland and 
the Danubian Provinces were to be the ultimate prizes gained 
by alliance with France; while Alexander joined hands with 
Napoleon to hold down the centre of Europe. Nay more ! The 
Land Power was to form an irresistible league for the ruin of 
the Sea Power. Our sole remaining ally, Sweden, could not 
resist the onset of 40,000 French who, marching into her pro- 
vince of Pomerania, compelled the surrender of Stralsund 
(Aug.). Russia and Prussia not only excluded English com- 
merce, but the former Power joined Napoleon in trying to 
force on us a ruinous peace. 

Was the English Ministry justified in rejecting the rnedia- 
F. R. 12 



178 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

tion projected by the Czar, but ultimately proposed by the 
Austrian Emperor ? In the first place, it must be remembered 
that alone of all the allies, England had suffered no disasters, 
but had made considerable conquests. Nearly all the French, 
Dutch, and Spanish colonies had fallen, or were likely to fall, 
into our hands. Our position in India was securer than ever 
before. Napoleon's Berlin decrees had as yet only served to 
exhibit his impotence at sea; for while his blockade of the 
British Isles remained a mere threat, our blockade of the 
Napoleonic States was so far effective that the neutral com- 
merce of the world was passing into our hands. There was 
therefore no urgent reason for making peace. Secondly, the 
British Government knew from the terms of the (published) 
Treaty of Tilsit with what severity Napoleon pressed on a 
vanquished foe; and it further had heard that a secret treaty 
had been signed between Napoleon and Alexander. When, 
therefore, the Czar proposed to offer his mediation between 
England and France, the British Government requested (Aug. 
29) to be informed what were "the just and equitable prin- 
ciples on which France intended to negotiate," as also what 
were the terms of the secret Treaty of Tilsit. No answer came; 
but our Government had already heard — Fouche's memoirs 
hint that Talleyrand was the informer — of the policy secretly 
arranged at Tilsit to compel Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal 
to join the continental league against England; and that Den- 
mark would be occupied by the French troops already on the 
borders of Holstein. Canning, English Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs in the new Portland Ministry, at once decided " to do 
by Napoleon what he has so long been doing by others." A 
great fleet under Admiral Gambler sailed for the Sound, there 
to be joined by a British force tardily sent to aid the Swedes 
in Pomerania. Our envoy offered to the Prince Royal an 
Anglo-Danish alHance, or strict neutraHty in the impending 
struggle. In either case the Danish fleet was Lo join ours as 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 179 

deposit/ partly for our own protection, partly to remove the 
reason for French demands of an alliance with Denmark. Not 
even the display of an imposing force of more than 80 British 
ships could overcome the indignation of the Danish Prince at 
this high-handed policy. The British land-forces under Lord 
Cathcart accordingly disembarked near Copenhagen ; and after 
the investment of its walls, a last offer was made of receiving 
the Danish fleet in deposit. On its rejection the works and 
the city were bombarded for the greater part of four days until 
(Sept. 5) it agreed to surrender the fleet unconditionally; six 
weeks' armistice were aUowed to equip the 16 ships of the line, 
13 frigates and 30 smaller vessels, which formed the sole prize 
of this expedition. The archives of our Foreign Office show 
that Canning desired far more, viz. an Anglo-Scandinavian 
league which might preserve the North of Europe from Napo- 
leon's grasp. But the Danish Prince refused all overtures for 
an alliance which would have drawn on him the armies of 
Napoleon; while a French alliance promised a share in the 
spoils of the Swedish monarchy. The result of the Copen- 
hagen expedition was, on the whole, disastrous for Great 
Britain. Denmark became the most trusty of all Napoleon's 
allies; and the Czar, casting aside his first scruples, soon 
declared war on England (Nov. 7, 1807). Our ally Sweden, 
menaced by the Danes on the side of Norway (then under the 
Danish crown), and threatened with the loss of Finland by an 
invasion of the Russians, maintained the unequal struggle for 
two years; but after the deposition of her quixotic monarch 
Gustavus IV, by his uncle, who succeeded as Charles XIII, 
she ceded Finland and the Aland Isles to Russia (Sept. 1809) 
and soon after agreed to exclude all British goods. 

At the opposite end of Europe the results of the secret 
compact between Napoleon and Alexander were seen far more 
immediately. Exasperated by our conduct at Copenhagen, 
Napoleon, at a meeting of the diplomatic circle, thus addressed 

12 — 2 



l8o The RevohUionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the Portuguese ambassador: "I will no longer tolerate an 
English ambassador ni Europe. I will declare war against 
any Power that receives one, after two months from this time. 
...The English no longer respect neutrals at sea. I will no 
longer recognise neutrals on the land." The Court of Lisbon, 
summoned to close its ports to us and seize English goods, 
refused to confiscate the property of a Power so closely allied 
for a century past; but even before the refusal of the Portu- 
guese Regent had reached Napoleon, the latter had signed 
with his Spanish allies the secret treaty of Fontainebleau (Oct. 
1807) for the partition of Portugal and its colonies between 
France and Spain. In pursuance of this scheme, French 
troops under Junot marched through Spain to overthrow the 
rule of the House of Braganza. The Portuguese Regent, un- 
able to offer any resistance, set sail (Nov. 30) from Lisbon for 
Brazil, thus fulfilling a boast in the Paris Aloniteiir — " The fall 
of the House of Braganza will be a new proof how inevitable 
is the ruin of all who attach themselves to the English." 

Rendered desperate by these extensions of Napoleon's 
system to all Europe — for after Austria joined the Continental 
System, Oct. 1807, only Sweden and Turkey remained friendly 
to us, or neutral — the British Ministry issued its second series 
of Orders in Council (Nov. 1807). These declared that every 
neutral ship trading between ports, from which our vessels were 
excluded, was "good prize of war"; and neutrals trading to or 
from a port hostile to us, must acknowledge our maritime code 
by putting in at a British harbour and paying a tonnage duty. 
Enraged at these pretensions to a maritime monopoly, Napo- 
leon at once retorted by his Milan Decrees (Nov. and Dec): — 
that all neutral ships submitting to the British maritime code 
were thereby denationalised, and became good and lawful 
prize. Between belligerents so exasperated, neutrality on sea 
was almost as impossible as on land ; and the disastrous year 
1807 closed with the imposition by the United States of a 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments, i8i 

general embargo on European vessels. Cut off from direct 
trade with the Continent and the United States, our position 
seemed gloomy indeed. Our policy had apparently resulted 
in a victory for Napoleon all along the line. The help to our 
aUies had always been sent too late; while our high-handed 
actions against Spain and Denmark had driven these Powers 
into his arms. Our great enemy, on the other hand, had 
shown all the qualities which ensure success in diplomacy and 
war. The bait of Hanover adroitly used to secure Prussia's 
neutrality until her allies were crushed, specious generosity to 
the Czar after Austerlitz and Friedland, crushing terms to 
Austria and Prussia when isolated and helpless, the skilful 
diversion of Alexander's ambition from the West towards the 
East — these main features of the Napoleonic policy secured as 
brilliant a success in state-craft as his swift and hitherto un- 
erring strategy had won on the field. "An union which the 
tvorld never before saw, of irresistible force with the most con- 
summate art (wrote Mr A. Baring, M.P., in Feb. 1808), is 
employed to rear his gigantic fabric; while the total lack of 
energy and genius on the other side appears to exhibit the 
hand of Providence in this extraordinary revolution." 

Every brilliant military and diplomatic triumph of Napoleon 
was marked by the increase of his power in France itself 
Rivoli and Campo Formio had raised him far above all French 
generals. Marengo and Luneville consolidated his power as 
First Consul. The Peace of Amiens gained him the Con- 
sulate for life with almost unbounded power. The over- 
throw ot the Third CoaHtion now enabled him to suppress the 
one public body in France which occasionally ventured to 
timidly criticise his acts. The Tribunate, designed by Sieyes 
as the criticising organ of the body politic, had been already 
shorn of some of its powers, and divided into sections which 
debated secretly (see p. 134). The Emperor now announced 
that he was about to "simplify and perfect French institu- 



1 82 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

tions": the Tribunate had preserved something of "the dis- 
quieted and democratic spirit which had long agitated 
France." This reason sufficed for its total suppression (Aug. 
1807) and the transference of its few remaining functions ta 
the more submissive Corps Legislaiif. Commissioners in this 
body were now to draw up drafts for laws ; but in reality most 
laws emanated from Napoleon or his obsequious Ministers, the 
thin disguise of calling them Seiiatiis Coiisulta being often 
dispensed with. 

Never, perhaps, have all the activities of government been 
so concentrated in one all-absorbing personality. Amidst the 
dearth of really able men in the later years of the French 
Revolution, Napoleon's genius had shone forth with dazzhng 
splendour ; and the contrast was even more marked when he 
measured his strength with the rulers, diplomatists, and generals 
of Europe. Nothing, indeed, is more surprising in his career 
than the swift expansion of his faculties and ambition along 
with extended power. After his most brilliant successes his 
behaviour ever denoted that he had done nothing as yet. 
Keen foresight in developing the resources of democratic 
France and diverting them into the path of military glory, 
Macchiavellian skill in dividing his foes and attacking them 
when severed and disheartened, political tact in welding the 
shattered fragments of old Europe into his own system of 
States — these were powers which paralysed or fascinated a 
Mack, a Haugwitz, or an Alexander. Add to this the fear 
caused by his terrifying personality, his invincible strength of 
mind and body, his long and furious rides which wore out 
all his suite, his machine-like power of endurance in long 
conferences which left his Ministers prostrate with fatigue, his 
correspondence, often ranging far into the night, on all matters 
from the conduct of a campaign to the repair of a road or the 
chit-chat of the royalist salo7is in the Faubourg St Germain — 
and the almost superstitious awe with which he inspired 



VIII.] Napoleon and the old Governments. 183 

idealogues and men of action alike, may perhaps be imagined. 
" The gigantic (wrote one of his Councillors of State) entered 
into our very habits of thought." 

But the student who has reaHsed the social and political 
weakness of the old European system, will find nothing super- 
natural even in the extraordinary career of the young Corsican 
who now swayed the destinies of the Continent. He himself, 
in words remarkable for their candour and perspicacity, once 
revealed the causes of his success — "Nothing has been simpler 
than my elevation. It was owing to the peculiarity of the 
times.... I have always marched with the opinion of great 
masses and with events." 



CHAPTER IX. 

The Nationalist Reaction. 

"At first the great man had enlisted his high intelligence and powerful 
will in the service of the general sentiments and desires. He now seeks to 
employ the public force in the service of his individual ideas and desires. 
He attempts things which he alone wishes or understands. Hence general 
disquietude and uneasiness." — Guizot. 

The latter part of 1807 may be regarded in many respects 
as the zenith of Napoleon's career. In ten months he had 
humbled Prussia to the dust. His will reigned supreme from 
Lisbon to Warsaw, from Copenhagen to Naples. There was 
as yet no discord in his relations with the Czar. Sweden was 
struggling hopelessly against her foes; and England seemed to 
be slowly succumbing to the commercial strangulation of the 
Continental System. Everywhere he had encountered a half- 
hearted or ill-organised resistance from armies and Govern- 
ments weakened by mutual jealousies or by want of hearty 
support from the nations which they claimed to represent. 
But after 1807 the struggle enters on a new phase. The 
resistance to Napoleon slowly deepens, as defeated rulers and 
statesmen begin to enlist on their side the forces which France 
had so triumphantly wielded. 

The State which suffered the most disastrous overthrow 
was the first to profit by the lessons of adversity. Two months 
after the loss of half his dominions at Tilsit, Frederick Wihiam 



Chap. IX.] The Nationalist Reaction, 185 

III entrusted the regeneration of Prussia to that able and 
determined reformer, Baron vom Stein. This great man, whose 
influence on Prussia is comparable to that of Napoleon on 
France, was by birth an Imperial Knight of the old Holy 
Roman Empire; but, attracted by the reforming zeal of Frede- 
rick the Great, he had in 1780 entered the Prussian service, 
with the ultimate hope of furthering the unification of Germany. 
In all his early organising work, — whether road-making, canali- 
sation of the R. Ruhr, or the incorporation of Miinster in the 
Prussian dominions — there appeared a passion for thoroughness, 
and for vigorous government in the interests of the people. An 
earnest student of Turgot and Adam Smith, he strove to carry 
out in Cleves and Miinster what the great French reformer had 
planned for the Limousin; for he saw clearly the defects in the 
social and political life of Germany. Arthur Young's descrip- 
tion of the solitudes around the mansion of a French seigneur 
is not more vigorous than Stein's comment on the results of 
feudalism in N. Germany: — "The abode of the Mecklenburg 
noble, who, instead of helping his peasants, hunts them, seems 
to me like the lair of some beast of prey which devastates all 
around and encircles itself with the stillness of the grave." 
Equally spirited, after he entered the Finance Ministry at 
Berlin, was his protest against the Cabal, or secret irrespon- 
sible Cabinet, which intervened so disastrously between the 
king and his Ministers; and in Jan. 1807 Frederick William 
dismissed him as a "scornful, obstinate and disobedient 
official." But after Tilsit, all was changed. The Prussia of 
Frederick the Great had utterly collapsed. The unhappy land 
lay under the heel of a conqueror whose exactions had no limit 
except the inability of his victim to pay any more. Indeed, 
nothing but fear of arousing the Czar's jealousy kept Napoleon 
from annexing the whole land, which his army continued to 
occupy. In a crisis so desperate a complete break with the 
past was inevitable. The king accordingly urged Stein to take 



1 86 TJie Revohttionary a7id Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

office with almost unlimited powers; and he as frankly accepted 
(Oct. 4, 1807) the Herculean task of reforming the social and 
political systems of Prussia by royal decrees. His successful 
inauguration of this policy not only saved Prussia from the 
social convulsions which followed the fall of feudalism in 
France, but indissolubly connected the fortunes of the Hohen- 
zoUern House with the cause of social equality. Alone of the 
old reigning families it found the great man, "the demi-god, 
who," according to Rousseau, "was fit to give new laws to 
men." Whereas the failure of Louis XVI and his Ministers 
to overcome the resistance of the Parlements had sealed the 
doom of the Bourbons, the legislation of Stein and Hardenberg 
secured the continuity of monarchy in Central Europe. The 
contrast is reflected in the national characteristics of to-day. 
While Paris represents the cause of militant democracy, Berlin 
is as distinctly the symbol of an enlightened and vigorous 
personal rule. 

If the French, after nine years of revolution, had needed a 
master mind to consolidate its results, how much more neces- 
sary was "reform from above" in Prussia, where the people at 
large had no share in public life? Stein's predecessors, Har- 
denberg and others, had recommended that the nobles should 
surrender their exclusive rights and their immunities from tax- 
ation, also that the serfs must be freed in Prussia Proper. Five 
days after Stein received his great powers, the Edict (Oct. 9, 
1807) for the emancipation of the serfs throughout the whole 
Prussian monarchy appeared at Memel. It was to take effect 
from Martinmas, 18 10. The same edict swept away the ancient 
restrictions on the possession of land, whereby only 'noble land' 
could be owned by nobles, only land belonging to towns could 
be held by men of the citizen class, and only 'peasant land' 
by peasants. Henceforth there was to be free trade in land, 
while nobles might follow 'citizen occupations'; the sharp lines 
marking off the callings of the citizen from those of the peasant 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 187 

were also obliterated. Precautions were, however, taken to 
prevent unlimited competition for land leading to the extinction 
of the peasant proprietors and land-holders who had formed, 
and were still to form, the backbone of the Prussian army. 

The edict of emancipation was an almost despairing effort 
of the Prussian monarchy to retrieve the fortunes of its over- 
burdened States by allowing for the first time free play to all 
faculties and callings. The watchword of the revolution, '''la 
carriere ouverte mix talents^'' was now proclaimed in Prussia, 
yet with a characteristic difference in the method of enunciation. 
Quietly and from the remotest corner of Prussia came the royal 
edict which reformed the basis of her society almost as completely 
as the spasmodic decrees of Aug. 4, 1789, had revolutionised the 
life of France. Another contrast must also be noticed, namely 
that in the Prussian edict the methods of confiscation were 
avoided,— except in the extinction of the status of serfdom or 
villainage. The former serfs were declared to be still "subject 
to all the obligations which bind them as free persons by virtue 
of the possession of an estate or by a special contract"; and it 
was not till Hardenberg's agrarian law of 181 1 that the 
peasants became freeholders of two-thirds of their holdings, 
ceding one-third to their former lords in lieu of the feudal 
services which then were abolished. The two Prussian edicts, 
therefore, by transforming the serf into the peasant proprietor, 
quietly effected no less a change than that of the French copy- 
holder into the freeholder brought about partly by the decrees 
of the Constituent Assembly and partly by force. About the 
same time serfdom was abolished in Swedish Pomerania, the 
Grand-Duchy of Warsaw, and the States forming the Con- 
federation of the Rhine. 

These new rights were to be closely associated with a vast 
extension of the sphere of civic duties, especially in connection 
with national defence. In the Prussian army the officers and 
the rank and file had been drawn almost exclusively from the 



1 88 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

two extremes of society, nobles and serfs respectively. That 
system had achieved wonders when worked by Frederick the 
Great against armies similarly composed; but even at Valmy 
it was seen that the Prussian army was a lifeless mechanism, 
and at the shock of Jena it collapsed helplessly before Napo- 
leon's forces. If enfeebled Prussia was now to renew her 
strength, she must evidently have recourse to that system of 
universal conscription by which France had vanquished the 
Second and Third Coalitions. Frederick William himself urged 
on a great scheme of army reform ; and the military commis- 
sion suggested that whereas the army "had been hated and in 
some degree despised by the other classes, it ought to be the 
union of all the moral and physical energies of the nation." 
As the citizen class was now to be called to arms, there must 
be an end of the degrading punishments so prejudicial to the 
spirit of the men, though it had been often necessary in the past 
when foreign adventurers formed no small portion of the army. 
Further, as Prussia was overwhelmed by the increasing French 
demands for a war indemnity, and could not keep up a large 
force on active service, the famous organiser Scharnhorst pro- 
posed (1807) to drill men, and, after service in the standing 
army, to pass them into a provincial militia, " an internal sup- 
plementary police." This unambitious project would save the 
Prussian exchequer and perhaps allay Napoleon's jealous sus- 
picions. In Sept. 1808, however, came a demand from Paris 
that the Prussian army should not exceed 42,000 men. Com- 
pliance was inevitable. Thus the conditions of the time almost 
compelled Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and other army reformers 
to form a secret reserve which in three years gave Prussia 
150,000 trained troops; but it was not till 1813 that the 
Landwehr and Landsturm were actually formed as second and 
third lines of reserve. In the meantime officers received a 
new and skilful training, arms and uniforms were adapted to 
the swifter movements required in the Napoleonic wars, and 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 189 

new cannons were cast for the eight fortresses which remained 
free from the French army of occupation. 

We saw that in the early days of the French Departmental 
System the terms citizen and National Guard were almost co- 
extensive, though the municipalities had to surrender nearly all 
their liberties to the central government after Nov. 1793. 
While a similar travesty of local self-government was being 
extended by the French in the Confederation of the Rhine, a 
desire was expressed by a few Prussian towns for some such 
self-government as had flourished in the mediaeval Free Cities 
of Germany. Accordingly, with the help of his colleagues and 
the entire approval of the king, Stein promulgated his famous 
Municipal Reform of Nov. 19, 1808, which freed Prussian 
towns from their irksome control by the central government 
or the lord of the manor, and from government by half-pay 
officers. All towns, even those subject to manorial lords, were 
placed in the same relation to the State and were divided only 
according to population into great towns (those above 10,000), 
middle towns (above 3500) and small towns (above 800 souls). 
The old distinctions between 'great' and 'small' citizens now 
ceased, and all Prussian civihans who owned land in the town 
or followed town occupations were henceforth during good 
conduct to enjoy the rights and fulfil the duties of citizenship; 
all others were merely 'residents,' who must pay rates but 
were without the franchise. The cidzens were to elect an 
executive magistrate and a representative council, exercising a 
general supervision of all town affairs : only those councillors and 
other officials were to be paid who gave their whole time to 
public duties; and nearly all citizens were when elected bound 
to serve even in unpaid offices. The frequent appeals to civic 
spirit, and the us€ of German terms (e.g. 'Gemeinde' instead 
of ' Commune '), mark the desire of the Government to foster 
local patriotism as the first approach to a future national 
patriotism. The success of the measure may be seen in the 



IQO The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

superhuman efforts made by all parts of Prussia in 1813; while 
the practical nature of its details is shown by its continuing 
unchanged down to 1831 — a striking contrast to the hasty and 
unfortunate French scheme of 1789 — 90. 

Stein unquestionably designed this measure as a stepping- 
stone towards a national Parliament; but he barely had time 
before his resignation to draft a measure (which, in a modified 
form, became law in Dec. 1808) for unifying and strengthening 
the cumbrous administration of the State. In Prussia the 
responsible Ministers had formed no collective Cabinet but 
had consulted individually with the king, whose decisions were 
often warped by the secret advice of irresponsible * cabinet 
secretaries' forming a sort of ' cabal' Another cause of weak- 
ness and confusion was the local division of the departments 
of government, viz. that according to the separate and very 
diverse States or provinces of the monarchy. Indeed, nothing 
but Frederick the Great's genius and energy could have im- 
parted clearness and energy to this ' cross division ' — to use a 
logical term — of powers and functions called the Prussian 
Government. To put an end to this confusion, a Ministry 
of State, comprising only the responsible Ministers, was now 
to form the supreme legislative and executive Council presided 
over by the king or one of the Ministers. The local division of 
ministerial functions was abolished. The provinces were sub- 
divided for administrative purposes into districts {Bezirke); 
and judicial tribunals were completely separated from the old 
governmental Chambers. 

Stein was also able to abolish various trade monopolies of 
the old gilds, along with the exclusive rights of erecting mills 
in East Prussia. In fine, his thirteen months of office effected 
well-nigh as much for Prussia as the Constituent Assembly had 
done for France, that is, it transformed an almost mediaeval 
social and political structure into a modern State. The parallel 
would have been still more complete if he had been able to 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 191 

crown his work by founding self-governing institutions for the 
parish and the circle {Kreis), and parliamentary representation 
for the nation. That he had prepared the way for this last 
innovation was clear by the king's ready assent to the convo- 
cation of the Provisional Parliaments which met in 181 1 and 
again in 18 12 — 1815; but this was to be the work of his 
scarcely less able successor, Hardenberg. The reforms actually 
promulgated by Stein had aroused a storm of opposition from 
the Prussian nobles and from what was known as the French 
party at Berlin ; but the immediate cause of his dismissal was 
the seizure by the French (Aug. 1808) of an indiscreet letter 
in which the patriot Minister described the rapid growth of 
exasperation against Napoleon, the sensation caused by the 
Spanish rising, and the imminence of a Franco-Austrian war. 
This discovery gave Napoleon a pretext for pressing heavier 
terms on Prussia (Sept. 1808) and led to Stein's resignation of 
office. After the French had occupied Madrid the Emperor 
launched a decree of proscription against Stein (Dec. 1808), 
who fled for his life to Austria. 

A change in laws and institutions writes itself but tardily in 
the national life, unless the nation itself has been quickened to 
a new and vitalising receptivity. If the work of the legislator 
is to yield plenteous fruit, the impulses which come from the 
poet and the thinker, or which spring unconsciously from the 
people itself, must first have played their part. The enthusiasm 
for Rousseau's teachings and the Rights of Man had aroused 
through Central Europe a wide-spread desire for some connec- 
tion with democratic France; but the invasions of the revolu- 
tionary and Napoleonic armies began to dispel the dreams even 
of German Jacobins. Instead of forming a federation of free 
States, Germany was becoming the parade-ground and com- 
missariat department of French armies, and groaned under the 
ever-increasing pressure of the Continental System. The most 
phlegmatic temperament was moved by the French domination 



192 The RevoliLtionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

to think more kindly of the cumbrous old empire; while an 
ardent nature like that of the historian and poet Arndt revolted 
at the sight of "the old German splendour overthrown and 
trodden underfoot by these insolent French.... When Austria 
and Prussia had fallen, then first I began to love Germany 
truly, and to hate the foreigner with an utter hatred." Schiller's 
last drama, Wilhebn Tell (1804), describing the rising of 
the Swiss mountaineers against Hapsburg usurpations, seems 
designed to unite Germans by the claims of brotherhood, pa- 
triotism and love of freedom to repel all French aggressions 
on the Fatherland. Unfortunately, the greatest of German 
poets, Goethe, after his Hen?ia7in und Dorothea (1797), re- 
mained deaf to the new patriotic movement and beUttled 
himself by accepting from Napoleon the Cross of the Legion 
of Honour (Oct. 1808). But a school of young patriotic poets 
was rising, which shook off the indifference of the i8th century 
poets to the claims of country, and soon gave forth many a 
patriotic song to inspire their brethren on the battle-field. 

The new spirit of the age invaded the domains of philo- 
sophy and education. The first man on the Continent to utter 
a public protest against the Napoleonic domination was the 
great thinker Fichte, who up to 1805 had professed complete 
indifference about the rise and fall of States; but in the days of 
Prussia's humiliation, patriotism dethroned his cosmopolitan 
philosophy, and in the early part of 1808 inspired those glow- 
ing appeals to national sentiment, the Addresses to the Ger- 
man Natio7i. As Germany had perished owing to the selfish- 
ness of its members, so now it could be restored only by a new 
ideal, the self-surrender of the individual for the good of the 
community. Every noble nature, he insists, will value life not 
for its own sake, but for the work which it can accomplish; 
and the perpetuity of that work can be assured only by the 
survival of the nation which values and protects it. Seeing 
that the old education had done nothing to curb individual 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction, 193 

selfishness, there must be a new national education which may 
"fashion the German people to a unity throbbing through all 
its Umbs." Fortifying his idealist appeals by a reference to the 
days of Arminius, he shows that a nation which "fastens its 
gaze on that vision from the spiritual world, Liberty, will 
certainly prevail over a people which is used only as a tool for 
lust of foreign sway." These inspiriting calls, uttered at the 
risk of his life while the French garrisoned Berlin, sank deep into 
the consciousness of the people, and helped on the formation 
(1808) of a non-political association, the "Tugendbund," for the 
"revival of morality, religion, serious taste and public spirit." 
Fichte's influence also powerfully aided the impulse towards 
national education. William von Humboldt, the great classical 
scholar, was in April, 1809, appointed Minister of Education; 
and in a year he extended and reformed the system of public 
training in the public schools (Gymnasia). To compensate 
for the loss of the University of Halle, and to bring culture and 
practical life into close contact, two new Universities were 
founded, at Berlin and Breslau, for the former of which the king 
gave a royal palace. Just as Napoleon had desired by his 
lycees and the University of France to enlist an army of 
teachers in his service, so now Prussia in a wiser and less 
autocratic spirit relied on the strength which a State gains from 
the support of enlightened and devoted citizens. The result 
was to be seen in the ardour with which professors and 
students rushed to arms in the War of Liberation of 

1813 

"The Spaniards were the refrain to everything, and we 
always returned to them": such is Varnhagen von Ense's sum- 
mary of an interview with that humorous genius, Jean Paul 
Richter, in Oct. 1808. The momentous influence of the 
Spanish rising on German and European affairs now claims 
our attention. 

We have already seen that in pursuance of the policy of 
F.R. 13 



194 l^he Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, [Chap. 

Tilsit, Portugal had been occupied by French troops, while by 
the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau (Oct. 1807) her lands were 
to be divided between Napoleon and the Court of Madrid. 
Accordingly Spanish troops helped General Junot in the occu- 
pation of Portugal. Spain was thus almost denuded of regular 
troops; for after a foolish proclamation of the Spanish Court on 
Oct. 4, 1806, calling the people to arms. Napoleon had required 
that 4000 Spanish horse and 10,000 foot should be sent to 
assist him in defending the mouth of the Elbe against England. 
Even more favourable for his plans against Spain was the open 
discord between Ferdinand, heir to the Spanish throne, and 
his parents. The queen's favourite, Godoy, was bent on ruin- 
ing Ferdinand and excluding him from the succession; and 
when the prince attempted to overthrow Godoy on a hasty 
charge of treason, he himself was placed under arrest by his 
father Charles IV and was pardoned (Nov. 5) only on Napo- 
leon's demands. It is generally assumed by historians hostile 
to the French Emperor, that he all along intended to have the 
crown of Spain at his disposal, in revenge for the ambiguous 
and threatening call to arms issued by Godoy and Charles IV 
just before Jena. There is, however, very Uttle evidence for 
this view except that the French ambassador at Madrid had 
intrigued with Prince Ferdinand against the king. MoUien 
even asserts that Napoleon's first intention in attacking Portugal 
was merely to lure the English on to the mainland and 
so decisively defeat them. But the unguarded state of Spain, 
the apparent lethargy of its people, and the discords in the 
royal palace, seem to have tempted him on to the perfidious 
policy which culminated at Bayonne. The first sign of this 
was his confidential order to Junot to send him a description 
of the roads and resources of Spain, and drawings of its fort- 
resses carefully made by his engineers. At first no suspicions 
were aroused. Indeed, the march of 49,000 French troops 
towards Valladolid caused no less joy to Ferdinand and the 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 195 

great mass of the people than alarm to Godoy and Charles IV. 
They were at first welcomed as deliverers from the yoke of the 
insolent favourite who was seizing the chief emoluments of the 
State ; but this feeling changed to alarm and indignation when 
all the chief strongholds of north Spain were by ruse or force 
occupied by the French (Feb. — March, 1808). Threatened 
by the French invaders, and hated by their people, the despic- 
able king and queen prepared for flight to the New World, the 
very step to which Napoleon wished to drive them. The news 
of this cowardly intention aroused a storm of indignation; and 
a popular outbreak against Godoy brought about not only his 
resignation but the voluntary abdication of Charles IV in favour 
of "his very dear son Ferdinand" (March 19). Enraged at her 
ignominious fall, the queen besought the aid of Murat, com- 
manding the French troops, to restore Charles IV to the position 
of which mob violence had deprived him. 

The ambitious marshal, hoping that the crown of Spain 
would be his own, secretly promised to forward to Napoleon a 
protest against Ferdinand VII's accession ; while the young 
king, hoping for Napoleon's continued support, facilitated the 
entry of Murat's troops into Madrid. Everything seemed to 
favour Napoleon's plans; and his clever agent Savary was now 
sent to induce Ferdinand to meet the Emperor in the north of 
Spain, with the assurance that his title as king would be recog- 
nised and his promised marriage with Napoleon's niece would 
be arranged. On this understanding the young king set out 
for Vittoria, where secret preparations were made by Savary 
to carry him off by force, if he refused to go further. Sur- 
rounded by French troops, he departed for Bayonne. The 
arrival there of his parents and Godoy increased his difficulties ; 
for Charles IV demanded his abdication and yet disclaimed 
any intention of ruling again himself or even 01 returning to 
Spain. The news of a fierce popular rising in Madrid against 
the French and its ruthless repression by Murat (May 2) 

13-2 



196 The Revolutionary and Napoleo7iic Era. [Chap. 

enabled the parents to heap on Ferdinand their bitterest taunts 
and Napoleon to threaten him with execution as a rebel. The 
young king's spirit at last was broken. On May 5th he resigned 
the crown to Charles IV, who in his ignoble desire for revenge 
on his people surrendered all his claims to Napoleon. Pensions 
and estates in France sufficed for these degraded descendants 
of a long line of kings; and Napoleon boasted to Talleyrand 
that he was "master of the situation in Spain as in the rest of 
Europe." 

In reality he had compassed his own destruction both in 
Spain and throughout Europe. Instead of securing complete 
possession of Spain, this infamous treachery at Bayonne aroused 
a passion for vengeance in the Spanish people, nerving them 
to desperate struggles which even Napoleon's power could not 
crush. It was in vain that the dethroned princes and some 
official bodies counselled submission to overwhelming force, in 
vain that Napoleon promised to become "the regenerator of 
Spain." Without waiting to count the odds, the Spaniards 
rushed to arms, formed popular Juntas in their chief cities and 
a central one at Seville; and Europe saw the rise of a new 
and potent influence when the little province of Asturias with 
sublime audacity declared war against Napoleon and sent a 
request for English aid. Putting aside the consideration that 
we were nominally at war with Spain, Canning at once declared 
(June 15) that any nation opposing Napoleon "became in- 
stantly our essential ally"; and soon an English force was sent 
to assist in freeing the Peninsula. Meanwhile, though the 
patriots were in many places routed, they achieved two impor- 
tant successes, beating back the French from the streets of 
Saragossa and compelling the surrender of General Dupont's 
2O5O00 troops at Baylen in Andalusia (July 21), — events which 
broke the spell of French invincibility. Joseph Bonaparte, 
named King of Spain by his brother — Murat had to accept with 
disgust the throne of Naples vacated by Joseph — after a nine 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 197 

days' sojourn at Madrid had to retreat with the French forces 
to the line of the Ebro. The fortunes of the patriots were 
advanced still further by the landing in Mondego Bay of 18,000 
British troops under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and their victory 
over Junot's forces at Vimiero (Aug. 21); but the arrival of the 
senior commanding officers Burrard and Dalrymple led to the 
much censured Convention of Cintra, by which the French 
troops in Portugal were to be conveyed on British ships to 
France. The commencement of the Peninsular War was thus 
marked by two considerable successes, one gained by the 
numbers and enthusiasm of the Spanish levies, the other by 
the tenacity of British regulars and the skill of a military 
genius. Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose patience, powers of organi- 
sation, and unerring judgment supplied just those quahties in 
which our allies were most deficient. A further gain to Spain 
was the escape on British ships of the Spanish troops com- 
pelled in 1806 to serve Napoleon in Denmark. The annexa- 
tion of the Papal States to the French Empire (May, 1808) 
and the arrest of the Pope a year later gave the Spanish Rising 
the aspect of a crusade against infidels; and every able-bodied 
man who did not serve against the French was looked upon as 
a traitor to his country and his faith. 

This explosion of popular fury, from what had long been 
considered an extinct volcano, thrilled Europe with astonish- 
ment and Napoleon's foes with hope. The French funds 
which after Tilsit rose to 94 now sank to 70; and the Emperor, 
after ante-dating the conscription of 1809 so as to replenish 
his armies, turned to assure himself of the Czar's support before 
crushing the Spanish patriots. The change in policy was 
significant. Before Tilsit Napoleon had posed as the champion 
of democracy against the old Governments. Henceforth he 
relied on dynastic alliances, while his foes could for the first 
time appeal to a potent principle, that of nationality. The 
moral force, which he himself measured even in warfare as three 



198 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

times the effect of the physical force, now began to pass over 
to the side of his enemies. 

Outwardly, however, the fabric of his power was more 
imposing than ever. The meeting of the Emperors of the 
West and East at Erfurt was graced by an assemblage of Ger- 
man kings and princes, who were clearly made to perceive their 
dependence on the conqueror. But there was another object 
more pressing than that of parading the humiliation of Germany, 
namely to renew the Franco-Russian alliance. The policy 
of Tilsit had aroused, but not satisfied, Alexander's ambition 
for conquests on the lower Danube. The conquest of Finland 
from Sweden, agreed upon between the Emperors at Tilsit, had 
been virtually accomplished; but Alexander desired above all 
to revive the Eastern Empire by extending his Empire to the 
Bosphorus. He had accordingly heard with great chagrin (Jan. 
1808) that Napoleon disapproved of any partition of Turkey 
and demanded Silesia for France if Russia kept Moldavia and 
Waliachia. The Spanish question, however, led to Napoleon's 
renunciation of this claim, and to the revival of the partition 
scheme ; for Alexander insisted that the expulsion of the Turks 
from Europe was required by the enlightenment of the age 
even more than by sound policy. But for the Spanish rising, 
it is certain that the interest of the world would have turned to 
the East; for Napoleon in the early part of 1808 often said 
that Constantinople was the centre of his policy. Indeed, his 
correspondence of May, 1808, shows that after settling Joseph 
in Spain, he desired to ruin English commerce by a Franco- 
Russian expedition overland to Egypt, Persia, and India, 
while French and Spanish squadrons despatched to the Cape 
and other parts were to distract and humble the mistress of 
the seas. 

The Spanish rising changed all that. An immediate breach 
with Turkey was now most undesirable. Alexander's support 
was also more than ever necessary to hold in check Central 



IX ] The Nationalist Reaction, 199 

Europe, now aroused by French reverses beyond the Pyrenees; 
for the Hapsburgs feared that after the fall of the last 
Bourbons their turn would come next. Austria accordingly 
began to arm. From his dreams of eastern conquests, the 
French Emperor was thus suddenly brought to the need of 
renewing that agreement with the Czar, on which rested his 
domination in Central Europe. Relying, however, on his 
ascendancy over Alexander, he determined to win a diplomatic 
triumph such as he had gained at Tilsit. He thus summed up 
his desires to Talleyrand, whom he charged with the negotia- 
tions at the Erfurt interview: — '*I want to come back from Erfurt 
free to do what I like in Spain : I want to be sure that Austria's 
uneasiness will be held in check; and I don't want to be defi- 
nitely engaged with Russia in eastern affairs." This was vir- 
tually the result of the famous interview. The Czar agreed to 
postpone the joint expedition against Turkey and the East; but 
he firmly refused to join in a demand for Austrian disarma- 
ment. Vainly did Napoleon resort by turn to blandishments 
and exhibitions of temper. "From me" — retorted Alexander 
— "anger gains nothing. Let us reason, or I depart." Sump- 
tuous festivities, appropriate dramas acted by the Comedie 
Fra7tfatse, interviews with Goethe and other German savants, 
hid from the world these inner dissensions; and at the end of 
a fortnight of unexampled splendour, Napoleon gained the 
substance of his demands in a secret Convention (Oct. 13, 
1808). It renewed the Franco-Russian aUiance formed at 
Tilsit, and offered peace to England, with the retention of con- 
quests by each belligerent, if she would recognise Joseph 
Bonaparte as King of Spain, and the cession of Finland, Mol- 
davia and Wallachia to Russia. Napoleon also, under the 
strictest secrecy, consented to the Czar's acquisition of the 
Danubian Provinces. If Turkey renewed the war with Russia, 
France was to remain neutral, unless Austria helped the Sultan. 
In that case Austria was to be attacked by France; and if she 



200 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

made war on Napoleon, the Czar promised to give active aid to 
his ally. Finally, Denmark was to receive an indemnity for the 
losses sustained in 1807. The diplomatic victory here rested 
with Napoleon as decisively as at Tilsit. His new engagements 
to the Czar involved him in no immediate breach with Turkey; 
and in secretly assenting to the Russian acquisition of the 
Danubian Provinces and Finland, he only acknowledged what 
then seemed definite conquests. Alexander, on the other 
hand, promised to keep Austria quiet while Napoleon finished 
with Spain. An envoy sent by the Emperor Francis to Erfurt 
failed, notwithstanding Talleyrand's private assistance, to avert 
this understanding, though Talleyrand's secret preliminary ad- 
vice to the Czar, that Austria was necessary to the equilibrium 
of Europe, led to his rejection of the joint proposal for her 
instant disarmament. Furthermore, a hint dropped by Napo- 
leon to Alexander, and developed by Talleyrand, that the 
interests of France required Josephine's divorce and that one 
of the Czar's sisters was of a suitable age, met with an evasive 
though not unfriendly reply. Thus opened that rift within the 
lute, which somewhat marred the majestic harmonies of Erfurt. 

Without waiting for the "diplomatic mummery" — as 
Fouche termed it — of proposing peace to England on condition 
that she would desert the cause of the Spanish patriots. Napo- 
leon set out for the Ebro to end "this war of peasants and 
monks," scattered their ill-organised forces and on Dec. 2 
received the capitulation of Madrid. There he at once ordered 
the abolition of the Inquisition and sequestration of its pro- 
perty, the reduction of monasteries and convents by two-thirds 
(the property of the suppressed houses being also confiscated), 
the abolition of all feudal rights over rivers &c., the banalit'es of 
mills, all seigneurial courts of justice, and provincial Customs' 
barriers; but these sweeping social reforms made little impres- 
sion on a people whose feeling he had so deeply outraged. 

For the present Napoleon turned to crush Sir John Moore's 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 201 

army, which, relying on the promises of the Spaniards, had 
marched from Portugal towards Burgos in the vain hope of 
rallying the Spaniards, or at least of diverting the French 
march from Madrid. The English force of about 24,000 men 
was now exposed to Napoleon's victorious armies, which when 
united numbered over 80,000; but Moore by a skilful retreat 
amidst terrible hardships withdrew his troops to Corunna. 
There, armed with new muskets, his men beat back Soult's 
superior forces (Jan. 16, 1809) and embarked for England, 
leaving their gallant leader buried in the citadel of the fortress. 
This ill-fated expedition did not alter the current of English 
pubHc opinion; for two days before the Battle of Corunna 
a treaty of alliance had been signed at London between Great 
Britain, 'Ferdinand VII,' and the Central Junta of Seville, 
binding the contracting parties to a close alliance against 
France. The return of Napoleon to Paris, to extirpate the 
germs of discontent and confront Austria, scarcely lessened the 
pressure on the Spanish patriots. Everywhere they were de- 
feated. The determined men of Aragon, after the most despe- 
rate defence of modern times, were compelled to surrender to 
Marshal Lannes the ruins of their capital, Saragossa (Feb. 21). 
Yet, though all parts of Spain except the most mountainous 
districts were in a mihtary sense conquered, the peasantry still 
flocked to arms with a dogged perseverance which defied the 
efforts of over 300,000 French; and when some 40,000 of 
Napoleon's troops were withdrawn to confront the war prepara- 
tions of Austria, and Sir Arthur Wellesley landed at Lisbon, 
the Peninsular War entered on another phase. 

In Prussia, as we have seen, Stein had striven to excite a 
war a outrange agsiinst Napoleon; but Frederick William refused 
to stir without the aid of the Czar, which was not to be obtained. 
The war party in Austria had however gained the upper hand 
in the autumn of 1807, seeing in the Spanish rising as power- 
ful a help as that offered by the regular armies of Russia and 



202 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Prussia before Friedland. In truth, the position of Austria 
since the Treaties of Presburg and Tilsit had become insup- 
portable. Shut out from her traditional influence in Germany 
and Italy, threatened by Napoleon's troops in Prussia, Saxony, 
Bavaria, and Venetia, she saw her foreign commerce decaying 
under the influence of the Continental System, and heard with 
anguish the groans of her faithful Tyrolese under the cast-iron 
liberalism of Franco-Bavarian policy. Five centuries of Haps- 
burg rule in accord with Tyrolese traditions had been cut short 
by the cession of Tyrol to Bavaria in Dec. 1805, but with a 
promise from the newly-styled King of Bavaria that the rights 
of that ancient county would be respected. No sooner, how- 
ever, was Tyrol fully occupied by his troops than he and his 
Minister Montgelas began to force on innovations like those 
recently introduced at Munich. The property of Tyrolese 
bishoprics was confiscated, religious rites and customs were 
interfered with, in May 1808 the Estates were dissolved, and 
the name of South Bavaria was imposed. As this happened at 
the time of Napoleon's usurpation in Spain, the annexation of 
half the Papal States to the kingdom of Italy, and the proposed 
Franco-Russian scheme for a partition of Turkey, it seemed 
part of a project for assuring universal dominion to Napoleon 
and his allies. The result of the Erfurt Conference was by no 
means reassuring to the Emperor Francis, except to show that 
Alexander desired to maintain Austria as a bulwark between 
Russia and the Napoleonic States. The belief that the Czar 
was secretly jealous of French domination, that England would 
help her by an expedition to the Low Countries, the certainty 
that the Tyrolese would revolt against the Bavarian rule, and 
that Napoleon must keep fully 250,000 men in Spain, decided 
Austria to prefer the risks of war to an intolerable peace. So 
far from her action being an aristocratic plot for the overthrow 
of French democracy, Austria's conduct in the spring of 1809 
showed a greater reliance on popular sentiment and support 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 203 

than ever before. In June, 1808, Francis had ordered the 
enrolment of a defensive militia, to act also as a reserve for the 
regular army ; and the Archduke Charles, by improving not only 
the military organisation but also the condition of the soldiery, 
greatly increased the efficiency and tenacity of his forces. The 
Chancellor, Count Stadion, talked of inaugurating reforms like 
those of Stein in Prussia ; and Austria stood forth as the cham- 
pion of German nationality. "Soldiers" — so ran the procla- 
mation of the Archduke Charles, April 6, 1809 — "the freedom 
of Europe has sought refuge under your colours. Your 
triumphs will loose her fetters, and your German brethren still 
in the enemy's ranks await deliverance from you\" The last 
wish was to be falsified. Fear of Austrian conquest or of 
Napoleon's vengeance kept on his side the troops of the 
Rhenish Confederation, but as soon as an Austrian corps 
entered Tyrol, the whole country arose : 6000 Franco-Bavarian 
troops were compelled to surrender, and in five days Tyrol was 
freed by these brave peasants under the lead of Hofer and 
Hormayer. 

Space will admit only the briefest account of the chief cam- 
paign — that on the Danube. The Archduke Charles, leading 
a force of about 120,000 men up to Ratisbon, for a time placed 
the French and confederate troops in great danger; but Napo- 
leon, hurrying from Paris, at once massed his forces and by 
vigorous blows at Hansen, Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmiihl, 
and Ratisbon (April 19 — 23) defeated the Austrian forces and 
drove them down the opposite sides of the Danube. By the 
side of these terrible reverses, temporary Austrian successes in 

^ Some writers call this the war of the Fifth Coalition, reckoning the 
Fourth as being inaugurated by the Treaties in the spring of 1807. It is 
preferable, I think, to reckon the struggle of April — ^June, 1807, ^s the 
Third Coalition in its second phase. That of 1809 was not a Coalition, 
there being no treaty between Austria and England, or between Austria 
and the Spanish patriots. 



204 ^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Venetia, Tyrol and at Warsaw were of little avail; for the 
defeats on the upper Danube precluded the hope of that 
general rising of Germany, for which Stein, and all patriots had 
hoped and worked. A hopeless attempt was indeed made 
near Cassel; and the brave Colonel Schill, leading his cavalry 
regiment out of Berlin, strove to excite a national war against 
the French; but, meeting with little support, he marched north- 
wards to Stralsund, there to be overpowered and slain by 
Dutch troops in Napoleon's service (May 31). The young 
Duke of Brunswick also began a daring raid from Bohemia 
into Saxony, gaining some signal successes over Jerome Bona- 
parte's troops; but the issue of this and other isolated efforts, 
even of the far more important and sustained Tyrolese rising, 
depended on the main campaign on the Danube. 

Meanwhile Napoleon had entered Vienna ; but in his 
attempt to drive the Austrian army from the north bank of the 
Danube, he met with his first great repulse at Aspern-Essling 
(May 21 — 22), finally having to draw back his shattered troops 
into the great island of Lobau, with a total loss of about 27,000 
men. A thrill of expectation ran through Europe at this unex- 
pected change of fortune. " In Prussia " (wrote Varnhagen 
von Ense) "the enthusiasm is general. The spell is broken. 
Napoleon is no longer invincible.. ..His downfall may well be 
expected." If Schill's and Brunswick's attempts had been 
made conjointly after the news of Aspern, and England had 
made her projected diversion on the North Sea coast in time 
it is probable that Germany would have been aroused, and 
Napoleon's overthrow assured ; but again he was to be saved 
by the maladroitness of his foes and his own surprising energy. 
Marmont, Marbot, and other French commanders, admit that 
a vigorous attack on their rear immediately after Aspern 
would have placed their army in the greatest danger ; but the 
Archduke Charles, dismayed by his own heavy losses, remained 
strictly on the defensive, and allowed Eugene's army from Italy 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 205 

to strengthen the French communications. After six weeks of 
quiet preparation and concentration of all available forces, 
about 170,000 French crossed the Danube at night, far below 
the Austrian batteries, thus compelling the enemy to fall back 
on another strong position at Wagram. There a long and 
most obstinate conflict (July 6) was finally lost by the 140,000 de- 
fenders, mainly owing to the non-arrival of the Archduke John, 
who was to support their left wing, and by the skill and persist- 
ence of Macdonald's attack on their centre ; but this Marshal 
— he received the title on the field of battle — himself wondered 
why the Austrians, after an orderly retreat, should have sought 
an armistice (July 15) from victors who were in almost equally 
great straits owing to want of ammunition. The despondency 
of the Austrian Government was deepened by Wellesley's 
retreat on Portugal after Talavera and by the failure of England 
to make any timely and effective diversion on the North Sea 
coast. 

The surrender of the Hapsburgs was fatal to the daring 
attempt of the Duke of Brunswick, as well as to the Tyrolese 
patriots. After defeating Jerome's troops and occupying 
Brunswick, the brave leader had to retreat to the North Sea 
coast, where he was saved by an English squadron (Aug. 10). 
The Tyrolese resistance was harder to break. After the first 
defeats of the Archduke Charles on the upper Danube, the 
Franco-Bavarian forces again occupied Innsbruck (May 19), 
only to be driven out of Tyrol at the close of that month so 
disastrous for Napoleon's arms ; and after Aspern the Emperor 
Francis promised that he would sign no peace which would 
sunder Tyrol and Vorarlberg from his Empire. The men of 
the latter province made successful raids into Baden, and even 
captured Constance ; and Tyrol enjoyed two months' rest 
under Hofer. Once an inn-keeper near Meran, Hofer now 
resided at the castle of Innsbruck with the title of Imperial 
Commander-in-chief, levied taxes, issued a coinage, organised 



2o6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

a militia, and restored the old system of government. After 
Wagram, Lefebvre led 25,000 troops up the Inn valley and 
occupied Innsbruck; but at Hofer's summons the brave Tyrolese 
again rose. In a deep valley near Oberau their sharp-shooters 
harassed another invading column. The mountaineers crushed 
the Saxons with rocks and trees, and the invaders were rolled 
back on the capital, where another reverse decided the French 
marshal to evacuate the county (Aug. 14). All the devotion of 
the Tyrolese, however, was futile, if unaided by some show of 
energy on the part of the British Government and by determi- 
nation in the councils of the Emperor Francis. He and his 
new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Metternich, foreseeing no 
effective help from any quarter against Napoleon's superior 
forces, finally agreed to conditions of peace. These the French 
Emperor, by a discreditable ruse, considerably aggravated, and 
hurried on to the final stage of the Treaty of Schonbrunn 
(Vienna), Oct. 14, — "a treaty (Metternich declares) full of un- 
worthy artifices, having no foundation in international rights." 
By it Austria recognised the Bavarian rule over Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg, besides ceding to Bavaria Salzburg and a strip of 
Upper Austria as far as the R. Inn. To the French Empire 
she yielded up Croatia, Carniola, with Trieste and the greater 
part of Carinthia — all of which were reorganised by Napoleon 
as the Illyrian Provinces. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
received from the Hapsburgs all West and New Galicia (their 
share of the spoils of 1795) together with a district around 
Cracow; while the Czar received a strip of land from East 
Gahcia. Beside these losses of 4,500,000 subjects and of her 
maritime provinces, Austria agreed to pay a war indemnity of 
;^3, 400,000, bound herself closely to the Continental System, 
and secretly agreed to limit her army to 150,000 men, as well 
as to dismantle some of her fortresses, including Vienna. After 
the least disastrous of her four wars against Napoleon she now 
suffered the severest losses ever sustained by the Hapsburgs ; 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 207 

and worse than their cessions of territory was the abandonment 
of the reforming poUcy which had recently promised to yield 
to them the moral as well as political hegemony of Germany. 
Even so, the patriotism of the Viennese, clinging ever more 
firmly to the Hapsburgs amid the storms of adversity, gave to 
the return of their Emperor Francis the appearance of a trium- 
phal entry. Indeed, it is significant that the most stubborn and 
successful resistance to Napoleon in 1809 was ofi'ered by the 
rank and file or by armed peasants, while timidity still paralysed 
the councils of commanders and diplomatists. A keen eye 
could discern, even amidst disasters, that the reaction against 
Napoleon was deepening in intensity. 

After having by their own gallantry three times freed their 
land from foreign troops, the Tyrolese refused to accept as 
final the terms of the Treaty of Schonbrunn which abandoned 
them to Bavaria. Towards the end of October 50,000 in- 
vaders began to press up the three chief Tyrolese valleys, the 
Pusterthal and those of the Inn and Adige. On the advice of 
the Archduke John, even Hofer leaned towards surrender 
until the fiery zeal of a few fanatics rekindled the embers of 
revolt. But the enemy held the main valleys, and the snows 
of winter gradually drove the Tyrolese from their fastnesses. 
Hofer, betrayed by an acquaintance, was taken to Mantua 
and there shot as a rebel (Feb. 20, 18 10). To stamp out 
Tyrolese feeling the famous county was divided, part of the 
south-eastern districts going to the Illyrian Provinces, and 
most of the Adige valley being annexed to Eugene's kingdom 
of Italy ; but readjustments of boundaries were powerless to 
efface the memory of the Tyrolese exploits against the might 
of Napoleon. 

The student will probably have noticed that in many of 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (especially in the cam- 
paigns of 1792 — 4, 1799 — 1800, 1803 — 1807) fortune favoured 
the allies in the spring and early summer, only to return more 



2o8 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

decisively to the tricolour standards in the latter part of the 
year. It was so in 1809 both in Central Europe and in the 
Spanish Peninsula. The withdrawal of 40,000 French from the 
Tagus to the Danube gave little relief to the Spanish patriots, 
until the advent of a military genius altered the whole character 
of the struggle. The French, numbering about 270,000 men 
under the lead of Soult, Ney, Victor, and St Cyr, were press- 
ing back the Portuguese and Spanish levies, when Sir Arthur 
Wellesley took command of some 25,000 allied troops at 
Lisbon. Marching swiftly northwards, by a skilful and daring 
move he crossed the Douro above Oporto and compelled 
Soult with the loss of 58 cannons to evacuate Portugal. The 
rapidity with which the English commander organised the 
defence of Lisbon, marched 200 miles through rugged country, 
and, striking at the communications of a powerful foe, forced 
him to retreat with the loss of all his cannons and stores, may 
well challenge comparison with those masterly moves of 
Napoleon a month earlier, which, changing a weak defensive 
into a crushing offensive, drove the Archduke Charles from 
Bavaria. Could Wellesley have changed commands with the 
Austrian prince, the liberation of Europe might have occurred 
in 1809. The English general further showed his powers of 
quick insight and rapid action in a campaign against Victor on 
the Tagus. Deprived of necessary reinforcements by the 
British Ministry, neglected and almost starved by their Spanish 
aUies, his troops yet penetrated to Talavera, where King Joseph 
and Victor assailed them. The English infantry stood firm, 
and though the centre was at one time broken, an opportune 
infantry charge of the 48th regiment gained the day (July 28); 
but the southward march of Soult's army compelled Wellesley 
to beat a speedy retreat on Portugal, indignant at the conduct 
of the Spanish forces. "We are here worse off than in a 
hostile country (he wrote to the English Government) : never 
was an army so ill-used. The common dictates of humanity 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 209 

have been disregarded by them." He determined henceforth 
to dispense with Spanish aid and to act for the present on the 
frontier of Portugal, where he soon was able effectively to 
control the military organization. The complete rout of 
52,000 Spaniards at Ocana (Nov. 1809) by about half the 
number of French, with the loss of 26,000 prisoners, seemed 
to promise the speedy subjection of Spain. But the Central 
Junta of the patriots at Seville still breathed defiance to the 
French, and Miot de Melito, Joseph's adviser at Madrid, after 
all the French triumphs in Catalonia, Aragon and Castile, 
wrote despondingly — " We have conquered but not con- 
vinced." 

This expression aptly characterises the whole European 
situation at the close of 1809. The new national impulses in 
Germany and Spain were as yet ill-organized, and had pro- 
duced only one leader worthy of entering the lists against 
Napoleon; and Wellesley was at the head of only 20,000 
British troops, while double that number were being sacrificed 
at Walcheren by the incapacity of Chatham. This splendid 
expedition, which might have aroused North-Germany and 
effected a most important relief for Austria, did not set sail till 
a month after she had been crushed at Wagram. It was then 
aimed against Antwerp ; but time was wasted in reducing 
Flushing until the former could no longer be carried by a coup 
de main. Our forces retired into Walcheren, whence after the 
loss of nearly half their number by disease they were withdrawn 
before Christmas, 1809. In this year of disjointed efforts the 
Walcheren failure was by far the most disgraceful; yet the 
Danube campaign shattered a reputation which had hitherto 
been second only to that of Napoleon. The Archduke 
Charles, skilful tactician though he was, so lost his power of 
initiative when opposed to the French Emperor as to paralyse 
the arm of Austria in April and July; while born leaders of 
men like Schill and the Duke of Brunswick were condemned 
F. R. 14 



210 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

to a merely guerrilla warfare in the level plains of Germany 
where such methods were hopeless. Nevertheless this disas- 
trous year had shown that Napoleon's domination rested only 
on force, fear, and the incapacity of the governments opposed 
to him. That he recognised the merely personal character 
of his supremacy was shown by a remarkable event at its 
close. 

As soon as Napoleon gained the Consulate for life some 
members of his family had urged him to divorce Josephine, 
who had borne him no child. Amidst the glories of Tilsit and 
Erfurt the need of an heir to consolidate his dynasty was 
more patent than ever. So persistent were the rumours of 
a divorce after Erfurt, that Fouche undertook to plead with 
Josephine to promote the interests of France by agreeing to 
a separation from Napoleon, as "the most subUme and also 
the most inevitable of sacrifices." An affecting interview 
between Napoleon and Josephine led to a disavowal of 
Fouche's act. It was certainly premature, for at that time 
a bride was still to be found. The elder of Alexander's 
surviving sisters had been engaged to the Duke of Oldenburg, 
immediately after the Erfurt interview; and the present tension 
in Franco-Russian relations promised no better success to a 
request for the hand of the younger sister. The extreme 
reluctance with which the Czar drew the sword against Austria 
(May, 1809), as he was bound to do by the Erfurt Convention, 
and the ostentatious inactivity of his troops, exposed him to 
the charge of perfidy; but after the somewhat doubtful issue 
of the Danube campaign, and amidst the discontent of all 
Roman Catholics at the imprisonment of the Pope (July, 1809), 
the French Emperor could not break with the autocrat of the 
East. The Czar's annoyance at the Treaty of Schonbrunn 
was, however, partly appeased by a promise from Napoleon 
that Poland should not be re-established. This act of com- 
plaisance was accompanied closely by a formal request (Dec. 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 211 

1809) for a matrimonial alliance. A few days previously 
the Emperor had announced his intentions to Josephine, who 
flung herself dpwn in a transport of grief with the words " No : 
I will never survive it." He tenderly aided one of his chamber- 
lains to carry her to her apartments ; and the agitation which 
shook his frame should prove to all but his bitterest enemies 
that he had retained much of his early devotion for her ; while 
the friendship which in her retirement at Malmaison she to 
the end of her days preserved for him, may well prove the 
sincerity of his alleged reasons for the divorce. 

This sinister event took place (Dec. 15); but the proposal 
for a marriage with the Czar's younger sister met (Jan. 18 10) 
with the same reply as the Erfurt proposal, namely that these 
matters were entirely in the hands of the Czar's mother, who 
was known to be bitterly opposed to the French. Foreseeing 
the possibility of such a reply, and keenly impressed with the 
need of gaining as soon as possible a direct heir to his throne. 
Napoleon had already caused his envoy at Vienna to meet 
half-way some cautious advances which Metternich, the new 
Austrian Foreign Minister, had made (Nov. 30, 1809) on the 
subject of an Austrian princess. It was in pursuance of the 
policy which this skilful statesman had recommended to his 
master on his assumption of the heavy cares of office : — " We 
must confine our system to tacking, and turning, and flattering. 
— There remains but one expedient, to increase our strength 
for better days, and to work out our preservation by gentle 
means." At Paris it is certain that Josephine herself, her son 
Eugene, Talleyrand, and many others urged on the Austrian 
marriage alliance as having a more lasting effect, as tending to 
preserve the equilibrium of Europe in favour of France, and as 
"absolving France from a crime not her own, but only the 
work of a faction." The skilful pleading of Talleyrand at the 
Privy Council meetings at Paris (Jan. 29 and Feb. 6) would 
perhaps have availed little but for Napoleon's knowledge of 

I A — 2 



212 The Revolutionary mid Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the first evasive answers from St Petersburg. The Council 
meetings gave him the appearance of choosing between a 
Russian and an Austrian bride; and, before the final refusal 
of the Czar's mother was made known, a courier set out from 
Paris for Vienna, asking for the hand of the Archduchess 
Marie Louise. Napoleon's amour propre was thus saved from 
a public slight, but only at the expense of Alexander's feelings; 
and the mutual annoyance at the whole proceeding was evinced 
and accentuated by the French Emperor's immediate refusal 
to ratify in treaty form his promise that he would never re- 
establish Poland. Alexander on his side took this as a thinly- 
veiled threat that the French Emperor meant to use the Poles 
in a war against Russia, and soon remarked to his friend and 
former minister, Czartoryski, that he expected war in 1811. 

The marriage of Napoleon (April i, 1810) with the niece 
of the ill-fated Marie Antoinette was something more than a 
visible sign of the repentance of France for the crime of 1793- 
It effected far more than the admission of the Corsican caporal 
and heir to the revolution, into the proudest of reigning families. 
It was an event of far-reaching importance. Napoleon had 
long ago remarked that his position could only be secured by 
an alliance with Russia or Austria. After Wagram he had 
reduced the latter almost to a second-rate Power, and seemed 
to desire a partition of the world between the Empires of the 
West and the East. The policy of Tilsit and Erfurt was now 
undermined by the Austrian marriage. Henceforth he began 
to support the Hapsburg Empire, to isolate Russia, and while 
holding her fast to his commercial system, to push her out 
of Europe in matters political and military. The marriage 
with Marie Louise further marks a recurrence to the Charle- 
magne ideal, somewhat discarded in 1807 — 1809 for what may 
be called the Romano-Byzantine policy of Tilsit and Erfurt. 
As the old Prankish hero's failure to gain the hand of the 
Eastern Empress Irene had Hmited his aims to central and 



IX.] TJie Nationalist Reactiofi. 213 

southern Europe, so too Napoleon after 1809 reverted to a 
more Frankish or Germanic policy. His correspondence and 
his conduct to Goethe and Wieland at Erfurt show his desire 
of propitiating the nascent sentiment of German nationality 
which so nearly caused his overthrow in May — June 1809. 
The alliance with the Hapsburgs now marks the final effort 
of Napoleon to reconcile Central Europe to the increasing 
hardships which his Continental System imposed. Out- 
wardly the Austrian marriage consolidated the Napoleonic 
supremacy in Central Europe; and the birth of a son, the 
*King of Rome,' seemed to place the keystone on the arch 
whereby he sought to span the gulf hitherto separating the old 
dynasties from the French Revolution. One other result of 
this momentous event must be observed. It emphasized the 
abandonment by Austria of her reforming projects and of 
her championship of German nationality from which Stein 
had hoped so much; and the tortuous time-serving policy 
necessitated by this ignoble alliance was to yield to Prussia, in 
the decisive struggle of 1813, the moral and political leadership 
of Germany. 

Long diverted from his efforts against England by the 
Spanish Rising and the Austrian War, Napoleon now desired 
to end the Peninsular War and complete the ruin of England 
by hermetically sealing the Continent against her goods. This 
cause or pretext for the annexation of maritime districts to his 
Empire — e.g. that of Etruria in 1808 and the Papal States in 
1809 — now began to operate with renewed vigour. Sweden 
was compelled (June, 1810) to adhere rigidly to his Con- 
tinental System, and renounce the exceptions in favour of salt 
and colonial produce which she had for nine months striven to 
maintain. Louis Napoleon was overwhelmed with reproaches 
from Paris for his neglect to apply that system with full rigour 
to his kingdom of Holland, which hved by its foreign and 
carrying trades. When, afcer numerous quarrels, Louis saw 



214 '^^^^ Revohitiofiary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

himself menaced by Napoleon's troops, he abdicated in favour 
of his son (July i); but this act was promptly set aside, and 
Holland was annexed to the French Empire (July 9). 

Hitherto the Continental System had been more or less 
evaded in Holland and even in the French Empire ; for while 
both the English and French Governments nominally forbade 
all intercourse, they secretly issued licences to merchants for 
trading even with a prohibited State in goods which were 
greatly needed. Indeed, the chief aim of our Orders in 
Council, the monopoly of the ocean commerce of the world, 
had been so far attained that Europe had to procure colonial 
produce directly or indirectly through our shippers, or submit 
to the privation of coffee, sugar, cotton, indigo, and the many 
products required in manufacture. Even where the license 
system failed, smuggling effected much the same result. From 
our ports of vantage in Malta and Sicily, from many ports of the 
Spanish Peninsula, the Channel Islands, and Heligoland, our 
goods secretly found their way into Europe, or even by way of 
Salonica and the Balkan passes into Austria and Germany. 

A French decree of October 1809, forbidding the importation 
of all colonial produce into Hamburg, proves that Napoleon 
even at that time regarded all such wares as being of British 
origin. It also states incidentally that about six hundred women 
had been engaged in smuggling cofiee and other colonial 
produce into that city, though it was then garrisoned by French 
troops. In this connection we may quote the testimony of 
Bourrienne, who was then the French agent at Hamburg. 
" Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, whilst 
the French Government carried it on extensively.... Licences 
for the sale of English goods were procured at a high price by 
anyone who was rich enough to pay for them. The speculation 
in licences was carried to a scandalous extent only to enrich a 
few, and to satisfy the short-sighted views of the contrivers of 
the system. I informed Napoleon that, notwithstanding his 



IX.] ■ The Nationalist Reaction. 215 

precautions, every prohibited article was smuggled in, because 
the profits on the sale in Germany, Poland, Italy, and even in 
France, were too considerable to deter persons from running 
any risks whatsoever to obtain them.... This profound ignorance 
of the maxims of political economy caused general privation 
and misery, which in their turn occasioned general hostility. 
The system could only succeed in the impossible event of all 
tlie Powers of Europe honestly endeavouring to carry it into 
effect. A single free port would have destroyed it. In order 
to ensure its complete success, it was necessary to conquer and 
occupy all countries, and never to evacuate them. ...It is neces- 
sary to have witnessed, as I have, the numberless vexations and 
miseries occasioned by this baneful system, in order to under- 
stand the mischief which it effected in Europe, and how much 
that mischief contributed to Napoleon's fall." — This interesting 
extract will serve to justify a statement which I shall often have 
to emphasize, that Napoleon's wars after 1807 had a vital 
connection with his Continental System ; and it incidentally 
refutes the prevalent belief that his later wars were solely the 
result of an unbridled ambition. On the contrary, they sprang 
almost necessarily from the adoption of a system which aimed 
at hermetically sealing the Continent against England, at 
securing a lasting peace and the undisputed supremacy of 
France. We must now return to consider the underlying causes 
of his failure and ultimate overthrow. 

The Continent, oppressed by conscription or devastated by 
war, was never so dependent on England for cheap and good 
manufactures as at this time. Napoleon's system and the 
English Orders in Council ruined neutral commerce, thereby 
compelling Europe to exist on its own resources, or buy 
through English merchants at prices enormously enhanced by 
the risks encountered or the devious routes adopted. Knowing 
that practically all colonial produce was bought through 
English traders, Napoleon now endeavoured by the decrees of 



2i6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Aug. and Oct. 1810 to raise a large revenue on colonial wares 
and yet destroy English goods. By the former he imposed 
duties averaging 40 or 50 per cent, on the value of colonial 
produce, because that was assumed to be the profit made by 
the merchant or smuggler. By the latter decree he ordered 
that all British manufactured goods should be seized and 
publicly burnt not only in his Empire, but in dependent 
States as Switzerland, the Rhenish Confederation, and the 
Hanse Towns. By these tyrannical orders the Emperor hoped 
finally to assure England's surrender ; but the means adopted 
pressed more heavily on his own States than on his foes. 

The confiscation and destruction of English goods brought 
present ruin on multitudes of his subjects in order to exclude 
those products in the future; while the 50 percent, tax was 
of course paid by the consumer in the enhanced prices of 
all colonial wares. The result of Napoleon's determination 
to "make commerce manoeuvre like a regiment" — to use 
Chaptal's phrase — was seen in the enormous increase of 
prices. Dyes, cotton, and other necessaries for manufactures 
now rose to twice, and sugar and coffee to five times, their 
natural values ; and while the English manufacturer gained his 
raw materials as cheaply as before and economised in pro- 
duction by the use of the power-loom, his continental rivals 
enjoyed scarcely any of the new inventions, and were further 
handicapped by the very system which claimed to protect 
them from English competition. *'When stripped of all 
political prestige (wrote Mollien) this system was seen to be 
the most mistaken and disastrous of fiscal inventions." It is, 
indeed, a remarkable fact that, when the economic blunders of 
the earlier revolutionists had so aggravated the miseries of 
France in 1793 — 5, the heir to the revolution should have 
assured his own overthrow by persisting in a policy, the 
results of which his own Finance Minister clearly foresaw. A 
few industries, it is true, were thereby started in his Empire ; 



17. 



TRAL EUROPE IN 1812 



AND CAMPAIGNS OF 1792- I810 




Stanford,'; Geoc^ raphicaL Estab. 



17. 



CENTRAL EUROPE IN l8Hi 

AND CAMPAIGNS OF 1792- I8IO 




taidordA GfioqrapfucuL Estab. 



•4 

J 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 217 

and interested monopolists were loud in the praise of his 
system as the " perfection of the prohibitive system " adopted 
by the Mountain in 1793. Beetroot sugar began to be made ; 
the growth of cotton was attempted in Italy ; and a few call- 
ings — especially that of the smuggler — received an artificial 
stimulus from the high prices; but that France gained little 
real benefit was proved by the growing discontent and by the 
use of State credit to stave off a severe crisis in 181 1. 

That year was the crisis of the commercial struggle 
between England and France. Our commerce, relieved in 
1808 — 9 by its admission into the Spanish colonies, suffered 
severely in 1810 — 181 1 from the collapse of rash speculation 
there, as also from the civil strife following their separation from 
Spain; while the interruption of intercourse with the United 
States, the increasing stringency of Napoleon's decrees, and the 
failure of our harvest in i8io, threatened our industrial classes 
with ruin and starvation. Trade was at a standstill in the 
manufacturing districts; and the Luddite riots of 181 1 threatened 
a social revolution, had not relief come at the end of that 
terrible year through the Czar's secession from the Continental 
System. The depreciation of our paper currency, then almost 
the only medium for our internal trade, and the alarming fall 
in the exchange value with other lands, seemed to presage the 
speedy collapse of our credit; but this very fall in the ex- 
change tempted Continental traders to deal secretly with the 
land where their money would go furthest. For these and 
other reasons English trade survived the strain which was so 
terrible to Continental industries. 

In Germany the distress was felt more keenly than any- 
where. The necessity of complete control of the North Sea coast 
brought Napoleon to decree the annexation (Dec. 13, 18 10) to 
his Empire of all the lands between the Lower Rhine and the 
Free City of Liibeck, including the Duchy of Oldenburg, ruled 
by a relative of the Czar ; and a fortnight later Canton Valais 



2i8 The Revolutionary and Napoleo7tic Era. [Chap. 

was incorporated into the Empire so as to gain complete 
control over the great Simplon road into Italy. The results 
of complete subjection to the Continental System were thus 
described by F. Perthes, then dwelling at Hamburg. — " Of 
the 422 sugar-boiling houses at Hamburg, few now stood 
open : the printing of cottons had ceased entirely : the tobacco- 
dressers were driven away by the government. The imposi- 
tion of innumerable taxes, door and window, capitation and 
land taxes, drove the inhabitants to despair." — The extension 
of the conscription to these new Departments of the Empire 
filled to the brim the measure of hatred against the tyrant of 
the Continent. It was indeed the height of folly for the new 
Charlemagne to nullify the undeniable benefits of his rule by 
measures which emptied every purse and every larder. To 
sweep away all relics of feudalism, to abolish serfdom through- 
out his Empire and dependent States, to decree religious 
liberty and civic equality, was futile when prosperous cities 
were ruined by his military exactions and commercial decrees. 
It was indeed the strangest contradiction to his earlier policy . 
of healing the wounds and satisfying the material interests 
of France. In trusting to the proclamation of social equahty 
to keep ruined communities in a state of idyllic content, the 
Emperor was now committing the very blunder of the revo- 
lutionary idealogues whom he despised. 

Whether Napoleon was sincere in the offers of peace which 
he made to the British Government after Marengo, to Fox in 
1806, again just after Erfurt, or in 1809 before the annexation 
of Holland, is too large and complex a question to be discussed 
here. Those who believe in his desire for peace have to 
explain how it was that during the Peace of Amiens he pro- 
ceeded with annexations as if in time of war, how far his 
designs in Jan. — March 1808 for the partition of Turkey and 
the East were consonant with a pacific policy, and whether his 
tentative proposal (March, 18 10) of evacuating Holland and the 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 219 

Hanse Towns if England would withdraw the Orders in Council, 
had any other aim than that of weakening our alliance with the 
Spanish patriots. Further official advances (apart from those 
made by Louis Napoleon and Fouche, for which the latter was 
disgraced) had been met by the reply from London that 
Napoleon must give up all claim to Spain, Sicily and Malta. 
The crushing terms imposed by him on Prussia and Austria 
were an ominous warning that peace might be worse than open 
war ; and the British Government decided to remain true to its 
treaty of Jan. 1809 with the Spanish Central Junta. 

It is more within our limits to point out that the weight of 
his government, the fearful drain in men and money, had long 
been producing discontent in France itself. The extension of 
his power, as a guarantee against a Bourbon restoration with 
the retrocession of the confiscated lands to their former owners 
(for therein lay the strength of Napoleon's position), was felt to 
be purchased at too high a cost when French blood was poured 
forth every year in quarrels which concerned French interests 
hardly at all. Farseeing Frenchmen — according to the testi- 
mony of Mollien — had long been dreading that his severity 
to the conquered States would "nationalise the resentment" 
against France ; but after the disgrace of Talleyrand and 
Fouche his Ministers were little more than passive tools, as 
completely subject to his will as were the Ministries of 1793 — 4 
to that Committee of Public Safety whose functions he in- 
herited and developed. Remonstrances only served to bring 
disgrace on the very few who were so indiscreet as to offer 
them ; while, by the strange irony characteristic of the years 
iyg4 — 18 14, those who at the earlier date had been the most 
ardent republicans were now foremost among the servile 
officials who desired to strengthen Napoleon's rule and to robe 
the new Empire with all the trappings of an ancient monarchy. 

The ceremonial of Louis XIV's Court was revived with all 
its splendour, and with far more ennui to the courtiers than 



220 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

was possible in that age of wit and intellectual brilliance ; for 
though Napoleon in private possessed great charm of manner, 
and generally unbent in a tete-a-tete with a Minister, his con- 
duct in public always inspired a certain uneasiness or dread. 
Brilliant causeur though he was, the incisiveness of his ques- 
tions, the sharp military ring of his sentences, generally recalled 
the associations of the parade ground. The effect of the smile 
which played about his cheeks and lips was marred by the ever 
fixed aquiline gaze of the eyes; and the general impression 
left on the beholder was one of ill-defined fear. "After the 
Emperor's departure" — wrote a foreign attache — "we all 
breathed freely again as if a heavy weight had been taken 
off. The conversation became loud and general as before his 
entry ; and the loudest of all were the hangers-on of the French 
court, who made amends for their previous silent dread by loud 
hilarity." Napoleon's dislike of "poHtical women" — witness 
his exile of Mdme de Stael — allowed none of those witticisms 
at the expense of government which had often tempered its 
rigour under Louis XIV. Even in the royalist salons of the 
Faubourg St Germain criticisms on the imperial rule were 
uttered with bated breath, lest they should find a place in the 
weekly or daily letters sent to him by informers who reported 
the state of public opinion. As for the Emperor's Court, it is 
succinctly characterised by his Minister, Chaptal, as " a slave- 
galley where each courtier pulled the oar to the word of com- 
mand." 

Far more oppressive was the strain on the material re- 
sources of France. Vastly as these had been developed by the 
splendid activity of the First Consul, they were soon unequal 
to the demands of an aggressive Imperialism. Though Mollien 
had succeeded in balancing revenue and expenditure for 1808, 
yet the Budget was hopelessly deranged by the Spanish War, 
and the year 181 1 closed with a deficit of 47,000,000 francs. 
For the first time Napoleon's adage that "war must support 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 221 

war " was completely falsified. The pay of Joseph Bonaparte's 
armies was generally a year in arrears, and the most pressing 
needs of his government could not be met from the scanty 
taxes of a land where revolt was general. Though Napoleon 
sent to Madrid part of the sums which he wrung from helpless 
Prussia, yet Spain continued to be so heavy a drain on French 
finance that he threatened to annex the land between the 
Pyrenees and the Ebro as a recompense. Talleyrand's quiet 
but firm disapproval of Napoleon's Spanish policy reflected 
the general sentiment of France. That whole struggle, en- 
venomed by the perfidy which commenced it, disgusted France, 
and wearied troops accustomed to the short and dramatic 
campaigns in Italy or Germany. " It was the war in Spain 
(wrote Marbot) which brought about Napoleon's fall." 

There were many reasons for the military failure in Spain. 
The Emperor, intent on supervising the myriad details of his 
administration and on maintaining his domination in Germany, 
could not control in person all the operations beyond the 
Pyrenees, and so ensure that unity of action which the 
jealousies of his generals compromised at many critical 
junctures. The hatred of the Spaniards for a government 
thrust upon them by treachery, nerved them to struggle on, 
even when in a military sense they were vanquished, as at 
the close of 1808 and 1809. Further, all the skill of the 
French commissariat, and the experience of their troops in 
foraging and plundering, failed sometimes to solve the problem 
expressed in Henri TV's phrase — " In Spain large armies will 
starve, and small armies will be beaten." Finally the vast 
extent of the peninsula, divided by five great mountain chains, 
the risks in the communications with France through rugged 
provinces inhabited by the tenacious Basques and Catalans, 
the difficulty of holding down the fertile south, so as to ensure 
a revenue, while making head against the English in the west 
and the guerrillas everywhere, — these obstacles and problems 



222 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

alone would have retarded a permanent conquest, even in the 
face of a commander of ordinary talents; and Wellington 
possessed a combination of gifts — political tact in dealing with 
his allies, prudence in husbanding resources, and discernment 
when to strike quick and hard — possessed by no one of the 
French Marshals, except perhaps Soult. 

At the opening of the Peninsular campaign of 1810 the 
position was, in brief, as follows. Suchet's bold and skilful 
attacks were reducing most of the rugged province of Catalonia, 
which a British force might have easily kept from his grasp. 
Soult with 65,000 French had overrun the fertile province 
of Andalusia and driven the Spanish Junta with its army into 
the island which protects Cadiz (Feb. 18 10). This great sea- 
port remained the national capital as long as Madrid was 
held by King Joseph's forces. In the north the French were 
investing Astorga and Ciudad Rodrigo, when Massena, Prince 
of Essling, took command of an army of 86,000 m^en largely 
composed of troops victorious in Germany, with orders to "drive 
the leopards into the sea." The speedy success of Soult in 
Andalusia and the formidable invasion of Portugal threatened by 
Massena quickly reduced Wellington to the defensive. In the 
opinion of our allies and foes alike, he was guilty of deserting 
the Spanish general who attempted a brave but unavaiHng 
defence of Ciudad Rodrigo. Its surrender (July, 1810) and 
the explosion of a powder magazine at Almeida, laid open the 
northern road into Portugal, and the allies retired down the 
valley of the Mondego. The slowness of Massena's pursuit 
gave Wellington the opportunity of massing some 50,000 
Anglo-Portuguese troops on the heights of Busaco. The 
French commander, though informed by Marbot that there 
was a road which turned that strong position, yet persisted in 
the front attack which Ney had first advised. His rashness 
led to a severe defeat. Three brave attempts by about 60,000 
French veterans to storm the heights were repulsed with the 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 223 

loss of 4,500 men (Sept. 27, 18 10). The moral effect of this 
battle was most important : the inexperienced Portuguese 
troops gained confidence : the British Ministry, long wavering 
before the attacks of a strong peace party, was encouraged to 
persevere with the war; and the disputes between Massena 
and his generals were so envenomed by disaster as to paralyse 
French efforts at Torres Vedras. In a strategic sense the 
battle of Busaco was useless. Wellington's chief aim was to 
collect the allied resources within those famous lines; while 
Massena' s true course of action was shown by the ease with 
which he turned Wellington's position at Busaco by the flank 
march previously urged on him. The French now occupied 
Coimbra, but allowed Wellington to retire unmolested within 
the lines of Torres Vedras, taking with him or destroying the 
supplies of the country north of these defences. They con- 
sisted of an external and weaker line of works nearly 30 miles 
long from the sea to the Tagus, following the course of the 
mountains ; a stronger inner line roughly parallel to the first ; 
and a third at the mouth of the Tagus merely designed to 
cover a forced embarkation if the second line were pierced : 
150 redoubts with 600 cannons crowned the most important 
positions ; a flotilla on the Tagus protected the allied right ; 
and the presence of 70,000 regular troops and 50,000 irregulars, 
under Wellington's supreme command, promised a desperate 
resistance of this the chief refuge of the cause of national 
independence. The peninsula of Lisbon, the island on which 
Cadiz stands, and the fortresses of Badajoz, Elvas, Gibraltar, 
and Tarragona, were the only strongholds on the Continent 
which defied Napoleon's domination. Considering the excel- 
lence of the French spy system, it is extraordinary that 
Masse'na should only have heard of the existence of Welling- 
ton's lines of defence five days before he came in sight of 
them. His numerous delays had enabled the defenders to 
strengthen the outer line with walls and abatis of trees; and 



224 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap, 

Ney and Reynier now flatly refused to move their corps 
against positions stronger than that of Busaco. Rains of 
tropical violence and the difficulty of gaining food from dis- 
tricts which Wellington had cleared of its resources, decided 
Massena after a few vain attempts to retire to Santarem. 
There he exhausted the country without gaining the reinforce- 
ments which he requested; for Soult, though ordered to 
reinforce him from Andalusia, stopped to reduce Badajoz, an 
act of disobedience which brought the severe censure from 
Napoleon — " Soult gained me a town and lost me a kingdom." 
Unable to gain a hold on the left bank of the Tagus, Mas- 
sena's army was at last forced (March, 1811) to retreat. The 
most pertinacious of Napoleon's marshals was foiled by the 
skilful defence of Wellington, whose firmness had infused vigour 
into the wavering councils of Westminster, and had silenced 
the factious opposition of the Portuguese Regency at Lisbon. 
His tactics had, it is true, entailed terrible sufferings on the 
Portuguese people and vast expense to the British treasury to 
feed the multitudes of civilians within the lines ; but few will 
now deny that the cause of European independence was worthy 
of these sacrifices. Portugal, the very ground on to which 
Napoleon had once hoped to lure the EngHsh in order to 
defeat them, was freed from the French with a loss of 30,000 
to their effective strength. Ney had been removed from 
his command for disobedience, and Massena's reputation 
gained at Zurich, Genoa and Essling, was clouded over by a 
final and well-deserved disgrace for his failure at Busaco and 
Torres Vedras. This signal reverse, the first unretrieved 
disaster to Napoleon's arms, aroused secret feelings of hope 
among German patriots. After the gloom cast over Germany 
by the death of the heroic Prussian Queen Louisa (July, 18 to) 
came the news of Wellington's successful resistance. " In my 
intercourse with the farmers of North Germany (wrote Arndt) 
I awoke such romantic interest in the great Englishman and in 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 225 

the Spanish leaders, that whoever possessed a flock of merino 
sheep named the finest wether after one of them." 

The events of 1810 — 181 1 indeed proved that Napoleon's 
endeavour to control from Paris the actions of King Joseph 
and his marshals in Spain only hampered their movements and 
embittered their disputes. The French Emperor grumbled at 
the expense of the war in Spain, where the scanty resources 
had long been exhausted by plunder and requisitions. He 
often threatened to annex to his Empire all the land between 
the Pyrenees and the Ebro in compensation for the subsidies 
which he had frequently to send to Madrid ; and he sometimes 
even menaced his brother with the annexation of the whole of 
Spain, offering to give to him the still more precarious dignity 
of King of Portugal. On his side Joseph had numerous causes 
of bitter complaint against Napoleon. He rightly argued that 
no king could gain the confidence and respect of so proud a 
people as the Spaniards, who was not invested with all the 
attributes of royal power. His letters contain frequent pro- 
tests against the entire subservience to which he was subjected 
by the Emperor, who seemed intentionally to degrade him in 
the eyes of his new subjects. He complained bitterly that the 
almost unlimited powers of the French Marshals in their re- 
spective provinces reduced his authority to a mere shadow; 
that they intercepted his revenues, and ravaged the country to 
support their troops. Hence the prospects of reconciliation 
were indefinitely postponed, the treasury at Madrid was de- 
pleted and the administration was crippled at its source. In 
March, 181 1, Joseph sent the following pathetic letter to 
Berthier : — " The troops in my service have neither been 
clothed nor paid for eight months. The contractors have just 
taken all the objects of value which still remained in the palace 
at Madrid, and I have been obliged to strip the chapel. 
Two of my Ministers have been reduced to asking me for 
rations for their families. This I was obliged to refuse, as all 
F. R. IS 



226 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the other civil servants would have made the same demand. 
My ambassador in Russia is a bankrupt : the one in Paris 
died in the greatest poverty, and I live 'here in the ruins of a 
great monarchy." 

Joseph's trusty adviser, Miot de Melito, had several times 
urged him to resign his crown as a final protest against the 
dictatorial pretensions of his brother ; and now, oppressed by 
defeats and the imminence of bankruptcy, he hurried to Paris 
to gain better conditions or to abdicate (April, 1811). Both 
efforts failed; and with a monthly subsidy of ;£'2o,ooo and the 
promise that the army of the centre should be under his 
immediate control, he was cajoled back to the unreal splendours 
of Madrid. The annexation of Catalonia to the French Empire 
in the spring of next year showed how little the king's plea 
for the appearance of independence was respected by his 
brother; and the Cadiz Cortes mocked at Joseph as being 
"more than ever a puppet." 

The campaigns of 1811 — 1812 in Spain must be briefly 
summarised here. An attempt by Graham to turn the French 
lines menacing Cadiz led to the brilliant but fruitless victory 
at Barosa (March 181 1). The French still kept their strong 
positions opposite Cadiz. After the bloody battle of Fuentes 
d'Onoro (May, 181 1) had been lost by the French entirely 
owing to the jealousies of their marshals, they retired on Sala- 
manca; and the interest centred in the operations around 
Badajoz. Soult, advancing to raise the British siege of that 
fortress, was confronted by Beresford at Albuera, and the most 
desperate battle of the whole war was finally decided by the 
stubborn valour of the British infantry (June, 181 1); but all 
Wellington's skill failed to reduce Badajoz, the siege of which 
was soon raised by Soult and Marmont. The same month saw 
Suchet's capture of the Catalonian fortress of Tarragona ; and 
that intrepid general by the end of the year conquered most of 
Valencia. ''Had Wellington then retaken Badajoz and Ciudad 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 227 

Rodrigo (wrote Napier of this campaign) he would have 
gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of the war ; 
but, being baffled partly by skill partly by fortune, factiously 
opposed by the Portuguese Regency, thwarted by the Spanish 
Government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and 
pestered by the follies of all three, he was reduced to seeming 
inactivity, while the French added Tarragona and the rich 
kingdom of Valencia to their conquests." That the spirit of the 
north, however, was unbroken by defeat, was shown by the 
Spaniards seizing the fortress of Figueras, and by their incessantly 
harassing French communications. " The enemy (wrote Mac- 
donald) were ubiquitous, and yet I could find them nowhere, 
though I scoured the whole of Catalonia." The famous guerrilla 
chief Mina was especially famed for his daring exploits, in one 
of which he liberated 1,100 Spanish prisoners near Vittoria, 
capturing their French escort. The general trend of events 
in Spain, however, distincdy favoured the French until many 
of their seasoned troops were withdrawn for the Russian cam- 
paign, their place being taken by younger soldiers. Even then, 
so vast were Napoleon's resources that when he was preparing 
to humble the Czar, nearly 300,000 French troops maintained 
his authority beyond the Pyrenees; and Joseph was able to 
enhst several thousand Spanish levies from the docile inhabit- 
ants of the south. The futility, however, of his eftbrts to stamp 
out resistance in the north and centre is strikingly illustrated 
by some incidents narrated by the young Due de BrogUe in his 
Memoirs. He was attached to the staff of Marshal Bessieres, 
who had full military authority in Leon and Old Castille, and 
wielded it less harshly than some other French Marshals. Yet, 
because the town of Valladolid had not furnished the supplies 
requisitioned for his army, the marshal imposed a fine of 
1,000,000 reals (about ;^i 0,400). Towns and villages which 
were suspected of reinforcing the guerrillas were closely watched; 
persons who were absent from home without leave for more 

15—2 



228 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

than three days suffered confiscation of their property ; and the 
relatives of guerrillas were held responsible for their acts. In 
spite of all this severity, or perhaps because of it, the French 
could not, except in large numbers, venture far beyond the 
walls of Valladolid with impunity ; and Broglie compares Bes- 
sieres' whole position with that of a ''terrorist on mission." 

Wellington began the operations of 1812 by a successful 
dash on Ciudad Rodrigo (Jan.); and the southern road into 
Spain was laid open in April by the storming of Badajoz with 
a desperate courage, sullied by the ferocity of the British 
soldiers in their hour of triumph. But Wellington was recalled 
to the north by a move of Marmont into the Mondego valley, 
whence that marshal had promptly to retire on Salamanca, and 
finally beyond the Douro. After receiving reinforcements, the 
French commander suddenly crossed the river, thereby menac- 
ing Wellington's communications ; and a race ensued over the 
open plains of Leon to seize or save the important position at 
Salamanca. Eager to press his advantage by intercepting the 
British retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo, Marmont swung round his 
left wing far away from his main force posted near the Arapeiles 
hills. Wellington saw his chance. The French left was crushed 
by Pakenham's brilliant charge. Marmont was badly wounded, 
the French centre after a desperate resistance was driven from 
one of the Arapeiles, and only the approach of darkness, the 
skill of their General Clausel and the abandonment of Alba 
Castle by the Spaniards saved them from complete disaster 
(July 22). As it was, this battle cost the French about 7,000 
killed and wounded with as many prisoners, and led to their 
temporary abandonment of nearly half of Spain ; for Welling- 
ton, after pursuing Clausel's shattered forces through Valladolid, 
turned south to overthrow a smaller army under King Joseph 
which was to have reinforced his presumptuous marshal. The 
king at once retreated through Madrid towards Valencia, 
ordering Soult's army to join him there to effect the recovery 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 229 

of his capital, which had enthusiastically welcomed the English 
deliverers. Soult reluctantly abandoned the twenty lines of 
entrenchments opposite Cadiz, the arsenal of Seville, and the 
other fruits of his splendid conquest of Andalusia which for two 
years had been Joseph's chief support. In the opinion of the 
French historian Thibaudeau, the disaster at Salamanca was the 
chief cause of the ultimate loss of Spain to Napoleon. Certain 
it is that the drooping spirits of the Spanish patriots were 
ever3^where revived ; while the British Government, just then 
distracted by the war lately declared by the United States, was 
encouraged not to relax its efforts in the Peninsula. Welling- 
ton's laurels were, however, to be dashed by an important 
check. His deficiency in artillery occasioned the failure of five 
assaults on the castle of Burgos, gallantly held by the French ; 
and the concentration of their armies of the south and centre 
compelled him to withdraw his forces from Burgos and Madrid 
towards Ciudad Rodrigo, where his wearied troops went into 
winter quarters (Dec. 181 2) — an opportune and skilful retreat, 
offering a signal contrast to that of the Grand Army from 
Moscow. 

The influence of this sanguinary struggle on the political 
life of Spain presents some features of interest. The Spanish 
Cortes, or Parliament, which met at Cadiz (18 10), not far 
beyond the range of the French cannons, was mainly elected 
by refugees who claimed to represent towns or districts of 
Spain occupied by the invaders ; and its tone was that of the 
tumultuous democracy of Cadiz. While its blustering incom- 
petence paralysed military operations and aroused Wellington's 
anger and contempt, the Cortes also confirmed the colonists in 
their desire for independence from the old oppressive colonial 
system, and alienated the sympathies of the royalists and 
clericals^ who had the support of nearly all the Spanish 
peasantry. In its anxiety to obliterate the memory of Napo- 
leon's programme of social reforms proclaimed at Madrid in 



230 TJie Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Dec. i8o8j the Cortes proceeded to an hysterical imitation of 
the French Constituent Assembly of 1789. It proclaimed 
freedom of the press, forbade its members to receive any office, 
pension or reward, abolished the Inquisition, and began to 
encroach on the executive powers of the Regency which was 
striving to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII. Quickly 
developing its democratic ardour, the Cortes gained as signal 
a triumph over the more moderate party of Spanish reformers, 
as the French National Assemblies had won over the Left 
Centre in 1789 — 1792. The leader of what may be called" 
the Spanish Feuillant party was the able and statesmanlike 
Jovellanos, whose position in Spanish politics was somewhat 
analogous to that previously occupied by Pombal in Portugal 
and by Turgot in France. He was a reforming statesman, sin- 
cerely attached to the philosophical doctrines of the eighteenth 
century, which he had long sought to carry into effect by royal 
decrees. Thus, when he was appointed Councillor of State by 
Charles III in 1794, he endeavoured to avert the bankruptcy 
which threatened to overwhelm Spain, by proposing that the 
property of the titled clergy should no longer be exempt from 
taxation; and though he was disgraced and was banished to 
the mountains of his native province of Asturias for making so 
sacrilegious a proposal, yet through the pressure of events the 
tax was imposed somewhat later. In 1799 his services were 
again required and he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice, 
soon to be banished again owing to the persistence with which 
he urged reforming projects on the Court. After the fall of 
Godoy in 1808, he became a member of the Central Junta, 
which, two years later, had to give way to the Cortes. In the 
Junta, Jovellanos and the party of moderate reform had carried 
their point that nobles and titled clergy should form a higher 
Chamber, while deputies of the untitled clergy and Commons 
should form a second Chamber. But this compromise, which 
had been vainly urged by Necker, Mounier and others at 



IX.] TJie Nationalist Reaction. 231 

Versailles in 1789, was now equally distasteful to the democrats 
of Cadiz. For at this time everything English was abhorrent 
to the fervent patriots in the Cortes and in the political clubs 
of Cadiz ; and the term Inglesimo was the height of oppro- 
brium. To the excitable Spanish imagination, chafed by 
frequent disputes with the English commanders whom they 
ever suspected of treachery, and fanned to fever heat by 
intemperate newspapers and pamphlets, the moderation of 
Jovellanos seemed akin to treason; and in a popular rising 
of November 181 1 he was put to death by the so-called 
patriots. Had his advice been followed, first by reactionary 
rulers and now by headstrong revolutionists, the course of 
Spanish politics might have been far more tranquil. As it was 
the Spaniards rushed from one political extreme to another so 
inconsiderately as to postpone to our own days any approach 
to orderly constitutional government. 

In 181 1 the Cortes decided to apply to military hospitals 
the funds of religious orders, abolished torture, as well as all 
the old feudal and seigneurial rights or banalites over ovens, 
mills, forests, fishing, &c., together with every sign of vassalage. 
Declaring that "sovereignty resided essentially in the nation," 
it next proceeded to draw up a Constitution, modelled on that 
of France in 1791. Legislative power was to reside in the Cortes 
along with the king, who was left nominally with the control of 
the executive; but his functions were as carefully restricted by one 
omnipotent Assembly as those of Louis XVI after 1791. The 
Cortes was to be elected every two years by universal suffrage 
for equal electoral districts ; it could not be dissolved by the 
king and his veto was merely suspensive, being valid only 
through two sessions and lapsing if the measure was carried in 
a third. The king was to name his Ministers, but they 
remained responsible to the Assembly, which also fixed his 
civil list every year. The provincial and parochial administra- 
tions were to be modelled on the French Departmental System, 



232 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

with the addition of a plan for pubhc education ; and yet the 
Roman Catholic faith was to be the only one tolerated by the 
State. Improving on Robespierre's motion of 1 791, the Cortes 
declared that deputies of one Assembly were ineligible for the 
next ; and crowned its work with the order that no alteration 
in this Constitution of 181 2 was to be made within eight years. 

The victory of Salamanca released the dreamers of Cadiz, 
and, bringing them into contact with central and northern 
Spain, produced sharp conflicts between Jacobins and 'serviles.' 
Galicia and the Basque provinces at once rejected this central- 
ising constitution. Indeed the strifes between the Cortes and 
the clerical party nearly led to a civil war, and brought Welling- 
ton almost to despair. Placed by the Assembly in supreme 
command of all the Spanish troops (Oct. 18 12), he was more 
than once on the point of overthrowing it, and wrote to the 
British Government to ask whether it would approve of such a 
step being taken as a last resort. So narrow was the balance 
between success and failure in the Peninsula. Certainly nothing 
but his "long enduring blood" and his military genius could 
have snatched victory from defeat in every one of the years 
1809 — 1812. 

It is, however, a task as profitless as it is easy to criticise 
the false steps in the first wild rush for political freedom where 
the very idea was a novelty. A less superficial view of the 
Tyrolese and Spanish struggles against foreign usurpation, and 
of the legislative efforts of Stein and the Cadiz Cortes, reveals 
the fact that the spirit and the principles of 1789 were now 
being effectively used by two great peoples to sap the founda- 
tions of the Napoleonic domination. 

The position of Italy in the European system of States 
was throughout this era almost entirely one of passivity. 
Napoleon's conquests had given to the long-divided Italians 
some approach to social equality and pohtical unity ; and 
though the French domination eventually aroused much dis- 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction, 233 

content, yet the benefits conferred by Napoleon's sway partly 
counterbalanced the sacrifices entailed by the conscription 
and by his commercial system. With the exception of France, 
no land benefited so much as Italy by his splendid activity 
in organisation. Hence, the nationalist reaction, which was 
to have so potent an influence on the history of Spain and 
Germany, acquired no very decisive activity in Italy, at least 
until the year 18 14. The sentiment of Italian nationality was 
not at first unfavourable to the great warrior, whose vigorous 
blows awakened it from the torpor of centuries. 

As has been incidentally mentioned. Napoleon had in 1808 
annexed the eastern and northern parts of the Papal States 
to the kingdom of Italy. At the same time Rome was 
occupied by a French force, and the Pope was kept almost 
a prisoner in the Castle of St Angelo, while the cardinals were 
either arrested or dispersed throughout their dioceses, and the 
papal troops were enrolled in the French army. In May 
1809, when Napoleon seemed compassed with difficulties 
in Germany and when French supremacy in southern Italy 
was menaced by the landing of an Anglo- Sicilian force, the 
Pope appeared to sympathise with the Emperor's foes. This 
was sufficient to precipitate the long impending catastrophe. 
x\n Imperial decree proclaimed the deposition of the Pope 
from his temporal power in the following words — "Charlemagne, 
my august predecessor, in conceding certain domains to the 
bishops of Rome only assigned them as fiefs, and Rome did 
not cease to form part of his Empire." Under this flimsy 
pretext, which is devoid of any historical justification — for 
Karl the Great was not master of Rome, when he accepted the 
Imperial crown at Leo Ill's hands — the temporal power of the 
Papacy was abolished, and the last independent State in Italy 
ceased to exist. It was in vain that Napoleon sought to 
disguise this act of spoliation by a misleading reference to a 
dim and distant past. Men saw that in this extinction of the 



234 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

temporal power and of the sole surviving ecclesiastical State, 
he was recurring to the policy of the Directory in its most 
aggressive phase. Against the proclamation that Rome was 
henceforth a free and imperial city, Pius VII was preparing 
to protest by a bull of excommunication against the Emperor, 
when he was arrested by the French general Miollis and hurried 
northwards, to be long kept under restraint at Savona. When 
the negotiations for the Austrian marriage seemed to assure 
Napoleon's domination in Europe, the conqueror ventured 
on the final step by definitively incorporating Rome and its 
environs in the French Empire (Feb. 1810). The Eternal City 
was declared to be the second city in Napoleon's dominions ; 
and the Charlemagne legend was further kept up by the 
bestowal of the traditional title, King of Rome, on the 
Emperor's son and heir. 

French rule at Rome soon bore witness to the vigorous and 
enlightened policy of the Emperor, which did so much to 
palliate the violence of his methods of acquisition. At Rome 
as elsewhere we remark Napoleon's determination to effect a 
beneficent blending of the new and the old, or, as he himself 
once happily phrased it, to endeavour to harmonise Gothic 
institutions with the spirit of the nineteenth century. This was 
observable both in the intellectual, material and political 
spheres. The ruins of old Rome were to some extent cleared 
of the accumulations of rubbish which obscured their grandeur, 
and every care was taken there and elsewhere in Italy to 
preserve those monuments of the arts and the relics of antiquity 
which the rapacity of the French had left in their historic 
surroundings. The material prosperity of Italy was furthered 
by the institution of funds for the encouragement of agriculture 
and the industrial arts. A canal was cut to facilitate transport 
between Lake Como and the Adriatic Sea, the ports of 
Venice and Genoa were enlarged and fortified, and high- 
roads were improved. Napoleon also laboured hard to uproot 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 235 

clericalism from the former Papal States. The number of 
bishoprics was stringently reduced, and ecclesiastical discipline 
was to a large extent assimilated to the system then established 
in France. The administration of the Cardinals, almost 
mediaeval in its character, gave place to the vigorous organisa- 
tion of a modern State ; and central and southern Italy, even 
under the blighting reaction which followed the overthrow 
of Napoleon's sway, never quite lost the effects of the 
beneficent impulse which his master-mind imparted. 

In spite of these undeniable benefits, Italy was by no 
means contented under the French supremacy. In the south, 
despite the benefits of Murat's rule, there were many attempts 
at insurrection, which were fomented by the emissaries of the 
former Bourbon rulers. Owing to the presence of an English 
force under Lord Bentinck and the protection of English cruisers, 
the Bourbons not only maintained themselves in the fertile 
island of Sicily but frequently threatened descents on the 
mainland. The republicans of southern Italy were dissatisfied 
with Murat's autocratic rule ; and many of them, withdrawing 
to the fastnesses of the Abruzzi, founded or greatly extended 
the activity of the secret associations of the Carbonari. The 
Bourbons intrigued with them so as to increase the difficulties 
of the Neapolitan Government ; but, down to 1813, Murat 
succeeded in repressing most of the attempts against his 
authority. By completing the abolition of feudal customs 
and introducing modern methods of administration, he effected 
much for the social and material welfare of his kingdom. 

It was in the more commercial and industrial north, 
however, that the pressure of Napoleon's Continental System 
began to be felt most seriously ; and the discontent arising from 
material need was there augmented by the attachment to the 
traditions of municipal freedom which have always distinguished 
the northern parts of Italy from the more docile and backward 
south. The men of Venice, Genoa, Milan, Turin and Brescia 



236 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

could look back on a splendid past, rich in memories of local 
freedom and industrial supremacy. It was little to them that 
Napoleon promised to renew these ancient glories, when their 
industries were ruined by the decrees dated from Milan and 
Fontainebleau, and when their harbours were almost deserted 
owing to the operation of the Continental blockade. In read- 
ing the usually prosaic records of commercial transactions, 
one is startled by finding such incidents as the following. 
Owing to the prohibition of all intercourse with England, 
two parcels of silk sent from Bergamo to London were smug- 
gled, one by way of Smyrna, the other by way of Archangel, 
to their destination: the former took one year, the latter 
two years, in the wanderings necessitated by Napoleon's 
decrees. 

Though Eugene Beauharnais endeavoured as far as possible 
to mitigate the hardships of such a regime^ and honestly strove 
to promote the welfare of his subjects, yet the material pressure 
caused by Napoleon's great commercial experiment and by the 
constant drain of men to fill the ranks of his armies, naturally 
sowed broadcast the seeds of discontent. The promise of 
political liberty and representative government which had 
been made in 1797 to the Cisalpine Republic, had soon 
been found to be illusory ; and the system of rule which after 
1808 prevailed throughout Italy, was an autocracy concealed 
under the thinnest of disguises. — " Such was the state of Italy 
(wrote Bourrienne concerning the year 1809), that I have 
been informed by an individual worthy of credence, that 
if the army of the viceroy Eugene, instead of being vic- 
torious, had been beaten on the Piave, a deeply organised 
revolution would have broken out in Piedmont, and even 
in Italy, where, nevertheless, the majority of the people 
fully appreciated the excellent qualities of Eugene. I have 
been also credibly informed that lists were in readiness, 
designating those of the French who were to be put to death, 



IX.] The Nationalist Reaction. 237 

as well as those by whom the severe orders of the Imperial 
Government had been mitigated, and who were only to be 
banished." — If this was the state of public feehng in a realm 
which had reaped many benefits from the French supre- 
macy, and where the viceroy was beloved, the exasperation 
against Napoleon in Spain and Germany may be faintly con- 
ceived. 



CHAPTER X. 

The Wars of Liberation. 

** The life of peoples cannot be summarised in the lives of a few- 
individuals; for the bond uniting them to peoples has never been dis- 
covered."— Count Tolstoi. 

That Napoleon must ultimately have succeeded in subdu- 
ing the Spanish Peninsula, if he could have bent all his vast 
resources to that struggle, can only be denied by those who 
believe that one British soldier was worth some indefinitely 
large number of French. If the Emperor's policy had been such 
as to admit the evacuation of all central Europe and northern 
Italy by his troops, even the mythical British infantryman 
would probably have been outnumbered. With Napoleon in 
command the ridge of Busaco would have been turned, and the 
lines of Torres Vedras pierced. Considering the enormous 
difficulties of Wellington's position, it is no slur on his genius 
to assert that he must have succumbed to the Grand Army, if 
led by Napoleon in person, and not enfeebled by the mistakes 
and jealousies of his marshals. 

But the fundamental blunder of the Emperor's policy was 
that he aroused the irreconcilable hatred of the Spaniards at 
the very time when he was already burdened with the vast 
problem of shutting out from the Continent the manufactures 
of Great Britain and the colonial products of which she had 
the monopoly. His Continental System could only succeed 



Chap, x.] TJie Wars of Liberation, 239 

by being enforced on the whole of the Continent. A puncture 
at any one point must produce a general collapse of his 
commercial experiment. The connection between his econo- 
mic system and his seizure of Portugal, which in its turn lured 
him on into the policy of Bayonne, has been already explained; 
and it is also obvious that his annexation of Holland, the North 
Sea coast and Liibeck had no other motive than that of ensur- 
ing the complete control of those important centres of com- 
merce. The Spanish War, even after Torres Vedras, was 
indeed only one of his many Herculean efforts against the 
many-headed hydra of British commerce; and he felt himself 
unable to leave Paris, where he could best supervise the whole 
course of the general struggle. Not only in Germany but also 
in France itself there were ominous signs of discontent. To a 
deputation of merchants, who came in the summer of 1811 to 
ask for relief from the many grievances under which they 
groaned, Napoleon replied as follows: "Commercial relations 
with England must cease, I tell you plainly, gendemen. 
Merchants who have business to wind up, or capital to with- 
draw, should do so as soon as possible I shall remain armed 

in order to carry out my decrees and resist the attempts of the 
Enghsh in the Baltic. Some fraud exists still, but it shall be 
completely crushed." — The distress caused by the recent 
sharp rise of prices in France (the cause of which has been 
explained in the preceding chapter), was intensified by the 
increase of taxes necessitated by the warlike preparations which 
occupied the latter half of the year 181 1, and by the heaviest 
drain of all, the blood tax. It had become customary for the 
conscription to be levied one year in advance of the legal age; 
and owing to this illegality, to the annexation of the North Sea 
coast, and also to the detestation of military service in Spain, 
the number of refractory conscripts was ever on the increase, 
rising in 181 1 to the enormous total of 40,000. Light columns 
were organised to chase deserters and — as General Foy re- 



240 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

marked— "to compel the French to become conquerors." The 
religious discords with the Pope had the further eftect of re- 
opening the wounds temporarily healed by the Concordat ; and 
the uneasiness in France was so general that a new war of 
conquest might well have seemed desirable to divert attention 
from internal and economic difficulties and rekindle the warhke 
ardour of her people. 

As has been already remarked, Napoleon cherished the 
belief that an alliance either with Russia or Austria was a 
sufficient guarantee to his supremacy on the Continent. The 
irritation caused by the marriage negotiations has also been 
described. At the close of 1810 came a far more serious 
affiont. Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg, to whose Duke 
Alexander's elder sister had been so promptly betrothed after 
Erfurt, warned the world of the probability of a rupture between 
the allies of Tilsit. That treaty (as the Czar reminded the 
Courts of Europe in a circular despatch of March, i8ti) 
guaranteed the possession of Oldenburg to its lawful sovereign. 
"What value," — continued the Russian note — "could alliances 
have, if the treaties which cemented them did not hold good?" 
It is true that offers were made to give compensation to the 
dispossessed duke ; but that could only be in Germany, which 
was equally at the mercy of Napoleon's statecraft; and the 
incident revived all the Czar's indignation at encroachments 
which promised to thrust Russia from all participation in 
European affairs. 

Recurring to his early friendship with the Polish Prince 
Czartoryski, who when in office had always extolled the good 
faith of England as contrasted with the unscrupulous aggres- 
sions of Napoleon, the Czar at once wrote asking him to sound 
the feelings of the Poles in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and to 
ascertain the possibility of enHsting them on the side of Russia, 
if they were assured of the "certainty of their regeneration." 
With a rising of the Poles and the Prussians against Napoleon, 



X.] The Waj's of Liberation. 241 

the Czar hoped to meet him at least on equal terms. Czarto- 
ryski's reply was discouraging. The Poles felt gratitude to 
Napoleon for what he had done for them; their 20,000 troops 
serving in Spain were so many hostages in his hands, and his 
constant success fascinated their ardent imaginations; finally 
they would be satisfied with nothing less than the complete 
reunion of their ancient dominions, with outlets for trade 
(Danzig here is hinted at), and the restoration of the constitu- 
tion of 1791. To this Alexander rejoined (Jan. 31, 181 1) that 
he proposed to reconstitute the whole of Poland with the rivers 
Dwina, Beresina and Dnieper as frontiers, and a liberal consti- 
tution; Austria was to be provisionally offered Wallachia and 
Moldavia as far as the Sereth in compensation for her retro- 
cession of Gahcia to the PoHsh realm. "It is beyond a doubt" 
(continued the Czar's letter) "that Napoleon is striving to pro- 
voke Russia to a rupture, hoping that I shall make the mistake 
of being the aggressor. This would be a great blunder in 
present circumstances; but if the Poles would join me, that 
would put an entirely new face on the matter. Being reinforced 
by their 50,000 men, by the 50,000 Prussians who could then 
also join me without risk, and by the moral revolution which 
would infallibly result in Europe, I could advance to the Oder 
without striking a blow." But these secret overtures which the 
Czar urged his friend to make at Warsaw, were unsuccessful. 
The Poles adhered to Napoleon's fortunes, — a resolve as 
disastrous as the trust reposed in him by his other faithful allies, 
the rulers of Denmark and Saxony. 

The fundamental cause of the war of 1812 still remains to be 
noted. It was the Czar's refusal to adhere to the later and 
more stringent developments of the Continental System. Not 
content with insisting on the exclusion of British ships and 
wares from Russia, Napoleon in a letter of Oct. 16, 1810 had 
requested Alexander to seize in Russian harbours the neutral 
ships — they were mostly American — which brought colonial 
F. R. 16 



242 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

produce, inasmuch as this was undoubtedly of British origin. 
"The blow to England (wrote Napoleon) will be terrible; for 
all these goods are to the account of the English. It depends 
on your Majesty to secure peace or to lengthen out the war. 
Peace is, and must be, your desire. Your Majesty is certain 
that we shall attain it, if you confiscate these 600 ships with 
their consignments. Whatever papers they carry, and under 
whatever names they disguise themselves — French, German, 
Spanish, Danish, Russian, or Swedish — your Majesty may be 
sure that they are English." The Czar, however, refused to go 
beyond the terms of the treaty of Tilsit and, by confiscating 
ships which were undoubtedly neutral, to violate the principle 
that the flag covers the goods, for which Russia had contended 
against England in the Armed Neutrality Leagues of 1780 and 
1800. In his anxiety to strangle English trade. Napoleon was 
requiring his ally to adopt measures as arbitrary as those ever 
asserted by the mistress of the seas. Annoyance at the Czar's 
refusal was undoubtedly a secondary cause of the annexation of 
Oldenburg to the French Empire. Even before hearing of that 
sinister event, Alexander had shown his concern for the dear- 
ness of colonial wares in his own Empire, by issuing a ukase 
(Dec. 31, 1 810) which facilitated the entry of those much 
needed goods; while it virtually excluded wines and other 
expensive products of France, the entry of which was thought 
to be injurious to the ' balance of trade ' and the chief cause 
of the alarming depreciation of Russian paper money. 

From this time a breach between these potentates was 
almost inevitable. In fact, during a conversation with Metternich 
in the previous September Napoleon had said — "I shall have 
war with Russia on grounds which lie beyond human possi- 
bilities, because they are rooted in the case itself"; and on the 
same occasion he confidentially offered in case of a war to give 
up to Austria her Illyrian provinces in exchange for Galicia, 
the addition of which to a regenerated Poland would gain him 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 243 

the enthusiastic support of that unhappy people. Napoleon, 
however, did not carry out this statesmanlike project, and 
when once embarked in the war he could not afford to 
alienate Prussia and Austria in return for Polish support. 
Thus on both sides the question of Poland was left in abey- 
ance, each Emperor desiring to gain its support, and yet 
dreading to precipitate a conflict by pronouncing irrevocably 
for its re-establishment. The question thus turned on the 
Continental System, as to which the two potentates could not 
come to any accord. Napoleon desired to impose it in all its 
rigour on Russia and Sweden, in order to bring England on 
her knees ; whereas these Powers, urgently needing colonial 
produce, refused to deny themselves the comforts of life, when 
Napoleon by his secret Hcences infringed his commercial 
edicts whenever the needs of his Government demanded it. 
In this momentous dispute Great Britain had been a most 
interested but still a passive spectator. " No indication," 
says M. Vandal, " permits us to suppose that this conspiracy 
(i.e. of Alexander against Napoleon) had been formed by con- 
nivance with England." But so far from having conspired 
against Napoleon, the Czar had endeavoured to observe the 
Treaty of Tilsit ; and there is distinct evidence to prove that 
both potentates entered the arena reluctantly and only under 
what they conceived to be the pressure of events. Napoleon 
felt confident that by seahng up the Baltic against British goods, 
he would assure our ruin, which he thought to be imminent, 
and so bring about a general peace ; while Alexander was not 
loth to decide a contest which he considered inevitable, while 
300,000 of Napoleon's troops were still engaged in the- Penin- 
sular War. 

The diplomatic and military preparations for the war 
occupied the greater part of 18 11 and the spring of 181 2 ; and 
in the endeavours to form coalitions the balance of success 
was on Napoleon's side. The Poles, as we have seen, refused 

16 — 2 



244 '^^^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Alexander's secret overtures and remained true to the French 
aUiance. Austria at first declared for armed neutrality; but 
Napoleon had no wish to leave an armed neutral in his rear ; 
and the marriage alliance was found to entail its responsi- 
bilities, when he required and obtained the assistance of 
30,000 Austrians to protect his right flank in Volhynia. Still 
more important, however, for the success of his preparations, 
was the concurrence of Prussia; for Danzig, with its French 
garrison and governor, was to be the chief base of supplies, his 
"Paris in the East." His troops still occupied the Prussian 
fortresses on the Oder as well as Berlin. Even that did not 
seem sufficient guarantee against a desperate national rising; 
and in Sept. 181 1 he wrote to Davoust, who was marshalling 
some 100,000 troops on the Elbe, to be ready to seize the 
fortress of Spandau if necessary. But Frederick William III 
was not cast in that heroic mould which could do and dare 
everything for national independence even against hopeless 
odds ; and he refused to stir without far stronger succours than 
Alexander could promise. As for help from England, the 
utmost that the patriotic Hanoverian Louis Ompteda had been 
able to obtain was a consignment of arms now on shipboard in 
the Baltic, with the offer of the English fleet as a last refuge 
for the king. In such desperate straits Frederick William was 
justified in rejecting Gneisenau's plan of a people's war against 
Napoleon, which he returned with the written comment — 
"very good as poetry." Finally Napoleon brought the Berlin 
Court to a treaty (Feb. 24, 181 2), which marked the surrender 
of Prussia's resources into Napoleon's hands for all his wars 
except those in the south of Europe : 20,000 of her troops 
were to aid him in the coming war beyond the Niemen : the 
Grand Army was to traverse Prussia at her expense ; and no 
levy of Prussian troops was to be made in its rear. This 
treaty seemed the death blow to the hopes of German patriots. 
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and von Boyen resigned their offices 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 245 

rather than serve under Napoleon. Gneisenau departed to 
join the Germans who with Stein were striving to strengthen 
the Czar's resistance. An envoy was secretly sent from Berlin 
to St Petersburg to explain that Prussia's action against the 
Czar was due solely to compulsion from Paris, and that by 
enticing Napoleon into the heart of Russia his ruin might be 
ensured, if a skilful defensive campaign were persevered in by 
Alexander's generals. A somewhat similar explanation was 
given by Austria of her ostensible hostihty. 

Napoleon's important diplomatic successes placed virtually 
the whole resources of Europe from the Pyrenees to the 
Carpathians, from Naples to Konigsberg, at his disposal ; and 
yet, by enabling him to begin his campaign at the Niemen, 
and impelling him into the heart of Russia, they ultimately 
served but to magnify his disaster. 

His endeavours to secure the neutrality of Sweden and the 
active assistance of the Turks were unavailing. The Porte 
remembered his sudden change of front at Tilsit, and turned 
a deaf ear to his promise that the recovery of the Crimea 
should be the reward ol an offensive alliance against the Czar. 
English and Russian diplomatists also persuaded the Turks 
that the union of all the Continent under Napoleon's sway 
was now more to be dreaded than Muscovite ambition, that 
Turkey existed only owing to the divisions and jealousies of 
the Powers ; that, finally, it was her best policy to make peace 
with Russia, retaining Moldavia and Wallachia, which the 
Czar's troops had virtually conquered. By the politic Treaty 
of Bucharest (May 28, 181 2), which gained for him the rich 
land of Bessarabia, Alexander now restored to the Porte two 
provinces which he could not have retained in face of the 
French invasion, and soon set free his army on the Danube for 
the defence of the Ukraine. 

The conclusion of a Russo-Swedish alliance was still more 
advantageous for Alexander. The Court of Stockholm had 



246 TJic Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

in iSio favoured the choice of Napoleon's ^Marshal Bernadotte 
for the eventual succession to its throne, as cementing 
anew the old friendship between France and Sweden, and 
on his side Napoleon was not altogether loth to see this 
strange event ; for — as he said to Metternich — *' A French 
marshal on the throne of Gustavus Adolphus is one of the 
finest tricks anyone could have played upon England." Alarm 
and indignation were loudly expressed both at London and 
St Petersburg. It was groundless. The Swedish choice had 
fallen upon that one of all the French marshals who was 
on the worst terms with the Emperor. Able in command, 
skilful in intrigue, and far more ambitious than Moreau, 
Bernadotte after his opposition to the coup d'etat of Brumaire 
had been saved from disgrace only by his marriage to a sister 
of Joseph Bonaparte's wife. Many causes of irritation had 
embittered his relations to the Emperor; and the somewhat 
grudging consent of the latter to his acceptance of the rever- 
sion to the crown of Sweden gave this ambitious man a 
personal reason for resisting Napoleon's overbearing policy 
towards his adopted land. On his way to Stockholm he had 
been warned by Bourrienne at Hamburg that the Continental 
System would entail ruin on Sweden, and that his best 
policy would be to trade with England and brave the 
Emperor's wrath. He followed the advice. Napoleon had 
in the early part of 1810 given back Swedish Pomerania and 
Riigen to the Court of Stockholm as the price of its accession 
to his commercial system ; but when it steadfastly refused to 
submit to an entire exclusion of colonial goods, he in Jan. 
181 2 invaded that province, as a pledge for the execution 
of his decrees. Whether from personal hostility to Napoleon, 
or from a desire to secure his position in Sweden by an in- 
dependent and patriotic policy, Bernadotte accepted the 
challenge thus thrown down; and on March 24,-1812 a treaty 
of alHance was signed between Sweden and Russia, by which 



X.] The Wars of Liberation, 247 

the former Power took for the third time a prominent part 
in the struggle against revolutionary France, on the under- 
standing that it should gain Norway. 

The events in Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the exhaustion 
of France by a commercial crisis and a severe dearth weighed 
for a time on Napoleon's spirits. He finally decided, however, 
that the war was an inevitable part of his system for the 
acquisition of a general peace, and that his new dynasty, the 
outcome of a revolution, could never be secure while any of 
the old reigning families held a position of such power as that 
of the House of Romanoff. It was in vain that his Ministers, 
except the obsequious Maret, Due de Bassano, who nominally 
controlled the Department of Foreign Affairs, protested against 
a war which violated all the principles of sound policy. They 
ineffectually urged on him the imprudence of engulfing half a 
million of men in the wastes of Lithuania, while at least half 
that number must be kept amidst the mountains of Spain, and 
they pointed out that a disaster beyond the Niernen would 
certainly entail a rising of Central Europe in his rear. Mollien 
reminded him of the embarrassment of his finances, only to be 
crushed by the characteristic reply — "Because they are em- 
barrassed, they need war"; and the Emperor proceeded to 
amuse his Minister with an estimate of the rich gains which 
he would reap by requisitions in Russia, and by the sale of her 
timber and salt. The remonstrances of his advisers were 
unavailing, though they probably contributed to strengthen his 
desire to save appearances by sending pacific overtures to the 
Courts of London and St Petersburg. The negotiations at the 
former capital broke down as speedily as those in 1810 which 
they resembled in their general tenor. Napoleon offered to 
England proposals for peace on the basis of '■ uti possidetis' 
which the English Government refused, unless Ferdinand VH 
were restored to the throne of Spain. At St Petersburg also 
the French overtures were no better received, Alexander finally 



248 The Revolutionary mid Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

requiring the entire evacuation of Prussia and Swedish Pome- 
rania by Napoleon's troops, and a reduction of the French 
garrison at Danzig. He consented, however, to accept an 
indemnity for his brother-in-law, the dethroned Duke of Olden- 
burg, and even to renew commercial relations with France, but 
not so far as to exclude English goods so thoroughly as Napo- 
leon's economic experiment demanded. It is, therefore, evident 
that though personal grievances and rivalry entered into the 
dispute, its main cause was the secession of Russia from the 
Continental System. 

The march eastwards was begun without any formal decla- 
ration of war. At Dresden Napoleon held a reception (May, 
181 2) of the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and his 
other German allies, in the hope that this display of his vast 
resources would intimidate his foe; but neither there nor at 
Wilna nor Smolensk did he receive the expected submission. 
At Dresden he incidentally remarked to Metternich that he 
would not venture further than Smolensk in that campaign, 
but would re- organise Poland and Lithuania, and if necessary 
advance in 1813 quite to the centre of Russia. "My enter- 
prise is one of those of which the solution is to be found in 
patience." 

On June 24, amidst strains of music and with shouts of 
martial ardour, three immense columns rolled towards the 
Niemen, which they crossed near Grodno and Tilsit ; and by 
the end of the month 325,000 men had entered the Czar's 
dominions. Other forces, following as rear-guard and reserves, 
raised the total numbers to nearly 600,000 men. The com- 
position of this host reflected the cosmopoUtan character of the 
Emperor's sway. About 200,000 were French, 147,000 were 
Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine, 80,000 Italians, 
led by Eugene and Murat, 60,000 Poles, besides Illyrians, 
Swiss, Dutch, and even a few Spaniards and Portuguese, while 
Prussians on its left and Austrians on its right were to guard its 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 249 

flanks. The army had not therefore that homogeneity which 
rendered the campaigns of AusterHtz and Jena so decisive. 

Its first columns found no enemies but the ahiiost tropical 
heat of a Russian midsummer, a violent thunderstorm and 
torrents of rain. The rough tracks were at once cut up by 
the passage of the artillery and vast convoys of stores ; and 
it soon became apparent that the most perfect organisation 
could not keep the Grand Army supplied with food. In vain 
had East Prussia and parts of Poland been swept clear of carts 
and horses. The horses began to die from the excessive toil 
and from diseases caused by rank grass, some 10,000 succumb- 
ing between the Niemen and Wilna, so that a French general 
coming up with reserves declared that the track of the Grand 
Army resembled that of a defeated foe. The desire of sur- 
prising the Russians while they were scattered over a front of 
eighty leagues spurred forward Napoleon, and only by speedy 
retreat were the defenders saved from a military disaster ; but 
the haste of the invaders entailed serious consequences. The 
regular commissariat system broke down from the outset. The 
vast supphes collected at Danzig and Thorn could never be 
hurried up in time to relieve the wants of the main army, which 
therefore maintained itself almost entirely by plunder and 
requisitions. So customary had this become as to lead up to a 
calculation that the invading army should not exceed one tenth 
of the invaded population, if it were to subsist in comfort on 
the fruits of their toil. Such methods, highly serviceable in the 
campaigns of Marengo, Ulm and Jena, were less practicable 
in Spain, and now broke down hopelessly in the wastes of 
Lithuania, where the resources had been already depleted by 
the retreating Russians. Halting for a few days at Wilna to 
rest his wearied troops, Napoleon endeavoured to enlist the 
inhabitants of the old Lithuanian capital in his service by 
cautious half promises which would not alienate Prussia and 
Austria. 



250 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

We have seen throughout this work how divulsive an 
influence the partitions of Poland exerted on the solidarity 
of the Eastern Powers. The Valmy campaign had been 
decided by the fears and cupidity of Vienna and Berlin as to 
a second partition, quite as much as by the bravery of Keller- 
mann's levies. Poland, Bavaria, or Hanover had hitherto 
dissolved every compact of the Powers and left Central Europe 
a prey to Napoleon's concentrated strength. By reviving the 
ancient kingdom of Poland it was now possible for him to gain 
an ally in the East, and to thrust back the Czar's rule beyond 
the Dnieper and the Dwina ; but, hampered as he now was by 
a dynastic alliance, he could not, as after Jena, boldly appeal 
to Polish sentiment. Now he could only deal in half promises 
which were nullified by the devastations of his troops. To a 
deputation of Poles and Lithuanians who came to Wilna to 
request the restoration of the old Polish realm, he replied, " If 
your efforts be unanimous, you may cherish the hope of com- 
pelling your enemies to recognise your rights To this it is 

my duty to add, that I have guaranteed to the Emperor of 
Austria the integrity of his dominions, and that I cannot sanc- 
tion any movement tending to disturb his peaceable possession 
of the Polish provinces which remain to him." This diplomatic 
reply chilled the ardour of the Poles and Lithuanians ; and the 
nomination of seven grandees to form a provisional government 
under French supervision was his sole encouragement to the 
PoUsh patriots who in the Diet at Warsaw had lately declared 
for the restoration of their realm in all its extent. His appeal 
for a national rising to throw off the Russian yoke met with a 
timid response when it was known that a Lithuanian noble 
coming at the head of his vassals had been maltreated and 
robbed of everything by Napoleon's South-German troops. 

There is, indeed, no sure proof that the restoration of Poland, 
which some historians assert to have been the real aim of Napo- 
leon's expedition, was ever seriously entertained by him after the 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 251 

Austrian alliance became the keystone of his policy. Passing 
from his utterances on this subject to the far safer testimony of 
his actual preparations, it appears certain that Napoleon had 
neither expected nor desired a general levy of these oppressed 
people. "What proved (says Marbot) that the Emperor's only 
aim in invading Russia was to re-establish the continental 
blockade was, that he had made no provision for arming and 
equipping the troops which the Poles were to raise." He 
trusted to his enormous superiority in regular troops, among 
whom were already some 60,000 Polish regulars. It is further 
pointed out by the young Due de Broglie, who was then serving 
in the French Em.bassy at Warsaw, that Napoleon in his brief 
stay there had " drenched with cold water " the deputies of the 
enthusiastic Polish Diet ; that he had chosen as his ambassador 
the Abbe de Pradt, who had been one of the butts of the 
French Court ; that finally the Polish contingents in the Grand 
Army were kept separate and were not massed together under 
the command of that able and brilliant soldier, Prince Ponia- 
towski, as would have been the case if Napoleon had desired to 
revive their national feeling. 

The general plan of campaign was to separate by a rapid 
incursion the Russian forces which had been stationed north 
and south of Wilna, The former had been thrown back on 
the Dwina, along which river several engagements took place, 
generally in favour of the French. The southern portion under 
Bagration was to be kept severed from the northern by a vigorous 
march of Davoust and Jerome Bonaparte on Minsk. With 
superior numbers and the advantage of the central position 
Napoleon trusted to end the campaign by a few vigorous blows 
on the upper Dwina and Dnieper. Davoust nearly succeeded in 
intercepting Bagration and his 40,000 Russians in the marshes 
west of the R. Beresina; and he asserts that only the disobe- 
dience of Jerome Bonaparte to his orders saved the South- 
Russian force from a disaster. Napoleon dismissed his brother 



252 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

and allowed him to return to his amusements in Cassel; and 
Bagration by a wide detour finally succeeded in joining the 
main body of Russians. Meanwhile their northern army under 
General Barclay de Tolly, a general who nobly sustained the 
bravery and prudence of his Scottish ancestry, had retreated 
towards Smolensk, leaving a corps to oppose the advance of 
St Cyr and Macdonald north of the Dwina. Pursuing Barclay 
as far as Witepsk, Napoleon was there forced, by the fatigue of 
his men and the utter exhaustion of his horses, to call a halt, 
exclaiming — "Here I must stop, refresh my army and organise 
Poland. The campaign of 181 2 is finished: that of 181 3 will 
do the rest." Had he now confined himself to his original 
intention of consolidating his conquest of Poland and Lithuania, 
the history of the world would have been different; but the 
prospect of maintaining for nine months a cautious defensive 
chafed his ardent spirit; and the difficulty of feeding and 
keeping under control his murmuring allies seemed greater 
than that of snatching the flower safety out of the nettle 
danger. 

Massing his columns for a vigorous offensive, he pushed 
on swifdy for Smolensk, the fortress on the Upper Dnieper 
which barred the entry to Russia Proper. The news that 
Bagration and Barclay were there eft'ecting a junction promised 
the decisive engagement which he had long been seeking. 
His troops sustained heavy loss in an attack on the holy 
city. The Russian resistance was, however, only intended to 
gain time for a retreat and the destruction of shelter and all 
possible supplies. In the night Barclay fired the city in several 
parts and protected by the flames withdrew his rear-guard 
(Aug. 18). Vainly did Napoleon seek to hide his chagrin 
under a violent tirade against Russian cowardice. His trustiest 
advisers, seeing the true position of affairs, counselled a halt 
within the charred ramparts of Smolensk, and pointed out the 
danger of engulfing himself amongst the fanatically hostile 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 253 

people of Russia. Outwardly Napoleon appeared to yield; 
but the news of St Cyr's victory at Polotsk over the Russians 
on the Dwina, and of a victory of the Muscovite horse over 
some of his own cavalry brigades, again seemed to promise a 
more enterprising spirit among his foes. By his acts he belied 
his words. He placed his two most daring chiefs, Murat and 
Ney, in command of the advanced guard; and they, rightly 
construing the Emperor's inclination, brought on an engage- 
ment on the Moscow road, ending in another barren victory 
for the invaders. But where was this campaign to cease? 
So far from avaihng anything in that vast land, each triumph 
increased the difficulties and distress of the victors by drawing 
them further than ever from their base, amidst a people impal- 
pable and invincible as the air. The recent ratification of the 
treaty between Alexander and the Sultan had set free another 
Russian force to menace Napoleon's rear; but, measuring 
events only by the success of the Grand Army, he trusted to 
his ever increasing reserves and to his Austrian and Prussian 
allies temporarily to guard the rear, while he sought peace by 
the overthrow of the host in his front. To those who at 
Smolensk had reminded him of the pitiful state of his army, he 
had replied — "It is dreadful, I know: at Wilna half of it 
were stragglers; now they form two-thirds: there is therefore 
no time to be lost: we must extort peace: it is at Moscow." 
The Emperor had indeed observed that only the prospect of a 
great battle held together the weary ranks and kept them from 
the dissolution which a long halt ever produced. 

The Russians on their side beheld his rapid advance with 
dismay. Unable to see the wisdom of Barclay's Fabian policy, 
they were enraged at the surrender of Lithuania, and of holy 
Smolensk, to a foe whom they detested as Antichrist; and 
since the junction of Bagration's force with that of Barclay 
the dissensions in their councils had risen to such a pitch that 
the cautious leader was at last accused of treason by his head- 



254 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

strong colleague. The strife was assuaged by the appointment 
of the old fighting general Kutusoff, reared in Suv6roff's school, 
as generalissimo; and near the R. Moskwa and the village of 
Borodino the Russians prepared to contest the approach to 
Moscow. Their forces crowned a semicircle of hills, the right 
of which was protected by a ravine. Near their centre rose a 
hill which they strengthened by a formidable redoubt; and earth- 
works defended their more accessible left. The presence of 
about 130,000 men and 600 cannons on each side foreboded 
a contest more sanguinary even than that at Wagram. On his 
part Napoleon did not allow his joy at the prospect of the 
pitched battle which he had been chasing from the Niemen to 
the Moskwa, to outweigh his prudence; and owing to an 
internal ailment, increased by his chagrin at the news of Sala- 
manca, and inflamed by the first chills of autumn, he even 
displayed a degree of caution which lost a great opportunity at 
the end of the day (Sept. 7). By noon the divisions of 
Murat, Davoust, and Ney had pierced the Russian left and 
taken two of the redoubts; but the second Russian line twice 
restored the balance of the fight, and only the havoc wrought 
by the French artillery among the dense masses on the ridge 
checked their advance. In this critical position Napoleon 
refused repeated requests that his famous Old Guard should 
move forward to threaten in its rear the shattered Russian left; 
and the chance of rolling in the enemies' line on the ravine 
on its right had to be abandoned by his incensed marshals. 
Meanwhile the Russian right and centre had long maintained 
a desperate fight, finally decided by a dashing charge of the 
French cavalry into the rear of the great redoubt; and when 
beaten from these heights, the defenders stoutly rallied 
on a second ridge, thereby covering their retreat from the 
bloodiest day's fight of all the Napoleonic wars. The battle of 
Borodino or the Moskwa must indeed be called rather a 
disaster than a victory for the Emperor; for it reduced his 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 255 

force by 30,000 and depleted his ammunition, while the losses 
of the defenders were not much greater. 

It cannot be proved that Moscow was the goal at which 
Napoleon had all along aimed, though secret advice from 
Berlin had reached the Czar that Napoleon would strike at the 
old Muscovite capital. Indeed, he was too great an adept in 
the complex and ever shifting game of war, to bind himself 
rigidly to plans, subservience to which has often led to great 
disasters. His great art, in which he excelled all the captains 
of ancient and modern times, consisted in his fertility of con- 
ception, his eagle glance which divined the weak point of his 
enemies' position, and the astonishing energy with which he 
compelled all circumstances to give effect to his fundamental 
maxim — "at the critical time and place to bring an overwhelm- 
ing force to bear on the foe." These qualities, seen at their 
best in his Italian and German campaigns, had impelled him 
on his disastrously victorious career to Smolensk and Borodino. 
He had at the outset burst through the too extended line of 
defence and, pushing on his main army between their severed 
forces, had compelled these to converge at an acute angle if 
they were to reunite at all. Their junction at wSmolensk and 
retreat along the Moscow road led him to pursue the victory 
which ever eluded his grasp, until it was seized amidst the 
slaughter of Borodino. It was the desire to destroy or capture 
the main Russian army which chiefly dictated the advance 
towards Moscow, though he also hoped that the occupation of 
that holy city would overawe the impressionable Czar and his 
superstitious subjects. But, that he was led on more by 
military than by political considerations is proved by his 
hesitations at Wilna, Witepsk, and Smolensk, as also by the 
frequency of his earlier assertions that he would not emulate 
the fortunes of Charles XII. And yet now his successful 
strategy had lured him on to an enterprise which yielded up 
as hostages to fortune far vaster forces than were embarked in 



256 The RevohUioiiary and Napoleonic Era. [Char 

the adventurous campaign of Pultowa. Strange examples of 
the Nemesis which overtakes great warriors when they cease 
to be statesmen ! The valour of his veterans, wielded by his 
own genius, had at last yielded Napoleon the coveted victory, 
with Moscow and peace and plenty as the expected reward. 

Such were the feelings which inspired Napoleon's weary 
troops as they gazed on the gilded cupolas of Moscow. Some 
of the veterans had heard his inspiring reminder that forty 
centuries looked down on them from the heights of the Pyra- 
mids. The ancient Muscovite capital, so they were now 
assured, was to be the goal of their wanderings, and its capture 
the prelude to a general and enduring peace. Great was their 
leader's chagrin when no request for an armistice, no depu- 
tation of obsequious citizens came forth to entreat his 
clemency : greater still the dismay of his troops at finding its 
streets nearly deserted. The policy of removing supplies and 
population before the advance of the foe, so successfully 
adopted by Wellington before Torres Vedras, had been carried 
out by Barclay and Kutusoff on Napoleon's line of march 
through Russia Proper. Moscow was to be the crowning 
example of this mode of warfare. Hatred and fear of the 
French as infidels and ruthless plunderers, had aided the 
governor. Count Rostopchin, in depopulating the capital and 
preparing for a general conflagration. Whether this terrible 
act was entirely the work of Russian incendiaries, or whether, 
as some of their writers aver, it was caused by French and 
Polish pillagers, it is at any rate certain that flames burst 
forth at several places on the night of Sept. 14, and, fanned by 
the equinoctial gales, raged for five days. That this event had 
less effect on his fortunes than has been commonly believed, 
is evident from the fact that the Grand Army remained in 
Moscow for a whole month afterwards, in spite of some 
further isolated fires, and that at the final council of war at 
Moscow one of his advisers strongly urged the advisability of 



X.] The Wars of Liberation, 257 

wintering at Moscow. The chief difficulty was not the lack of 
shelter but the increasing scarcity of food for men and horses. 

The arrival of stragglers and considerable reinforcements 
almost made up the gaps caused by the Battle of Borodino; 
but how were the 110,000 combatants, 20,000 sick and 
wounded, and the horses for 550 cannons and 2000 waggons, 
to be fed from an almost desolated district? In vain did 
Napoleon offer personal security and high prices to all peasants 
who v/ould bring corn and hay. Their fanatical animosity 
against the French would have forbidden intercourse, even if 
the few who ventured had not been despoiled by pillagers; 
and distant forays were often attended with losses. Kutusoff, 
after abandoning Moscow, had occupied the south road to 
Kaluga, guarding thereby the more fertile south and the arsenal 
of Toula, and giving time for recruits and volunteers to throng 
to his ranks. His threatening attitude sufficed to deter Napo- 
leon from a march on St Petersburg, against which all his 
marshals protested. By a tacit agreement there seemed for a 
time to be a suspension of arms between the Russians and the 
outposts of Murat ; and it is said that the imposing presence 
and headlong courage of this great cavalry chief so impressed 
the Cossacks, that some of them even expressed a wish to 
have him as their hetman. Among the many strange results 
of the revolutionary wars none is more remarkable than the 
bewildering eminence to which many soldiers of fortune had 
risen. A Corsican ca_poral seemed about to reduce Russia to 
her limits under Peter the Great : the son of a lawyer at Pau 
was assuring his accession to the throne of Sweden : and the 
son of an inn-keeper at Cahors had sabred his way to that of 
Naples, and was now for a brief space eclipsing the Czar's 
lustre in the eyes of the Cossacks of the Don. 

For a month the army remained in and around Moscow, 
its leader still chnging to the hope that Alexander would give 
way as he had done after Austerlitz and Friedland ; but that 

F.R. 17 



258 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

monarch, surrounded by a devoted people who detested the 
principles of the French Revolution, now rejected overtures, 
the acceptance of which would have cost him his throne. The 
successes of Wellington in Spain, intercourse with the rugged 
personality of the German exile Stein, and the impression 
caused by deepened religious convictions, concurred to fortify 
a will which had been gaining in solidity since the days of 
Tilsit; and the mental instability on which Napoleon chiefly 
reckoned had now been replaced by a fixed determination to 
effect that liberation of Europe which had been the Czar's 
youthful dream in 1804. Just as Napoleon's military genius 
had led him into his present dilemma, so now his presuming 
on Alexander's lack of determination sealed his own doom. 

He was also outmatched in cunning. Kutusoff feigned the 
utmost concern at the results of the war, and a belief that his 
master would lend a ready ear to overtures for peace which 
Napoleon proposed to send to St Petersburg (Oct. 6). A 
reply could not be expected for a fortnight; and before that 
time elapsed, the informal armistice between Kutusoff and 
Murat was broken by a sharp conflict in which the French 
advanced guard lost severely (Oct. 17). The Emperor saw 
that he had been duped ; and, to make the most of the open 
autumn weather, he two days later moved his army secretly by 
the new road to Kaluga, hoping to avoid Kutusoff's forces. 
But the march was encumbered by a barbaric profusion of 
plunder; the Russian scouts were active, and Kutusoff seized 
a strong post at the town of Malo-Jaloslawitz. By the gallantry 
of the viceroy Eugene and his ItaHan troops this position was 
carried, only to disclose the foe drawn up in forest passes 
which Bessieres, the Commander of the Guard, declared to 
be impregnable. In an agony of distress Napoleon saw his 
progress by the southern route to Smolensk completely 
blocked, and the devastated line of his advance alone avail- 
able. With hearts foreboding disaster, and hard pressed by 



X.] The Wars of Liberation, 259 

elated foes, his men turned northwards, and skirted the 
ghastly field of Borodino. Not all the skill and tenacity of 
Eugene and Davoust could avert heavy losses from the rear- 
guard at Wiasma (Nov. 3) ; and the miseries of the retreat 
were infinitely increased by the tardy advent of sharp wintry 
weather. " Up to Nov. 6 " — says General Gourgaud, a more 
trustworthy historian of the campaign than the melodramatic 
Segur — ''the weather was fine, and the cold much less than it 
was for some months in the Prussian and Polish campaigns of 
1806 — 1807." As it is stated by Napier (to say nothing of less 
accurate panegyrists of Napoleon) that the Emperor's enter- 
prise, "the grandest and most provident, the most beneficial 
ever attempted by a warrior statesman," was foiled by "the 
fires and snows of Moscow," and that he was " vanquished by 
the elements," the following official record of the numbers of 
his main army, apart from the reserves and the forces on the 
Dwina and in Volhynia, should be carefully noted. The 
number of effectives after the hardships and desultory fighting 
in Lithuania had shrunk to 182,000, and before the battle of 
Borodino to 133,000; on the departure from Moscow, in- 
clusive of reinforcements, it stood at 107,000; and after the 
affair at Wiasma, but before any snow or severe cold set in, only 
55,000 men and 12,000 horses were fit for active service. 

Now was seen the horrible truth of the warnings given at 
Moscow by Russian prisoners — " In a fortnight your nails will 
drop off, and your weapons will fall from your benumbed and 
half-dead fingers." Henceforth man's attacks were feeble com- 
pared with the ceaseless rigour of Nature. Kutusoff, in very 
pity for his own men as well as for the foes, desired to leave 
the rest to winter; but his ardent lieutenants desired to 
destroy the whole of the Grand Army, and their Cossacks 
completed its miseries. The pitiful pretext that the retreat 
was a move to join St Cyr's army on the Dwina and threaten 
St Petersburg was no more heard at Napoleon's head-quarters; 

17 — 2 



26o TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

and the hope that cantonments at Smolensk and Witepsk 
would afford shelter was soon to vanish. The standards were 
generally abandoned by Illyrians, Germans, and Italians — in 
fact by all who had no interest in a war the motives of which 
had ever seemed mysterious. The Poles, brave in fight but 
addicted to marauding, had ceased to hope for the restora- 
tion of their country and gave themselves up to despair or to 
plunder. The advanced columns swept the country of supplies 
and fuel, thereby increasing the miseries of the rear-guard, 
which was already sufficiently harassed by the Cossack lances. 
For in the horrors of a rout the fierce passions aroused by war 
are seen in all their hideousness, unveiled by the glamour 
which disguises them in a victorious advance. In place of 
regiments there were now generally seen bands of stragglers, 
kept together only by self-interest or skill in foraging; and 
these thrust back into the cold outsiders who sought to share 
the scanty meal or fire. But amidst this unarmed, half-clothed 
and frost-bitten rabble the heroism and fertility of resource 
of the French veterans stood out in brilliant relief. When 
Davoust's and Eugene's corps were exhausted by service as 
rear-guard, they were reinforced by that of Ney, "the bravest 
of the brave." The stores at Smolensk were of little service, 
for they were pillaged by the first comers ; and the retreat was 
nearly intercepted by a sharp attack of the Pvussians at 
Krasnoe which completely cut off the rear; but Ney, after 
blowing up part of the ramparts of Smolensk, fought his way 
through throngs of Russians, crossed the Dnieper on insecure 
ice, and with the loss of his cannons and stores rejoined the 
main force (Nov. 20). 

It was of little avail that the remains of what had been 
the Grand Army were now succoured by the reserves under 
Victor, and by St Cyr's troops which had been successfully 
repelling attacks of the Russian army of the Dwina ; for the 
Austrians under Schwarzenberg had suffered, or rather, had been 



X-] The Wars of Liberatio7i. 261 

powerless to prevent, 60,000 Russians from the south passing 
northwards, taking up a position on the R. Beresina, and so 
threatening to cut off the survivors of the Grand Army. To 
secure the passage of that river General de Marbot's dismounted 
troopers vainly strove to seize and hold the only bridge against 
the Russian batteries. With the destruction of the bridge the 
last hope of the French seemed to have vanished ; for owing 
to a partial thaw the ice would not bear the passage of an 
army. Napoleon, however, lured the enemy down the stream 
by a feigned march, while his brave engineers toiled for six 
or seven hours to construct three light bridges higher up, over 
which Napoleon and most of his effectives passed unmolested ; 
but such was the confusion that few timely efforts were made 
to get the waggons and stragglers over while the enemy was 
absent. Finding out their mistake, Tchichakoff and Wittgen- 
stein now advanced up both banks, and though stoutly repulsed 
at most points, their fire finally told with fearful effect on 
Victor's rear-guard and the crowd of stragglers who now rushed 
for the two bridges still remaining (Nov. 28). The breaking 
of one of these under the cannons, the agonised struggles of 
camp-followers and regulars, horse and foot, to gain or to keep 
a foothold on the few frail planks, under a hail of grape-shot 
that continued far into the night, presented an accumulation 
of horrors under which the stoutest hearts gave way to wild 
panic ; and the final burning of the bridge to cover the retreat 
left a crowd of stragglers to the mercy of the pursuers. 

Still, the elite of the army maintained a bold front, while the 
few remaining squadrons protected the Emperor in hollow square 
whenever the line was threatened by Cossacks. Thus in com- 
parative safety the retreat dragged on its weary course ; for the 
Russian regulars were too exhausted by cold and hunger to 
venture on serious attacks. On Dec. 5 Napoleon suddenly 
left the relics of the Grand Army, with orders to rally and 
resume the campaign at Wilna; while he secretly hurried on to 



262 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Paris to organise new forces and intimidate Prussia and 
Austria. Meanwhile the survivors, paralysed by a return of 
the intense cold, when halting at Wilna for rest and supplies, 
were menaced by a small force of Cossacks under the adven- 
turous leaders Platoff and Tettenborn. Storming the gates at 
dawn, the latter struck such terror into his foes that they fled 
instantly, leaving 6,000 prisoners, 24,000 wounded in their 
hospitals, and nearly all the remaining cannons and stores 
(Dec. 9). This was the last blow. Five days later the rear- 
guard of 1,000 armed men under the dauntless Ney pro- 
tected the miserable remnant of 20,000 stragglers who tottered 
across the Niemen, over which five months before more than 
half a million of men had passed to gain for the. Emperor his 
final triumph. And yet so vast were his resources, so trans- 
cendent his genius, that after a disaster which completely 
eclipses all others in the history of civilised nations, he was 
still able to bring up half a million of soldiers and fiercely 
assert his domination from the Oder to the Ebro\ 

Macdonald, with 20,000 Prussians and a few South Ger- 
mans and Poles, had been hastily recalled from the siege of 
Riga by the news of the catastrophe. Had these Prussians 
and Schwarzenberg's Austrians in Podolia been aware of the 
completeness of the disaster, the relics of the Grand Army 
would have been as completely in their power as Darius was 
in that of the Greek mercenaries at the bridge over the Danube 
when he fled before the Scythian horsemen. But in the modern 
instance the decisive news came barely in time, even if there 
had been any leader bold enough to paralyse the brain of 
Napoleon's military system by the capture of his marshals. 
Their sole danger therefore was from Platoff's Cossacks, who 

^ According to the tables given by Gen. Chambray in his history of 
the campaign, 20,000 survivors assembled behind the Vistula in Jan. 1813 
out of the 505,000 men who had waged the main campaigns on the Upper 
Dwina and beyond the Dnieper. 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 263 

began to harass the retreat to Konigsberg. Meanwhile Mac- 
donald by a skilful retreat broke through the Russians and 
crossed the Niemen at Tilsit, expecting General Yorck with 
a considerable number of Prussians to follow. On the last 
day of 18 1 2 the hasty march of the Prussians from his head- 
quarters to rejoin their comrades warned the French leader of 
their total defection ; and he himself barely escaped with his 
remaining regiments to Konigsberg. 

On the previous day the Prussian general Yorck had taken 
the momentous step of accepting the overtures of the Russians 
that the district between Memel and Tilsit should be considered 
neutral, and held as such by the Prussians, who were not to 
serve against the Russians for two months. In a strict sense 
Yorck's act was treason against his sovereign ; and it was quite 
possible that Frederick William might screen himself from the 
Emperor's vengeance at the expense of his general. Yorck 
hinted at this when he exclaimed to his enthusiastic officers, 
" It is very well for you to talk : but my old head feels loose 
on my shoulders." There was another danger, that the 
Russians after losing fully half their troops in the past cam- 
paign would not venture beyond the Niemen and bind 
themselves to another coalition. General Kutusoff pressed 
this view on the Czar ; but, fortunately for Germany, Alexander 
listened to the promptings of Stein and other German patriots, 
as well as of his own generous nature, and decided to become 
the liberator of Europe. He knew that Napoleon's character, 
even his fundamental poHcy, must impel him to wipe out the 
memory of his disaster. Prudence therefore dictated an attack 
when the French military system was for the time paralysed, 
and northern Germany was eager to cast off its chains. If the 
French were not pursued beyond the Vistula, Napoleon would 
reassemble the forces of Germany, compel the Court of Berlin 
to hold to its compact, and Russia would again have to face 
the forces of western and central Europe. It was therefore the 



264 The Revolutionary a?id Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

best way of defending Russia to appeal to the national hatred of 
the Germans against Napoleon, and to carry the war beyond the 
Elbe. As for the King of Prussia and his minister Hardenberg, 
they could be trusted to join the national cause when it was 
safe to do so, and in the meantime to wear the mask skilfully. 

The need of forcing Frederick William's hand now explains 
the strange course of events. Russian troops began to occupy 
Prussia Proper; and on Jan. 18, 181 3, Alexander commis- 
sioned Stein to act provisionally as governor of East and West 
Prussia, and to collect the revenues and arm the Landwehr and 
Landsturm, in the name of the Czar. Thus the preparations 
for the German War of Liberation were begun by a Prussian 
general and a German exile, both of whom v*^ere technically 
guilty of high treason. The Provincial Estates of East and 
West Prussia in their session at Konigsberg (Feb., 1813) over- 
looked the illegalities of the position and enthusiastically 
greeted Yorck's words '*I hope to beat the French wherever I 
meet them; and if we are too much outnumbered, we shall 
know how to die with honour." Frederick WilHam, after 
launching against Yorck an order for trial by court-martial 
which was never carried out, now took the significant step of 
withdrawing from French influence at Berlin to Breslau, where 
the patriotic feeling ran as high as at Konigsberg ; and finally 
by the vigorous action of the Czar and Stein a Russo-Prussian 
treaty of alliance was signed at Kahsch (Feb. 27, 18 13), which 
is of great importance as marking the second step (the treaties 
of 1805 having been the first) towards the reconstruction of 
Europe. 

The Czar, desirous of reigning as constitutional King of 
Poland, refused the preHminaries which would have restored to 
Prussia Warsaw and other spoils gained in the second and third 
partitions. In place of that proposal, a clause was finally 
inserted that Prussia " shall be reconstructed in the statistical, 
geographical and financial proportions conformable to her 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 26$ 

extent before the war of 1806." She was to receive her 
compensations in North-Germany (excepting the ancient pos- 
sessions of the House of Hanover) so as to give her "the 
unity and compactness necessary for constituting an indepen- 
dent State'': in particular she was to acquire on the east a 
frontier which both in a mihtary and geographical sense would 
connect West Prussia with Silesia. This treaty vaguely fore- 
shadowed the changes of the future, viz. the move westwards 
of Prussian and Russian influence, the former Power thence- 
forth becoming almost entirely Germanic, while the Czar's 
influence was for the first time to be extended beyond the 
Vistula into the very heart of Europe. Furthermore, Prussia's 
renunciation of all claims on Hanover facilitated the accession 
of England to this, the fourth great Coalition. The signature 
of this important treaty had been hurried on by the imperious 
action of Stein; and Prussia and Russia passed from a state 
of war to a close alliance as quickly as had been the case with 
Britain and Spain five years previously. Both alliances were 
pushed forward and cemented by statesmen, Canning and Stein, 
who lent their great powers to change the war of the govern- 
ments to a union of the peoples; but in 1813 as in 1808 the 
address of statesmen, and even the determination of the Czar, 
would have been Of little avail but for their co-operation with 
an irresistible impulse, the longing of an oppressed nation to 
cast off an alien yoke. 

The complete failure of Napoleon, in spite of his unvaried 
military successes, to extort peace at Moscow has been already 
referred to the invincible repugnance of the Great- Russians to 
the character of his rule. The passionate devotion to the Czar 
expressed by nobles and merchants in meetings at Moscow, and 
their readiness to sacrifice their wealth for the common cause, 
had a less demonstrative but more effective counterpart in the 
quiet but stubborn resolve of the peasants and serfs to have no 
dealings with the invaders. The principles of 1789 which had 



266 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

been Napoleon's best ally in his campaigns from Areola to 
Jena, were as powerless at Moscow as they had been at Cairo. 
The Russian social system, based on the Mir or village com- 
munity, and cemented by devotion to the Czar, offered, it is 
true, one weak place to its assailant, the custom of serfdom; 
but the Czar had effected in 1803 some important ameUora- 
tions in the lot of the serfs; and these were, besides, too 
ignorant to understand any proclamation of freedom at the 
hand of Napoleon, whom they detested as an infidel and a 
sacrilegious plunderer. There was therefore no solidarity of 
interest between Napoleon and the inhabitants of Great Russia; 
and to his tardy recognition of this fact the disaster of 181 2 
must be chiefly ascribed. In West and South Germany, on 
the contrary, his rule had directly or indirectly conferred 
many benefits, abolition of serfdom, immunity from feudal 
dues, some approach to personal and religious liberty and 
social equality. France was for some time looked upon as the 
champion of the lesser States against the rapacious designs 
of Austria and Prussia; and but for the material pressure 
of the Continental System it is scarcely probable that the 
Confederation of the Rhine would have been dissolved in a 
single campaign. Napoleon, indeed, still disposed of more 
strictly German troops than Prussia and Austria when united 
could bring against him; and only by degrees did the confede- 
rate troops rally to the national cause. The decisive part in 
this great struggle was therefore played by Prussia. 

In that unhappy land the name of Napoleon was associated 
with no reforms : these had been quietly carried out in the 
teeth of his opposition by Stein, Scharnhorst and Hardenberg. 
French supremacy only meant to the Prussian people the occu- 
pation of the capital and the chief fortresses at their expense, 
the sequestration of their revenue for the payment of an elastic 
war indemnity, the limitation of their army, the ruin of foreign 
commerce, and finally the systematic plundering of their towns 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 267 

and villages during the passage of the Grand Army. So intense 
and widespread was the hatred of French domination that pity 
alone seems to have preserved from popular vengeance the 
bands of frost-bitten survivors who in Jan. 1813 crept towards 
the ramparts of Thorn and Danzig. French influence was 
not more alien to the oriental fatalism of Moscow and the 
intense national pride of the Spaniard, than to the spirit of 
regenerated Prussia. The cabals of the French or aristocratic 
party at Berlin were now powerless against the tide of popular 
feeling. Staunch adherents to the old regime, like Yorck and 
Bliicher, were at one with the innovators Stein and Scharnhorst; 
and there was but one fear, that Frederick William's prudence 
would postpone the struggle against Napoleon. Some ardent 
civilians had long been preparing for a national German rising 
against Napoleon. The enthusiastic patriot Karl Miiller had 
even bought weapons and ammunition and had arranged plans 
of attack on the French garrisons; and it is stated by Louis 
Ompteda that if Frederick William had much longer delayed 
he would have been overthrown by a revolution begun by the 
people and the army. The identity of feeHng between ruler 
and subjects was now, however, assured. Indeed, the delay was 
only due to the king's desire to gain some guarantee from his 
ally for the future position of Prussia; and regret can scarcely 
be felt for Frederick William's circumspection, inasmuch as it 
yielded the initiative in the proclamation of v/ar to a professor. 
While it was still doubtful against whom the volunteers, 
just called for by royal proclamation, were to serve, Stefifens, 
Professor of Physics in the new University of Breslau, called 
on the students to enlist for a war agai?2st Napoleon. It was 
responded to with ardour. A similar zeal was shown by the 
youth of Berlin and Konigsberg Universities, and even Halle, 
Jena and Gottingen were left almost deserted by the rush of 
students to join the muster at Breslau. The gaps still left 
by exemptions from regular service were more than made up 



268 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

by the throngs of volunteers. Scharnhorst's plan of a Land- 
wehr and Landsturm as second and third lines of reserve, was 
now carried into effect (March 17): the 150,000 men who had 
passed through the ranks in his short service system now came 
forward; and Prussia stood forth a nation in arms, organised 
even more completely than France after Carnot's levee en niasse. 
The enthusiasm of France in 1793 was now rivalled by the 
superhuman efforts and sacrifices of Prussia in 18 13. Old men 
brought their all for the support of regiments of volunteers, 
officials renounced their salaries, and sixteen workers in a 
Silesian coal-mine, as the results of their toil overtime, brought 
221 thalers (;£33) to equip their comrades for the war: women 
brought their jewels, and one girl, whose flowing locks were her 
only wealth, shore them off to lay on the altar of the Father- 
land. The gifted young poet Korner came from a life of rich 
promise at Vienna to serve in the famous Liitzow brigade, and 
sealed with his life's blood his devotion to the cause of German 
freedom. His warlike songs, with those of Riickert, Kleist, 
and others, breathed the passions pervading young and old, 
rich and poor, which found their fullest expression in Arndt's 
*'Whatisthe German's Fatherland?" — that trumpet-call rallying 
the Germans of the west and south to the one national cause. 

On his side Napoleon determined to maintain his grip on 
Spain, Germany and Prussia, as if he had not lost half a million 
of men and the districts east of the Vistula. " If I begin by 
giving up towns," he exclaimed, " they will end by demanding 
kingdoms." Such was his force of will, and so great was his 
confidence in the policy of never acknowledging an error and 
never receding a single step, a policy which often accelerates 
the progress of the victor but generally ends in irretrievable 
disaster. 

Events in France might well have led him to compromise. 
Towards the close of October, 181 2, a General Malet, with two 
other officers of strong republican opinions, by means of forged 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 269 

documents had succeeded in leading some troops to seize 
the Minister and Prefect of PoUce, Savary and Pasquier. A 
little more and he would have seized other ministers and pro- 
claimed the republic. The success which for an hour or two 
favoured this foolhardy attempt, caused an uneasy feeling, 
which was vastly increased by the news of the Emperor's 
disaster in Kussia; but when he suddenly appeared in Paris 
and appealed in his misfortunes to the nation, French generosity 
was touched, and no open opposition was offered to his design 
of a campaign on the Oder. By calling out all disposable 
troops and some 100,000 National Guards, as also by antici- 
pating the conscription of 18 14, he hoped to have nearly 
500,000 troops without counting his armies in Spain. The 
Emperor's uneasiness as to the state of public opinion in France 
was, however, betrayed by a singular action. He charged the 
Prefect of each Department to enrol a hundred young men of 
the best families as guards of honour, not only because he 
desired to reinforce his cavalry by some 10,000 men, but 
chiefly because these guards would be hostages for the loyalty 
of their families. As Mollien naively remarks — "Napoleon 
was sceptical as to the value of devotion on word of honour, 
and desired another guarantee." Not a voice was raised by 
the servile Senate and Corps Legislatif against the renewal of 
offensive warfare, though there was much discontent in the 
south and west of France and a slight revolt in the newly 
annexed German lands. It was left for the most independent 
of his advisers, such as Caulaincourt and Talleyrand, to counsel 
negotiations with the Powers ; but the utmost concession which 
the Emperor would make was that he would request the 
intervention of his father-in-law, the Austrian Emperor, \vith 
the offer of a few shadowy concessions to the Czar ; but, as 
will shortly appear, the Court of Vienna was now prepared 
to play a much more active part in the restoration of the 
equilibrium of Europe, than that which Napoleon desired to 



2JO The Revolutionary mtd Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

assign to it. As to French finances, they were to be strength- 
ened by selling for the benefit of the exchequer the domains 
of parishes or communes, at least those which were let out 
on lease; and in spite of Mollien's protest against this act of 
confiscation, it was carried out — a strange corollary to the 
policy of confiscation begun in Nov. 1789. 

When his government was reduced to these straits, it is 
surprising that Napoleon did not frankly accept the offer of 
mediation which his father-in-law sent from Vienna; but he 
spurned this suggestion as an infraction of the Franco- Austrian 
alliance of 181 2, which he tardily endeavoured to cement by 
promising to Francis I the restoration of Illyria and acquisitions 
in Silesia and Poland, if he would place 100,000 men in the 
field against the Russians and Prussians. It was not, however, 
to the interests of Austria that French supremacy should again 
be assured ; and when her intervention was nominally accepted 
but virtually rejected, she concluded a secret convention at 
Kalisch (March 29) with the Czar, whereby his troops were to 
be allowed to enter Cracow. Poniatowski's Poles were thus 
compelled to fall back on the province of Galicia and pass 
westwards, giving up their arms until they had passed through 
the Austrian dominions. Unable to draw the Emperor Francis 
from his present attitude of armed neutrality, Napoleon thought 
to avert his eventual hostility by conferring the Regency of 
France on Marie Louise, which would also be some safeguard 
against any enterprise like that of General Malet. This was 
almost the only precaution which Napoleon took on the 
resumption of the war; and even his panegyrist, Thiers, con- 
siders his uncompromising attitude as great a disaster as the 
Russian campaign itself. 

Napoleon, on leaving the Grand Army, had entrusted the 
command to Murat, King of Naples ; but that dashing soldier, 
ill-adapted for conducting a retreat and anxious for the security 
of his throne, abruptly left the army and hurried to Naples, 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 271 

throwing the command on the shoulders of the viceroy Eugene. 
The latter, after strengthening the French garrisons in the 
fortresses on the Oder, fell back on Berlin; and when unable 
to hold the capital, he retired to Wittenberg, trusting to the 
line of the Elbe as a defence against the victorious allies. The 
Russians, after helping to free Berlin, threatened this great 
natural barrier on Eugene's front as also at Dresden and 
Hamburg. 

The citizens of this famous old Free City were too much 
exasperated against French rule to wait even for the approach 
of the Cossacks led by the adventurous Tettenborn. A riot 
occurred at the Altona gate on Feb. 24 owing to the harshness 
of the French customs' officers in searching every one who 
entered the city. The mob disarmed the guard, tore down 
the octroi palisade and imprisoned all the French in the town. 
Tettenborn, after persuading or compelling the Duke of Meck- 
lenburg to withdraw from the Confederation of the Rhine, 
entered Hamburg (March 18) amidst unbounded enthusiasm. 
— " None had ever seen (wrote Varnhagen von Ense) such an 
outpouring of passionate joy, nor were Germans deemed 
capable of so much emotion : the people even went so far as to 
kiss the Cossacks' horses in their excess of rapture." Tetten- 
born, a native of Hamburg, though now serving under the Czar, 
at once declared it a free port, ordered the seizure of all 
French property and handed over to the city the goods in the 
customs' house valued at ;^6o,ooo, A levy of troops called 
the Hanseatic Legion was held there as at Liibeck and other 
towns which now revolted against French rule; but the for- 
tunes of the Hanse Cities rose and fell with the main current 
of events higher up the Elbe. Vandamme retook Hamburg at 
the end of May, and Davoust was able to renew his despotic 
sway in Hamburg up to the end of the year. 

Though this campaign in North-Germany was of merely 
secondary importance, it furnished many incidents, which 



272 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

served to illustrate the character of the whole struggle. An 
attack of the enemy on Liineburg threatened to dash the hopes 
of its citizens for the long-desired independence; but as the 
French were about to shoot those who had most prominently- 
sympathised with the patriots, the advent of a Russo-Prussian 
force aroused the inhabitants from the depths of despair to 
transports of joy, and. compelled Napoleon's troops to evacuate 
the town. There, and indeed everywhere throughout Germany, 
the depth of popular feeling may be measured by the ardour 
shown by non-combatants, and especially by women. That 
faculty of inspiring men to the fray and of restoring the fortunes 
of an unequal contest, which Caesar and Tacitus described as 
a characteristic of the women of ancient Germany, was once 
again called forth at many crises of the War of Liberation ; 
and the exalted patriotism which Schiller had portrayed as the 
formative influence in the life of his noblest female character, 
Gertrud, now nerved many a town and district to more 
desperate and persistent efforts. It is related that when sym- 
pathy was offered to an old woman for the loss of her cottage 
by fire in an engagement, she exclaimed, "Well, let it burn, if 
it will get the French out of the place more quickly." Some 
girls emulated the example of the Maid of Saragossa. In the 
fight at Liineburg, a girl distinguished herself by the coolness 
and daring with which she braved the bullets of the foe in 
order to carry ammunition to her countrymen ; and later on a 
warlike maiden succeeded in enlisting as a volunteer, and in 
concealing her identity, which she only revealed when she lay 
dying of a wound. 

The position at the opening of the campaign of 1813 was 
briefly as follows. Napoleon's garrisons still held the fortresses 
of Danzig, Thorn, and Modlin on the Vistula, Stettin, Ciistrin 
and Glogau on the Oder, Spandau, Wittenberg and Magdeburg 
on the Havel and Elbe; but the capture by the allies of Ham- 
burg and Dresden had weakened his main line of defence. 



X.] TJie Wars of Liberation. 273 

Macdonald had given the sensible advice to evacuate the 
fortresses on the Vistula and Oder and concentrate all forces 
on the Elbe. Had this been done Napoleon would have had 
a great superiority of force. As it was, he had to rely mainly 
on the young conscripts lately raised in his Empire, Avho, 
with all their bravery, could not move with the speed and 
steadiness of the veterans lost in Russia, or even of those 
now blockaded in Polish and Prussian fortresses. He was 
also rather deficient in artillery and very weak in that terrible 
cavalry whose charges had so often decided and crowned his 
greatest triumphs. At the close of April, 1813, both sides 
marched towards the fertile plains of Saxony, which contest 
with those of the Low Countries the claim to be the battle- 
ground of Europe. Napoleon, as usual, marched his troops at 
a rate which outstripped all the efforts of his commissariat 
department; and their wants were satisfied partly by requisi- 
tions but still more by plunder. According to von Odeleben, 
a Saxon ofiicer in his army, the wantonness of the pillage ex- 
ceeded anything which had yet been seen. — " To set fire to a 
house or a village through negligence was an act entirely un- 
noticed. The cursed c'est la guerre was an excuse for every- 
thing." Such conduct, it is true, lightened his commissariat 
and accelerated the advance, but it also added fuel to the 
hatred long nursed by the peasants of Germany, and ensured 
the defection of the Saxons and Bavarians at the first possible 
opportunity. In fact, the King of Saxony had declared him- 
self friendly to the allies; and only the sudden irruption of 
Napoleon's troops kept him to the French alliance. 

The first pitched battle of 18 13 was fought near the village 
of Liitzen, the scene of the last and greatest victory of Gusta- 
vus Adolphus. Napoleon was marching his troops, only one- 
third of whom were French, towards Leipzig, when near 
Liitzen and Gross Gorschen they were attacked on their flank 
by the allies (May 2). Drawing back and reforming his lines, 
F. R. iS 



274 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Napoleon for a time was forced to maintain the defensive, and 
Ney's young conscripts at first gave ground to the Prussians. 
Never did Napoleon show greater anxiety as to the issue of 
a battle, exposing himself to fire, and riding to animate his 
troops when ordered up for the attack. The key of the French 
defence was so seriously threatened that only the arrival of 
Eugene's and Macdonald's corps, and a charge of the Young 
Guard supported by the fire of 60 cannons, restored the 
balance of the fight. Finally a second great column of attack 
broke the centre of the allies and compelled them to fall back; 
but Napoleon's lack of cavalry prevented any pursuit: and as 
night fell a squadron of the allied horsemen by a brisk attack 
nearly swept off the Emperor and his staff. It is claimed 
by German historians that if the first attack had been more 
vigorously delivered by Wittgenstein, or that if at the crisis of 
the fight the allied cavalry and part of the Russian reserves 
had been launched against the foe's right flank, victory must 
have been assured. As it was, the Prussians had captured 800 
prisoners and 5 cannons without losing any; but the gallant 
Scharnhorst received a wound which soon proved fatal. The 
retreat of the aUies eastwards laid open Dresden to Napoleon; 
thereby assuring the wavering fidelity of the Saxons, and 
regaining the whole line of the Elbe. He now sent Ney and 
Victor northwards to threaten the Prussians and Swedes near 
Berlin; for Bernadotte had brought 25,000 Swedish troops, 
in order to earn the prize of Norway promised by Alexander 
the year before. The main body of the allies had retired on 
Bautzen, where they again sustained a defeat from the Empe- 
ror's forces (May 20, 21); but the determination of their officers 
and soldiers was seen not only in a stubborn defence, but in 
their orderly retreat and the complete success of an ambush 
which they laid for their pursuers and the capture of 1 1 cannons 
and many prisoners. Napoleon, however, succeeded in carrying 
the war into Silesia; and at the beginning of June his left was 



X.] TJie Wars of Liberation. 275 

near Glogan, his centre occupied Breslau, and his right threat- 
ened Schweidnitz. 

The prospects of the alHes looked black indeed. The 
prudent Barclay, lately appointed commander-in-chief of the 
Russian forces, knew that his men were greatly disorganised 
and declared that he must retreat into Poland. Ammunition 
was running short : the fortress of Schweidnitz was unten- 
able, and a reinforcement of 20,000 Silesian Landwehr was 
useless because their muskets hastily bought in Austria had 
no touch-holes bored. With the greatest difficulty Barclay was 
dissuaded from a retreat beyond the Oder by the argument 
that the allies could at least hold out for six weeks in the 
fortresses of Silesia and in the mountains which separate that 
province from Bohemia: and that if he retired into Poland, 
Austria would certainly withdraw her promise of acceding to 
the coalition in six weeks' time if Napoleon rejected her armed 
mediation. 

On his side the French Emperor had offered the allies 
a truce which they now (June 4) gladly accepted as being the 
only means of keeping their armies near together and close to 
the Bohemian frontier. Napoleon seems to have considered 
that the gain of time would enable him to bring up new 
levies from France, to add to his weak and overworked 
cavalry, and to threaten Vienna from his lUyrian provinces. 
He also hoped that two victories would assure the fidelity of 
his father-in-law, as that of Liitzen had won him the reluctant 
support of the Saxons; and he naturally expected the dis- 
couragement of the Czar and Frederick William to lead to the 
peace which was freely discussed at their head-quarters; but 
here again he omitted from his reckoning the unquenchable 
hatred of the Prussian people. The fear that the armistice 
would lead to a dishonourable peace roused the fierce resent- 
ment of the patriots. It was nothing that the French were 
threatening even Berlin itself. Karl Miiller called the people 

18—2 



276 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

to go forth like the Helvetii and burn what they left behind: 
and inspired by the examples of Saragossa and Moscow, he 
exclaimed — "Let us learn as the Russians did, first to go round 
and burn, and then find for ourselves poison and dagger as the 
Spaniards did. Against those two peoples alone could Napo- 
leon's troops effect nothing." With such a spirit pervading the 
peoples, a second Tilsit was impossible. 

In striking contrast to this reckless determination to do 
and dare all for the Fatherland, stands the cool and calculating 
diplomacy of the Court of Vienna. As far back as Sept. 1810 
Metternich had foreseen that the impending conflict between 
France and Russia would "ensure a decisive importance for 
Austria's opinions during the war and at the end of it." 
Amidst the disasters of the 181 2 campaign the Austrian Govern- 
ment had quiedy drawn back Schwarzenberg's corps on Cracow 
without offering any opposition to the victors. The prospect 
of regaining access to the sea by the recovery of the Illyrian 
provinces became more remote with every French victory, 
and Metternich now decided that the hour had come for 
Austrian intervention. The terms which Austria offered to 
Napoleon were the partition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
between Russia, Prussia and Austria; the restoration of the 
Illyrian provinces to Austria with a good frontier towards 
Italy, and the renunciation by France of her German provinces 
beyond the Rhine. 

All Metternich's actions were adroitly designed to make 
the weight of Austria tell most fully in the balance of power. 
Proceeding to the allied head-quarters in Silesia he was 
received by Alexander with the mistrust which since 1806 
had arisen between him and the Court of Vienna ; but the 
skilful diplomatist soon convinced him that Francis I meant 
well for the alHed cause. — " If Napoleon declines our media- 
tion the truce will come to an end and you will find us among 
the number of your allies : if he accepts it, the negotiations 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 277 

will most certainly show Napoleon to be neither wise nor just, 
and then the result will be the same." Having received a 
pressing message from Napoleon to go to Dresden, Metter- 
nich proceeded thither (June 26) to be greeted by these 
menacing words — " So you too want war : well, you shall have 
it. I have annihilated the Prussian army at Liitzen : I have 
beaten the Russians at Bautzen : now you wish your turn to 
come. Be it so : the rendezvous shall be in Vienna. Men 
are incorrigible. Experience is lost upon you...." Metternich 
remarked that peace rested with him ; but the Emperor re- 
torted that he, the child of fortune, could not give up one 
handbreadth of soil — " My reign will not outlast the day when 
I have ceased to be strong and therefore to be feared." Later 
on, in a fit of rage at being told that his soldiers were boys and 
the last that France could give him, he flung his hat into the 
corner and declared that a man such as he did not concern 
himself much about the lives of a million of men. " The man 
is lost," was Metternich's reply to the French generals who 
crowded around him after this memorable interview hoping to 
hear news of the assurance of peace. 

A singular concurrence of events during the armistice 
served to strengthen the allied cause. On June 14th and 15th 
Great Britain signed at Reichenbach conventions of alliance 
and subsidy with Prussia and Russia, whereby these Powers 
agreed to keep on foot at least 80,000 and 160,000 men re- 
spectively, receiving for the current year the sums of ;^666,ooo 
and ;£i, 1 33,000. Subsequently it was also arranged that 
England should support a German legion of 10,000 men 
serving under the Czar. In this convention, which was ratified 
with some additions in the following September, the Court 
of Berlin definitely renounced all claims on Hanover. The 
course of the reaction against Napoleon was thus marked by 
the recurrence to a diplomatic situation somewhat similar to 
that of Bartenstein in the spring of 1807. But Napoleon's 



278 The RevohUionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

position was in reality far more perilous than that from which 
the lightning stroke of Friedland had deHvered him. The need 
of complete accord between the Powers, if they were to make 
head against the French Emperor, had been well learnt during 
six years of disunion and humiliating subservience. Austria 
was now ready to accede to the alliance from which she had 
so unaccountably turned away in the spring of 1807; and 
Wellington's sword was now thrown with overpowering effect 
into the wavering balance of European affairs. His decisive 
triumph at Vittoria (June 21) had a marked influence on the 
negotiations at Dresden. 

On June 30 Napoleon acquiesced in Austria's mediation, 
and the armistice was prolonged to August 10. That Power 
had, however, signed a treaty widi the allies at Reichenbach 
(June 27) pledging herself to join them with 150,000 troops if 
Napoleon did not accede to her conditions as stated above ; 
and so far had the rivalry of Austria and Prussia vanished in 
their misfortunes, that Austria in the negotiations with Napoleon 
then pending, insisted on the restoration of Prussia to the 
place of a great Power, little thinking that half a century later 
she would be ousted from Germany by the very State which 
she now helped to re-create. To face this formidable coali- 
tion, the only ally which Napoleon could gain was Denmark. 
The Court of Copenhagen, knowing that Bernadotte, Crown 
Prince of Sweden, had joined Russia and England, on the 
understanding that the kingdom of Norway should be the price 
of Swedish assistance to the allies, saw safety only in a close 
union with Napoleon — a decision which was to prove fatal to 
Danish interests in the near future. The French Emperor, 
however, made great and finally successful efforts to gain active 
assistance from his brother-in-law Murat, who had retired in 
high dudgeon to Naples at the close of 181 2. He also called 
Fouche back to favour to fathom "this infernal Austrian 
negotiation which is slipping through my fingers." 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 279 

Into the details of the negotiations at Prague it is unnecessary 
to enter. With a natural feeling of resentment at the 
return which Francis was giving for the care lavished on his 
daughter at Paris, and with a magnificent confidence that his 
genius would conquer as at Austerlitz and Wagram, Napoleon 
refused, until it was too late, the Austrian terms that would 
have reduced his eastern boundary to the Rhine \ 

When the armistice ceased on Aug. 10 Napoleon's position 
was but little stronger than at its commencement, while that 
of the allies was vastly more commanding. Bernadotte with 
25,000 Swedes reinforced the Prussians at Berlin and brought 
the strength of the northern army to 150,000 men. The acces- 
sion of Francis I to the coalition gave the allies the help of a 
great Austrian army led by Schwarzenberg, who with Russians 
and Prussians now began to threaten Napoleon's flank from 
the vast natural bastion formed by the mountains of Bohemia. 
Bliicher's army in Silesia had also been nearly doubled in 
strength, and mustered nearly 100,000 strong. To oppose 
these there were the corps of St Cyr, Vandamme and Ponia- 
towski, in all about 100,000 men, watching Bohemia; as many 
under Macdonald in Silesia; 75,000 menacing Berlin ; 50,000 
held as a reserve by Napoleon himself; beside Bavarians on 
the Inn and Eugene's troops in Italy watching the Austrians 
on the Danube and the Drave respectively. From her central 

1 The treaties which built up the fourth great Coalition were (i) Russia 
and Sweden, March 24, 18 12: (2) Russia and Prussia at KaHsch, Feb. 28,1813: 
(3) England and Sweden, March 3, 1813: (4 and 5) Conventions of subsidy 
and alliance between England and Russia and Prussia at Reichenbach, 
June 15, 1813: (6, 7 and 8) Definitive Treaties of alliance between Austria 
and Russia and Prussia at Teplitz, Sept. 9, 18 13: (9) Preliminary treaty 
of alliance between England and Austria at Teplitz, Oct. 3, 18 13. In 
Oct. — Dec. Austria also made treaties of alliance with Bavaria, Saxony, 
Wlirtemberg, Baden, Hesse, &c. It will be noticed that as in the second 
and third Coalitions, Russia and Sweden took the initiative, and that 
England was one of the later signatories. 



28o The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

position Austria was thus able to threaten Napoleon and his 
allies in Saxony, Bavaria, North-Italy and Illyria. Though the 
French Emperor had regained for himself the central strategic 
position of Saxony, yet over the whole area of the war the 
advantage of position lay with Austria ; and the diplomatists 
of Vienna were thus able in the approaching collapse of 
French supremacy to substitute Austrian predominance in the 
affairs of Germany and Italy. Such were the interests in- 
volved in this vast struggle. The allies had in all nearly half 
a million of armed men in Central Europe ; while Napoleon's 
slight numerical inferiority was counterbalanced by the vigour 
and unity of action inspired by one master mind. After 
twenty years of almost constant war the forces of every people 
in Europe except the Turks were confronting each other on 
the banks of the Oder and the Elbe, the Ebro and the 
Bidassoa. 

Keeping with the reserves at about an equal distance 
from his three main armies, Napoleon heard of the incursion 
into Saxony of the allied Grand Army led by Schwarzenberg, 
Barclay and Kleist, which drove in St Cyr's outposts on 
Dresden. Hurrying up for the defence of the Saxon capital, 
which he had formed into a vast fortified camp. Napoleon 
repelled the attack and occupied the hills south of the city. 
Reinforced during the night by Marmont and Victor, he on 
the next day resumed the offensive, and a dashing charge of 
Murat's cavalry cut up the Austrian left and gained a complete 
victory (Aug. 27). Swift concentration of troops had once 
more gained a victory over the allies, who owing to divided 
councils and a defective intelligence department had not 
enough troops close at hand to repel so vigorous an attack. 
They left ten battalions and a vast number of cannons and 
stores in the hands of the victors. For skill of combination 
before the attack, and the vigour of its execution, the Battle of 
Dresden deserves to rank among Napoleon's greatest victories, 



X.] TJie Wars of Liberation. 281 

and refutes the assertions often made as to the decay of his 
powers. He fell in the plenitude of his vigour before forces 
which no one man could overcome. The pursuit of his beaten 
foes was partly paralysed by news of Macdonald's defeat on the 
previous day; and he left without due support a strong column 
led by Vandamme, which attempted to seize a pass of the Erz- 
Gebirge at Kulm and so cut off the retreat of the allies. 
A Russian corps, soon reinforced by Austrians, obstinately 
contested Vandamme's advance, while a body of Prussians 
closed in on his rear. Caught in a trap such as had long 
ago been fatal to the Romans at the Caudine Forks, all 
Vandamme's troops except a few horsemen had to lay down 
their arms (Aug. 30). This blow, which cost Napoleon 15,000 
men in killed and prisoners, had been closely preceded by 
even worse disasters to his cause. Oudinot's advance on 
Berlin had been checked by the allies at Gross Beeren ; and 
though Bernadotte desired to retreat and abandon the capital, 
a battle had been forced on by the determined Prussian 
General von Biilow which ended in the defeat of the French 
(Aug. 23). Three days later a more decisive victory was won 
by the allied army in Silesia led by the gallant old Bliicher. 

This veteran of over seventy years of age brought the skill 
and experience gained under Frederick the Great to rebuild 
the fortunes of Prussia. After the disaster of Jena his tenacious 
resistance at Liibeck together with that of Gneisenau at Kolberg 
stood out in bold relief amidst the tame surrenders of other 
Prussian generals. He had lived on for revenge. Arndt 
describes him during the weary years of subjection to the 
French, as often spending the heavy hours in lunging with his 
sword at an imaginary foe, calling out — Napoleon ! Nothing 
is more astonishing than his vitality. His limbs were fine and 
round as those of a youth. The upper part of his face seemed 
to Arndt a fit abode for the gods, curiously blended with lines 
about the mouth and chin which betokened the "cunning of 



282 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the hussar." Such was old " Marshal Forward " who was now 
to lead the army of Silesia from the Oder to the Seine. At 
the outset this army was pressed back by Macdonald from 
Goldberg; but it fiercely assailed that marshal's forces as his 
lieutenants (against his orders, he states) were leading them 
over the flooded stream of the Katzbach on to a plateau 
sodden by the rain. The French were hurled back in wild 
confusion (Aug. 26), and in the disorder of a protracted retreat 
left 18,000 prisoners and 103 cannons in the hands of Bliicher's 
troops. In September another of Napoleon's best marshals 
suffered defeat. Ney was beaten at Dennewitz by the northern 
allied army (Sept. 6). 

Thus, on the whole, Napoleon had only maintained his 
ground at his centre of operations in Saxony, while his lieu- 
tenants had been badly beaten in Brandenburg, Silesia and on 
the confines of Saxony. The way was thus opened to strike 
a blow at his centre, Dresden, or to cut off his communications 
with Erfurt and the Rhine. The latter alternative was chosen ; 
and the allies prepared to effect the long desired junction of 
their forces. Bliicher and Schwarzenberg again advanced on 
Saxony, but retreated when Napoleon opposed them in force. 
When reinforced however by 50,000 reserves from the east, 
the allies appointed Leipzig as their rendezvous. By a daring 
flank march, Bliicher led his troops through Bautzen, crossed 
the Elbe near Torgau, and, constructing an entrenched camp, 
waited for Bernadotte's army of the north. The allied move- 
ments were, however, much hampered by the tardiness of the 
Swedish Crown Prince, who was justly suspected of only 
joining in the campaign in order to dethrone Bonaparte and 
take his place. At any rate, he did as little as possible against 
the French. 

Meanwhile Napoleon had been losing much precious time 
in efforts to invade Bohemia; but the difficult passes of the 
Erz-Gebirge were found to be impenetrable; and in the time 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 283 

thus allowed Bliicher with Bernadotte in his rear was beginning 
to threaten Leipzig from the north, while the Grand Army- 
advanced against that city from the south. Leaving Murat to 
defend Leipzig against the main army of the allies, Napoleon 
hurried northwards to overthrow Bliicher, who foiled his aim 
by a wary retreat, thereby enabling the allies on the south to 
press Murat back. Alarmed for the safety of Leipzig, the 
Emperor determined to rejoin the King of Naples and accept 
the battle to which the skilful movements of Bliicher and 
Schwarzenberg had reduced him. The position was unfavour- 
able. At his back was an unfortified city the inhabitants of 
which were eager for his overthrow. In case of a retreat 
westwards there was but one important bridge over the R. 
Elster; and by a strange oversight Napoleon gave no definite 
orders for the construction of temporary bridges. Thus com- 
menced the greatest series of battles ever fought at any one 
place, in which about half a million of men were finally 
engaged. 

On the first day (Oct. 16) the allied Grand Army failed 
to hold against Napoleon three villages which it had cap- 
tured, still more to cut off his communications on the west. 
Napoleon, in fact, hoped by hurrying Marmont's army from 
the north side to gain a complete victory; but his marshal 
was there fiercely assailed by Bliicher and finally had to 
abandon the village of Mockern. This defeat compelled 
Napoleon to draw in his own army nearer to Leipzig, and he 
vainly sent a request for an armistice. On the i8th Murat, 
supported by Napoleon and the Old Guard, maintained an 
obstinate resistance to the overwhelming numbers of the 
Grand Army; but the French defence on the left wing was 
endangered by the desertion of 3600 Saxons and Wiirtem- 
bergers. Only the speedy arrival of Napoleon and his Old 
Guards prevented an immediate collapse at that point. Mean- 
while Bernadotte's tardy approach was threatening an even 



284 TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

worse disaster to the French, and with more energy on his 
part their retreat could have been cut off. As it was, they 
only had ammunition left for two hours more, and finally fell 
back into the crowded streets of Leipzig amidst terrible con- 
fusion. A slight wooden structure over the Elster broke down, 
and while the stream of fugitives was still surging across the 
only other bridge, a premature explosion cut off the rear-guard 
which had been bravely defending the suburbs. A few, among 
them Macdonald, escaped by swimming or by felled trees; 
many more were drowned, including the gallant Poniatowski, 
who had received his marshal's baton but three days before; 
and thousands were made prisoners. In all Napoleon lost on 
those three days 300 cannons, 45,000 men killed, wounded or 
prisoners, besides leaving 23,000 in the miHtary hospitals. But 
the fi-eedom of Germany, which was fully assured by this gigantic 
conflict, had been dearly bought. The allies had sustained 
still heavier losses in the field and were in no condition for 
a vigorous pursuit. Beset by typhus fever and harassed here 
and there by hght troops, the remains of Napoleon's army 
plodded through the miry lanes of Saxony and Thuringia, past 
Liitzen, Auerstadt, and Erfurt, once the scenes of victory and 
splendour and now of a hurried and disastrous retreat. Still, 
the sunset of his fortunes was gilded by some acts of generosity 
worthy of the new Charlemagne. He had forbidden his 
generals to set fire to the suburbs of Leipzig, though the allied 
advance would have been thereby retarded. In the hapless 
city he had bidden his unwilHng ally the King of Saxony to 
make the best terms he could with the allies; and he permitted 
the rest of the Saxon troops to join the national cause, against 
which they had throughout the campaign unwillingly fought. 
The Bavarians had allied themselves with Austria a week 
before Napoleon's disaster ; and their troops now occasioned 
him serious trouble and losses at Hanau; but he finally led 
about 70,000 men across the Rhine (Nov. i — 2), and returned 



X.] TJie Wars of Liberation. 285 

to Paris as in the previous winter with a loss of nearly half a 
million of men. 

Meanwhile Tettenborn, when driven from Hamburg by 
the French, had captured Bremen by a coup de main) and 
after Leipzig he was there reinforced by Bernadotte. The 
allies were able also to help a general popular rising against 
the French in Holland, and despatched troops against the 
Danes in Holstein. The latter came to terms with the aUies ; 
and Bernadotte reinforced by 10,000 Danish troops began to 
march towards the lower Rhine. With the exception of Da- 
voust's entrenched position at Hamburg, French rule suddenly 
shrank within the limits gained by the revolutionary armies under 
Jourdan and Kleber. The garrisons imprudently left in PoHsh 
and German fortresses also began to surrender — Danzig (with 
the wrecks of Napoleon's Russian army and 1300 cannons), 
Modlin, Zamosk, Stettin, Torgau, Erfurt, &c.: Dresden, Ciis- 
trin, Wittenberg and Magdeburg held out through the winter \ 
Hamburg and Glogau until the following autumn. The re- 
sults of the campaign showed that though the possession of 
fortresses may be very important, it can rarely reverse the 
effects of a decisive defeat in the open field, and that after a 
great military disaster such as Leipzig, it may prove, as at Metz 
in 1870, to be merely a trap for their garrisons. In all about 
190,000 men were cut off from France by the results of the 
battles near Leipzig. 

Side by side with the collapse of his vast military effort. 
Napoleon's political supremacy in Germany and Italy fell with 
a rapidity which revealed its hollowness and artificiality. 
The Austrians had easily regained Illyria and Dalmatia, where 
they were generally welcomed. Jerome Bonaparte's rule in 
Westphalia vanished like a dream, and the imposing Con- 
federation of the Rhine dissolved at the first touch of the 
alUed arms. What would replace it ? 

We have already noticed the commanding influence of 



286 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Austria on the course of events, enhanced by Metternich's 
skilful diplomacy. That statesman now used all his powers to 
counteract the efforts of Stein and other friends of liberty to 
gain free institutions for Germany. He had vainly endeavoured 
to dissuade the Czar from handing over to that zealous patriot 
the provisional administration of the liberated German lands, 
and now set himself to curb the "revolutionary aims" of 
young Germany and assure the future supremacy of Austria by 
treaties with the States seceding from the Confederation of the 
Rhine. The first of these treaties had been with Bavaria 
(Oct. 8), which was secured in " the full and entire sovereignty 
of all its States, towns, domains," with a secret reservation that 
Austria was to gain a good military frontier on the side of 
Bavaria and Tyrol. This treaty, acceded to by the other allies, 
assured to Bavaria the formerly Prussian lands of Baireuth and 
Anspach, as well as the numerous Free Cities and knighdy 
domains seized in 1803 — 1806. In this treaty as in many 
others — 22 were signed in a single day at Frankfurt — the allies 
restored lawful princes to their States, largely increased as these 
were at the expense of church lands and the estates of the 
Imperial Knights; and the princes were invested with "un- 
reserved sovereignty." 

In two respects these arrangements were fatal to German 
liberty and unity. They abandoned the principle of sub- 
ordination to some central authority, which had existed in 
name down to 1806 and since then in stern reality, to 
Napoleon; and the perpetuation of the French Emperor's 
policy of mediatisation aggrandised the middle-sized States 
and so vastly enhanced the difficulties of future unification. 
For the present Metternich only sought to secure the supre- 
macy of Austria by diplomatic bargains which would ensure 
the support of the German princes. Thus, amidst all the 
efforts made by the people of Germany, their desires for 
liberty and eftective unity were ignored. 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 287 

The Austro-Bavarian treaty also gave the Emperor Francis 
a commanding influence over the destinies of Italy. A secret 
clause gave him permission to send his troops into Tyrol. 
Eugene's positions in Venetia were thus turned, and he was 
soon unable to hold the line of the Adige against the invaders. 
Italy was in a weak and distracted state. She had poured 
forth her best blood for Napoleon on the battle-fields of 
Germany, Russia and Spain, while the pressure of his Conti- 
nental System had ruined her industries and effaced the 
memory of his earlier reforms and public works. He had 
awakened, without satisfying, the sentiment of Italian nation- 
ality; and at every blow dealt to French supremacy north of the 
Alps, there were ominous reverberations throughout the Penin- 
sula, which revealed the stifled discontent of all repubUcans 
and of the partisans of the fallen dynasties. 

The people were, however, united only in the wish to 
throw off Napoleon's yoke. On all else they were divided. 
The old bands of the sanfedists, together with the Carbonari 
of the south, declared for the return of the Bourbons; while 
some generals in Murat's army, among whom was Pepe, 
plotted to gain a constitution similar to that enjoyed by Sicily 
under its English protectorate. Republican, Austrian, and 
Papal intrigues or plots completed the confusion. For a time 
Murat, who again abandoned Napoleon's fortunes, endeavoured 
to come to terms with the Austrians and with Lord Bentinck, 
the English commander in Sicily. He desired, in fact, to be 
recognised by the allies as King of Italy, and, declaring for 
the independence of the Peninsula, he occupied Rome, Ancona 
and Bologna. This weakened Eugene's defence of Lombardy, 
which was further compromised when Bentinck with an Anglo- 
Sicilian force, landing in Tuscany, declared that fertile land 
freed from the French empire, and occupied Genoa. Eugene, 
finding his position untenable, finally (April, 18 14) concluded 
an armistice with the Austrians, by which his French troops 



288 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

were allowed to return to France. Murat soon afterwards 
abandoned the hope of becoming king of all Italy, and retired 
to Naples. 

The Leipzig campaign, therefore, swept away the political 
results of all French victories gained since Bonaparte's first 
appearance as a general in the Italian riviera. But in the 
spheres of intellectual and social development, the mighty 
impulse given by the French conquests could not disappear. 
Their influence lives on to-day in the ideas, customs and laws 
of Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Germany ; and among the 
most important, if less evident, results of Napoleon's triumphs 
must be remembered the strong desire for effective national 
unity aroused in the breasts of Germans and Italians, finally to 
be consummated at Koniggratz and Sedan. 

Compared with the momentous issues decided on the plains 
of Saxony, the expulsion of the French from Spain was an 
event of secondary importance. In fact, as scon as Napoleon 
was menaced by the fourth great Coalition he virtually decided 
to abandon Spain. Had that been done promptly, the presence 
of 200,000 more tried troops in Saxony would have been fatal 
to the allies ; but Napoleon's desire to hold as much ground as 
possible from the Douro to the Vistula was to lose him every- 
thing. 

The importance of Wellington's Salamanca campaign in 
showing the completely artificial character of Joseph Bona- 
parte's rule in Spain, has been already explained ; and though 
the English commander had finally to retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, 
it was only before a concentration of French armies which lost 
them the wealthy province of Andalusia. The numbers of the 
French party, which up to the middle of 181 2 had been slowly 
increasing, were winnowed by failure and still more by the news 
of the Russian expedition. At once Napoleon began to recall 
the flower of his armies in Spain, to form a nucleus for the 
young levies who were to maintain his cause in Germany ; and 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 289 

Joseph found himself in May 18 13 with rather less than 
200,000 effectives, including the reserves at Bayonne. Of these 
68,000 were needed by Suchet to hold down the warlike North- 
east, while 20,000 under Clausel were chasing Mina's guerrillas 
in Navarre and Aragon, with what success may be judged from 
his final assertion that it would take 50,000 troops three 
months to crush the Spaniards of the North. This single fact 
will suffice to refute the sneers which many English writers, 
including Napier, level at the partisan warfare. It not only 
disconcerted French plans by the capture of despatches, but 
compelled Joseph's troops to scatter in mobile columns, thus 
leaving far fewer men to concentrate against Wellington. 

The king, in fact, now found it impossible to hold Madrid, and 
retreated towards Burgos, there collecting about 55,000 men at 
the beginning of June. Wellington, after many difficulties with 
the Cortes and the insubordination of the Spanish and Portu- 
guese troops, assumed the offensive with about 90,000 men, 
of whom rather more than half were British. Aided by the 
guerrillas of the North and assured of supplies from the 
Asturian ports, he began what has been well called the march 
to Vittoria. Pushing French detachments beyond the Tormes 
and the Douro, he kept extending his left wing so as to outflank 
Joseph's army, thus winning many strong positions, including 
the castle of Burgos. The French fell back on the upper 
Ebro, where they were again outflanked by Wellington's superi- 
ority in numbers and tactics. The king had sent an urgent 
order to Clausel to cease chasing Mina's guerrillas and come to 
his help ; but not more than 14,000 men were available, and 
they were not to arrive until all was over. Rolled back by 
Wellington's left, the French concentrated in good positions 
west of Vittoria, their left and centre crowning hills in front of 
which flowed the R. Zadora, while their right wing was far in 
the rear on the other bank of that river, guarding the bridge 
to the north of the town. Marshal Jourdan, the chief of the 
F. R. J9 



290 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

king's staff, desired to retreat to stronger positions, but he was 
overruled on the ground that Clausel was approaching Vittoria 
and that it would disgrace 70,000 trained troops to abandon 
Spain without fighting a battle. 

The king and Jourdan showed a strange lack of energy. 
They neglected to strengthen their front by breaking the bridges, 
and Vittoria was so blocked by waggons as to hamper any back- 
ward movement. Their hope of Clausel's arrival was also dis- 
appointed by Wellington's vigorous attack with 83,000 British, 
Portuguese and Spanish troops (June 21). General Hill, after 
two hours' obstinate fighting, drove the French left from its 
strong position on the heights of Puebla, while Wellington's 
centre crossed the bridges and carried the hills in the teeth of 
deadly volleys from infantry and artillery. "The terrible fire 
from our battery (wrote Miot de Melito) could not arrest the 
advance of the English, and we observed the intrepidity of 
that advance with irresistible admiration." The French fell 
back on a second range of heights, which they defended 
with desperation; but their line of retreat was by this time 
seriously menaced by Graham's persistent and finally successful 
attacks on their right wing. Late in the afternoon his horse 
cut off the retreat by the direct road to France, while other 
squadrons threw into wild disorder the main body of French 
in the crowded streets of Vittoria. Artillery-men cut the traces, 
and the army fled in utter rout by the eastern road towards 
Pampeluna, leaving behind 143 cannons, all the ammunition, 
the baggage, and the treasure chests of the army, besides all 
the property amassed by King Joseph, his generals, officers 
and civilians during five years of warfare, plunder and extortion. 
The completeness of the victory surprised even Wellington 
himself. Clausel hastily retreated and finally regained France ; 
but Suchet, though pressed by Mina's guerrillas in the north 
and an Anglo-Sicilian force in the south, long held out in 
Catalonia ; and the obstinate defence of the French garrisons 



X.] The Wars of Liberation. 291 

at Pampeluna and San Sebastian retarded Wellington's pro- 
gress. The rest of Spain was, however, irretrievably lost to 
Napoleon at Vittoria. 

On receiving at Dresden news of that disaster, the Emperor 
at once ordered King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan to retire 
to country-seats in France, where they were to live in seclusion. 
He also promptly selected Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, as the 
leader best able to oppose Wellington; but the marshal's 
ambitious wife strongly opposed his acceptance of a post 
"where nothing is to be got but blows." Her protests to 
Napoleon were cut short by the incisive statement that woman's 
province was to obey her husband and a marshal's duty was 
to obey his Emperor ; and Soult, with his duchess, was hurried 
off with orders to defend the Pyrenees inch by inch. Rallying 
the French forces, he boldly assumed the offensive, in the 
endeavour to succour Pampeluna and San Sebastian, and was 
with difficulty beaten back from before the former fortress (July 
27 — 30) and from the crags and defiles of the Pyrenees. Only 
the astonishing hardihood of the British infantry, and the thirst 
for vengeance of Wellington's Portuguese and Spaniards, could 
so speedily have driven their foes from a succession of natural 
ramparts, and finally from strong entrenchments on the precipi- 
tous bank of the Bidassoa. On his side, Soult showed how 
quickly an able general can rally troops disorganised by 
disaster, and amply justified the Emperor's recent choice. 
Junot, Victor, Ney, Masse'na, Bessieres, Marmont, Clausel, and 
Jourdan had come out of the ordeal of conflict with the great 
British leader, with reputations dimmed if not completely 
eclipsed. It was reserved for Soult to show that glory could 
be gained even in a series of reverses, when these were 
inflicted by Welhngton and his Peninsular veterans. 

The surrender of the French garrisons in San Sebastian and 
Pampeluna, on the last day of August and October respectively, 
removed the last obstacles to Wellington's invasion of France. 

19 — 2 



292 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. x. 

When Napoleon was fighting his way back to the Rhine, 
nothing remained to him in Spain except a few positions held 
for a time by Suchet in Catalonia; and in the spring of 18 14 
the only results of his Spanish policy were the devastation of 
the Peninsula, the loss of fully 200,000 of his best troops, and 
a secure foothold gained by Wellington on the soil of France 
itself. 



CHAPTER XI. 

The Reconstruction of Europe. 

"Thou might'st have built thy throne 
Where it had stood e'en now: thou didst prefer 
A frail and bloody pomp, which Time has swept 
In fragments towards oblivion." — Shelley, 

Talleyrand, with a perspicacity which was not blinded 
by all the splendours of the Erfurt interview, had there con- 
fidentially remarked to the Czar, that all the conquests beyond 
the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, were the work of Napoleon, 
not of France, and that she must inevitably lose them in 
course of time. The remark, which as regards Italy and 
Germany, must have seemed in 1808 to be a prophecy of the 
remote future, is interesting as showing that at least one 
prominent Frenchman was not so fascinated by Napoleon's 
genius as to lose the sense of historic perspective or overlook 
the silent but resistless forces which tend to re-adjust the 
equiHbrium of States or peoples. The birth of some great 
idea, the spread of a vivifying belief, the advent of some mighty 
organizer or warrior, has temporarily bound together and 
spurred on even scattered tribes to subdue the inert masses 
of half the known world. But the very force of the impact 
in course of time evokes energy, if only that of sheer despair. 
The peoples subdued or menaced with subjection are thrown 



294 '^^^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

back on the firmest centres of resistance ; their faith becomes 
fiercely miUtant, and the military reaction calls forth a Tancred, 
a Cceur de Lion, and the Cid. 

Revolutionary France was raised to unparalleled power 
by a singular concurrence of all the above-named factors of 
national greatness. The growth of the democratic idea, and 
fervent belief in Rousseau's gospel of social equality, endowed 
her with latent energies soon to be called into unexampled 
activity by her two great organizing powers — the Committee 
of Public Safety and Bonaparte. It has been briefly shown 
in this work, how the French armies, warring against effete 
systems, retained their revolutionary ardour, even after that 
had spent itself at Paris amidst the degrading strifes of factions. 
What must have been the strength of the prime impulse and 
the thoroughness of organization, if when Paris was weary of 
interminable wars, Napoleon's eagles still could wing their 
flight to Cadiz and Moscow? Those two names, however, 
recall the fact that military triumphs which overleap the bounds 
of racial solidarity, and war against the sympathies or material 
interests of the conquered, cannot be long maintained against 
the earthquake shocks of some impulse originating in the 
popular consciousness or against the denuding influences of 
time. 

These two potent influences are ever at work in history as 
in the physical world, the volcanic process tending to form a 
great State along the lines of least resistance, whereupon it is 
immediately subjected to the denuding effects of war and diplo- 
macy, or of the constant strivings of the human race for the 
fittest conditions of existence. The weathering-away process 
is the more usual — witness the gradual dissolution of the 
Angevin dominions in France, of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and of the Turkish power in south-eastern Europe. The 
formative process in the history of States (especially when it is 
of the volcanic rather than of the sedimentary character) is 



XI.] The Reconstructmt of Ettrope. 295 

naturally far more concentrated and interesting. The climax 
of interest is of course reached whenever an internal popular 
impulse is developed by some great genius to an abnormal 
power or intensity. It is for this cause that the revolutionary 
and Napoleonic era exhibits triumphs so astonishing, followed 
by overwhelming disasters. It is essentially cataclysmic. The 
democratic movement, which under a Carnot, Kleber, or 
Moreau, might possibly have touched Vienna, Berlin and 
Rome, was carried by Napoleon's determination to conquer 
England upon the Continent, to the banks of the Guadiana and 
the Moskwa. The rebound, the rising of the nations against 
an Imperialism that had become intolerable, was proportion- 
ately the more violent. It swept away, not only his conquests 
over the bitterly hostile peoples of Russia, Prussia and Spain, 
but also his rule in Germany and Italy, lands which had at first 
welcomed the principles of 1789. 

The reaction of the peoples and their rulers against 
Napoleon, intensified by their dread of leaving him in power, 
was now threatening the limits of revolutionary France. Even 
the tide of military events, from Valmy to Friedland and back 
again from Baylen to Waterloo, bears witness to the truth of 
the statement that the real boundaries of a nation are not 
marked by its political limits but by the sphere of its intel- 
lectual and spiritual attraction. To the discerning eye, the 
confines of France in 1789 were far wider than those of 
Napoleon's Empire when it stretched to the Baltic and the 
Adriatic. At the earlier date her ideas were permeating the 
world. In 181 2 the growth of the national principle was 
already threatening to drive her back within her strictly 
historical limits ; and it is significant that the attitude of the 
Prussian and German patriots was now distinctly more aggres- 
sive than that of their governments. 

At the time when the allied sovereigns at Frankfurt were 
offering Napoleon the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees as 



296 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the boundaries of his Empire, Arndt issued his important pam- 
phlet — ''The Rhine a German river, not Germany's boundary" 
— which had a marked influence on public opinion and even 
on the diplomatists at Frankfurt and Chatillon. But the 
rising tide of German nationality was beginning to alarm the 
sovereigns. They were inclined to disregard a public opinion 
which they regarded as revolutionary ; and peace would 
probably have been assured but for Napoleon's determination 
not to accept it in the midst of defeat. 

It is a wide-spread and very natural error to suppose that 
Napoleon's fall was due to the snows of Russia and the rising of 
Central Europe. Both notions are incorrect. The Emperor 
boasted to Metternich that he had spared Frenchmen in the 
Moscow campaign and made other peoples bear the brunt of 
it. As a matter of fact, his losses of French troops there were 
less than those caused by the constant drain of the Spanish 
campaigns. The results of the war of 18 13 were far more 
serious; but at most they only shattered his supremacy in 
Germany and Italy, and reduced him to limits which Louis 
XIV's arms had never been able to gain. The Moscow ex- 
pedition had lost him only some of the results won at Fried- 
land and Wagram; and the Leipzig campaign after all only 
limited France to what she had virtually gained by 1795. The 
great majority of Frenchmen now longed for a peace which 
would assure to them the quiet possession of what the re- 
volution and its armies had won. Fouche wrote to Napoleon 
from Rome at the close of 1813, warning him of the magical 
effect of the word independence throughout Italy, and begging 
him to content himself with the "natural frontiers" of France. 
A similar wish was loudly expressed even in Napoleon's 
Court. 

By a strange coincidence the very same offer was now 
distinctly sent by the allied sovereigns from Frankfurt, There 
was a strong peace party among the allies. Indeed, but for 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 297 

the death of Kutusoff in the spring of 18 13 it is doubtful 
whether the Russian army would have advanced beyond the 
Oder; and it is certain that the Czar was now satisfied with 
freeing Europe as far as the Rhine. Frederick William, of a 
disposition naturally hesitating and rendered more so by years 
of calamity, had no wish to venture everything in a campaign 
beyond the Rhine. The Emperor Francis, seeing Illyria, 
Tyrol, and northern Italy virtually in his power, did not wish 
to press his son-in-law further; and Lord Aberdeen, England's 
representative at the allied head-quarters, declared — " England 
is satisfied ; for the power of France is now reduced within 
legitimate bounds; and this is all that England ever desired." 
The allies therefore drew up the famous offers of peace to 
Napoleon (Nov. 9, 1813), leaving to his Empire the * natural 
boundaries ' of France, the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees : 
the unconditional independence of Germany and Spain must 
be acknowledged ; Italy and Holland must be independent of 
France, but their form of government and the Austrian boun- 
dary in Italy were to be determined by negotiation. England 
was prepared to offer great sacrifices for peace on these terms 
and to abandon most of her maritime claims. A congress was 
to assemble at some town east of the Rhine, to adjust these 
and other questions. 

Extraordinarily favourable though these terms were to a 
sovereign who had recently lost two immense armies, Metter- 
nich rightly judged that Napoleon would refuse them, and the 
sovereigns did not suspend the march towards the Rhine. 
The French Emperor consented (Nov. 16) to negotiate, but 
only on the general principle of the equilibrium of the Powers, 
and gave no definite assent to their terms as a basis for 
negotiations. On the contrary the Moniteur bristled with 
warlike articles; and the instructions given to Caulaincourt, 
his new Minister of Foreign Affairs, prove how wide an inter- 
pretation Napoleon gave to the phrase 'natural boundaries': 



298 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the tetes de pont east of the Rhine were to remain in French 
hands, and also a considerable part of Holland : a federal 
constitution for Germany was objected to, and Jerome was to 
retain his kingdom of Westphalia or gain compensation in 
Italy. Even before this virtual rejection of the allied terms. 
Napoleon's ambiguous attitude had strengthened the war 
party at Frankfurt; and when it heard of WelHngton's suc- 
cesses in the south, the revolt of Holland against Napoleon's 
rule, and the surrender of French garrisons in Germany, there 
was little prospect of similar terms being again offered to 
the once redoubtable foe. 

It is difficult fully to fathom Napoleon's reasons for not 
frankly and unreservedly accepting those conditions. It is 
stated by the Baron de VitroUes, who was soon to play so 
important a part in the restoration of the Bourbons, that the 
air of uncertainty and extreme moderation in the allied 
governments amidst a triumph for which they were not pre- 
pared, and their offering terms instead of dictating them, 
encouraged Napoleon to hope for the dissolution of the 
coalition, or that one French victory would gain him much 
Ijetter conditions. The Frankfurt terms were, however, not 
much less favourable than those to which he had, when too 
late, acceded at Prague just after the lapse of the armistice. 
It is possible, indeed, that in his remorse at having acceded 
to that suspension of arms, so fatal to his fortunes, he had now 
steeled himself to the conviction that all signs of moderation, 
whether in himself or his foes, were proofs of weakness. His 
other illusion, that a new dynasty could not survive a con- 
fession of weakness which might be borne with impunity by an 
old reigning family, had twice been disproved by the state of 
public opinion in France. Malet's venture was made before 
the news of the evacuation of Moscow had reached Paris. 
After two fatal campaigns there was no attempt to dethrone 
Napoleon; and most Frenchmen would have hailed with joy 



XI] The Reconstruction of Europe. 299 

the return to the natural frontiers as a pledge of a peaceful 
policy. 

But the voice of France now rarely reached the Emperor's 
ears, and he remained in the illusion that she was entirely 
devoted to his cause so long as he gave her glory and 
victory. The campaign of 18 14 was to show that he singularly 
overlooked the real strength of his position— viz. that he was 
the sole effective guardian of the material and social gains 
effected by the Revolution. All the rest, the boasts of military 
honour and glory, were now mere idle talk to all save a few 
infatuated devotees and the veterans of his army. As for his 
other assertion, that the allies wished to humiliate France and 
that he must win a victory in order to conclude an honourable 
peace, it was skilfully refuted by a declaration which the allies 
drew up at Frankfurt (Dec. i) and caused to be circulated 
throughout France :—" The Powers confirm to the French 
Empire an extent of territory such as France has never had 
under her ancient kings ; for a brave nation does not lose its 
rank because it has in its turn sustained reverses in the course 
of an obstinate struggle in which it has fought with its usual 
bravery"; and the public offer to the French people of the 
'natural boundaries' would, it was hoped, sever the cause of 
France from the policy of Napoleon. 

Another incident might surely have given him pause. The 
Corps Legislatif, usually so obsequious, voted by a majority of 
four to one (Dec. 29), an address urging him to declare that 
he " would give to Europe and the world the assurance that he 
continued the war only for the independence of the French 
people and the inviolability of its territory"; and it prayed 
him to "guarantee the rights of freedom, security of property, 
and to the nation the free exercise of its political rights." 
Napoleon's only reply was to order the prorogation of the 
Assembly, the destruction of the address, and to launch a 
tirade against the authors of the address as bad men " in the 



300 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

pay of England." In fact, his whole attitude at the close of 
1813 gives some colour to the charge that he was not alto- 
gether averse from war, as tending to stifle political agitation 
in France and rally around him all who were interested in 
maintaining the material gains of the Revolution. 

He made an effort to detach Spain from the allies by a 
treaty with the captive Ferdinand VII (Dec. 11, 1813), offer- 
ing to restore to him his throne, on condition that all British 
troops evacuated Spain. Ferdinand adroitly referred him to 
the Spanish Cortes, which honourably refused to treat apart 
from the English Government. Consequently WelUngton's 
base of operations in Spain remained unshaken, and he was 
able to advance towards Orthez. The sternness with which he 
checked plundering by his troops, even by the insubordinate 
Spaniards, made a good impression on the French peasantry ; 
and an official letter from Bayonne declared that the good 
order which he maintained did Napoleon's cause more harm 
than ten battles. 

The decisive blows were, however, to be struck in the 
valleys of the Marne and Seine. In spite of the opposition 
of the Czar, therein influenced by his old tutor Laharpe and 
another Swiss democrat. General Jomini, it was decided not to 
observe the neutrality of Switzerland, which had been violated 
by Napoleon for ten years past. The allied Grand Army, some 
250,000 strong, therefore passed the Rhine at Basel, and, 
proceeding to turn the strong defensive line of the Vosges, 
finally debouched on the plateau of Langres and menaced 
the lines of the rivers which there have their source. A 
detached column also marched on Geneva and threatened 
Lyons. On the first day of 18 14, Bliicher led his Silesian army 
of about 90,000 men across the Rhine at three points between 
Mannheim and Coblentz ; while the allied army of the north, 
under Bernadotte and von Biilow, began somewhat later to 
threaten the Belgian Departments. With the allied forces under 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 301 

Wellington and others in Italy and North Germany, the whole 
forces opposed to Napoleon promised to exceed 600,000 men, 
among whom were Rhenish Confederation troops which had 
previously fought for him. 

To oppose these masses the French had scarcely 250,000 
men ready to take the field ; but a Senatus-consultum ordered 
the enrolment of 300,000 unmarried men, though the con- 
scription had already been rigorously pressed. It was found 
that the conscripts of this time, having been born during 
the Reign of Terror, were distinctly below the average 
strength ; yet it was on these that France now mainly had to 
rely. Napoleon, however, still had the advantage of the 
central position, which Carnot had turned to such account in 
1793 : he also rightly counted on the presence of invaders 
on the 'sacred soil' to still all divisions, while these would 
increase among the allies as they advanced nearer to their goal. 
The densest masses of invaders were also mainly Austrians and 
Confederate troops of indifferent quality, and were handled by 
Prince Schwarzenberg, who had little confidence in himself, 
and was constantly hampered by the pacific leanings of the 
Emperor Francis. The northern army was reorganizing in 
Holland. For the present, therefore, only the Silesian army 
was to be met, and its junction with the Grand Army on the 
Aube prevented at all costs. 

The first events were in favour of the allies. Bliicher's 
rapid and unexpected advance deprived the French of the two 
strong lines of the Moselle and the Meuse, the fortresses on 
which rivers he left detachments to observe or besiege. When 
his columns reached Brienne without serious resistance (Jan. 
26), and were not very far from Schwarzenberg's vanguard, the 
campaign seemed, in a strategical sense, decided. He was 
soon undeceived. Napoleon, rallying the French forces which 
had been falling back, drove a Prussian column from St 
Dizier, and on Jan. 29 hurled back another part of the Silesian 



302 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

army at Brienne, where as a youth he had first studied the art 
of war ; but, on receiving reinforcements from the Grand Army, 
Marshal 'Forward,' with about 85,000 men, resumed the 
offensive, and inflicted on Napoleon's 40,000 a decisive defeat 
at La Rothiere, capturing 3,000 prisoners and 50 cannons 
(Feb. i). 

The completeness of the success was in one sense a mis- 
fortune. Young officers invited each other to dinner in the 
Palais Royal in a week's time. Bliicher himself, regarding the 
victory as decisive, desired to march on Paris by way of 
Chalons ; while the Czar and the Emperor Francis, not desiring 
too complete a triumph of the Prussian arms, began to with- 
draw the support of the Grand Army, and recommended a 
leisurely march on Paris, chiefly by way of Troyes. A force of 
12 Cossack regiments was to keep the two chief armies in 
touch. It was urged at the aUied head-quarters that this 
division of forces was necessary to secure provisions; but 
General Miifliing states in his memoirs that even then it 
appeared a device for delaying operations so as not to cut off 
Napoleon from the means of concluding peace in the Congress 
at Chatillon, where negotiations had been opened ; and that 
the prospect of Bliicher's army gaining possession of Paris 
evidently aroused the jealousy and fears of the two Emperors. 
Indeed, when Bliicher had nearly traversed the plains of 
Champagne, an order came from the Czar that his forces were 
not to enter Paris before the arrival of the sovereigns ; and at 
the same time a corps was withdrawn from his command. 
Strange to say, the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia suspected 
the Czar of desiring to place Bernadotte on the throne of France, 
or, as being easier and more conformableto the spirit of the times, 
of favouring a return to a moderate republican government; and 
they even entered into a secret treaty (Feb. 14) for garrisoning 
Paris equally, lest the Czar should perpetrate a republican coup 
diktat. 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 303 

Owing to these dissensions, all touch was lost between the 
Grand Army on the Seine and the forces of Bliicher and 
Yorck in the Marne valley. The latter were, on Feb. 5, 
between Sezanne and Chalons, and appeared to have inter- 
posed a wedge between Napoleon's army retreating from 
Troyes, and Macdonald's forces near Epernay ; but the Silesian 
army, in its effort to cut off Macdonald's direct retreat on Paris 
by the Marne valley, left its columns at intervals of more than 
a day's march, and thus dangerously exposed to a flank attack 
from the south. Napoleon, ever apprised by his marshal of the 
enemy's movements, seized the opportunity. Marching by 
miry cross-roads from Nogent northwards, he fell with about 
30,000 troops on Bliicher's severed corps and completely 
defeated them at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry 
and Vauchamps (Feb. 10 — 14), inflicting total losses of more 
than 15,000 men and 50 cannons. These French victories in 
the Marne valley had a far more important effect than that ot 
throwing back the shattered Silesian army on Chalons. They 
raised the spirits of the young French conscripts and strength- 
ened the wavering belief in the Emperor's invincibility. Not a 
vivat had greeted him ten days before on his entry into Troyes. 
The citizens would supply nothing except on compulsion. A 
considerable number of the troops — 6,000 it was said — deserted 
there. Napoleon himself was for som.e hours deeply depressed. 
He complained in his letters that his troops were nearly 
starving, and authorised Caulaincourt provisionally to accept 
the allied terms ; while to his brother Joseph, who was aiding 
the government at Paris, he sent orders (Feb. 9) to have every- 
thing removed from Compiegne and Fontainebleau which would 
serve as a trophy for the enemy. Not only was the devotion 
of his soldiers beginning to cool, but the wealthy and mer- 
cantile classes were almost to a man hostile. The Due de 
Broglie states that the audience at one of the Paris theatres 
hissed off the stage a play ordered by the Imperial police, 



304 The Revolutionary and Napoleo7iic Era. [Chap. 

which in one scene represented the Cossacks plundering and 
burning a French village. Nevertheless, the alienation of 
urban feeling only served to show more clearly what was the 
central support of the imperial edifice. Except in the royahst 
west and south, the peasants still looked on the Emperor as 
the guarantee for their tenure of lands confiscated during the 
revolution. In regard to the material interests of the peasantry, 
he was still the crowned Jacobin guarding the agrarian con- 
quests of 1789 against a return of the Bourbons and the emigres. 

This feeling was strongest in the centre and east of 
France, where feudalism had been most oppressive ; and the 
allied reinforcements on their march were now often harassed 
by National Guards and popular risings. The spirit of his 
troops had also been restored by the recent victories. The 
terrible cry 'Vive I'Empereur' again menaced the invaders; 
and the spirit of Valmy seemed to animate the young con- 
scripts who daily came to fill the ranks. Still more impor- 
tant was the arrival of two divisions of infantry and one of 
cavalry, which he withdrew from Soult's army at the beginning 
of February. He would have fallen again on Bliicher's army 
at Chalons, but for news that the allied Grand Army was now 
threatening to overwhelm the divisions of Victor and Gudinot, 
which he had left to guard the Seine valley; and the war, 
strategically the most interesting of all Napoleon's campaigns, 
except perhaps those of Italy and Waterloo, became more than 
ever a struggle for the possession of the roads leading down 
the Seine, Aube and Marne towards Paris, on which the two 
chief rivers converge. 

The student will here observe the immense defensive 
importance of a broad and deep river. It is in some respects 
a better military defence than a mountain chain. The approach 
of the enemy can be observed more readily. There are few 
chains which are not penetrable by numerous defiles ; and the 
invaders, if defeated, can find refuge in them or on the slopes. 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 



O^D 



The passage of the Alps by Hannibal and Napoleon illustrates 
the practicability even of a vast range of mountains to armies 
led by great commanders; and the battle of Kulm in 1813 
shows how a retreating foe may rally in a defile and restore 
the fortunes of the war. On the other hand, the passage of 
a river or marsh in front of undefeated enemies is one of the 
most hazardous of military movements. Its successful per- 
formance by Marlborough at Blenheim, and by Wellington 
above Oporto, ranks among the great achievements of modern 
times; whereas neglect of due precautions in this operation 
led to the disasters of Austerlitz, Friedland, and the Katz- 
bach, beside vastly increasing the losses at the Beresina and 
Leipzig. Indeed, the whole course of Napoleon's defeats may 
in a military sense be summarised thus, that after losing 
successively the lines of the Niemen, Vistula, Oder, Elbe, 
Saale, Rhine, Moselle and Meuse, he was now using all the force 
of his genius and indomitable will to hurl back the Silesian 
and Grand Armies on the further banks of the Marne and 
Seine. 

In the former of these efforts he seemed to have almost 
succeeded, when he was recalled by the news that part of the 
Grand Army was advancing on Paris by the Seine valley. 
Retracing his steps, the Emperor hurled his compact forces on 
them and at the close of a sharp engagement at Montereau 
drove them in much confusion across the river and seized 
the bridge before it was cut by the enemy (Feb. 18). The 
allies, taught by these severe lessons, saw the need of con- 
centration; and, as after Ligny and Quatre Bras, foiled 
Napoleon's efforts at separating them, by a concentric retreat. 
The Grand Army retired towards Troyes to re-organise, while 
Bliicher promised to support them near that town with an 
army now strengthened by the arrival of reserves. But more 
important than the accession of numbers was the undaunted 
bearing of the veteran Field- Marshal, whose spirit now, as in 
F. R. 20 



3o6 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

June 1815, only seemed to rise higher with defeat. All his 
energy was now needed to re-invigorate his staff and the allied 
sovereigns. — "In what a position were we on Feb. 22 (wrote 
General Muffling) as compared with the 2nd ! Now fugitives, 
avoiding a battle with Bonaparte who had probably only half 
our numbers." 

Remembering the advantages gained by the armistice of 
the previous summer, the aUies now tried to gain time for 
further reinforcements from Germany, by sending overtures 
for an armistice to Napoleon, which he refused. A true view 
of the situation should have convinced Napoleon that his 
brilliant resistance had amply satisfied the honour of France 
and retrieved the glory of his arms, that when the northern 
allied army was beginning to appear on the arena, the psycho- 
logical moment had arrived for accepting any terms not 
absolutely humihating. But, either from alarm at the dis- 
content in Paris, or from an exaggerated estimate of his recent 
successes \ or because the portentous triumphs of his earlier days 
had ingrained in his masterful nature a confidence which 
absolutely excluded the thought of ultimate failure. Napoleon 



^ This alternative may be supported by a few extracts from his letters 
to King Joseph at Paris. Feb. 11 (after Montmirail) "The army of Silesia 
has ceased to exist. I have completely routed it." — Feb, 15 (after 
Vauchamps), "The peasants have picked up here on the battle-fields more 
than 40,000 muskets." — Feb. 18 (just before Montereau), "The enemy is 
now in a very different position from that which he occupied when he 
made the Frankfort proposals : he must now feel almost certain that few 
of his troops will recross the frontier." — Feb. 19, "As soon as the allies 
heard that I had forced the bridge of Montereau, they ran away as fast as 

they could. Their whole army is terrified." "I have ordered General 

Maison to collect the garrisons in Flanders, to march towards Flanders 
and resume operations." — At the same date he expresses to Eugene the 
hope of preserving Italy and making Murat change sides. At that time 
von Biilow was at Mons in great force, and Eugene was barely holding 
.his own. 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 307 

once more let slip, until it was too late, an opportunity for a 
peace which the allies offered and for which France herself had 
long been sighing. 

As has been noticed, negotiations between Napoleon and 
the allies had been resumed at Chatillon on Feb. 5 ; and at 
that time of his despondency after la Rothiere he had given to 
his envoy Caulaincourt, Due de Vicenza, almost carte blanche 
provided he brought the negotiations to a happy end and 
saved Paris from occupation. The apparently decisive results 
of the first great battle far within the limits of ancient France, 
the news of Murat's defection from the Emperor, the arrival 
of the English Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh, with the 
welcome news of the determination of his government to 
persevere with the war in the South,— all these influences 
concurred to raise the expectations of the allies ; and they 
firmly declared that they would treat with France in the name 
of Europe as forming a single entity. At the second sitting 
of the Congress it was resolved to demand that France should 
return to her pre-revolutionary frontiers with a few exceptions 
determined by mutual convenience. To this Caulaincourt 
took exception, seeing that his government had stipulated for 
the Frankfurt terms of Nov. 1813 as the basis for the present 
negotiation ; and he stated that though the Emperor was ready 
to make the greatest sacrifices, he would demur to the limits of 
the old monarchy. 

We learn from Napoleon's secretary M. Fain, his indig- 
nation at these terms — "What can I answer to the repub- 
licans in the Senate when they demand from me their 
Rhine boundary? God keep me from such disgrace. Tell 
Caulaincourt that I reject such conditions. Rather will I 
endure the worst evils of war." Nerved by desperation, he 
flung himself on the Silesian and Grand Armies with the 
surprising results previously described. At one time Mac- 
donald's troops advanced so near Chatillon that the allied 

20 — 2 



3o8 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

envoys threatened to break up the Congress, and Caulaincourt 
had to beg the French Marshal to retire. Nevertheless, the 
aUies refused to give way on the chief points at issue, while 
Caulaincourt, pursuant to Napoleon's temporising policy, 
avoided any definite rupture of the negotiations. 

On Feb. 17 the aUies presented to the French pleni- 
potentiary the draft of a treaty nearly identical with that which 
ultimately became the basis for the reconstruction of Europe ; 
and, when it was obvious that Napoleon would not accept 
these terms, the allies formed by the Treaty of Chaumont 
(March i) a Quadruple Alliance which cemented, far more 
intimately and definitely, the compacts framed at Teplitz in 
the previous summer. Each of the four Powers now agreed 
to keep 150,000 men on active service for the war against 
Napoleon. England consented to furnish subsidies to her 
three allies at the annual rate of ;^5, 000,000 to be equally 
divided; and she was left free to substitute money, if the 
number of her troops could not be made up to the required 
total. The treaty was to hold good for twenty years. It 
was also secretly agreed that Germany was to form a federal 
State. 

As for the negotiations at Chatillon, they were protracted 
to March 20, without any result; and it was not until the 
allies were marching victoriously on Paris that Napoleon 
decided to accept their terms. As in 18 13, he let the time 
for negotiation pass by, and only gave his assent when it was 
too late. 

The recent defeats had only served to cement the union 
between the allies and to defer their jealousies until victory 
had fully crowned their arms. Two days previously fortune 
had again deserted Napoleon's cause. At Bar-sur-Aube, the 
Russian commander Wittgenstein had administered a severe 
check to the French, while at the same time Wellington, after 
passing the Gave at Orthez, drove his able adversary Soult 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 309 

from strong positions north of the town. The French mar- 
shal's retreat eastwards uncovered Bordeaux, to which great 
city Wellington was invited by a strong royalist party among 
the citizens. Beresford was despatched thither with light 
troops ; and, supported by their presence, the Due d'Angou- 
leme, eldest son of the Comte d'Artois, entered the city, and 
there proclaimed Louis XVIII as king (March 12). 

Events marched still more swiftly in the north. The corps 
of von Billow and VVintzingerode were threatening Paris on the 
north-east ; and as early as Feb. 25 Bliicher had formed the 
daring and eventually successful plan of leaving Napoleon to 
follow the Grand Army, while he himself marched towards the 
capital, arranging with Wintzingerode for a junction at or near 
Meaux on the Marne. Pushing the small corps of Marmont and 
Mortier down the Marne, his vanguard sustained a check from 
them near Meaux; and he soon gladly learnt from Tettenborn's 
Cossacks that Napoleon, suddenly awakened from his dream 
that the allies were retreating on the Rhine, was marching 
north in hot haste to prevent his junction with the northern 
army. This would give time for the Grand Army to threaten 
Paris from the Seine valley, while he and von Biilow menaced 
it from the Soissons road. In a strategic sense, therefore, 
Bliicher's march resembles his famous flank march before 
Leipzig, which had the effect of gradually bringing irresistible 
forces to bear on the objective of the whole campaign — in this 
case Paris. The prospects of the aUies were improved by the 
somewhat tame surrender of the fortress of Soissons by a 
French general, and there Bliicher and von Biilow effected the 
desired junction, forming an array of 110,000 Prussians and 
Russians with 500 cannons (March 4). The assertion of Na- 
poleon's panegyrists that the surrender of Soissons ruined his 
campaign is a gross exaggeration. The junction of forces was 
the decisive event, not the capture of a third-rate fortress. 
Behind the old walls of Soissons there were but 20 cannons 



310 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

and about looo troops; and many of these were disabled before 
the commandant surrendered with the honours of war. Be- 
sides, if the place was of such extreme importance, why was it 
left with a feeble garrison and deficient ammunition ? Had it 
held out for some days longer, the issue of events could hardly 
have been very different ; for there were other points at which 
a junction could have been effected. Bliicher was about to 
throw bridges across the Aisne when he heard of the sur- 
render. 

By threatening the allied flank and communications, 
Napoleon transferred the contest to the plateau of Craonne, 
where a desperate conflict ended in his favour. The allies fell 
back on the strong defence afforded by the natural citadel of 
Laon surrounded by wide plains ; weakened by dissensions 
more than by defeat, they there awaited the attack of half 
their numbers. On the first day of battle at Laon (March 9) 
the French maintained an equal contest even against these 
odds; but at nightfall, the allies carried out with startling 
success an attack on the wearied French and threw Marmont's 
wing into utter rout. The temporary illness of Bliicher and 
fear of Napoleon kept the allies from pushing the pursuit. 
Deep depression reigned in Napoleon's camp. He had failed 
to drive the allies back on Belgium; and the sole result of 
these battles on the Aisne seemed to be the loss of about 
15,000 men. Any other commander, on the news that 
Schwarzenberg was marching down the Aube, would have 
judged that enough had been done to save honour ; but Napo- 
leon, in his determination not to yield to the allied terms, 
preferred to struggle on against hopeless odds, and led his 
weary troops by way of Soissons (which had been easily re- 
taken), hoping to surprise Schwarzenberg's columns on the 
march. Collecting the corps of Ney, who had surprised 
Chalons, and of Macdonald, who was contesting the advance 
of the Grand Army, Napoleon counted on at least checking 



XL] The Reconstruction of Europe. 3 1 1 

the timid Austrian commander. A hasty concentration of 
Schwarzenberg's marching columns sufficed to avert defeat. 

Napoleon, mistaking these movements for that retreat on 
the Rhine which ever dominated his imagination, was ordering 
a march eastwards on Vitry to hasten their retreat, when his 
columns were menaced near Arcis, the birthplace of Danton. 
While part of the French were pressing on to Vitry, others 
were slowly and methodically attacked at Arcis by vast masses 
of the allies who, if effectively handled, ought to have cap- 
tured them (March 20, 21). As it was, the French suffered 
heavy losses; and, as Napoleon's movements towards the 
Marne had uncovered the road to Paris, Schwarzenberg and 
the Czar formed the surprisingly daring resolve to march on 
Paris, leaving behind a light corps as a screen to their 
movements. Bliicher's approach southwards supported them 
on their right, and in a rapid march the combined forces 
overthrew Marmont's and Mortier's corps at la Fere Cham- 
penoise, capturing thousands of prisoners and all Napoleon's 
reserve ammunition and stores. Meanwhile the French van- 
guard severed Schwarzenberg's communications on the upper 
Marne and captured its baggage, pontoons, and even some 
of the couriers and diplomatists at Chaumont. Thus the 
campaign presented the unexampled scene of simultaneous 
attempts upon the hostile rear. Napoleon hoping to relieve 
his garrisons in the east, to excite a popular rising in that 
quarter, and to intimidate the nervous Austrian commander; 
while the latter was resolved to dictate terms of peace at Paris. 
The French Emperor was committing the same blunder as 
at Smolensk, Moscow and Leipzig, that of underrating the 
energy and courage of his foes. Alone among his staff he did 
not suspect the truth. Near Vitry on March 27, Macdonald 
brought him a bulletin of the aUies with the news of la Fere 
Champenoise. Napoleon's disbelief in its news was strength- 
ened by a curious misprint, March 29 for March 26; but when 



312 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

later on Drouot and Macdonald pointed out from internal 
evidence that the battle had been fought on the earlier day, 
he proceeded to St Dizier to learn the truth, and so lost some 
more precious hours, while the vanguard of the allies was 
coming within sight of the spires of Paris. 

At last it had come to this. The Parisians, who in 1792 
had been in a frenzy of rage and terror at the capture of 
Verdun, were now by this strange series of events suddenly 
confronted with the forces of Europe thundering at their gates. 
The capital was even more defenceless than when Brunswick's 
manifesto had aroused the courage of desperation. The 
lassitude which always follows years of purposeless war, had 
now produced a wide-spread, desire for the acceptance of any 
honourable terms. There was now no levee en jnasse, still less 
any threat of massacring the royalists who listened eagerly for 
the Prussian cannons. What was the inner cause of this striking 
change in public opinion ? Mainly this; that Napoleon, who in 
1799 had seemed about to consolidate and guarantee the 
political hberties of France, had finally gagged and enchained 
them; so that the chief desire of the urban population of 
France was to shake off his yoke as a preliminary to some 
other pohtical experiment. And yet the Parisians revolted at 
the thought of a foreign occupation, which their city had not 
known since the days of Jeanne d'Arc. Some attempts at 
barricades were made, but to save the honour of Paris, not 
to maintain the rule of Napoleon. Few were nerved by 
this last sentiment except possessors of confiscated lands, 
the men implicated in the revolutionary excesses, officials, 
soldiers, and all whose interests were bound up with the 
Emperor's rule. 

In the absence of the Empress-Regent, who had departed 
for Blois, Joseph Bonaparte published a bombastic call to 
arms, which was signally stultified by facts ; for there were 
hardly weapons sufficient for the 13,000 National Guards of 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 313 

Paris ; but the presence of more than 25,000 troops of the 
hne under Marmont and Mortier, besides InvaUdes and 
l)upils of the miUtary schools, promised a defence sufficiently 
prolonged to ensure succour from Napoleon. Whether from 
fear of his arrival or from desire of avoiding a further effusion 
of blood, the allies issued a proclamation urging Paris to 
follow the examples of Bordeaux and Lyons — the latter had 
been surrendered by Augereau to the Austrians — and so 
hasten the advent of peace. It was in vain. At dawn of 
March 30, the allies began to march on the villages east 
of Paris, while others guarded the Fontainebleau road by 
which Napoleon was known to be hurrying to the rescue of 
his capital. For hours the combat raged in and around the 
village of Pantin ; and when the arrival of the Silesian army on 
the north brought the number of assailants up to fully 60,000, 
the Czar sent overtures to Joseph Bonaparte for a suspension 
of hostilities and the surrender of Paris. The Emperor's elder 
brother was not cast in that heroic mould which would gladly 
have defied the forces of combined Europe even amidst the 
ruins of Paris. The prospect of a bombardment and of street- 
fighting between 100,000 enraged combatants dismayed his 
imagination ; and though the relieving army was known to be 
near Fontainebleau, he shortly after midday gave directions to 
Marmont and Mortier that if they were unable to hold their 
positions, they might enter into negotiations with the allied 
commanders, and then retire on the Loire. At the same time 
Bliicher's troops began to assail the heights of Montmartre and 
were about to carry the summit when news of the armistice 
arrived. Nevertheless, the fierce veteran at once ordered 84 
cannons to be placed there to command Paris. Beaten back 
on the east side after desperate fighting, Marmont about four 
o'clock judged that the claims of honour were satisfied, and that 
he might now sue for an armistice to save Paris the horrors 
of a bombardment. The French troops were withdrawn into 



314 The Revohtiionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Paris, which they were forthwith to evacuate. Joseph had 
departed from Paris immediately after giving his message to 
Marmont. 

Meanwhile Napoleon, after awaking from his cherished 
illusion that the allies were retreating on the Rhine, rushed with 
his troops from Vitry to save the capital. Near Corbeil he 
hears of its surrender, and breaks into bitter taunts against his 
brother and generals. Still he is for a last desperate dash, 
to arouse and arm Paris against her captors. The sight of 
Mortier's vanguard in retreat recalls him to his senses ; and he 
spends the night in a hostel, some fifteen miles south of Paris, 
gazing at his maps and plans — only to hear in the morning that 
the aUied sovereigns are entering Paris. The imperious will, 
till then unsubdued by disaster, breaks down for a while, only 
to re-assert its force in conferences with his marshals at 
Fontainebleau. Berthier, Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, Macdonald, 
and others there insisted that the troops — even the Guard- 
were weary, famished, longing for peace, and determined not 
to expose Paris to the fate of Moscow. Macdonald showed 
him a letter from General Beurnonville, a member of the 
Provisional Government just formed at Paris, declaring that the 
allies would not treat with Napoleon and that France was to 
have a constitution like that of England. This was decisive. 
"Very well, gentlemen," said Napoleon, "since it must be so, 
I will abdicate.... Will you accept the King of Rome as 
my successor and the Empress as Regent?" — They all assented. 
He began to write his act of abdication. Even then the indomit- 
able resolve flashed forth in a hasty last appeal — ** Nonsense, 
gentlemen, let us leave all this alone, and march tomorrow. 
We shall beat them." The protest of Macdonald and the 
silence of the rest spoke the feeHngs of generals and soldiers ; 
and Napoleon felt himself powerless. 

Such was the strange end of this brilliant campaign, in 
which the genius of one man had long held at bay three armies, 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 315 

each stronger than his own. And yet, such is the confused 
turmoil of war in which the greatest commanders at times 
grope but bhndly, that the greatest master of the art of military 
concentration finally left his capital exposed to an overwhelming 
attack ; and by an equally singular contretemps it was reserved 
for the least enterprising of his opponents to propose and deal 
the final stroke. By a singular Nemesis, too, the destinies of 
France and Europe lay for a few critical hours in the hands of 
Joseph Bonaparte, whose bourgeois qualities seemed designed 
by nature as a necessary foil to the commanding gifts which she 
had lavished on the second brother; and, as if to crown this 
chapter of paradoxes, Napoleon's abdication was finally assured 
by mingled advice and compulsion from the very marshals 
whose fortunes he had created. 

As we have seen, the aUies had only recently contemplated 
the deposition of Napoleon. After Leipzig they had offered 
him the Rhine boundary : after La Rothiere they offered the 
limits of 1790; and, even when fortune had again smiled on 
their arms at Bar-sur-Aube, the Quadruple Alliance cemented 
at Chaumont (March i) ostensibly proposed to leave Napoleon 
in possession of pre-revolutionary France. But even then 
there was a secret though pow^erful impression among the 
Prussian, Austrian and English diplomatists that so daring 
a genius could not be left in limits which would cramp his 
energies, and that a peace " founded on legitimism " would 
alone be durable. Events were to justify the former belief as 
signally as they falsified the latter. 

This impression was deepened by the confident decla- 
ration (March 11) of the Baron de Vitrolles, spokesman 
for the French royafists, to Metternich — "There will be no 
peace with Buonaparte, and there will be no France without 
the Bourbons." Metternich objected that the alHes saw no 
signs of attachment to the old dynasty, and that they would 
act against the law 01 nations if they imposed it on France. 



3i6 TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Vitrolles maintained that when Napoleon's power was broken, 
the free opinion of France would declare for the Bourbons. 
The Czar, however, remained as before opposed to the 
return of the Bourbons; and though he had now renounced 
the idea of Bernadotte's accession, yet he still (March 17) 
was persuaded that a wisely organised Republic would be 
the best for France. Vitrolles' skilful representations to the 
allied sovereigns and diplomatists after the rupture of negotia- 
tions at Chatillon first prepared them for a declaration that 
they would reject all further overtures from Napoleon. The 
first pubhc declaration of the allies that they would not treat 
with Napoleon or any member of his family was after their 
triumphant entry into Paris. They also promised to respect 
the limits of ancient France such as it was under the legitimate 
kings, as well as to recognise and guarantee the constitution 
which the French people should adopt. The Senate was 
consequently invited to designate a provisional government. 

Up to the last exciting weeks, the very existence of the 
Bourbons had been almost forgotten by young France. The 
name Louis XVIII had for years past conjured up visions of a 
figure dimly flitting from one asylum to another in the far north, 
and occasionally uttering academic protests against the usur- 
pations of his all-powerful rival. The recent proclamation 
of Louis XVIII at Bordeaux had first brought into prominence 
the possibility of a Bourbon Restoration, which a few weeks 
before would have seemed a theme of merely antiquarian 
interest. Even now the cries at Paris were " Down with 
Napoleon" — "No conscription" — "No consolidated duties"; 
but few were raised for the Bourbons. A small informal 
meeting of nobles and wealthy men had, it is true, voted for 
the restoration of Louis XVIII, but the proposal was viewed 
with indifference or aversion by the mass of the people. Once 
more, as in 1791, 1795 and 1799, it was evident that the task 
of construction would be infinitely more difficult than the 



XI.] The Reconstrtiction of Etirope. 317 

ever inspiriting efforts for demolition ; for the portly old 
gentleman who had spent nearly a quarter of a century in 
exile since the fateful night of Varennes, though surpassing his 
unfortunate brother in ability, commanded little of the sym- 
pathy enjoyed by Louis XVI. 

The entry into Paris of the Czar and the King of Prussia — 
Francis I was at Dijon — revealed the existence of a small 
but vociferous party of royalists who distributed white cockades 
to the few who cared to don the Bourbon colour. The 
attitude of the many was that of resignation, curiosity, or, at 
most, of joy at the tardy advent of peace. Warned that the 
Elyse'e was mined, the Czar occupied Talleyrand's mansion; 
and this skilful diplomatist now played a momentous part in 
the affairs of France and of Europe. Having convinced 
himself that " under the Bourbons France would cease to be 
gigantic, in order again to become great," he now persuaded 
his illustrious guest that, to form a durable government, it must 
be based on a principle. That principle was legitimism. Its 
outward manifestation was Louis XVIII. The wily diplomatist 
had touched the Czar's weak side in his appeal to a principle. 
There was no more talk of a French Republic, still less of 
Bernadotte, whose threats of leading his troops against the 
alHes if they restored the Bourbons at last unmasked his 
designs in undertaking the war. Talleyrand forthwith con- 
vened the Conservative Senate, wiiose duty was to safeguard 
the constitution which at every crisis it had violated. It was 
now again true to its past. Though less than half its numbers 
were present, it appointed a provisional government in place of 
Napoleon, who was deposed from his throne and from the 
exercise of all his powers (April 2). 

In vain did Napoleon send Ney, Macdonald, and Caulain- 
court as his commissioners to urge that Marie Louise should be 
allowed to act as Regent for the King of Rome. Even Austrian 
diplomacy rejected a plan which a i^w days previously would 



3i8 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

have been welcomed by all the allies. Their determination 
was strengthened by the defection of Marmont, whose generals 
led the French vanguard within the alHed lines (April 5). 
Marmont's excuse for desertion was the need of rescuing 
France from needless dangers; but she rejected the excuse 
and branded his name with infamy. The allied positions 
south of Paris were sufficiently strong to have defied the power 
of Napoleon had all his troops advanced to renew a hopeless 
fight ; but even on April 6 he had endeavoured for the last 
time to rouse his marshals to an onset. They stoutly refused. 
The superhuman pertinacity of his will furnishes the best, 
indeed the only, excuse for Marmont's defection, and for that 
of Ney which speedily followed. At last, on final pressure 
from his marshals, Napoleon put an end to the suspense of the 
world by signing (April 11) the Act of Abdication for himself 
and his son; and after a thrilling scene of farewell to his 
" children " — the Old Guard — he departed for Elba, which the 
Czar had suggested as a fit abode. Only the presence of a 
Russian escort saved him from massacre at Orgon by a mob 
of royalists, whose rancorous hearts were untouched by the 
sight of fallen greatness. The story that he attempted to 
poison himself before leaving Fontainebleau, probably arose 
from his having taken a heavy dose of opium to secure much 
needed repose. Had he intended suicide, he would surely 
have committed it when surrounded by the rabble of the 
Rhone valley. His indulgence to Marie Louise was requited 
by her desertion of him ; and he never saw her or his son 
again. 

The last act of the war was a bloody and not very decisive 
engagement between Wellington and Soult at Toulouse (April 
10). During his hasty retreat on Carcassonne, the French 
marshal heard that peace was now secured; and the English 
general finished on the upper Garonne the campaigns begun at 
the mouth of the Mondego. 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 319 

Meanwhile at Paris the ardent royalists were urging the 
return of Louis XVIII without conditions ; but Talleyrand 
and the Senate were equally determined to have the following 
guarantees for constitutional government — two Chambers, a 
Ministry responsible to them, a Budget subject to the control 
of the Chambers, liberty of the press and of public worship, 
admissibihty of all Frenchmen to all employments, &c. The 
Comte d'Artois was persuaded by the Czar to acknowledge 
these principles of a Revolution which his youthful follies 
had done so much to provoke, and was declared lieutenant- 
general of the kingdom, until his elder brother, now called to 
the throne, should have acceded to the Constitutional Charter. 

In this capacity the Comte d'Artois signed (April 23) 
Conventions with the allies which were ratified in the Treaty 
of Paris (May 30, 18 14). The allies now granted conditions of 
peace slightly more favourable than those offered to Napoleon 
in March. Instead of fixing the limits of France as in 1790, 
those of 1792 were now conceded. This implied the retention 
by France of the County of Avignon, as also of Salm, Mont- 
beliard, and the district connecting Landau with Alsace. On 
the other hand it severed from France all the gains of the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars except Miihlhausen and 
the districts around Philippeville, Saarbriicken, Annecy and 
Chambery, If France lost heavily on land, she regained 
most of her colonial possessions. Perfidious Albion yielded 
up all the French colonies conquered by her, except Mau- 
ritius, the Seychelles, Tobago and St Lucia. The French 
coast claims on Newfoundland were also recognised by us. 
France regained Guadaloupe from Sweden and her part of 
Guiana from the Portuguese, ceding however to the Spanish 
Government the part 01 St Domingo which had belonged to 
Spain before the Treaty of Basel. After twenty years of war, 
which added about ;£6oo,ooo,ooo to the National Debt, some 
discontent was very naturally felt in England at the magnitude 



320 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chaf. 

of the restitutions to our late foe ; but Lord Castlereagh replied 
to some strictures in Parliament on this subject that it was 
desirable to give France an occupation for the time of peace : 
— " It is better (he said) for France to be commercial and 
therefore pacific, than a warlike and conquering State." 

This naive confession may be commended to the notice of 
the class, still numerous, it is to be feared, on both sides of the 
Channel, who can see nothing in English policy from 1793 to 
1 815, save perfidious and violent attempts to seize the trade of 
the world and destroy the liberties of France. That the war of 
1793 was to some extent a war of principles has been admitted: 
that it was so after 1803 has been refuted; and it has been 
abundantly shown that English maritime domination was as 
distinctly an engine of war, as Napoleon's conquest of the 
Continent was an attempt to humble the mistress of the seas. 
French declamation against the greed and perfidy of England 
is therefore no less irrelevant than the complacently insular 
explanation that Napoleon's march to Moscow was solely due 
to his overweening ambition. Both combatants played despe- 
rately for enormous stakes, and their methods are open to 
severe censure. That Napoleon would have granted peace 
and prosperity to Europe if he had conquered, is quite 
probable. It is certain, however, that England's ultimate 
triumph — due to the fact that she had the resources of the 
tropics at her back, while Napoleon's policy finally outraged 
the sentiments and wants of millions — was followed by the 
restitution of most of her conquests and the abandonment of 
her chief maritime claims. 

It is interesting to observe that in the Anglo-French 
additional articles to this Treaty, efforts were strenuously 
made by Castlereagh to procure the abolition by France of the 
trade in slaves \ and also to gain a promise of a commercial 
treaty between the two nations. Both questions were, how- 
ever, adjourned. 



XI.] The Recojtstruction of Europe. - 321 

The surrender of nearly all the conquests made in the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, seemed an unspeakable 
ignominy to the generation of Frenchmen who had been 
nurtured on the phrase 'natural boundaries'; and the cession 
of 53 fortresses with some 12,000 cannons, involved by the 
return to the limits of 1792, was felt by ardent royalists as a 
terrible blow to the restored dynasty. The shrinkage of the 
Napoleonic Empire into the kingdom of France severed 
from her rule 15,300,000 Italian, German, Flemish and Dutch 
subjects ; but, except in Eastern Savoy, very few French- 
speaking people were transferred to an alien rule. Indeed, the 
France of Louis XVIII, as contrasted with that of Louis XVI, 
gained districts with nearly half a million souls. Yet the vast- 
ness of the immediate loss very naturally obscured these 
slight gains on the old historic limits. The allies imposed no 
war indemnity on France; and most of the objects of art 
taken from the various cities of Europe were left at Paris. 
Among the few which were reclaimed in 18 14 was the Victory 
of the Brandenburg Gate at Berlin, which was received by the 
Berhners with unbounded rejoicings. The debt still due from 
Prussia to France since 1807 was of course cancelled. 

Hard though these conditions seemed to the French, they 
can scarcely be considered so, when the magnitude of the 
allied efforts and the completeness of their triumph are duly 
considered. Talleyrand, Louis XVIII's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, was severely blamed for signing such a treaty, and was 
indeed accused of being bribed into it. His refutation is com- 
plete and crushing. He shows in his Memoirs and Appendices 
that two-thirds of the French army were prisoners, and half of 
Napoleon's empire in the hands of foreign troops; further, 
that the Emperor himself when he heard of the march of the 
allies on Paris, despatched Caulaincourt to accept their con- 
ditions : finally, that now in the complete helplessness of 
France, better terms were finally gained by the restored 
F. R. 21 



322 The Revolutionary and Napolco7iic Era. [Chap. 

dynasty than Napoleon could have obtained at the close of the 
last campaign. These facts were not known to the multitude ; 
but they absolve the allies from the charge of trampling re- 
morselessly on France in her helplessness, and of imposing a 
weak dynasty in order to plunder her of the natural boundaries. 
The Rhine boundary was lost by Napoleon at and after la 
Rothiere ; and his own ruin was assured by the pertinacity 
with which in August 1813 and March 181 4 he held out 
against the offers of the allies until after the definite rupture of 
negotiations. 

Sufficient has also been said to disprove the charge that 
the allies forcibly imposed the Bourbons on France. On the 
contrary, they viewed this alternative with suspicion, they were 
virtually forced by Napoleon's obstinacy to depose him, and 
then they left French opinion to decide on its form of govern- 
ment. The Restoration was brought about by the energy of 
the French royalists, the skill of their spokesmen, Vitrolles 
and Talleyrand, and by the vote of the Senate. Among those 
who voted for the deposition of Napoleon v/ere some men 
prominent in the earlier part of the Revolution, Roger Ducos, 
Gre'goire, Kellermann, Lanjuinais, Serrurier, &c.; and these 
men in deposing the Emperor must have known the truth of 
Talleyrand's words to the Czar, " Either Bonaparte or Louis 
XVIII, Sire : anything else is an intrigue." 

Limits of space preclude any account of Louis XVIII's 
measures during the first restoration. His speech at the open- 
ing session of the Chambers showed what a gulf yawned be- 
tween the ancient regime and the new order of things. The 
phrases — "The Charter granted {pctroyee) by us," "The nine- 
teen years of our reign " — jarred on the ears of the young 
generation; and the Charter itself, though granting most of 
the points required by the Senate, limited the franchise to 
citizens who paid 300 francs a year in direct taxation. Even 
in the later days of the Empire, the pretence of universal 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 323 

suffrage had been kept up ; and the present Hmitation of the 
franchise to about 80,000 persons was felt as a direct contra- 
vention of one of the chief principles of the revolution. Some 
features of the imperial regime were continued under Louis 
XVIII. The king alone was to propose laws, though the 
Chambers might supplicate him to do so. The Senate was to 
consist of members nominated for life by the king; and its 
debates were to be secret. The Charter also declared an 
amnesty for all past acts except those of the most prominent 
regicides ; and it proclaimed in unmistakable terms the in- 
violability of all lands and property gained during the con- 
fiscations of the revolution. The apprehensions, however, of 
the holders of confiscated lands were soon re-awakened by the 
increasing arrogance of the old nobles and by the demands of 
their journals that confiscated lands should now revert to their 
ancient possessors. A project for indemnifying these men 
was proposed by Macdonald to the Chamber of Peers ; but 
such a torrent of claims flowed in that the matter had to be 
adjourned owing to the embarrassment of the finances, and 
only the few national domains which remained unsold were 
restored to their former landlords. With this slight exception, 
the agrarian settlement was postponed, and was not solved 
until the reign of Charles X. 

Other questions, such as an attempted limitation of free- 
dom of the Press, irritated public opinion. The slights in- 
flicted on old soldiers, and the honours showered on all who 
had intrigued for the royalist cause, disgusted all who during 
the Empire had seen honours bestowed according to genius 
and deserts. ''The Court (wrote Marshal Macdonald) was 
daily losing ground in public opinion. It seemed as though 
the Ministry and their agents were vying with each other as to 
which should give proof of the greatest folly, and the entourage 
of the King, as to who should exhibit the greatest haughtiness 
and conceit." 



324 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Equally precarious was the situation in Central Europe. 
Throughout this work I have insisted on the divulsive effect 
on the first three great coalitions of the jealousies and rivalries 
of the Powers concerning Poland, Bavaria, and Hanover. 
Each of these questions was worth an army to France. Only 
the crushing weight of Napoleon's domination hushed the 
quarrels about those States. Not till Prussia was entering on 
the death-grapple with her foe in 1807 and 1813, did she 
renounce those claims on George Ill's Electorate, which 
would yield to her the line of the Weser and the fortress of 
Hameln as the western bulwarks of her power. That question 
had at last been set at rest by the treaty of Teplitz (Sept. 
1813). The Leipzig campaign had also shown to the Austrian 
Government the possibility of outflanking Eugene's positions 
in Venetia, if it came to a close understanding with Bavaria. 
Here again, then, it was antipathy to Napoleon and desire 
for complete preponderance in distracted Italy, that led 
the Hapsburg Emperor to renounce designs on Bavaria which 
had for a generation past weakened the Germanic system j 
and the Austro-Bavarian Treaty of Oct. 181 3 cleared away the 
chief elements of discord in South Germany. There still re- 
mained, however, the eternal Polish problem, and the closely 
aUied question of the future of Saxony, not to speak of the re- 
construction of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 

The re-construction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna 
presented, indeed, the vastest political problems ever ap- 
proached by statesmen and diplomatists. Imagine the soil of 
a continent rent by subterranean convulsions and desolated 
by floods, till the old land-marks had well-nigh disappeared, 
and some conception may be formed of the political confusion 
of Europe in the summer of 18 14. It is not surprising that 
the most meritorious attempts at reconciling the rights of 
property with the public welfare should have failed to please 
the old proprietors and also to meet the claims of the many. 



XI.] TJie Reconstrtictioii of Europe. 325 

Still less is it to be wondered at that the occasion yielded 
a rich harvest to many an adroit pilferer. 

Amidst the hurly-burly of war three important compacts 
had been struck — those of Kalisch, Teplitz, and Chaumont. 
Of their clauses only the following need be recapitulated here 
as bearing on the negotiations at Vienna. At Kalisch Prussia 
had been promised by the Czar an eastern frontier adapted to 
connect the province of West Prussia with Silesia — a phrase 
capable of very wide interpretation: for his losses in the east, 
Frederick WilHam was to receive compensation in North or 
West Germany, so as to bring his realm to the position it held 
before 1806. The Treaty of KaHsch therefore foreshadowed 
that western extension of Russian and Prussian power which 
was ultimately to place the middle course of the Vistula and 
the Rhine in their keeping. 

The Teplitz Treaties stipulated that after the dissolution of 
the Rhenish Confederation, the German rulers of the lands 
between Prussia and the Rhine should enjoy "full and uncon- 
ditional independence." In vain did Hardenberg, Stein and the 
Prussian patriots oppose this clause as being fatal to any effective 
union of Germany. Stein submitted a j^lan for two great 
German federations, Prussia heading the North and Austria 
the South. Metternich, however, desired by friendly compacts 
with the other German Governments to assure Austrian supre- 
macy, and also to postpone any attempt at a popular federal 
constitution for which the Prussian patriotic party was striving. 
Instead of Joseph IPs revolutionary and aggressive policy, 
Austria now aimed at heading a sort of Fiirstenbund or League 
of Princes, which would keep " the revolution " in check and 
quietly pave the way for Hapsburg predominance in German 
affairs. Treaties with Bavaria and the other German States 
(Oct. — Dec. 1 8 13) assured the triumph of Metternich's policy. 
At Chatillon and Chaumont (March 1814) it was resolved that 
the States of Germany should be independent but united by a 



326 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

federal bond. The Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814) also 
sUpulated that the part of Italy which did not fall to Austria 
should be composed of sovereign States : that Holland under 
the restored House of Orange should receive an accession of 
territory, the lands between the new limits of France and the 
Rhine being named as compensation for Holland, Prussia, ' 
and the smaller German States. Genoa, which had been occu- 
pied by English troops, was to strengthen the reconstituted 
kingdom of Sardinia; and the return of the Pope into pos- 
session of the Papal States was acknowledged by the Powers, 
in spite of the annoyance of Austria, which had hoped to 
gain those important territories. A secret understanding was 
arrived at by the Powers forming the Quadruple Alliance, that 
France was not to interfere in the pending territorial changes. 

Beside these compacts of primary importance there are 
others which also influenced the transactions at Vienna, and 
must therefore be briefly noticed here. Both from Russia 
and England the assurance had been given to the Court of 
Stockholm that Norway should be the reward of Swedish help 
in the struggle against Napoleon. When Denmark was over- 
whelmed by Bernadotte's forces in Holstein, she concluded 
the Treaty of Kiel (Jan. 18 14) by which England promised 
her good oflices to obtain for the Danish realm a fit in- 
demnity for the loss of Norway. Sweden ceded to Denmark 
Riigen and Swedish Pomerania ; but by a complicated series 
of exchanges they ultimately went to Prussia, Denmark taking 
Lauenburg. Great Britain retained Heligoland as well as the 
Danish fleet captured in 1807 — thereby refusing to make 
reparation for that high-handed action. It is true that after 
the Danes had rejected the final offer of England to regard 
the fleet as a pledge, it was taken as a prize of war ; but its 
restoration at the general peace was nevertheless morally 
binding. 

During a visit of the allied sovereigns to London it was 



XI.] TJie Reconstruction of Europe. 327 

decided (July 18 14) that Belgium should form the addition to 
Dutch territory foreshadowed in the Treaty of Paris. An 
illusory attempt was made to safeguard the interests of the 
Belgians in this artificial arrangement, which avowedly aimed 
at building up a barrier state on the north-east of France. A 
month later England agreed to restore to Holland the Dutch 
colonies (all of which had been conquered) with the very 
important exceptions of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, 
Essequibo and Berbice. England, however, agreed to pay a 
sum not exceeding ;^3, 000,000 towards the fortification of the 
frontier fortresses in the south of Belgium. 

The Austro-Bavarian alliance was strengthened by a secret 
Convention (June 18 14) transferring nearly the whole of Tyrol, 
Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and the Inn-viertel to the Hapsburg 
dominions ; while Austria ceded in return Wiirzburg (held by 
her Arch-Duke Ferdinand), and promised to secure for Bavaria 
as much land as possible on the left bank of the Rhine. 
The retention by Bavaria of Anspach and Baireuth — formerly 
Prussian principalities — was also tacitly agreed on, as in the 
preceding treaty of Oct. 1813. 

Treaties between Spain and the Powers recognised the 
restoration of Ferdinand VII as King of Spain and its 
colonies. Some States also yielded to English solicitations 
for the abolition of the traffic in slaves. " There is hardly a 
village (wrote Castlereagh to Sir H. Wellesley in Spain) that 
has not petitioned on this subject : both Houses of Parhament 
are pledged to press it ; and the Ministers must make it the 
basis of their policy." 

Such was the general condition of European affairs before 
the commencement of the Congress of Vienna (Nov. 3, 18 14). 
The visit of Alexander and Frederick William to London 
had revealed sharp differences between the Czar's opportunist 
Liberalism and the desires of the English Government to 
support legitimist claims. Moreover, ever since the violation 



328 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

of Swiss neutrality, there had been a personal feud between 
the Czar and Metternich, which was to develop into a life-long 
struggle ending in the complete success of the diplomatist. 
In 1814 the victory was in the main to Alexander. "I shall 
keep what I hold:... I have given Saxony to Prussia: Austria 
consents : " such were his menacing words to Talleyrand, the 
plenipotentiary of France. Alexander's determination to keep 
all, or nearly all, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was supported 
by the pleadings of Laharpe and Czartoryski that he would 
resuscitate . the Kingdom of Poland. Prussia, in return for 
sacrificing two-thirds of her former Polish lands, was determined 
to have the whole of Saxony besides a great gain of territory in 
western Germany. Austria and England were strongly opposed 
to the extension of the Czar's power beyond the Vistula ; while 
France, Austria and Bavaria equally objected to the extermi- 
nation of the Kingdom of Saxony as fatal to the balance of 
power in Germany. Austria, France, and Great Britain were, 
therefore, naturally opposed to the Russo-Prussian claims. 
Wellington himself, writing from Mons in August 18 14, had 
advocated an understanding between England and France as 
safeguarding the interests and even the peace of Europe. 
Castlereagh also favoured an understanding with our late foe 
as a check to " improvident schemes and undue pretensions." 
It is evident, then, that the desire for accord existed at 
Downing Street; and that Talleyrand's claim in his letters 
to Louis XVIII, of having formed that entente cordiale, is 
exaggerated. Indeed, he was at first filled with the usual 
French belief in the utter selfishness of British policy, as 
contrasted with his own edifying advocacy ot "principles"; 
but the first few weeks at Vienna sufficed to reveal the 
difference between Castlereagh's tone and that of the three 
Continental Powers, especially Russia and Prussia. There 
was thus once again a possibility of that Anglo-French ahiance 
which Voltaire and Adam Smith had advocated, for which 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 329 

Pitt and Fox, Mirabeau and the youthful Talleyrand, had 
used their gifts of eloquence and statesmanship, only to see 
their hopes vanish before the aggressive claims of the Jacobins 
and the rampant militarism of the Napoleonic regime. After 
more than twenty years of bitter hostility between the two 
nations, the disciple of Mirabeau now again began to reaHse 
the practicability of that alliance which his master probably 
inculcated on his death-bed, and which he hmiself vainly 
strove to effect in the autumn of 1792. 

To so dextrous a diplomatist as Talleyrand it was not 
difficult to reveal the hollowaiess of the accord between the 
four other great Powers. His skilful refutation of their claim 
to be "allies" as against monarchical France, and his dis- 
avowal of all the compacts made before the Congress, speedily 
lifted France from the depths to which Napoleon's obstinacy 
had hurled her. Threats that France must be made to feel 
some of the hardships which the Napoleonic arms had inflicted 
on Prussia and otlier lands, were deftly parried by the legitimist 
shield: France had returned to her lawful sovereigns and to 
her historic hmits: — "We Frenchmen must be good Europeans. 
France ought to demand and does demand nothing, absolutely 
nothing, beyond a just re-division (of Europe) among the 
Powers, i.e. the balance of power." This last principle of 
policy, which has long been regarded as the climax of arti- 
ficiality and yet was so natural as a protest against the pre- 
dominance of France, was defined to mean — "a combination 
of the rights, the interests, and the relations of the Powers 
among themselves, by which Europe seeks to ensure (i) that 
the rights and possessions of a Power shall not be attacked by 
one or several other Powers : (2) that one or several other 
Powers shall never attain to domination over Europe : (3) that 
the combination adopted shall render difficult or impossible 
a rupture of the estabhshed order and of the tranquillity of 
Europe." Talleyrand's adroit acceptance of the very claims 



330 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

for which the Powers had since 1805 been persistently con- 
tending, completely enfiladed the allied position, the climax 
of diplomatic comedy being reached when he blandly insisted, 
in spite of the impotent protests of some of the plenipotentiaries, 
that the Congress should be held according to the principles of 
international law\ 

The two burning questions at the Congress which nearly 
involved Europe in a general conflagration, were those of 
Poland and Saxony. The King of Saxony had since Tilsit 
held the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which the Czar was now 
determined to revive as a Kingdom of Poland, subject to some 
cessions to Prussia. Even so the Court of Berlin dreaded such 
an extension of the Czar's power, and regarded the possession 
of the whole of Saxony as inadequate compensation for the 
loss of the lands around Warsaw. England and Austria 
for a time persuaded Prussia to protest against the Czar's 
Polish claims, but pressure which the Czar put on Frederick 
William and through him on his plenipotentiary, Hardenberg, 
renewed the Russo-Prussian accord (Nov. 6). Theoretically, 
the most skilful way of countermining their claims would have 
been for England and France to protest against the two last 
partitions of Poland, which the former had never acknowledged, 
and to have declared for the complete independence of Poland 
as in 1 791 ; but that was felt by Castlereagh and finally by 
Talleyrand to be impracticable, and after admitting the prin- 
ciple of partition there was no valid argument against the 
Czar's claim that in return for his immense services to the 



1 Matters of general concern were settled in a Commission of the Great 
Powers. German affairs were to be adjusted in a separate Commission 
in which Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Hanover {not 
Saxony) were represented. The reconstruction of Germany is treated very 
briefly here, as it forms the subject of another vohmie of this series, "The 
Foundation of the German Empire, 1815 — 1871." This volume will also 
contain a map of Central Europe after 1815. 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 331 

European cause he must have the lion's share of the Duchy of 
Warsaw. 

In that case, Prussia insisted on obtaining Saxony, the 
administration of which, hitherto in the hands of the Russians, 
was now by the Czar's orders transferred to the Berlin 
Government. This arrangement, acquiesced in conditionally 
for a time by Austria and England, was strongly opposed 
by France, Bavaria and the German Princes, who signed 
a protest that " without a free and independent Saxony, 
there is no stable federal Germany." Metteinich and Castle- 
reagh were also brought by Talleyrand to see the importance 
of keeping Saxony with strength little impaired; and the 
conclusion of peace between Great Britain and the United 
States (Dec. 24, 18 14) on the basis of the status quo ante belliun, 
left the former free to take a firmer tone in European matters. 
The dislike of our Prince Regent and all German princes 
to Prussian predominance also helped to range England side 
by side with France, Austria and the German States, who 
cloaked their fears of Prussian aggrandisement under their 
professions of horror at the spoliation of a king. The work of 
the Congress, wrote Talleyrand to Castlereagh, was to close 
the Revolution and restore the lawful sovereigns — a perfectly 
unwarrantable assumption: all but one of the revolutionary 
dynasties (he referred to that of Murat) had vanished : all but 
one of the old reigning families, that of Saxony, had been 
restored: it remained for the Congress to show its devotion 
to principles by dethroning the usurper, and restoring the 
much persecuted King of Saxony to his governing powers. 
European Liberalism also protested against a plan which would 
hand over the Saxons to an alien rule. On the other hand 
there certainly was some feeling in Saxony in favour of union 
with Prussia, as a step towards that unification of Germany 
which had nerved the Germans to the efforts of 1813. "The 
far-sighted and energetic spirits (wrote Varnhagen von Ense) 



332 Ihe Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

were all on the side of Prussia." The splendid efforts which 
speedily raised her from an abyss of degradation to heights 
never reached even by Frederick the Great, her new institutions, 
and the seemingly sure prospect of Parliamentary Government, 
aroused the eager hopes of all Germans who longed to sweep 
away the barriers raised by feudality and particularism, and to 
unite with the one German State which appeared able to 
guarantee the safety and Hberty of the Fatherland. Following 
the general lead of Stein, this "unitarian sect," as it was 
sneeringly called by Metternich, urged that the Saxons did not 
form a nation, that their absorption by Prussia would power- 
fully aid the work of German unification, to which the middle- 
sized States then, as ever, formed the chief obstacle, and that 
the Saxon King's opposition to the national cause, and his 
faithlessness to Austria in 1813, justified his complete depo- 
sition. A suggestion that the king should receive as compen- 
sation some German lands west of the Rhine, was objected 
to as certain to create a satellite of France on Germany's weak 
side. 

Thus raged the diplomatic contests, aggravated by the 
haughty tone of the Czar, which so annoyed Castlereagh as to 
evoke from him the declaration that England v/ould not accept 
laws from anybody. The Powers began to arm as if for war ; 
and Talleyrand attained a brilliant diplomatic triumph by the 
formation of a secret compact between England, France and 
Austria, to which Bavaria, Hanover and the Netherlands soon 
acceded, for resistance to the Russo-Prussian demands. 
Whether French soldiers would have fought side by side with 
English and Austrians, or the British Parliament would have 
sanctioned a war for this purpose, is at least problematical; 
but the compact enabled Talleyrand to boast to Louis XVIII 
that the coalition against France was dissolved for ever, and 
that she now had alliances which she could hardly have hoped 
to gain in fifty years. Further, he was at once admitted to 



XI.] The Reccnstrtiction of Europe. }^^^-^ 

all the conferences of the Great Powers. Satisfied with his 
success, and unwilling to push his sovereign into an unpopular 
war, Talleyrand now abated his claims, as did all parties in 
the dispute. Alarming news of Bonapartist intrigues in France 
and Italy helped on the solution of the Polish and Saxon 
difficulties. Metternich showed the danger of dethroning the 
Saxon King and giving him lands on the confines of France, 
and now offered that Prussia should take rather more of Saxony 
than had lately been conceded. The Czar consented to leave 
the fortress of Thorn to Prussia; and to calm the fears of 
Austrian military authorities, the important city of Cracow 
with its district was to remain a free Republic. The Liberal 
principles of the Czar were emphasized in a clause that all 
parts of Poland as it was before the partitions should enjoy 
" a representation and institutions which should ensure the 
preservation of their nationality." 

As regards the Saxon question, Castlereagh finally per- 
suaded Austria and France to concede not only the fortress of 
Wittenberg but that of Torgau to Prussia, thereby safeguarding 
the southern approaches to Berlin. She was also to acquire 
the more thinly peopled half of Saxony, with 850,000 inhabit- 
ants, on the north, east and west, reducing that kingdom to its 
present extent. 

On the side of Poland, Prussia regained from her spoils 
of the second and third partitions only Danzig, Thorn 
and the province of Posen ; but by her great gains in the 
west (noted below ') she became the chief purely Germanic 
power, and stood forth as the natural protectress of the 

^ Her former lands west of the Elbe, the Alt-Mark, with Magdeburg, 
Halle, Erfurt, Eichsfeld, Paderborn, Minden, Munster, and Cleves, re- 
turned to her sway, beside other lands which helped to build up the 
present Westphalian and Rhenish provinces. On the other hand she 
sacrificed Anspach and Baireuth to Bavaria, and Hildesheim and East 
Frisia to Hanover — now made a kingdom. 



334 ^^^^ Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

weaker German States not only against Russia but also against 
France. Strange to say, she viewed with apprehension the 
acquisition of the Roman-Catholic Rhenish Province, so long 
subject to France, as entailing great difficulties and ex- 
penses for defence. On their side, the French diplomatists 
regarded it as a triumph to maintain the independence of 
the richer half of Protestant Saxony, and to yield to Prussia the 
population of the Rhine lands, which she would assimilate with 
great difficulty. Both sides then failed to discern that the 
guardian of the Rhine would naturally become the champion 
of Germany against France. It is difficult, indeed, to see how 
German unity could have been accomplished, had the allies 
acceded to Hardenberg's plan of acquiring all Saxony and 
indemnifying its king with lands west of the Rhine, and Bonn 
as his capital. The due Pasquier at that time saw the ad- 
vantages of having a lirm foe to Prussia established in that 
commanding position; but the French diplomatists in their 
excessive zeal for the legitimist cause, preferred to maintain 
the Saxon Government in Dresden and Leipzig in order to 
trim the balance in German affairs. Events were to show that 
in this respect Talleyrand, Metternich and Castlereagh were 
Prussia's best friends ; for the efforts to defend her long and 
straggling frontiers braced her to the contest which ended 
in the annexation of the intervening German States, and the 
consohdation of that unity for which Germany was not fully 
prepared in 1815. 

A question discussed at great length in the Congress was 
the compensation to Bavaria for her cessions to Austria and 
for her efforts in the allied cause. Mainz, the key of Germany 
on the west, was coveted by her; and Austria, according to 
treaty promise, endeavoured to procure that stronghold for her 
satellite ; but it was felt to be too important a fortress for a 
growing State like Bavaria to hold, and with its adjoining land 
was assigned to Hesse-Darmstadt, subject to its being garri- 



XI.] TJie Reconstruction of Eitrope. 335 

soned by Prusso-Aiistrian troops as a federal fortress. The 
claims of Bavaria to the lands about Hanau, Frankfurt, Fulda 
and Mannheim were set aside, as tending to sunder southern 
from northern Germany ; and she was finally limited to gains 
which formed approximately her present territories. As these 
were neither conterminous nor so extensive as she had hoped 
for, the seeds of dissension were thereby sown between her and 
Austria. Hesse-Cassel and Oldenburg were revived in nearly 
their old extent ; as also were the Free-Cities of Hamburg, 
Liibeck, Bremen and Frankfurt, now the only survivors of the 
51 which existed in 1789. The 12 Imperial villages had of 
course been entirely absorbed. The shocks of revolution had 
completely shattered the rights of the petty * immediate' 
princes, and had also blotted out from the map of Germany 
the 73 ecclesiastical States or domains which had governing 
powers. The concentrating tendencies of this era may be 
summed up in the statement that of about 300 sovereign 
States existing in Germany at the death of Frederick the Great, 
only 39 remained at the fall of Napoleon to build up the new 
Germanic Confederation. 

While these and other territorial changes were approaching 
a settlement, startling news arrived which promptly hushed all 
minor differences. The last faint possibilities of war between 
the Powers vanished when it was known that Napoleon had 
eluded the vigilance of French and English cruisers off Elba 
and was sailing northwards. Talleyrand at once remarked 
that he would land in Italy, then in a ferment of agitation; 
but Metternich shrewdly conjectured that Paris was his aim. 

Three landings of Napoleon Bonaparte on the Provengal 
coast will serve to remind posterity of the vicissitudes in his 
extraordinary career. In the spring of 1793, after the ex- 
pulsion of his family from Corsica, he lands in France to 
carve his way by his sword, either in the service of the Sultan, 
of the English East India Company, or of the regicide re- 



336 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

public. The autumn of 1799 sees him disembark at Frejus, 
after almost miraculously escaping Nelson's cruisers, to be 
enthusiastically greeted as the conqueror of the East and the 
only possible saviour of France. And now on March i, 1815 
he lands near Cannes with about a thousand men to rouse 
France against the Bourbons and emigrant nobles. 

The people of Provence were deaf to his appeals, but the 
potency of his fascination over the army was at once evident. 
Many of the soldiers in garrison at Antibes climbed down the 
ramparts to join their Emperor. His activity and skill were 
phenomennl. He baffled the designs of the authorities for his 
capture by a speedy de'tour through the difficult mountain- 
road to Grenoble, thus avoiding the lower Rhone valley, the 
ardent royalism of which he had reason to remember. Pro- 
clamations scattered among the people aimed at reviving the 
old illusions, that he was in 1814 conqueror at all points and 
only the treachery of Augereau at Lyons and Marmont at 
Paris thwarted the complete success of his movement for 
cutting the communications of the allies. "Soldiers ! we have 
not been beaten. Two men, who rose from our ranks, be- 
trayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor." 
— " Your general, called to the throne by the choice of the 
people, and raised on your shields, has come back to you : 
come and join him. — The eagle with the national colours will 
fly from steeple to steeple right to the towers of Notre Dame." 

To the citizens he protested the right of each country to 
have the ruler that it chose, and to reject a rule forced on it 
by foreigners. The splendour of his personality hid from the 
general eye the unreality of these claims, and France threw 
herself at his feet as readily as in 1799. The garrison of 
Grenoble, when ordered to capture the Emperor in the in- 
terests of France and of peace, marched to fulfil its duty. 
Muskets were raised to fire, when Napoleon, opening the well- 
known grey over-coat, exclaimed " Let him among you who 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe, 337 

wishes to kill me, fire." What else could the generous French 
soldiers do than cheer for the Emperor and mount the 
tricolour cockades long carried in their knapsacks ! This 
dramatic scene decided the whole course of events. Napo- 
leon's Guards afterwards assured Macdonald that, had they 
been fired upon by the Grenoble garrison, they would have 
laid down their arms and retired home, since most of them had 
come with him to France only to escape from the weary exile 
at Elba. As it was, the gates of Grenoble were now pulled 
down by the excited citizens and Napoleon entered in triumph. 
At Lyons Macdonald's ardent appeals to the royal troops to 
join in a cheer for the king were answered by stony silence. 
Officers and soldiers alike were disgusted with the shower of 
honours to emigrant nobles and chouans, and the neglect of 
services rendered on many a famous battle-field. The Comte 
d'Artois hurriedly left Lyons escorted by a single trooper, and 
Macdonald with one general barely escaped from the town 
which in 1793 had fought desperately for the royalist cause. 

Events now rapidly trended in the direction of burlesque. 
Ney had declared that he would bring back Napoleon in an 
iron cage. He promptly took all his troops, the chief re- 
maining support of the Bourbon throne, over to the Emperor. 
At Paris nothing was heard but loud protestations of loyalty to 
the king, while measures were secretly taken to ensure favours 
from the usurper on his arrival. At a royal session of the 
Senate, the Comte d'Artois and his sons threw themselves into 
the king's arms, swearing fidehty to the Charter which they 
detested. Louis XVIII declared that he would die on his 
throne in defence of his people : four days later he hurriedly 
left Paris for Lille and Ghent. Finally, on the night of March 
20 Napoleon, escorted by a vast torchlight procession, entered 
the Tuileries amidst a delirium of excitement. 

The glamour of this transformation-scene failed to impose 
on the minds of the thinking few. They besought the soldiers 
F. R. 22 



338 The Revohitionajy and Napoleonic Era, [Chap. 

and people not to plunge Europe again into a war which was 
inevitable with Napoleon on the throne. The chiefs of the 
constitutional party, Laine, Lafayette and others, pointed out 
the securities for liberty and peace which Louis XVIII's 
Charter and general policy assured. It was in vain. Napoleon 
or his partisans skilfully proclaimed that he intended to follow 
a pacific policy, that he had a friendly understanding with 
Austria, that he came to restore liberty and prevent the return 
of the old feudal dues. What did soldiers and peasants care 
for the tame constitutional rule of the Bourbons, and Talley- 
rand's diplomatic triumphs at Vienna? They saw only the 
insolence of the emigrant nobles and their avowed intention of 
recovering their old lands. 

In some respects, then, this startling revolution resembled 
that of 1789. Fear of a return to the old abuses, at any rate 
when the Comte d'Artois should mount the throne, was the 
most potent motive with civilians. But, though in part a 
social and agrarian revolution, it yet bore a closer resemblance 
to that of Fructidor than to the essentially popular movements 
of 1789. After all it was in the main the work of the army. 
The return of a quarter of a million of soldiers imprisoned in 
England, Spain, Russia, and Germany would at any time 
have been a formidable danger to a new government. To the 
Bourbons it was fatal. Still, it is only fair to say that with 
such materials the work of building up a firm government was 
almost impossible. The example of Imperial Rome exhibits 
the difficulties of staying the course of revolutions begun by 
the Praetorians, save by the advent of some general with 
commanding powers or by the destruction of the disturbing 
elements. Unfortunately for France, the return of the great 
general involved war with Europe. 

Napoleon's sincerity in his professions of a pacific policy 
has been hotly discussed. In a striking address he spoke of 
having heard at Elba, as in a tomb, the voice of posterity: 



XI.] TJie Reconstruction of Eitrope. 339 

he protested that he now desired peace, that although he 
would never have signed the peace of Paris, yet he would 
faithfully observe it : that the repose of a constitutional king 
would accord with his decHning years, and that his sole desire 
was to save the Revolution. The value of these declarations 
was unfortunately lessened by his previous conduct. When 
menaced by the forces of united Europe in the heart of France, 
when scarcely 100,000 wearied troops followed his eagles, he 
had persisted in his refusal to accept the historic limits of 
France, until the time for negotiations had passed. Even be- 
fore their rupture he wrote to his brother Joseph (Feb. 18, 
1814) "If I had signed peace on the terms of the ancient 
limits, I should have rushed to arms in two years, and I should 
have told the nation that I had signed not a peace but a 
capitulation." When he penned those words three-fourths of 
his veterans were in the power of the allies. Is it conceivable 
that now, when he had the prospect of speedily forming a 
great army, he would have renounced for ever the hope of 
regaining those natural frontiers, the loss of which the French 
regarded as a national disgrace? Was it possible for the 
guardian of the revolution to abandon the conquests of Jourdan 
and Kleber? The question, if regarded in a broad spirit, i.e. 
in regard to the dominant sentiment in France and Germany, 
reveals an inherent antagonism respecting the ownership of 
the Rhine Province. That the French army would of its own 
initiative have attempted to regain the natural frontiers, is 
highly probable ; for it never regarded itself as beaten in fair 
fight even in 181 2 — 1814. That peace could not have lasted 
long must be conceded even by those who believe in Napoleon's 
pacific professions. The advent of the great warrior precipi- 
tated a perhaps inevitable struggle, rendering it short, dramatic 
and decisive; for if on the one hand Napoleon's return restored 
to France the greatest captain of modern times, the fear of 
his prowess at once banded the rest of Europe against her. 

22 — 2 



340 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

Talleyrand's skilful work of dissolving the coalition against 
France was swept away in a moment ; and the Powers at 
Vienna declared (March 13) that in violating the Convention 
which established him at Elba, Napoleon placed himself out- 
side the pale of civil and social relations, anS was an enemy 
and disturber of the repose of the world. This stern de- 
nunciation would, it was hoped, stay his progress to Paris. 
It had no such effect, except on the few Frenchmen whose 
heads were not turned by the excitement of that" stirring 
march. Napoleon on his side cherished the illusion that the 
Powers were on the point of fighting about Saxony; and he 
strove to sow further dissensions by sending to the Czar a 
copy of Talleyrand's secret compact against Russia and Prussia. 
Alexander contented himself with embarrassing Metternich by 
showing him the full copy, and then burnt it with the words 
" Let us forget all that : the question now is to overthrow our 
common enemy." A treaty of alliance was signed among the 
Powers (March 25), each agreeing to send 150,000 men to 
secure his deposition and effectual banishment. On the ratifica- 
tion of this treaty a declaration was added by Great Britain, with 
the warm approval of the Czar, stating that she did not bind 
herself to procure the restoration of the Bourbons. In spite of 
this reservation the British Government was subjected to sharp 
censure in Parhament for binding the country by treaty with- 
out consent of the nation. In regard to constitutional right, 
the censure was just ; but the further declaration of belief by 
the Opposition in Napoleon's professions of peace betrayed a 
singular credulity. The Ministerial contention that to let 
him consolidate his power would only aggravate an inevitable 
struggle, was consonant with all past experience. 

The other Powers acceded to the British declaration con- 
cerning the Bourbons ; and all the European States, including 
Sv»ritzerland and Denmark, joined the league against Napoleon. 
Under a show of paternal compulsion Marie Louise with her 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 341 

son remained at Vienna, beguiled by the prospect of the 
Duchy of Parma for herself Eugene also continued his 
residence at Vienna, but without any hopes of retrieving a 
brilliant past. 

Napoleon's efforts to reconcile the constitutional and old 
Jacobin parties to his rule met with little success. The 
royalist resistance in the west and south was repressed without 
much difficulty ; and an Additional Act, which promised 
to crown the Imperial edifice with the long delayed pinnacle 
of political and civic liberty, gained some approval. A com- 
promise was necessary, though it accorded ill with his own 
ideas of sovereignty. Shrewd observers like Caulaincourt 
remarked that even so he did not give the liberty which 
France expected, that his habits of demanding entire obedience 
frequently carried him away, and that in fine " he was not in 
his own saddle." These were the opinions of his Foreign 
Minister, an outspoken but trusty friend. For the rest, he made 
Davoust Minister of War, Carnot Minister of the Interior, and 
for Police he had to put up with that time-serving intriguer, 
Fouche, who in his new capacity carefully sounded the ground 
at Vienna in his own interests, and further remarked to 
Pasquier that when once Napoleon had departed for the war, 
the constitutionalists would be masters at Paris ! Suspecting 
that the ground beneath him was mined, Napoleon desired an 
imposing display of devotion to his cause, so as to " nationalise 
the war," as Talleyrand phrased it. 

The Additional Act, drawn up by Benjamin Constant the 
leading constitutionalist and friend of Mdme. de Stael, but 
amended in some points by Napoleon, granted a freer re- 
presentation to France than that accorded by Louis XVIII's 
Charter. Nominees appointed for life and with hereditary 
functions were to form the Chamber of Peers. The Chamber 
of Deputies was to consist of deputies elected directly by 
electoral colleges, themselves chosen by adult Frenchmen : 



342 The Revoltitioitary ajid Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

it could be dissolved by Napoleon provided that another was 
convened in six months. Liberty of the press was fully 
accorded; but the proposal to prohibit confiscation was 
thwarted by Napoleon himself. The Additional Act failed 
to satisfy the zeal for liberty which had lately burst forth 
with redoubled energy after the long restraints of imperial 
despotism. In a ple'biscite it was accepted by 1,300,000 votes, 
but the vast majority did not go to the urn — a striking contrast 
to the enthusiasm of 1799 and 1804. Now, the Emperor's 
promises of liberty were no more believed by the constitu- 
tionalists and old Jacobins, than were his pacific professions by 
the rest of Europe, — a terrible Nemesis which blighted what 
was at least an interesting experiment. 

Once more, in this phase of the Revolution, the attempts 
at reconstruction revealed differences and discords, which 
lay hid amidst the dramatic scenes of destruction. A Champ 
de Mai, an imposing scene which aimed at recalling the 
Federation Festivals of 1790 — 1792, excited the enthusiasm of 
the soldiery as the eagles were entrusted to their keeping ; but 
it aroused the discontent of all friends of liberty at a renewal 
of imperial pageantry. So wide-spread were the murmurs that 
Fouche, his Minister of Police, ventured to privately advise the 
Emperor to proclaim his son Napoleon II and retire to America. 
The new Chamber of Deputies now took an almost menacing 
tone. The Girondin Lanjuinais was chosen its president, and 
his words with those of Lafayette soon warned Napoleon 
of the determination to have done with the old imperial 
regime. The very name '■ Additional Act to the Constitutions 
of the Empire ' was interpreted by friends of liberty as a sign 
that Napoleon's views on government had not changed. The 
Vende'ans were still in arms in the west ; and disquietude gained 
ground at the Tuileries as it appeared that France was torn 
by dissensions, while the forces of united Europe were marching 
against her. A furious proclamation by the Prussians suggested 



XI.] The Reconstmction of Etirope. 343 

a further comparison with the events of 1792. But how 
different the position of the European peoples now ! Years of 
disaster had brought temporary accord between governments as 
between rulers and subjects; and the national hatreds against 
Napoleon now rendered a military promenade, like that of 
Custine to Frankfurt, an utter impossibility. Amidst general 
forebodings in France, the Emperor alone remained unshaken, 
ever buoyed up by his indomitable will, and displaying a 
confidence which might be called sublime but that it again 
entailed a useless effusion of blood. After further troubles with 
the deputies he departed for the Belgian frontier, trusting 
by sheer force of military genius to hurl back his foes, and as 
at Marengo and Austerlitz to bring the monarchs of Europe 
and the republicans of France alike submissive to his feet. 

Napoleon's three last campaigns exhibit a fierce concentra- 
tion of effort. That of Russia dragged its weary length through 
half a year. The freedom of Germany was decided in four 
months' fighting. The overthrow of the French Empire was 
assured in half that time ; and the attempt at its reconstruction 
was baffled in the most exciting trilogy of war which the world 
has ever witnessed. No three days of human history have 
called forth so perennial a flood of discussion and dispute 
as those which hurled the Emperor from his throne ; but 
into the controversies which still rage around many of their 
incidents, it is both undesirable and impossible to enter at 
length. 

On June 15 the allied generals were only beginning to 
concentrate their troops; and as these were dispersed over 
nearly all the space between Mons, Namur and Brussels, they 
were quite unprepared to render mutual support. Bliicher's 
unrelenting energy brought together most of his men between 
Ligny and Charleroi, while Wellington's scattered forces were 
uniting more slowly. This remissness of the British com- 
mander has exposed him to just and merited censure. A 



344 'T^^^ Revolutioiiaiy and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

speedier concentration of the allied forces would have gained 
them the defensive line of the Sambre with its bridges at and 
near Charleroi. Napoleon had rightly judged that Bliicher, 
with his dashing "hussar spirit," would concentrate his men 
more speedily than the cooler and more methodical Wellington; 
and in his Memoirs he claims it as his intention to strike first 
at the Prussians and then at the Anglo-Dutch forces, thus 
forcing them on " divergent lines of retreat." The two allied 
armies were exposed to the same strategic movement which in 
1796 hurled back the Austrian and Sardinian armies from the 
Apennines on Milan and Turin respectively. Here, in his last 
campaign as in his first, Napoleon hoped to defeat his foes in 
succession and drive them back on their ultimate bases of 
operation, in this case Wesel and Antwerp respectively. But 
years of disaster had taught the allies the absolute need of 
close and effective support ; and, as in 1813 — 1814, Napoleon's 
blows only served to weld their cause into a firmer unity. 

If the allies are open to criticism for their slackness in face 
of a foe who had often decided a campaign at the first blow, 
yet on the other hand some of Napoleon's arrangements have 
been censured quite as sharply. It is true that he lacked the 
support of many of his ablest Marshals. Massena and Moncey 
were effete ; Berthier was detained in Germany, where he met 
a violent death ; Macdonald, Marmont, Oudinot, St Cyr and 
Victor remained true to the royalist cause; Augereau's services 
were rejected as those of a traitor ; Mortier fell ill ; Clausel 
was holding down the royalist South ; Suchet was awaiting the 
advance of the Austrians and Russians on the east, and Brime 
was skirmishing with the Austro-Sardinian forces in the Mari- 
time Alps. But the Emperor made the singular mistake of 
condemning two of the ablest of his Marshals, Davoust and 
Soult, to positions which afforded no fit scope for their abiHty, 
energy, and tenacious courage. To the former, in spite of his 
remonstrances, was confided the command of Paris; while Soult 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 345 

had to replace Berthier in the merely executive duties of Chief 
of the Staff. Moreover, only at the last moment did Napoleon 
entrust Ney with any command, as if to mark his distrust of 
him, after that Marshal's early defection to the royalists ; and 
it was not until the first shots had been exchanged at Charleroi, 
that Grouchy, essentially a cavalry general, was placed in com- 
mand of the right wing of the army, in spite of Soult's protests. 
To this strange redistribution of duties must be mainly 
attributed the extraordinary blunders which brought the cam- 
paign to so speedy a conclusion. With 124,000 highly trained 
troops and 340 guns swiftly approaching two armies still partly 
in their cantonments, Napoleon might have hoped for another 
Ulm. Certain it is that his own energy was at this time but 
slightly impaired by the internal disease which had troubled 
him once before, in 18 12. For vigour of conception and 
swiftness of execution his first blows in 181 5 recall the days of 
Marengo and Eckmiihl. Bliicher's army numbered about 
120,000 men, nearly all Prussians, and mosdy animated by 
their leader's hatred of Napoleon ; but even among his troops 
there was a strong French feeling in the Saxon and West 
German contingents. Wellington headed a motley array of 
31,000 British troops, 29,000 Dutch-Belgians, 22,000 Hano- 
verian-Brunswickers, 6,000 King's German Legion, &c. — in all 
about 93,000 men. Such a force was necessarily wanting in 
cohesion, while the fidelity of the Belgians was deservedly 
questioned. Most of the British and Hanoverian troops had 
never stood fire before, a fact which condemned the Duke to 
defensive tactics. His army could therefore be httle more 
than the pivot on which that of Bliicher moved. Against 
such armies Napoleon might hope to hurl his 124,000 French 
veterans with every hope of success. The results of his secret 
and speedy advance were at once apparent. On June 15th 
he drove the Prussian vanguard from Charleroi, pushing it 
back on the road leading to Fleurus and Ligny, while Ney 



34^ The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

gained possession of the high-road to Brussels as far as 
Frasnes, within three miles of Quatre Bras. It is claimed by 
many writers who desire to throw all the blame of Napoleon's 
disaster on his lieutenants, that Ney had received a verbal 
order to seize this important post ; while in reply it is urged 
that Ney's troops had had a very long march ending with an 
engagement, and were unsupported by Count d'Erlon's corps, 
which was far in the rear. Had Ney seized this important 
position on the 15th, it is improbable that Bliicher would have 
accepted battle next day at the exposed position of Ligny. 

Even as it was, though Napoleon's aim of driving back the 
Prussians out of touch with Wellington had not been realized, 
yet the communications between the aUied arm.ies were 
seriously menaced by the triumphant French advance, for 
which both Bliicher and Wellington were unprepared. The 
latter, who was not informed of Napoleon's attack on Char- 
leroi till the evening of the 15th, was not shaken in his belief 
that the French main advance would be by way of the Mons- 
Brussels road to cut off his communications with the sea ; and 
yet, when it was of the highest importance to ascertain Napo- 
leon's plans, the Duke thought it not incompatible with his 
duties to attend the Duchess of Richmond's ball at Brussels. 
Indeed, it was in contravention of Wellington's first orders, 
that the Prince of Saxe- Weimar occupied the important posi- 
tion at Quatre Bras with Dutch-Belgian troops; and, but for 
his promptitude, that post would have been occupied without 
fighting by Ney. Riding hastily to the front on the morning 
of the i6th, Wellington gave to Bliicher a promise of support 
in case he himself was not attacked in force, cautioning 
Bliicher however against accepting battle in so advanced a 
position and on a slope so exposed to the French cannonade. 
The statement of most Prussian writers that he gave an 
absolute promise of support, is quite without foundation. 

The military position at noon of the i6th was briefly 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 347 

as follows. Bliicher with about 80,000 troops, of whom about 
one-third were Landwehr, held a strong but exposed position 
on a slope extending between Ligny and neighbouring villages, 
where he intended to defend his communications with the 
fortress of Namur on the east, and the Namur — Quatre Bras 
road in his rear, which still provided access to Wellington's 
vanguard. Billow's corps was far away in the rear. The 
British troops were beginning to approach Quatre Bras. Their 
presence in force would have relieved the pressure on Bliicher's 
exposed right, only some five miles distant from the Dutch- 
Belgian brigade ; but for a long time Wellington could scarcely 
hold his own. On his side Napoleon with 67,000 men hoped 
to cut off Bliicher's right in St Amand by an attack on the 
Prussian centre at Ligny; and he ordered Ney, after seizing 
Quatre Bras, to march on the Prussian rear and help in 
capturing the whole of its right wing. The Emperor, however, 
under-estimated Bliicher's forces. Ney's operations were 
clogged by the tardy advance of d'Erlon's corps in his rear ; 
and this delay, due to friction and mistakes in Ney's newly 
constituted staff, saved the allies from serious disaster. 

With only half his full forces, the French Marshal began 
his attack on Quatre Bras about two o'clock, when scarcely 
any British troops were there. The Dutch-Belgians fell back 
after a creditable resistance, until the arrival of the Duke of 
Brunswick's brigade and Picton's division restored the fight. 
Even so, the superiority of the French in cavalry and 
artillery wrought havoc among the allied infantry; and only 
the gallantry of the 42nd and 44th regiments withstood an 
attack on flank and rear by the French lancers. The rout 
of some Dutch-Belgian and Hanoverian Landwehr regiments 
left the issue doubtful even late in the afternoon when Welling- 
ton had a superiority of numbers. 

Meanwhile Napoleon, on hearing the first sound of Ney's 
cannon, had begun to assail the Prussians. After a fierce 



348 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

cannonade and charges on the villages of St Amand and Ligny 
which at first were bravely repulsed, he was ready to commence 
the decisive move of his Guards on Bliicher's centre, when 
Vandamme reported the approach on his flank of a hostile 
force. The combat slackened for nearly two hours, until 
the approaching column was ascertained to be the belated 
corps of d'Erlon, which, when marching to reinforce Ney, 
had been ordered off to join Napoleon by one of the Emperor's 
aides-de-camp on his own responsibility. Then after seven 
o'clock the Old Guard was launched against Ligny with decisive 
effect. Bliicher, coming up from St Amand, where he had 
presumed the supreme struggle would be, was overthrown and 
much hurt in one of a series of cavalry charges, and was 
saved only by the skill and courage of his aide-de-camp, who 
skilfully concealed him until a charge of Uhlans brought rescue 
to their chief. Indeed such was the tenacity of the Prussian 
troops that after a loss of 18,000 killed and wounded they 
retired under cover of the darkness and in good order, beating 
off the onsets of the French horse. The delay in Napoleon's 
final attack, caused by d'Erlon's unlucky corps, saved Bliicher 
from protracted pursuit. The same cause had hampered Ney's 
operations. He has been severely blamed for leaving a whole 
corps more than two hours in his rear, but he is not responsible 
for its deviation towards Napoleon's army. Imperiously re- 
calling it to his own command when it was about to turn 
the Prussian flank at St Amand, he yet derived no succour 
from it; and thus 19,000 troops were left oscillating between 
two battles and taking part in neither. 

Their weight, if thrown into the wavering balance at Quatre 
Bras, must have been decisive. As it was, the gradual arrival 
of British reinforcements decided that bloody contest in favour 
of the allies. Kellermann's cuirassiers were not brought into 
action until the British and German infantry were so well 
posted as to beat back the hero of Valmy and Marengo with 



XL] 



The Reconstruction of Europe. 



349 



BRUSSELS 




ac.jeano „ o- -^ 

//\ SLLairben 

/ I oPlancnenoiL 



crushing loss; and after six hours of desperate fighting Ney 
was eventually driven back on Frasnes with the loss of 4,000 
men, Wellington's losses, however, being even heavier. Among 
the slain was the gallant Duke of Brunswick, the hero of the 
attempt of 1809. The allied success at Quatre Bras was ren- 
dered fruitless by the Prussian reverse at Ligny; and the Anglo- 
Dutch forces fell back promptly on the Waterloo position. 

The fate of the campaign now depended on the vigour of 
Napoleon's pursuit and 
the direction taken by 
Bliicher's forces in re- 
treat. Over-estimating 
the importance of his vic- 
tory, or fatigued by his 
great exertions — he had 
travelled from Paris and 
fought a great battle in 
five days — Napoleon de- 
layed striking at WeUing- 
ton's exposed forces, or 
following up the retreat- 
ing Prussians. This re- 
missness, so unlike his 
conduct after Jena, lost 
him all the fruits of his 
victory, and gave the 
Prussians the opportu- 
nity of retreating on a 
line parallel to the Quatre 
Bras — Brussels high-road. 

A partial reconnaissance ordered by Soult early on the 17th 
seemed to indicate that the Prussians were retreating eastwards 
towards Namur, their immediate base of operations. So strong 
was Napoleon's belief in this, the natural move of a beaten 



Nivelies 




Stan/ord's Geogi Estabi 



350 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

army, that not till noon did he order Grouchy with 33,000 men 
to pursue Bliicher's forces. In vain did the Marshal — he had 
lately received his baton — remark that his troops were wearied, 
that the Prussians had 18 hours' start, and that the direction of 
their retreat was not known. Napoleon soon repeated his com- 
mands more explicitly ; for in the meantime news had arrived 
that 20,000 Prussians were near Gembloux. Grouchy accord- 
ingly received written instructions (now known in their entirety) 
to explore in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, and find 
out whether Bliicher's forces "are separating themselves from 
the English or whether they are intending still to unite, to 
cover Brussels or Liege, and to try the fate of another battle." 
Grouchy did not start till 2 p.m. on June 17. Rain began to 
fall heavily, so retarding his progress that twelve hours elapsed 
before he found out definitely that the Prussians had marched, 
not south-east towards Namur, but northwards to Wavre. 

The credit for the initial move in this direction belongs to 
Gneisenau, and is consonant with his undaunted spirit. Yet 
even he hesitated in taking the decisive step of abandoning 
the Prussian communications with the Rhine, and boldly 
joining WeUington at the first opportunity. It was the septua- 
genarian Bliicher, weak and bruised from his fall at Ligny, 
who took the responsibility and therefore deserves the credit 
for this final resolve. The student will observe that, whereas 
up to 1809 the defeats of the coalition forces became disasters 
owing to want of persistent mutual support, from 1813 and 
onwards the allies clung together as the only means of safety. 
Their concentration near the Bohemian frontier of Silesia after 
the defeat at Bautzen, Bliicher's flank marches from Silesia 
to join von Biilow on the Elbe, and again in 1814 from the 
Seine to join him on the Aisne, foreshadowed the prudently 
daring movement which assured the final triumph at Waterloo. 

On Wavre, therefore, the Prussians began to concentrate ; 
and the arrival of Billow's and Thielemann's fresh corps 



XI.] The Reco7istr7iction of Europe. 351 

brought the Prussian forces up to 90,000 men. News of this 
was sent to WeUington, who rephed that he would accept 
battle at the Waterloo position if one Prussian corps were 
sent to support him; but the definite assurance of even that 
amount of support did not reach the Duke till the early 
morning of the eventful Sunday. In the first case^ therefore, 
it was Wellington alone who decided to trust in the bravery 
of his British and German troops and the strength of the posi- 
tion to repulse an army which excelled his own in cohesion, 
experience, and numbers. Indeed, owing to the Duke's in- 
ability to support the Prussians at Ligny, there seems to have 
been in Bliicher's staff some fear that Wellington would retreat 
on Brussels and leave his allies exposed. At any rate, it 
was not till they heard the welcome sound of the cannon at 
Waterloo, that any vigorous attempt was made to advance. 
The same winged messenger should have reminded Grouchy 
that the very letter of his instructions (which for long after- 
wards he suppressed) required a half-left turn to intercept any 
flank march of the Prussians towards Waterloo. A warm 
remonstrance to this effect by General Ge'rard only con- 
firmed him in the strange belief that he ought to attack the 
Prussians at Wavre. He did so, gained his point, and lost 
the campaign. 

Wellington's position at Mont St Jean extended along 
the ridge of a slope at the back of which ran a rough road, 
while further in his rear were the village of Waterloo and the 
forest of Soignies. The front of his right flank was strengthened 
by the chateau and wood of Hougomont, his centre by the 
spacious farm-buildings of la Haye Sainte, commanding the 
Brussels high-road. A shallow valley separated the allies from 
the rather higher ridge east and west of la Belle Alliance 
along which extended Napoleon's imposing Hues. To con- 
front 72,000 French, of whom 15,700 were cavalry, Wellington 
could muster only 67,000, of whom not quite 24,000 were 



352 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Ei^a. [Chap. 

British; and he had only 156 cannons against the enemy's 
246. But his skilful arrangement of most of his troops behind 
the brow of the ridge screened them from the terrible losses 
of the Prussians on the St Amand-Ligny slope. The Iron 
Duke's tactics offered throughout the day a masterly defence 
against foes whose effective strength for the first four hours 
of fighting was nearly double his own. Only one error in his 
dispositions has been remarked, viz. his leaving 18,000 men 
at Hal so far away to the west, as to be useless on the day 
of battle. By that time it was fairly obvious that Napoleon 
was attempting to crush the allies in succession, not to sever 
the English communications with the sea. 

The Emperor's delay in beginning the battle until nearly 
noon has been sharply criticised ; but it was necessary for the 
movements of his formidable cavalry and artillery to let the 
ground harden after 1 6 hours of heavy rain ; and if, as seems 
certain, the Prussians deferred their march from Wavre until 
the cannonade was heard, the delay had none of the decisive 
consequences which have often been stated. The ardour 
of the French troops converted what was intended to be a 
subordinate attack, that on the wood and mansion of Hougo- 
mont, into a fierce and prolonged contest ; but this advanced 
post was stubbornly held by the English Guards and their sup- 
ports throughout the day against double their numbers. The 
key of the British position was, however, la Haye Sainte, held 
by part of the King's German Legion. After a cannonade from 
the overwhelming French artillery, which decimated an exposed 
Dutch-Belgian brigade, the Emperor was about to order an 
attack in force on the allied left centre, when he observed 
troops far away towards Wavre. The uncertainty was ended 
by the capture of a Prussian hussar who was bearing to Wel- 
lington news of von Billow's advance. Soult thereupon, just 
after i p.m., added a postscript to a despatch urging Grouchy 
"not to lose an instant in approaching and joining us, and to 



XI.] The Reconstntction of Europe, 353 

crush Billow whom you will catch in the very act" ; but this 
order did not reach him till 6 p.m. In Grouchy's defence it is 
urged that an earHer despatch approved of his movement on 
Wavre. But this did not reach him till 4 p.m., up to which 
time he alone is responsible for neglecting to observe and 
check the Prussian movements towards their allies. 

For the present, Napoleon was satisfied with detaching some 
light cavalry to the right, and sending repeated messages to 
his Marshal, all of which reached him too late. Evidently, how- 
ever, Ney's attack on Wellington's centre must be pushed home 
with irresistible force; and this apparently accounts for the 
denseness of the columns hurled on la Haye Sainte. A persist- 
ent attack in that formation against foes disordered by a severe 
cannonade had rarely failed to secure the victory, as at Wagram, 
Borodino, Liitzen, and Ligny; and the criticism lavished on 
the unusual massiveness of the columns seems irrelevant. They 
actually mounted the crest and their menacing appearance 
sufficed to break up the Dutch-Belgians in their front; but 
there the French masses were received by a withering fire; 
and a prompt charge of Picton's men drawn up hastily in a line 
two-deep, rolled one column down the slope with heavy losses. 
As the French cuirassiers advanced to renew the contest they 
too met the fearful shock of Ponsonby's household brigade and 
fled in confusion; while the Scots Greys, Inniskillings and 
Royal Dragoons overthrew and cut up the other two of d'Erlon's 
columns, which lost in all some 3,000 prisoners and two eagles. 
The ' Union Brigade,' pursuing its furious career, rode up the 
French slope, sabred the gunners and disabled many cannons ; 
but the hostile cavalry, previously inactive, now rode them 
down, inflicting severe losses in their retreat, until the French 
lancers themselves received prompt punishment. 

Thus to and fro swept the tide of batde for the first four 
hours, the advantage being in the main with Wellington. The 
artillery fire was now redoubling in intensity, a sure prelude to 
F. R. 23 



354 ^/^^ Revohttionary and Napoleo7iic Era. [Chap. 

another attack in force, this time by the chief mass of the 
French cavalry on Wellington's right and centre. The French 
tactics here too have been severely criticised ; but Napoleon's 
belief in the power of cavalry was justified by all previous ex- 
perience; and his surmise that Wellington's untrained troops 
were demoralised by the hail of grape-shot was correct. More- 
over, at la Haye Sainte a Hanoverian regiment had been com- 
pletely dispersed by his cuirassiers — the only success there 
gained by his troops. These grand cavalry charges may also 
be defended as a speedy though wasteful method of snatching 
at a victory which was rendered more and more doubtful by 
the slow but steady approach of the Prussians on the French 
right flank. After giving a general assent to the employ- 
ment of his cavalry against Wellington's squares, Napoleon 
about 4.30 P.M. repaired to Planch enoit, then first seriously 
menaced by von Billow's corps ; while Ney for two hours hurled 
his heavy cavalry against Wellington's right centre. The Duke's 
dispositions to meet these living avalanches are worthy of all 
praise. Sheltering his squares behind the crest of the slope 
from the hail of grape-shot which preluded each onset of the 
horsemen, Wellington left his artillery alone exposed to view. 
The cannoneers, after dealing death among the approaching 
squadrons, unlimbered their guns and ran for shelter to the 
squares. These defied all the efforts of the chivalry of France, 
which swerved from them and vainly sought to cleave an entry. 
Foiled at the very time when they imagined themselves masters 
of the ridge, the successive waves of cavalry surged back again, 
hard pressed by the aUied horsemen or galled by shot and shell. 
Though again and again the French brigades enveloped the 
British and German squares and apparently carried the posi- 
tion, yet no French infantry was at hand to maintain the 
ground won, nor could the allied cannons be carried off, and 
neglect to give due support to these cavalry charges seems to 
be Ney's chief blunder on that day. The exploits of the French 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe, 355 

horse at Marengo, Jena, Eylau, the Somosierra, Borodino, and 
Dresden — the last of which perhaps inspired Ney's tactics — 
could not be repeated on the ridge of Waterloo, and by 6 p.m. 
the French cavalry was exhausted. During the same critical 
time a French infantry attack on la Haye Sainte was again 
steadily repulsed by the King's German Legion; and at 6 
WeUington's position was intact \ 

Napoleon's chief blunder on the i8th seems to have been 
his neglect to oppose any but a few light troops to the 
Prussian vanguard when crossing the defile below St Lambert; 
for Grouchy was known to be too far off to hinder any but the 
Prussian rear-guard. About 4.30 von Billow deployed his 
troops on the French flank; and an hour later, after sharp 
lighting, 30,000 Prussians gained a hold on the outskirts of 
Planchenoit; but Lobau's corps and the Young Guard drove 
them out for a time until reinforcements arrived. This tem- 
porary diversion of French infantry to face the flank attack, 
probably accounts for its lack of due support to the cavalry 
and to the second great onset on la Haye Sainte. But the 
battalions of the German Legion, which for seven hours held 
this exposed post, had at last exhausted their ammunition, 
and shortly after 6 their few survivors retired to the allied 
hnes. Had Ney possessed sufficient reserves of infantry and 
cavalry, Wellington's centre might now have been pierced. 
The shattered allied lines there and on the right were for 
some time in the greatest danger, and only the tact of 
Wellington and his staff in drawing in supports from his 

1 Mr Ropes, in his careful and exact review of the Waterloo campaign, 
follows Charras in stating 4 P.M. as the time when la Haye Sainte was 
finally taken. This, however, must refer to a temporary lodgment gained 
by the French. The evidence of Kennedy, staff officer of the division so 
seriously menaced, and the Journal of the King's German Legion, seem to 
show that it was not completely taken till 6 p.m. But Judge O'Connor 
Morris in the English Historical Reviexv for Jan. 1895, fixes the time earher. 

23 — 2 



356 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

extreme wings, sufficed to make good the fearful gaps. All 
three armies were in a critical position ; and Napoleon, feeling 
the pressure of von Billow's renewed attack on Planchenoit, 
was convinced that only a supreme effort of his Old Guard 
could win the day. That was still possible; for not more 
than 35,000 Prussians as yet menaced him, and WeUington 
had scarcely so many trustworthy troops still available. 

About 7 o'clock the Emperor hurled against WeUington's 
right centre eight battalions of his Guard, supported by masses 
of infantry. These veterans of the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars, led by Ney in person, supported by horse artillery and 
their own Chasseurs, steadily mounted the slope. The leading 
part of their column was pHed with a destructive fire from 
Napier's guns and from a Dutch-Belgian battery, while the line 
of Maitland's Guards shattered their front. Halkett's two 
regiments on their flank crushed every attempt at deploying, 
and an advance in line rolled the veterans down the slope in 
complete disorder, as the second part of their great column 
marched up to retrieve the fight. This fared even worse. 
Galled in front by a steady cannonade and volleys of musketry, 
it was charged on the flank by Colborne's 52nd regiment, and 
driven in utter rout into the valley. The other French troops 
fell back, and Wellington, feeling the touch of Ziethen's Prus- 
sians on his left, gave to his troops the long desired order for a 
general advance. His wisdom in holding back the British 
horsemen was now manifest. The brigades of Vivian and 
Vandeleur did fearful execution among the disordered French ; 
and the Emperor, in his fallacious bulletin, ascribed the loss of 
the battle to these effective onsets of the British horse. That 
these, supported by a general advance of the allies, drove 
back the wrecks of the French squadrons and two reserve 
battalions of the Old Guard, cannot be questioned. Yet it 
would be disingenuous not to recognise the importance of the 
Prussian share in this momentous victory. Wellington's final 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 357 

advance would have been most hazardous had not Ziethen's 
fresh corps then hurled itself on the French right. The in- 
vincible energy of Bliicher, von Billow, Ziethen, and their 
devoted troops overcame the serious obstacles to the advance, 
and launched in all some 41,000 men against the French. 
Yet so stubbornly did the Comte de Lobau defend Planche- 
noit that not till after the final advance of Wellington's Hne 
was it yielded to von Billow's men. Then all was panic and 
disaster on the road to Charleroi, and under the protracted 
pursuit of the Prussians — their revenge for Jena — the French 
fled beyond the Sambre with the loss of all their artillery, 
ammunition and stores. Napoleon himself escaped capture 
only by precipitate flight. Had he fallen into the hands of 
Gneisenau's troopers, they would have shot him on the spot. 

The tactics of Napoleon and Ney have been severely cen- 
sured, as always happens after disaster. To the present writer 
they do not appear to differ materially from the Emperor's 
usual method of freely sacrificing his men in order to wear 
away and confuse his foes at all points until the final blow 
could be delivered with crushing effect. To launch heavy 
columns of attack after the enemy had suffered from the first 
onsets and crushing cannonade, had till then almost invariably 
won the day against continental foes. These tactics were foiled 
by the tenacious defence of Hougomont and la Haye Sainte 
and still more by Wellington's dextrous use of the brow of the 
ridge to screen his troops from the tempest of iron and to 
hide his defensive moves. Time after time did the French 
horse and foot mount the slope in triumph, only to be shattered 
by volleys from the squares or from the thin red lines which 
mangled their front and then charged with the bayonet. 
Tactics which had succeeded elsewhere were baffled by the 
natural strength of the position, by the invincible courage and 
steadiness of Wellington's best troops in meeting the columns 
with an outflanking attack in line, and by the deadliness of the 



358 The RevohUionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

British musketry fire, which had been proved in every battle 
from Corunna to this final contest. Colonel Tomkinson, in 
his recently published diary of the campaigns of 1808 — 18 15, 
points out the advantages of the line formation for experienced 
and steady troops against a massive column. This can only 
move slowly and emit a scanty fire, while the lines can destroy 
the head of the column, harass its flanks, and complete its 
disorder with the bayonet. These tactics, employed with de- 
cisive effects at Albuera and other battles of the Peninsula, 
received their final and most dramatic illustration on the 
slopes of Mt St Jean, where the veterans before whom Europe 
had trembled for the last decade were broken by less than 
their own number of British regulars. On the other hand, the 
fearful losses of the allies, amounting to more than one-fourth 
of the British troops and the King's German Legion, with 6,700 
Prussians, bespeak the vigour of the French attacks. How 
Wellington could have held his ground, had Grouchy marched 
against the Prussian flank, and so secured for Napoleon's 
army freedom to act in front, it is difficult to conceive. Yet, 
however severe the blame which may be lavished on Ney and 
Grouchy, a considerable share of it must rebound on the 
Emperor, who at a few hours' notice assigned duties to these 
Marshals for which they were not well suited. Even before 
his defeat at Dennewitz, Ney's splendid fame was that of a 
desperate fighter and gallant corps leader, rather than that of 
a skilful tactician; while on Grouchy, known till 181 5 only as a 
dashing cavalry general, devolved a task which called for some 
strategic insight. Had their places been filled by Soult and 
Davoust, justly renowned for their combination of skill and 
tenacity, the issue must have been different. 

Attempts have often been made to account for the disaster 
by the decay of Napoleon's bodily and mental powers. It is 
true, of course, that he did not display the freshness and 
clearness of conception of his ItaHan campaigns, and that the 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Eicrope. 359 

fatigues caused by his multifarious energy at Paris and by the 
hghtning strokes with which he astonished the alHes, some- 
what told on a frame which had lost the elasticity of youth ; 
but the endeavour to exhibit the commander as oppressed by 
bodily torpor at the crisis of his destinies, is a ludicrous dis- 
tortion of facts. Whatever hesitation he displayed in the 
middle of the battle was due to the unexpected success of 
Wellington's defensive tactics, to the delay in Grouchy's fulfil- 
ment of his own reiterated orders, and to the increasing vigour 
of the Prussian attack. Enough has been stated above to 
prove that the errors on the French side were due, not to the 
Emperor's obesity, but to the somewhat strange redistribution 
of duties which accompanied the hasty reorganization of his 
vast and complicated engine of war. 

Napoleon's main army now presented the scene, un- 
paralleled except at Jena, of an army of veterans utterly 
broken up in a single day. Grouchy, after beating the 
Prussian rear-guard at Wavre, hastily fell back on Namur. 
Thence he retired to Dinant, Rheims, and Soissons, where a 
feeble attempt at resistance was offered. In fact, the triple 
line of fortresses which had foiled the allies in 1793-4 now 
scarcely delayed their conquering march. Meanwhile at Paris 
the Emperor was endeavouring to invest himself with dicta- 
torial powers. Carnot also urged the necessity of declaring 
the country to be in danger, and of rousing the people against 
the allies. But the spirit of 1793 had vanished. Fouche 
skilfully maintained in the Imperial Council the need of re- 
lying on the Chambers, not on a dictatorship which would 
dissolve them. Cajoling the Bonapartist deputies with the 
hope of a proclamation of Napoleon II as a last resort, the 
quondam regicide now began to weld together parties against 
the Emperor. It was also reserved for the earliest hero of the 
revolution to deal a blow at the pretensions of its last and 
greatest dictator. Lafayette brought forward and carried a 



360 The Revolutionary and Napoleofiic Era, [Chap. 

series of propositions that the independence of the nation was 
menaced, that whoever attempted to dissolve the Chamber 
was guilty of high treason and that the Ministers must repair 
to its sittings. These and other signs convinced Napoleon 
that his work was done, and he a second time abdicated in 
favour of his son Napoleon II, with the noble parting injunc- 
tion — " Let all unite for the public safety, in order to remain 
an independent nation." Strange to say, the act of abdication 
was written by his brother Lucien, who had helped him to 
power in 1799 ; and it was opposed in the Council of Ministers 
only by Carnot, who in 1804 had left France rather than ac- 
knowledge the Empire. 

At the end of June the allies were before Paris. Some 
combats ensued in the neighbourhood, Bliicher's troops driving 
the French from Sevres, and occupying the commanding 
plateau of Chatillon, while Wellington threatened the capital 
from the north. The news of the Austro-Russian advance and 
the departure of Napoleon for the coast, facilitated the con- 
clusion of an armistice which was drawn up at St Cloud, 
July 3 ; and five days later Louis XVIII re-entered Paris. 
On that same day Napoleon embarked on a frigate at Roche- 
fort, intending to sail for the United States ; but being watched 
by British cruisers he placed himself under the protection of 
the captain of H.M.S. Bellerophon. In pursuance of the 
declaration of the allies at Vienna, the fallen Emperor was 
finally conveyed to St Helena. After his refusal to abide by 
the Elba compromise, and the fearful effusion of blood which 
occurred in the Hundred Days, the need of some such final 
decision must be manifest to all but the devotees of hero- 
worship. The special malignity which some writers discern 
in England's action (e.g. Dumas, who describes it as that of 
Judas to the new Saviour of mankind) is solely the result of 
a vivid imagination. The recent treaty between the Powers 
bound them to prosecute the war until Bonaparte was put 



XI.] Tlie Reconstritction of Europe. 361 

"absolutely beyond the possibility of exciting further troubles." 
On the other hand, the lack of dignity and consideration shown 
to the great man at St Helena must be held largely responsible 
for the growth of a new Promethean legend, which was to have 
a strange influence on Europe in 1848 — 1870. 

The world now needed first and foremost some security 
for peace. This was the chief reason for restoring the phleg- 
matic and unwarhke Louis XVIII to the French throne. An 
effort was made by Fouche to procure the accession of the 
Duke of Orleans; but in spite of the former declarations of 
the allies, they now insisted on the restoration of Louis XVIII, 
who announced from Cambrai that he came to interpose him- 
self a second time between the allies and the French armies. 
Certainly, under no other rule than his could France have 
escaped heavy losses of territory to the Powers, especially to 
the incensed Prussians. With the greatest difficulty Bliicher was 
dissuaded by Louis XVIII and Wellington from blowing up 
the pout d'lena. The irate veteran at Wellington's banquet 
in Paris proposed as a toast — " May the diplomatists not spoil 
with their pens what the soldiers have won with their swords " ; 
and this expressed the general resolve of the Prussian govern- 
ment, army and people that France must be punished by the 
cession of Alsace-Lorraine to the Fatherland. Some of the 
German newspapers even stated that France must now be 
partitioned to reduce her to the weakness from which Germany 
had lately been rescued. It is recorded, indeed, by the due 
de Pasquier, the new French Minister for the Interior, that 
had Napoleon remained at large, France would have been 
subjected to some such treatment. Now that he was on his 
way to St Helena, such a proposal lost all vafidity. Neverthe- 
less, a strong claim was made by Prussia that Alsace-Lorraine 
should revert to Germany. "Not till then (so ran the Prussian 
Declaration) will France find herself in her true line of defence, 
with the Vosges and her double line of fortresses from the 



362 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, [Chap. 

Meuse to the sea ; and not till then will France remain quiet.'^ 
Even Metternich, the champion of old dynasties, now declared 
that the offensive power of France must be reduced by the 
cession or demolition of all her first line of fortresses, i.e. from 
Lille to Strassburg, while Stein suggested that Alsace-Lorraine 
should be ruled by an Austrian Archduke. There is much 
to be said in support of these claims both from the standpoint 
of historic right and of temporary expediency. Those lands 
had been German, and Prussia's demand for a better boundary 
for her distant Rhine Province was in a military sense unques- 
tionable. Her army had suffered severely, and after a triumph 
more decisive than Jena, she might reasonably expect a terri- 
torial gain half as large as that wrung from her at Tilsit. 
Finally, her plenipotentiaries Hardenberg and Humboldt de- 
clared that, as the forbearance of the Powers towards France 
in 18 14 had only led up to the Hundred Days, it was now 
necessary to employ sterner measures and to prefer the safety 
of Europe to the prestige of the Bourbons. 

Against these arguments drawn from past and present 
conditions, the Governments of Great Britain and Russia urged 
the necessity of founding peace on a lasting basis. In a states- 
manlike Memoir of Aug. 11, Wellington set forth the impolicy 
of so exasperating French public opinion as to mar the settle- 
ment. Granting that that land was still left " in too great 
strength for the peace of Europe," he yet pointed out that 
" revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world, than 
France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular Govern- 
ment ; and that is the situation in which we ought to endeavour 
to place her." The views of the Czar were analogous, viz. that 
the allies should endeavour to strengthen as far as possible 
the cause of constitutional monarchy in France, not to enfeeble 
it by demanding territorial cessions which would wound the 
national pride; and that only so could the European equilibrium 
be assured. It was further pointed out that Germany under 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 363 

an almost nominal form of union such as that now proposed, 
would be far too weak to hold Alsace-Lorraine against the 
bitter hostility of France. Had German unity been effected 
in 181 5, it is probable that these provinces would then have 
been detached from France. 

The final success of the Anglo-Russian arguments led to the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris (Nov. 20, 1815), whereby France 
was to recede within her limits of 1790, surrendering to the 
Netherlands the districts around Marienburg and Philippeville, 
to the Prussian Rhine-Province part of the Saar valley, to the 
Bavarian Palatinate Landau and its environs, and to the 
Kingdom of Sardinia Chambery and Annecy. Allied troops to 
the number of 150,000 were to occupy the French fortresses of 
the east and north for a time not exceeding five years, and 
France was to pay a war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs (about 
:^ 2 8, 000, 000). The Powers likewise stipulated that the French 
army was to be temporarily disbanded, and that all the works 
of art and literary treasures seized by the French, " contrary to 
every principle of justice and to the usages of modern warfare," 
should be restored to their rightful owners. 

For the second time, then, the desire to establish the 
Bourbon rule saved France from the vengeance of German 
patriots, and averted from her the appHcation of that undisguised 
force by which Prussia had been nearly crushed out of existence 
at Tilsit. That France was completely at the mercy of the 
allies, and could have been partitioned, is indisputable. A 
mere relic of her army remained, while nearly a million armed 
men lived on her from July to November; but it was to the 
interest of Russia and England to respect her historical 
boundaries in the interests of orderly government. Had the 
French royalists and Charles X exhibited similar moderation, 
their rule might have become far firmer than ever that of 
Louis XVI had been. France, it is true, continued to chafe 
at the settlement of 1815; but the verdict of time has on 



364 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

the whole justified the wisdom of the compromise as regards 
her frontiers on the east and north. Certainly, history records 
no instance of efforts so great ending with victory so complete, 
yet crowned with such self-abnegation, as the efforts of Great 
Britain during the Hundred Days. After spending enormous 
sums on her own troops, and subsidising all the aUies, she 
gained nothing which had not been virtually decided before 
the adjournment of the Congress of Vienna. Weak and tardy 
in her first opposition to the Jacobin designs on Holland, 
she had at last won the decisive triumph on the scene of her 
earlier reverses; and after long stemming the tide of French 
conquests, she now, with the help of the Czar, set limits 
to the westward rush of the nationalist reaction, which 
threatened to overwhelm France. 

In its effect on the map of Europe the democratic impulse 
may be compared to a mighty tidal wave which, sweeping on 
from the Seine to the Tiber, the Tagus and the Moskwa, pro- 
duces a reflux as powerful in its ultimate effects. When the 
old limits are reached, the spectator can at once discern the 
mighty work of levelling, simplification and destruction of effete 
or artificial barriers accomplished in the interval. European 
affairs, mostly arranged by the Congress of Vienna at the time 
of Napoleon's entry into Paris, were soon settled after his 
abdication. My task will be completed by a brief survey of 
the political and social changes effected in this great formative 
period of our modern world. 

After an unparalleled dilation and contraction of influence, 
France in Nov. 18 15 returned almost exactly to her frontiers of 
1790, having absorbed and assimilated the small fragments of 
foreign States within her frontiers. A similar process is ob- 
servable in her political and social institutions. The revolution 
found her a monarchy strangely hampered by the complicated 
political and commercial rights or privileges of the provinces ; 
it left her a strongly centralised State wherein all the functions 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Ettrope. 365 

of government were clearly defined by the Charter. Indeed, 
the collision between Rousseau's theories and the old monarchy 
ended by vesting the latter with powers not much less than 
those claimed by Louis XVI in his Royal Session of June 23, 
1789. The chief difference was revealed in the first article 
of the royal Charter—" The French are equal before the law, 
whatever may be their title or rank." The principles of civil 
equality and religious liberty were now frankly accepted by 
Louis XVIII ; and the chief social and political results of 
the revolution were to survive the royalist reaction of 1824 — 
1830. 

The changes effected in the Germanic system were analo- 
gous to those in France. The frontiers of the new German 
Confederation (181 5—1866) were almost the same as those of 
the old Empire which it was intended to replace, except that 
Savoy and the Austrian Netherlands (save Luxemburg), together 
with a few outlying districts, had now fallen away from the old 
connection. As has been previously indicated, the shocks of 
this terrible epoch had been fatal to nearly all the small States 
and Free Cities, and only 39 sovereign States survived, while 
the larger States, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, &c., now 
possessed more compact territories than ever before. Austria 
gave up her distant and scattered Flemish and Swabian pos- 
sessions, but vastly increased and consolidated her lands by the 
absorption of Salzburg, Trent and other bishoprics, as also by 
the recovery of Milan, Mantua, Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia, 
besides gaining Ragusa and Cattaro. She now ceased to touch 
France and to be the natural champion of Germany on the 
west ; but her vast gains in Italy were none the less a challenge 
to France, and were destined to renew the strife of centuries 
in that unhappy land. For her losses in Poland, Prussia gained 
largely in Saxony and the Rhine lands, her growth following 
the general trend of military events westwards in the final cam- 
paigns against Napoleon. Though Austria retained her old 



366 TJie Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

position of supremacy in the Germanic system, yet these terri- 
torial changes bequeathed to Prussia the burden of defending 
Germany against France ; and the events of half a century later 
were to solve the question of German dualism in favour of the 
Power which successfully grappled with its heavy responsibi- 
lities. 

The Federal Constitution was soon seen to be little more 
than a Fiirstenbund, a league of the Governments, impotent to 
secure unity in internal affairs, and apparently designed for the 
suppression of liberty in the several States. After heroic efforts 
in the cause of national independence and political liberty, the 
general failure of Germans to secure either of these aims 
aroused bitter discontent against the rulers who now, except in 
the south, evaded their promises of constitutional government. 
On social matters, here as elsewhere, the influence of the 
French domination was more abiding than on constitutional 
forms. In very few strictly German States was serfdom re- 
established. With lew exceptions the social results of the 
Germanic revolution survived in all the lands between the 
Rhine and the Niemen ; and the Napoleonic code of laws long 
remained in force in the German provinces west of the Rhine. 

In Italy the same general results are still more observable, 
viz. the permanence of most of the social reforms brought by 
the French occupation, but an approximate restoration of the 
previous boundaries and forms of government. Murat's final 
efforts to arouse a national feeling in his favour had failed 
because they had been ambiguous and ill-sustained. His 
General Pepe declared that a bold proclamation of a national 
war against the Austrians would have rallied 60,000 men to his 
standard. As it was, he was soon overwhelmed in a brief 
campaign in the Papal Legations and fled to France (May 
1 81 5). In the autumn a final madcap attempt to wrest the 
crown from the Bourbons resulted in his capture and execution. 
Between the Austrians in the north and the Bourbons in the 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Eni'ope. 367 

south, Italy was now a prey to a calamitous and bloody reac- 
tion, which caused Murat's rule long to be regarded with regret. 
*'Within the space often years (wrote General Pepe) we had made 
more progress than our ancestors had done in three centuries. 
We had acquired the French civil, criminal and commercial 
codes. We had abolished the feudal system, and justice was 
administered with improved methods." The same regrets were 
felt throughout Italy. Her old republics, except that of San 
Marino, had disappeared, that of Genoa being 'incorporated 
with the Kingdom of Sardinia, while Venetia formed part of 
Austria's Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom. Modena was restored 
to the House of Este, and Tuscany to the Austrian Archduke 
Ferdinand, while Marie Louise gained Parma for herself, though 
not for her son. The Ionian Isles, formerly belonging to 
Venice, were now declared a free and independent State under 
the protectorate of Great Britain, which had wrested them from 
France in 1809 — 1814. The temporary administration of 
Sicily and Genoa by Lord Bentinck accentuated the contrast 
presented by the now unfettered rule of the Spanish Bourbons 
and the House of Savoy respectively; and though in both cases 
the English Government had given promises more or less bind- 
ing for the continuance of popular liberties, it allowed them to 
be trampled on with impunity. Hence Sicily and Genoa were 
in the van of all the insurrectionary movements of the years 1820 
— 1860. For the present, Italy was too exhausted to offer any 
resistance to her domestic tyrants or to the Austrians encamped 
in her northern and central fortresses; but, as in Germany, 
the new groupings of the population under the French supre- 
macy had aroused that sentiment of nationality which was 
finally to achieve the unification vainly attempted in 1815. 

As Sardinia was strengthened to form on the side of Italy a 
barrier State against France, so too the House of Orange 
received an important aggrandisement in the Belgian Provinces, 
holding the old barrier fortresses against her on the north-east 



368 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

— an artificial arrangement which ignored the differences of lan- 
guage, religion and sentiment between Dutch and Belgians. As 
a set-off to the loss of their German lands, the younger branch 
of this family received the Duchy of Luxemburg, for which the 
King of the Netherlands was to have a vote in the German Con- 
federation. Luxemburg was to rank, with Mainz and Landau, 
as a federal fortress. 

The course of the reaction in Spain merits little attention. 
In May 18 14 Ferdinand VII had been received with tumul- 
tuous acclaim by the people of Madrid, and perceiving the 
slight support accorded to the democratic Constitution of 
181 2 he speedily annulled it and resumed the royal powers in 
their entirety. It was in vain that our envoy Sir H. Wellesley 
protested against the wholesale arrests of the Spanish Liberals 
and the restoration of the Inquisition. English appeals for the 
abolition of the slave trade met with no better result. After a 
heedless rush into advanced democracy Spain relapsed into a 
mediaeval policy which spared only some of the agrarian re- 
forms of the years 1809 — 1811. The restoration of the House 
of Braganza in Portugal ultimately led to similar proceedings 
in that country. 

At the other extremity of Europe the cause of national 
independence was compromised by the forcible union of 
Norway with the Swedish Crown. Instead of gaining the 
complete independence which they desired, the Norwegians 
now had to accept a distasteful connection, owing to the 
assistance of Sweden and the hostility of Denmark to the 
allied cause in 18 12 — 1813. Norway was virtually the ex- 
change for Finland, ceded by Sweden to the Czar in 1809; 
and, as has been noticed above, the small duchy of Lauenburg 
was finally the meagre compensation awarded to the Danish 
Crown for the loss of Norway. 

Strange to say, it was in Poland that the cause of liberty 
and independence seemed to have suffered least in 1815. 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe. 369 

True to his early promises of reigning as constitutional king of 
Poland, Alexander granted a constitution to his new realm 
similar to that established in France by Louis XVIII's Charter, 
with the proviso that all officials should be Poles and that 
Polish should be the official language. " The general impres- 
sion (wrote Czartoryski at Warsaw) at the promulgation of the 
Constitution has been as favourable as could be desired... Tts 
principles have attached the people to your Majesty." The 
joy was brief The arbitrary proceedings of the Grand-Duke 
Constantine, Russian commander in Poland, soon overrode 
the new popular Hberties; and the Poles, whose lot presents 
some curious parallels to that of France in 1791, 1807 and 
181 5, were ten years later to see their charter set aside by the 
unbending autocrat Nicholas. Every revolutionary outbreak 
in France sent a thrill through oppressed Poland. Its sole 
effect was to rivet tighter the Muscovite chains ; and the chief 
result of Alexander's Polish policy was to introduce the Czar's 
power into the heart of Europe. 

For the rest, the Congress of Vienna declared the per- 
petual neutrality of Switzerland (now reorganised in 22 can- 
tons), and affirmed the principle of the free navigation of 
rivers, and of the abolition of the slave trade. The chief 
obstacle to British efforts for the complete vindication of this 
last great principle, was the determined opposition of our late 
allies, Spain and Portugal. 

Such were the general results of the revolutionary era. 
The conflicts which unhappily burst forth between democracy 
and the old Governments produced approximately the results 
which two such dissimilar thinkers as Burke and Robespierre 
had foretold as certain to be entailed by a warlike policy. 
After the dictatorial actions of the secret committees had 
saved social equality at the expense of political liberty, it was 
not difficult for a young genius who combined all the gifts 
F. R. 24 



370 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap. 

which France then so urgently needed, to impose his will on 
her, and through her on Europe. But the second of these 
dictatorships signally reversed many of the cherished aims of 
the earlier revolutionary thinkers and statesmen. In place of 
that federation of small friendly republics wherein Rousseau 
foresaw a new and peaceful future, there sprang Minerva-like 
from the revolution a military Empire which imposed laws on 
Europe and drove the peoples into revolt. It is impossible to 
over-estimate the disasters to the cause of political liberty 
from its close association with an aggressive policy. The 
Girondin War of 1792, so fatal to the Constitution of the 
previous year, and the war policy of 1793 which involved all 
Europe in flames, threw back the cause of freedom in France 
for more than half a century, and extinguished the last hopes 
of PoUsh independence. Of the principles of 1789 France in 
1804 — 18 1 4 retained only social equahty, which Napoleon 
safeguarded at the expense of liberty and the fraternity of 
nations. Lafayette scarcely exaggerated when in 181 5 he 
described him as "the greatest foe, considering his circum- 
stances, which liberty ever had." The task of reconciling the 
often conflicting claims of liberty and social equality has ever 
been found most difficult, even in times of profound peace; 
and to the inexperienced legislators of France success was 
perhaps impossible amidst the storms of popular tumult. The 
revolution produced no leader except the great Mirabeau who 
was capable of preventing the fatal divergence of those prin- 
ciples, which began after his death. Thenceforth the re- 
volution lost all solidarity of aim, and its difficulties were 
vastly enhanced by the inflexible rigidity of Girondin and 
Jacobin policy both at home and abroad. All the tenacious 
mental characteristics of the young Corsican caporal, and his 
early training in the civil strifes of Ajaccio and Paris, un- 
fortunately tended in the direction of a military autocracy such 
as the policy of France increasingly required. Throughout 



XI.] The Reconstruction of Europe, 371 

this work an attempt has been made to exhibit the direct 
descent of the Napoleonic regime from that dictatorship of 
1793-4 which naturally resulted from the warhke policy of 
the Girondins and Jacobins. 

In the sphere of social equality, however, Napoleon re- 
mained to the end a true democrat. Side by side with his 
work of destruction, he will always be remembered as having 
consolidated or founded the social and agrarian systems of 
France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Germany; 
while his invasions virtually compelled the legislators of Prussia 
and Spain to adopt a similar poHcy. This is his true glory, 
that even amidst the tempests of war, his matchless genius for 
organisation quietly laid the foundations of the chief social 
systems of the Continent. 

After the cause of social equality had been carried by the 
French arms as far as the Niemen, the nationalist reaction 
against the Napoleonic domination began to gather strength. 
In Germany, and to some extent even in Spain, the desire for 
national independence linked itself with the cause of popular 
liberty; and the spirit of 1789 thenceforth inspired the coali- 
tion far more than the Napoleonic armies. The allied cause, 
however, suffered no less than the earlier democratic impulse 
from its close association with the exploits of generals and the 
bargains of diplomatists; and the conflict of two principles 
not necessarily opposed resulted in a curtailment of popular 
liberties which left Europe maimed, exhausted, and in a state 
of arrested development. 



24—: 



APPENDIX I. 



A LIST OF THE MOST ACCESSIBLE AND TRUSTWORTHY 
WORKS DEALING WITH THIS PERIOD. 

(Limits of space preclude any attempt at forming a complete biblio- 
graphy. An asterisk is affixed to the foreign works which have been 
translated into English.) 

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (PART I. 1789— 1799). 

A. Histories : — 

Sorel's L'Etirope et la Revolution fi'angaise : also the works of Carlyle, 
P^yffe, Hausser, Louis Blanc, Mallet, *Mignet, Morse Stephens, Oncken, 
Quinet, *Sybel, and *Taine. Le Regne de Louis XVI (1774— 1789) by 
Droze. LAncien Rdgime by *Tocqueville and *Taine. Dix Ans de 
Faix armie ( 1783 — 1 793) by the Viscount de Barral-Montferrat. La France 
en 1 789 by Boiteau. Le Comiti de Salut Public by Gros. Vllistoire de la 
Terreur by Mortimer-Ternaux. 

B. Biographies: — 

* Marie Antoinette by M. de la Rocheterie: Mdme. de Larnhalle by M. 
Bertin: Voltaire, Diderot (2 vols.), Rousseau (2 vols.) by Mr John Morley, 
and his articles on Turgot, Condorcet, Robespierre, &c. in his Miscellanies : 
CorrespoJidance de Mirabeazt et la Marck edited by Bacourt: Mirabeau et la 
Constituante by Reynald: Mirabeau by Mezieres: Dumont's * Souvenirs 
sur Mirabeau : Etude sur Madame Roland et son temps by Dauban : 
Madame Roland hy Miss Mathilde Blind : Les Femmes ceUbres de 1789 — 
1 81 5 et leur influence dans la Revolution by Lairtullier: * Portraits de 
Femmes by Sainte-Beuve : Condorcet by Robinet : La Vie privie de Danton 



374 ^-^^ Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. 

and Le Proces des Dantonistes by Robinet : Marat by Chevremont : Robes- 
pierre by Hamel: St. Just by Hamel: Hochc by Rousselin: Klcber by 
Ernouf : Alarceau by Maze : Dubois Crance by Jung : Meinoires siir Carnot 
by his son : Bonaparte et son temps by Jung : the monographs of Chuquet. 

C. The chief Memoirs dealing mainly with the years 1789 — 1799 ^'^^ 
those of Bailly, Barbaroux, Barere, Bertrand-Molleville, Beugnot, Bouille, 
Brissot, Buzot, *Mdme. de Campan, des Cars, Chevernay, Clery, Du- 
mouriez, Ferrieres, Mdme. de Genlis, Lafayette, Latude, * Mallet du Pan, 
*Pasquier, Pontecoulant, Mdme. Roland, Mgr. de Salomon, Thibaudeau, 
Thiebault, Mdme. de Tourzel, Mdme. de Staal-Delaunay, and Weber. The 
travels of Arthur Young in France (1787 — 1790), the journal of Forster of 
Mainz, and the Correspondence of A. Miles also throw valuable light on 
this period. 

D. Of the many Essays and miscellaneous works on this period the 
following may be noted: — Burke's Reflections on the French Revolntion with 
Mackintosh's reply, Vindiciae Gallicae: Mdme. de Stael's * Considerations 
sur la Revolution frangaise : Helen M. Williams' Sketches of Manners &c. 
in the French Republic. Aulard's Etudes et lecons sur la Revolution 

fran(;aise'. Aulard's Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de VEtre Supreme: 
Aulard's Les Oratetirs de la Constituante, Les Orateurs de la Legislative 
et de la Convention, La SocietS des yacobins, and Recueil des Actes du Co mite 
de Saint public : Morse Stephens' Orators of the French Revolution : Oscar 
Browning's Varennes and other Essays, and his edition of Earl Gower's 
Despatches from Paris : Croker's Essays on the Prench Revolution : Alger's 
Englishmen in the French Revolution and Glimpses in the French Revolu- 
tion : Dickinson's Revohction and Reaction in Modern France. 

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (PART H. 1799— 1815). 

A. Histories : — 

Bignon, Capefigue, Fyffe, *Lanfrey, Morse Stephens, Oncken, Thi- 
baudeau, and * Thiers. Military History by Jomini : Great Ca??ipaigns 
by Adams: Captain Mahan's Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolu- 
tion and Empire. 

B. Biographies : — 

Fournier, O'Connor Morris, Seeley, * NapoUon intime by Levy, and a 
number of untrustworthy attacks on, or panegyrics of. Napoleon, which 
need not be named. Davoust by Chenier and by Mazade : Alassina by 
Amic : Murat et ses derniers jours by Galvani and by la JRocca : Ney by 



Appendix. 375 

Welschinger and by Verronnais: Soult by Desprez and by Clerc: Van- 
damme by du Casse: Maret by Ernouf: Les Diplomates Eiiropiens by 
Capefigue : Mdjiie. de Stael by Sorel and by Lady Blennerhassett. 

C. The chief Memoirs dealing mainly with the years 1799— 18 15 are 
those of the duchesse d'Abrantes,*Bausset, Joseph Bonaparte, Lucien 
Bonaparte, Jerome Bonaparte, * Boxirrienne, Broglie, Chaptal, Chateau- 
briand, Drouet (Comte d'Erlon), Fain's Manuscrit de 18 [2—1814, *Fouche, 
*Guizot, Hyde de Neuville, *Macdonald, *Marbot, Marmont, Massena, 
*Meneval, *Miot de Melito, Mollien, *Pasquier, Pingaud, Puymaigre, 
*Mdme. de Remusat, Rochechouart, *Savary,*Segur, * Talleyrand, and 
Vitrolles. 

D. Among the many miscellaneous works dealing with this period the 
following may be named : — Roederer's La premiere et la secottde Annies du 
Considat: * Saint-Amand's La Femme du pi-emier Consul: Mdme. de 
Stael's Bix Aiinees d'Exil: Ernouf's Les Fran^ais en Prusse (1807 — 
1808): Ernouf's Souvenirs d'un officier polonals: *Mdme. Durand's 
Napoleon et Marie Louise: Vandal's Napoleon et Alexandre: Houssaye's 
1814:: Benjamin Constant's Les Cent Jours: * Saint-Amand's La duchesse 
d' AngouUme et les deux Restaur at ions: Helen M. Williams' Narrative of 
Events in France in 1815. 

Napoleon's correspondence, though far from complete, is the best 
authority for his policy. Part of it has been edited by Captain Bingham in 
a spirit hostile to Napoleon. Louis Bonaparte's Des Ldees Napoleoniennes 
(1839) and the late Prince Napoleon's Napoleon and his Detractors are 
official presentations of the Napoleonic legend. 

GREAT BRITAIN (1789— 181 5). 

Histories: — 

Massey's Reign of George III: James' Naval History. 

Biographies : — 

Pitt by Lord Stanhope and by Lord Rosebery : Foxhy Lord J. Russell 
and by Wakeman: Canning by Stapleton : Wellington by Brialmont: 
Nelson by L. Browne, Laughton and Southey : Brougham's Life and 
Times written by himself: Brougham's Historical Sketches of Statesmen of 
the Time of George III: Craufurd and his Light Division by Rev. A. H. 
Craufurd. 



37^ The Revolutionary ajid Napoleonic Era. 

Memoirs, Correspondence, and Miscellaneous Works: — 

The Wellington Despatches: Castlereagh's Memoirs and Correspondence: 
the Correspondence of the first Earl of Malmesbury: the Correspondence of 
James, first Earl of Charlemont (vol. ii): the Correspondence of A. Miles: 
the Correspondence of the Right Hon. George Rose : Memoirs and Corre- 
spondence of Collingwood. 

Beamish's History of the King's German Legion^ and the Memoirs of 
Kincaird, Sir G. Napier, *Ompteda, Capt. Patterson, and Col. Tomkinson, 
illustrate the course of the wars of 1808 — 18 15. The Waterloo Campaign 
may be studied in the works of Siborne, von Ollech, Ropes, and in the 
Waterloo Letters. 

Tooke's History of Prices, many pamphlets in the Pamphleteer, and the 
works of Cobbett, will illustrate the economic and social conditions of the 
time. 

GERMANY. 

Histories: — 

*von Sybel, Hausser, Duncker, Oncken's Das Zeitalter der Revohition, 
des Kaiserreiches, und der Befreiungskriege : Treitschke's Deutsche Ge- 
schichte im neunzehnten Jahrhimdert (vol. i) : Perthes' Politische Ztistdnde 
und Personen in Detctschland [I'-^gti — 18 13): Beitzke's Die Freiheitskriege 
(1813 — 1814): Kriegsgeschichte der Jahre 1813 — 1814 by Muffling and by 
Plotho: Cathcart's Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany 
1812 — 1813: Krones' Geschichte der Nenzeit Oesterreichs: Beer's Zehn 
Jahre ocsterreichischer Politik (1801 — 1810): Leger's Histoire de f Antriche- 
Hongrie: Coxe's Me?HO)'ials of the House of Atistria: Scholl's Congrh de 
Vienne : von Lerchenfeld's Geschichte Baierns tenter Maximilian Joseph I. 

Biographies: — 

Stein by Pertz and by Seeley : Bliicher by Scherr and by Blasendorf : 
Yorck by Droysen : Gneisenaii by Pertz : Scharnhorst by Lehmann : Schill 
by Barsch: von Biilow by Varnhagen von Ense: Karl Miillcr by Varn- 
hagen von Ense. 

Memoirs: — 

*Arndt, von Boyen, Hardenberg, *Mettermch, * Muffling, * Christian 
Ompteda, Louis Ompteda, *von Odeleben, *r. Perthes, Radetzky, 
Steffens, Stern, * Varnhagen von Ense. 

The political pamphlets of Arndt, Gentz, Karl Mliller, Fichte's Reden 
an die dentsche Nation and Freytag's Bilder aus der deiitschen Vergangen- 
heit (vol. IV) give many details of German life and thought. 



Appendix. 377 

ITALY. 

The history of Signor Botta on the French domination in Italy needs to 
be corrected and supplemented by the critical works of Peschieri and 
Parenti, as well as by the histories — Franchetti's Storia d' lialia dal 1789 al 
1799, De Castro's Storia d' Italia dal 1799 a/ 18 14, Tivaroni's Storia critica 
del risorgijueiito italiano (vols. I— li), Vimercati's Histoire d' Italic de 1789 
^1863, Turotti's Storia delle armi italiane dal 1794 a/ 181 5, Carutti's Storia 
delta Casa di Savoia durante la rroohizione e V Impero francese, Lumbroso 
(Giacomo) Roma e lo Stato romano dopo V 89, Colletta's Storia del reame di 
Napoli dal 1734 ^^1825. 

Memoirs: — 

Alfieri, Azeglio (Massimo d') / miei ricordi (vol. 1), Balbo (Cesare) 
Atitobiografia, Bigarre, du Casse's Mcmoires d'Eughie, Leopardi (Monaldo) 
Antobiografia, *Macdonald, Melzi (Duca di Lodi), *Miot de Melito, 
* Pepe, Thaon de Revel, Thiebault, and Zucchi. 



SPAIN. 

Baumgarten's Geschichte Spaniens seit 1789: Napier's History of the 
Peninsular War: Wellington's Despatches. 

The Memoirs or Diaries of Broglie, Kincaird, *Marbot, Marmont, 
*Miot de Melito, Sir G. Napier, *Ompteda, Captain Patterson, Soult, 
Colonel Tomkinson, and Beamish's History of the King's German Legion, 
deal with parts of the Peninsular War. 



RUSSIA. 

Bemhardi's Geschichte Russlafids (vol. i, 1814—1831): Rambaud's His- 
toire de Russie: Vandal's Napoleo7i et Alexandre : Tatistcheff 's Alexandre I 
et Napoleon: V Histoire de I expedition en Russie by the Count de Segur, 
and a damaging criticism on this work by General Gourgaud: also the 
accounts of the 181 2 campaign by Cathcart, Chambray, Clausewitz, 
Marbot, and Wilson. 

Memoirs by*Prince Czartoryski, Tchichagoff, and Ernouf's Souvenirs 
d'un of/icier poloftais. 



378 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. 

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. 

Histories : — 

Carlson's Geschichte Schwedejts : Dunham's History of ^ Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway : Fryxell's History of Sweden : Vertot's Histoire des 
revolutions de Suede. 

Memoires de Suremain. 

HISTORIES OF TREATIES. 

The collections of Garden and Martens, and Koch and Scholl's Histoire 
des Traites entre les Puissances de r Europe, 1648 — 18 15. 



APPENDIX II. 

LIST OF THE CHIEF APPOINTMENTS, DIGNITIES AND 
HONOURS &c. BESTOWED BY NAPOLEON. 

[An asterisk is affixed to the names of his Marshals.] 

*Augereau. Due de Castiglione. 

* Bernadotte. Prince de Ponte Corvo. 

*Berthier. Chief of the Staff. (Prince de Neufchatel.) Prince de 

Wagram. 
*Bessieres. Due d'lstria. Commander of the Old Guard. 
Bonaparte, Joseph. (King of Naples.) King of Spain. 
„ Louis. King of Holland. 

„ Lucien. Prince de Canino. 
,, Jerome. King of Westphalia. 

* Brune. 

Cambaceres. Arch-Chancellor. Due de Parma. 

Caulaincourt. Due de Vicenza. Master of the Horse. Minister of 

Foreign Affairs (1814). 
Champagny. Due de Cadore. 

Chaptal. Minister of the Interior. Comte de Chanteloupe. 
Clarke. Minister of War. Due de Feltre. 
Daru. Minister of War. Comte. 
*Davoust. Prince d'Eckmiihl. Governor of Hamburg. 
Drouet. Comte d'Erlon. 
Drouot. Comte. Aide- Major of the Guard. 

* Duroc. Due de Friuli. 

Eugene (Beauharnais). Viceroy of Italy. 



380 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. 

Fesch (Cardinal). Grand Almoner. 

Fouche. Minister of Police (i8oi — 1810). Due d'Otranto. 

Jomini. Baron. 
*Jourdan. Comte. 
*Junot. Due d'Abrantes. 
*Kellermann. Due de Valmy. 
*Lannes. Due de Montebello. 

* Lefebvre. Due de Danzig. 

* Maedonald. Due de Taranto. 

Maret. Minister of Foreign Affairs (18 11 — 1814). Due de Bassano. 

* Marmont. Due de Ragusa. 

*Massena. (Due de Rivoli.) Prince d'Essling. 
Miot. Comte de Melito. 
Mollien. Comte. Minister of the Treasury. 

* Moncey. Due de Conegliano. 
Montholon. Comte. 

* Mortier. Due de Treviso. 

* Mouton. Comte de Lobau. 

*Murat. (Due de Berg.) King of Naples. 
*Ney. (Due d'Elchingen.) Prince de la Moskwa. 
*Oudinot. Due de Reggio. 
Pasquier, Due de. Prefect of Police. 

* Poniatowski. 
Rapp. Comte. 
Remusat. Chamberlain. 
Reynier. Due de Massa. 

Savary. Due de Rovigo. Minister of Police. 

Sebastian!. Comte. 
*Serurier. 
*Soult. Due de Dalmatia. 

* St Cyr, Marquis de. 

* Suehet. Due d'Albufera. 

Talleyrand. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1799 — 1807). Grand 
Chamberlain (1804 — 1808). Prince de Benevento. 

* Victor. Due de Belluno. 



INDEX. 



AbouMrBay, 109, no, 129, 130 

Absenteeism, 20 — 21 

Addington Ministry, The, 128, 131, 
142—3, 145 

Additional Act, The, 341—2 

Albuera, Btl. of, 226 

Alexander I, 149—156, 159—101, 
172 — 179, 198 — 200, 206, 210 — 
213, 240—5, 247—258, 263—279, 
297—317. 324—333' 362, 364. 

369 
Alkmaar, 114 
Allvintzi, General, loi 
Alsace, 20, 42, 61, 65, 83, 102, 361 

— 3 
America, North, 30—31, 33> 35^ 

40, 46, 217, 331 
Amiens, Peace of, 130—132, I43 
Ancients, Council of, 95, 96, 105, 

114— 116 
Anspach, 6, 158, 160, 286, 327 
Areola, Btl. of, loi 
Armed Neutrality League, 128— 

130, 242 
Amdt, 192, 268 
Artois, Comte d', 38, 41, 59, 145— 

6, 309, 319' 337' 338 
Aspern, Btl. of, 204 
Assembly, National, 38 — 43 

„ Constituent, 43 — 58, 61, 

73' 85 
„ Legislative, 61 — 67, 79 
Assignats, 52, 62, 65, 78, 83, 84, 

106 
Auerstadt, Btl. of, 170 
Augereau, General, 105, 313, 33^, 

344 
Austerlitz, Btl. of, 161 



Australia, 139 

Austria, 3—9, 13—16, 54, 60, 64, 
68, 73—4' 77. 89, 91—92, 99— 
103, 105, III, 113, 124—7, 132— 
3, 141, 149— 151, 199, 201—207, 

210 2T3, 241, 266, 269, 276 

287, 308, 319, 324—335, 34O' 360 
-366 

Avignon, 319 

Babeuf, 96 

Badajoz, 224, 226, 228 

Baden, 133, 146, 155, 167 

Bagration, 251 — 3 

Bailly, 39, 42, 56, 63, 85 

Baireuth, 6, 286, 327 

BanalUe, 20, 200, 231 

Barbaroux, 63, 66, 81 

Barclay, General, 252—3, 256, 275, 

280 
Barere, 79, 84 
Barnave, 44, 49, 56, 85 
Barras, 95, 96, 98, 107, 115— 116 
Bartenstein, Treaty of, 173, 277 
Basel, Peace of, 91, 319 
Bastille, The, 41—42 
Batavian Republic, see Netherlands 

{Dutch) 
Bautzen, Btl. of, 274 
Bavaria, 7, 28, 74' 9i» 103, 133, 

155, i6r, 162, 167, 202—7, 250, 

284—287, 324—335. 363. 365 
Baylen, Btl. of, 196 
Belgium, 10— u, 13. I4. ^5' 65, 

78, 79, 144, 327. 3635 365, 367. 

370 
Berlin Decrees, The, 171, 178 
Bernadotte, 90, 116, 166, 246, 274, 



382 The Revohitioiiary and Napoleonic Era. 



278, 279, 282—5, 300. 302, 316, 
326 
Berthier, 100, no, 136, 166, 225, 

344 
Bessieres, 228, 258, 291 
Billaud-Varenne, 84 
Bliicher, 171, 267, 279, 281 — 4, 300 

—313. 343—361 
Bonaparte, Napoleon, passim. 

,, Joseph, 165, 196, 198, 

200 — 201, 209, 221, 225 — 6, 288 

—292, 303, 312—15, 339 
„ Louis, 166, 213 — 214 

,, Lucien, 115 — 117, 360 

„ Jerome, 176, 251, 285 

Borodino, Bll. of, 254, 259 
Boulogne, 144 — 5, 156 — 8. 
Bourbons, The, 3, n, 13, 14, 30, 

53, III, 126, 146, 152, 165, 199, 

235. 304- 315— 1 7» 322, 336—340. 

360—367 
Bourrienne, 100, 164, 214 — 215, 

246 
Breisgau, 103 — 104, 126, 132 
Brienne, Lomenie de, 34 — 35 
Brissot, 63, 64 

Brittany, 37, 82, 94, 123, 128 
Broglie, Due de, 106, 228, 251, 303 
Brumaire, Coup d^etat of, 1 15 — 1 1 7 
Brune, General, 118 
Brunswick, Duke of, 66, 68 — 69, 

90, 169 — 170 
Brunswick-Oels, Duke of, 204, 205, 

209, 347, 349 
Billow, General von, 300, 309, 350, 

352, 357 
Burke, 73, 369 
Busaco, Btl. of, 222 — 3 
Buzot, 44, 63, 81 

Cadoudal, Georges, 145—6 

Cahiers, 35 — 36, 40 

Calendar, Revolutionary, 70, 147 

Calonne, 34 

Cambaceres, 122, 134 

Camperdown, Btl. of, 107 

Campo Formio, Treaty of, 103 — 

105, 107, 125, 132 
Camus, 52 



Canning, 178 — 9, 196 

Cape, The, 131, 142, 167, 198, 327 

Carnot, 83, 89, 94, 96, 97, 98, 105, 

109, 125, 341, 359, 360 
Castiglione, Btl. of, 100 
Castlereagh, Lord, 307, 320, 327 — 

333 
Catherine II, 9 — 11, 15 — 16, 59 — 

60, 73' 77. 91—2, III 
Caulaincourt, 269, 297, 303, 307 — 

8, 321 
Centralisation of power, 11 — 12, 46, 

57. 65, 79—80, 85, 93, 95, 118, 

122—124, 134—135, 140. 181— 2, 

190. 236, 335, 366, 370 
Ceylon, 131, 143 
Chaptal, 83, 136, 139, 216, 220 
Charles, Archduke, 154, 159, 203 — 

205, 209 
Charles IV, 194 — 6. 
Chaumette, 84, 85 
Chaumont, Treaty of, 308, 315, 325 
Chauvelin, 74 — 76 
Cherasco, Convention of, 99 
Church, The Roman Catholic, 6, 9, 

10, 17, 23, 36, 51—2, 78, 82, 106, 

119, 132-3, 135 
Cintra, Convention of, 197 
Cisalpine Republic, The, loi, 103, 

104, III, 118, 126, 131, 140 
Ciudad Rodrigo, 222, 226, 228, 229 
Clausel, 228, 289 — 290, 344 
Clergy, The, 9, 10, 17—19, 31, 35, 

43' 44> 45. 65, 94, 106, 119, 135, 

136, 230, 235 
Cleves, 6, 91, 133, 161, 333 
Coalition, First, 78, 91, 92, 99, 103, 

Coalition, Second, no, 112, 118, 

125 — 126 
Coalition, Third, 149 — 169, 173 — 8, 

181, 203 {note). 
Coalition, Fourth, 265 — 279 
Code, The Civil, 70, 116, 138 

,, The Napoleonic, 138 
Collot d'Herbois, 84 
Commercial Treaty (1786), 23, 37 
Committee of General Security, 46, 

80, 85, 93, 95 



Index. 



383 



Committee of Public Safety, 79— 

93> 95' 97—8, 120, 219 
Commune, The Paris, 48, 65—68, 84 

-88,93 
Communism, 90 
Concordat, The, 52, 135—6 
Condorcet, 63, 70, 128, 136 
Constitution, French (1791), 46 — 

47, 53—54' 56—58. 62, 64, 123, 

134, 230 — I 
Constitution, French (1793), 85, 134 
(1795). 94— 95, 

98, 114— 116, 134 
Constitution, French (1799), 57' i^o 

—122, 134 
Constitution, French (1802), 134 

M {1814), 322—3 
„ PoHsh (1791), 69— 70, 

77 

,, Spanish(i8i2), 231— 2 

Consulate, The, 119 — 147 

The (for life), 134 

Continental System, The, 141, 144, 

172, 176—7, 184, 206, 213—218, 

235—6, 238—9, 241—8 
Convention, French, 12, 67, 70 — 

76, 79—96 
Corday, Charlotte, 81 
Cordeliers' Club, The, 49, (^G 
Corvees, 32, 34, 70 
Couthon, 87—88 
Craonne, Btl. of, 310 
Custine, 70, 85 
Czartoryski, 150—155,212,240—1, 

328, 369 

Dalberg, 28, 168 

Danton, 49, 5O' 64, 67—8, 71, 72, 



78, 80, 



-86 



Davoust, 90, 251, 254, 260, 271, 

278, 285, 341 
Delaunay, 41 
Denmark, 9, 128, 176, 178—9' i97, 

200, 241, 278, 285, 326, 340, 368 
Departmental System, The, 50—51, 

52—3' 85, 123—4' 231 
Desaix, General, 125 
Desmoulins, Camille, 48 — 50, 71, 

86 



Diderot, 21, 25 

Directory, The, 57, 95—120 

Divorce, Napoleon's, 210 — 11 

Dresden, Btl. of, 280, 355 

Dubois-Crance, 117 

Ducos, 115 — 116 

Dumouriez, 64 — 70, 74, 78 — 80, 85, 

118 
Dunkirk, 83 
Duport, 44, 49 

Eckmuhl, Btl. of, 203 
Economists, The, 22, 31 
Education, National, 70, in, 136 

—7' 193 
Egypt, 107, 109— III, 131, 143. 
Elba, 143, 335, 337 
Empire, The Holy Roman, 2, 7, 17, 

20, 61, 64, 70, 73, 78, 91, 126, 

132—3, 149, 168, 185 
Encyclopaedists, The, 25, 34 
Enghien, Due d', 146, 149, 150 
England, 7, 8, 13, 15, 54' 72-5' 

77, 82, 89—90, 92, 94, 100, 

I03, 103, 107, 112, 124, 126, 128 
— 131, 140—145, 151 — 156, 164, 
177 — 181, 184, 202 204, 214 

217, 238—9, 242—4, 277, 287, 
297, 3OO' 308, 319—20, 324—332, 
340—364 

Erfurt, 198 — 200, 202, 210, 212, 

218, 240 

Erlon, Count d', 346, 348, 353 
Essling, Btl. of, 204 
Etruria, K" of, 126, 142, 213 
Eugene Beauharnais, 204, 236, 248, 
258—60, 271, 274, 279, 287, 306, 

341 
Eylau, Btl. of, 173 

Federation festival, 53 

Ferdinand VII, 194—196, 201, 230, 

300, 327, 368 
Feudalism, 17—21, 42, 58, 69, in, 

163, 186—7, 200, 218, 231 
Feuiilants, The, 56, 61—64, 79, 85 
Fichte, 169, 192—3 
Finland, 9, 177, i79' ^99 



384 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. 



Five Hundred, Council of, 95, 96, 

105, 114 — 116 
Fleurus, Btl. of, 89 
Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 180, 194 
Fouche, 94, 154, 178, 200, 210, 219, 

296, 341, 342, 359 

Fox, 145, 165, 167 

France, passim. 

Francis, 64, 73, 78, 91, 103, 124, 
149, 168, 199 — 200, 202 — 7, 269, 
270* 279, 301—2, 317, 324— 

335 

Frederick the Great, 3—7, 11, 19, 

24. 39 
Frederick William II, 7—9, 14, 68, 

III 
Frederick William III, iii, 153 — 

4, 159—162, 166—176, 185—193, 

201, 244, 263—7, 275, 325 
Friedland, Btl. of, 173 
Friesland, East, 6, 175, 333 
Fructidor, Coup d'etat oi, 105, 114 

Gahelle, 32, 70 

Game Laws, The, 20, 44 

Geneva, 109, 125 

Gensonne, 63 

Germany, 2 — 7, 14, 17 — 20, 27, 28, 
61, 64, 70, 91 — 2, III, 118, 124, 
126—128, 132—3, 138, 141, 143, 
144, 149 — 152, 160 — 176, 185 — 
193, 198 — 200, 202 — 207, 209, 
215, 217—219, 237, 239, 240, 263 
—8, 271—288, 295—8, 301, 308, 
321, 324—335. 362—366, 371 

Girondins, The, 62—75, 79—84. 93» 
96, 370 

Gneisenau, 169, 188, 244—5, 350 

Godoy, 194 — 6 

Goethe, 27, 69, 192, 199, 213 

Gregoire, 43, 52 

Gross Beeren, 281 

Grouchy, 350 — 9 

Guadet, 63, 81 

Gustavus III, 9, 60, 92 

Gustavus IV, 151, 179 

Hamburg, 153, 214 — 218, 271, 272, 
335 



Hanover, 158, 160, 161, 167 — 8, 
175, 181, 250, 265, 324, 332—3, 
365 ^ 

Hardenberg, 186 — 7, 191, 264, 266, 

325. 330. 334 
Hayti, 92, 139, 319 
Hebert, 49, 50, 71, 84, 85 
Helvetic Republic, see Switzerlatid 
Helvetius, 23 
Hesse-Cassel, 91, 133, 168, 175, 

335 
Hoche, 90, 94, 102 
Hofer, 205 — 207 
Hohenlinden, Btl. of, 126 
Holland, see Netherlands 
Houchard, 85 
Humboldt, W. von, 193 
Hungary, 6, 10, 14, 64 



Illuminati, The, 28, 70, iii, 133 
India, 30, 97, 107, 142—3, 198 
Indulgents, The, 81, 86 
Intendants, The, 18, 42, 50, 124 
Ionian Isles, The, 102 — 3, 107, 131, 

142, 176, 367 
Isnard, 63 

Italy, 19, 29, 98 — 104, no, 112 — • 
114, 124 — 126, 138, 140, 142, 143, 
154, 165, 204, 215, 232—7, 248, 
285, 287—8, 296, 324—326, 365 
—7. 370 



Jacobins, The, 49, 54, 59, 62—75, 
81—85, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 105— 
6, 114 — 117, 119, 120, 126 — 7 

Jacqueries, 42, 44, 62 

Jassy, Treaty of, 15 

Jemmappes, Btl. of, 69 

Jena, Btl. of, 170 

Joseph II, 6, 7—13. 16, 39. 78 

Josephine de Beauharnais, 98, 147, 
200, 210 — II 

Jourdan, 83, 89, 90, loi, 112, 114, 
116, 289 — 290 

Jovellanos, 230 — i 

Julich, 133 

Junot, 136, 181, 194, 291 



Index. 



385 



Kalisch, Convention of, 270 
Treaty of, 264, 335 
Kellermann, 69, 104, 125, 348 
Kleber, 82, 90, no 
Korner, 268 
Kosciusko, 91 
Kulm, Btl. of, 281 
Kutusoff, 254, 256—259, 263, 297 

Lafayette, 33, 35, 42» 48— 9' 54. 64, 

(i^, 338, 342, 359. 370 
Lamarck, 54 
Lameth, 44, 49' 5°. 5^ 
Landvvehr, 188, 268, 347 
Lannes, 100, 159 
Laon, Btl. of, 310 
La Reveillere, q6, 98, 106 
La Rothiere, B'tl. of, 302, 315 
Lavoisier, 85 

Legion of Honour, 137—8 
Leipzig, Battles near, 283—4 
Leopold II, II, 13, 14,64 
Licences, Trade, 214 
Liege, Bishopric of, 12 — 13, 69 
Ligny, Btl. of, 346—8 
Ligurian Republic, The, 104, 126, 

131, 140, 154 
Lodi, Btl. of, 100 
Lombardy, 100, 103, 287, 367 
Lonato, Btl. of, 100 
Lorraine, 20, 30, 361—3 
Louis XIV, I, 2, 18, 20, 89, 92, 

103, 122, 164, 219 
Louis XV, 19, 23—24, 30, 85, 126 
Louis XVI, 13, 30—42, 52—55, 60 

—68, 71--72, 85 
Louis XVII, 82, 94 
Louis XVIII, 94, 309, 310—323, 

328—338, 360—365 
Louisa, Queen, 162, 175, 176, 224 
Louvet, 63, 78. 

Luneville, Treaty of, 126— 128, 131 
Lutzen, Btl. of, 273—4 
Lyons, 21, 53, 81, 87, 90, 131, 3i3. 
337 

Macdonald, 89, 90, 113, 147,227, 
252, 273, 274, 281—284, 303, 307 
310—17, 323, 337, 344 
F. R. 



Mack, 154, 156—159 

Mainz, 28, 70, 82, 132, 133, 334 

Malesherbes, 35 

Malet, 268, 270, 298 

Malta, 107, 109, 112, 124, 129— 131, 

142—3, 153, 167, 214, 219 
Mantua, 99—101, 125 
Marat, 49, 50, 71— 72, 78, 81 
Marbot, 221, 222, 261 
Marceau, 90 

Marengo, Btl. of, 124—6 
Maret, 74, 247 
Maria Theresa, 30, 3 1, 39 
Marie Antoinette, 30—31, 54, 84, 

212 
Marie Louise, 211—213, 270, 312, 

318, 340, 367 
Marmont, no, 204, 283, 291, 309, 

311—14, 318, 344 
Marseillaise, the, 66, 69 
Massena, 90, 100, 112, 113, 124, 

136, 165, 222—224, 291, 344 
Maurepas, 31 
Maximum Law, 80, 83 
Mediation, Act of, 108, 141 
Mediatisation, 168, 286 
Melas, General, 124—5 
Metternich, 153, 156, 206,242,246, 

248, 286, 315, 325—335' 340 
Milan, 99—100, 112, i8o 
Miles, A., 62, 74—75 
Mina, 227, 289 

Miot de Melito, 142, 209, 226, 290 
Mirabeau, 34, 39, 43—49' 51—55, 

136, 370 ^ . 

Modena, loi, 103, 126, 132, 307 
Mollien, 216, 219, 220, 247, 269, 

270 
Moniteur, The, 50, 14 1, 297 
Montesquieu, 4, 21 
Montgelas, 133, 202 
Montmirail, Btl. of, 303 
Moore, Sir John, 200—201 
Moreau, 90, loi, 102, 125 — 6, 146 

—7 
Mortier, 3", 3i3,. 344 
Moscow, Occupation of, 256 — 8 
Mounier, 49, 50 c oo 

Mountain, The, 63, 7^—75, 80- 88 

25 



386 The Revohitionary and Napoleonic Era. 



Miihlhausen, 109, 319 
Municipal Reform (French), 42, 190 
Municipal Reform (Prussian), 189 
Murat, 90, 95, no, 159, 166, 171, 
195—196, 235, 253—4, 257. 270, 
278, 280—4, 287—8, 307, 331, 
366 

Naples, II, 104, 112, 126, 131, 143, 

165, 196, 235, 270, 367 
Napoleon, passim 
National Guards, The, 42,48,51, (i(), 

68, 82, 94— 5» ."269, 304* 312 
Natural boundaries, The, 65, 92, 

296—9. 321, 339 
Nccker, 33—40, 45. 47. 49. 5^, 53 
Neerwinden, Btl. of, 78, 82 
Nelson, 109, 112, 129, 157 — 8 
Netherlands, Austrian, 7, 10 — 11, 

13. 29. 69, 73—4. 78, §9' 103 
Netherlands, Dutch, 2, 7, 8, 11, 15, 
29. 54» 73—74. 77, 89, 103, 107, 
114, 118, 131 — 3, 140—2, 144, 
150—2, 154, 166, 175, 209, 213 
—14, 218, 285, 288, 297, 326—7, 

363. 367—8, 371 
Ney, 222, 224, 253 — 4, 260, 262, 
274, 291, 310—314, 337, 345— 

349. 353—8 
Nice, 69 — 70, 73, 99, 104, 125 
Non-jurors, 52, 82, 106, 119, 135 
Nootka Sound, 13, 53 
Norway, 179, 278, 326, 368. 

Ocafia, Btl. of, 209 

Oldenburg, 217, 240, 242, 248, 335 

Orders in Council, 171, iSo, 214 — 

216 
Orleans, Duke of, 40, 48, 79, 85, 

86, 361 
Orthez, Btl. of, 308 

Pache, 79 

Palm, 169 

Paoli, 82, 97 

Papal States, The, 100, 10 r, 108, 165, 

197, 202, 213, 233—235, 326 
Paris, Treaty of (1814), 319, 326 
» .. (1815), 363 



Parlements, The, 18, 24, 31 — 43, 45, 
50 

Parma, ir, 126, 140, 341, 367 

Pasquier, Due, 35, 41, 269, 341 

Paul I, 112, 114, 129 — 131 

Peninsular War, 197, 200 — 201, 208 
— 9, 213, 220 — 232, 288 — 292 

Pepe, General, 287, 367 

Petion, 44, 63, 66, 81 

Physiocrats, The, 22 

Pichegru, 89, 106, 145 — 6 

Piedmont, see Sardinia 

Pillnitz, Declaration of, 60 — 61 

Pitt, 9, 13, 73—74, 103, 112, 128, 
165 

Plenary Court, 34 

Polancl, 4, 5, 8 — 10, 14, 16, 59 — 60, 
73, 77. 82, 89, 90—91, 132, 151, 
172, 175, 210, 215, 240, 242—4, 
248, 250—1, 264, 324—333, 368 

—9 

Pombal, II, 39 

Poniatovvski, Prince, 251, 270, 279, 
284 

Pope, The, loi, 104, loS, 126, 135, 
147, 165, 197, 210, 233—4, 240, 
326 

Portugal, II, 39, 112, 131, 143, 178 
—180, 194, 222—224, 239, 319, 
368 

Potsdam, Convention of, 160 

Prairial, Law of, 87 

Presburg, Treaty of, 162 

Provence, Comte de, 59, 60, 94, 309 

Prussia, 3—9, 13—16, 19—20, 59, 
64, (>6, 68, 73, 77, 89, 90, 91—2, 
128, 132—3. 138, 142, 143. 149— 
154. 159-162, 166—177, 184— 
193, 213, 241, 244—5, 263—8, 
274—286, 319, 321, 324—335, 
340—366 

Pyramids, Btl. of the, 109 

Quatre-Bras, 347 — 9 
Quesnay, 22 

Rastadt, Congress of, 104, in — 113 
Ratisbon, Btl. of, 203 



Index. 



387 



Reichenbach, Peace of (1790), 14 — 

15, 54 
Reichenbach, Treaties of (1813), 279, 

280 
Reichs-deputation, The, 133 
Revokitionary Tribunal, 80 — 85, 87 
Rewbell, 96, 114 
Rhine, Confederation of the, 133, 

167 — 8, 170, 175, 187, 203, 216, 

248, 266, 285 — 6, 301 
Rights of Man, 45 
Rivoli, Btl. of, loi 
Robespierre, 2j6, 44, 49, 64, 71, 78 

—89, 97, 120, 128, 369 
Roland, 63, 71 
Roland, Madame, d^^ 75, 81, 85, 

86, 128 
Rome, 104, 108, 112, 233 — 235, 326 
Rousseau, 21, 26 — 7, 40, 44, 46, 49, 

55» 56, 61, 69, 70—71, 87, 98, 

191 
Royal Session, The, 38 — 40 
Russia, 5, 7— II, 15, 54, 60, 69, 73, 

77, 91, 112—114, 128, 142, 149— 

156, 159— 161, 167, 172—176, 

198 — 201, 207, 210 — 213, 240 — 

27i> 319. 324—335' 340. 360—4. 

369 

Salamanca, Btl. of, 228 

Salzburg, 103, 126 

Saragossa, 196, 201 

Sardinia, Kingdom of, 65, 92, 99, 

104, 112, 131, 140, 142, 150—2, 

319, 326, 363, 367 
Savary, 146, 269 
Savoy, 69—70, 73, 99, 104, 319, 

3^1' 363 
Saxony, 60, 91, 168, 175, 273, 280 

—4, 288, 328—334, 365 
Scharnhorst, 188, 266 — 8, 274 
Scheldt, The, 8, 73—4 
Schill, 204, 209 
Schiller, 27 — 28, 192 — 272 
Schonbnmn, Treaty of (1805), 162 
Schonbrunn, Treaty of (1809), 206, 

210 
Schwarzenberg, 260, 262, 276, 279, 

280, 282, 301, 310 — II 



Sebastian!, 142 
Secularisations, The, 132 
Seigneurial Courts, The, 17, 44, 200, 

231 
Senate, 121 — 122,-127, I34» ^36. 

146, 182, 269, 301 
Senlimentalism, 27, 98 
September Massacres, The, 68, 86 
Serfdom, 19 — 20, 32, 44, 186 — 7, 

218 
Servan, 68 

Sicily, 214, 219, 235, 367 
Sieyes, 44, 46, 50, 51, 57, 114—123, 

.133 

Sistova, Peace of, 15 

Slave Trade, The, 320, 327, 367 

Smith, Sir Sydney, 1 10 

Smolensk, 252—3, 260 

vSocial Contract, The, 26 

Soult, 201, 208, 222, 224, 229, 291, 
308—9, 318, 344—358 

Spam, 9, 13, 19, 53—4, 78, 90, 92, 
107, 126, 131, 138, 139, 143, 144, 
180 — I, 193 — 8, 200 — I, 208 — 9, 
213, 220 — 232, 238 — 9, 288—292, 
319' 368, 371 

St Cyr, 147, 165, 252, 253, 259, 260, 

2 79' 344^ 
St John, Knights of, 107, 109, 130 

—132 
St Just, 26, 71, 79, 83, 84—89 
St Vincent, Btl. of, 107 
Stael, Mdme. de, 96, 136, 220 
States General, 35 — 39 
Stein, 185 — 191, 204, 232, 245 — 258, 

263—267, 276—7, 286, 325, 332, 

362 
Stockach, Btl. of, 112 
Suchet, 222, 289, 290, 292, 344 
Suspects, Law of, 84 
Suvoroff, 77, 91, 113 
Sweden, 2, 3, 8, 9, 60, 128 — 129, 

149—152, 172, 176—179' 213, 

245—7, 278, 319, 326, 368 
Swiss Guards, ()(> — 7 
Switzerland, 2, 108 — 109, 11 1 — 114, 

138, 141, 142, 150 — 152, 216, 

288, 300, 340, 369, 371 



388 The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 



Talavera, Btl. of, 20S 

Talleyrand, 44, 45, 51—52, 107, 115, 
119, 120, 131, 160, 166, 168, 177 
— 8, 199—200, 211, 219, 221, 269, 
292, 316—19, 321—334, 340 

Tallien, 87, 94 

Teplitz, Treaties of, 279, 324, 325 

Terror, Reign of, 26, 83 — 88, 92, 
117 

Tettenborn, 262, 271, 285, 309 

Thermidorian Reaction, The, 88, 93 

—95, 
Tiers Etat, 35 — 40 
Tilsit, Treaty of, 174 — 177, 199, 240, 

242—3 
Tithes, Abolition of, 51, 73 
Tolentino, Treaty of, loi 
Torres Vedras, 223 — 4, 239 
Toulon, 83, 85, 97 
Trade-Gilds, 22, 32, 45, 190 
Trafalgar, 157 — 8 
Trebbia, Btl. of the, 113 
Tribunate, The, X2i, 127, 134, 138, 

181—2 
Trinidad, 131, 143 
Triple Alliance (1788), The, 8—10, 

13, 73» 20 
Tugendbund, The, 193 
Turgot, II, 22, 31—34, 39» 60 
Turkey, 8, 9, 15—16, 54, 60, 73, 

112, 131, 151, 172, 174—7,198— 

200, 202, 218, 245 — 7, 253 
Tuscany, 104, 112, 126, 132, 367 
Tyrol, 3, II, 100, 125, 132, 162, 

202 — 7, 286, 287, 297, 327 

Ulm, Btl. of, 156, 158—9 
University of Berlin, 193 

„ „ France, 137, 193 

Valais, I4I, 217 



Valmy, 69, 304 

Vandamme, 271, 279, 281, 348 
Varennes, Flight to, 5fc-6, 59 
Vendee, La, 11, 67, 72^5^94. 98, 

123 
Venetia, 102— lo-j, 162, 204, 234, 

287, 365, 367 
Vcrgniaud, 63, 84 
Veto, The Liberum, 4, 9, 59 — 60 
Veto, Royal, 46 — 7, 64 
Victor, 208, 260, 274, 291, 304, 344 
Vienna, Congress of, 324 — 335, 

364—9 
Villeneuve, 157 

Vitrolles, Baron de, 298, 315 — 16 
Vittoria, Btl. of, 278, 289 — 290 
Voltaire, 21, 24 — 25, 27, 32, 60 

Wagram, Btl. of, 205 

Walcheren, 209 

Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, 138, 174, 

175' 187, 204, 206, 240 — I, 276, 

324 — 333 
Waterloo, Btl. of, 352—8 
Wattignies, Btl. of, 83 
Wellesley, Sir A., 197, 201, 205, 209 
Wellington, Duke of, 222 — 232, 

278, 288—292, 300, 305, 308, 318, 

328, 343—362 
Westphalia, Kingd. of, 175 
Whitworth, Lord, I40, I42 
Wilna, Btl. of, 262 
Wittgenstein, 261, 274, 308 
Wiirmser, General, loo 
Wiirtemberg, 133, 155, 167, 330 

Yorck, General, 263 — 4, 267, 303 
York, Duke of, 90, 114, 118 
Young, Arthur, 21, 33, 68, 185 

Zurich, Btl. of, 113 



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